THE UNITED STATES AS 
A WORLD POWER 



BY 



ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY 



TXtto gorfe 

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

1923 

Mi right* reserved 






COFYEIGHT, 1908, 

By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. 



Set up and electrotypcd. Published May, 1908. 



"». 10, 1M0 *"* r 



Nortooeti |Brras 

J. 8. Cushing Co. — Berwick <fe Smith Co. 

Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 



456132 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PROPERTY 
TRANSFERRED FROM PUBLIC LIBRARY 



PREFACE 

No one can be more conscious than the author of this 
volume how far it is from carrying out the too ambi- 
tious promise of its title. Its subject — the United States 
as a World Power — could well be treated in many 
different ways. One writer might recount the growth of 
the country from its earliest infancy to its present stature ; 
to another its economic position in the world to-day might 
r> be of surpassing interest ; a third might care only for the 
2 spiritual influence of the United States, the spread of 
^ American ideals of liberty, government and civilization, 
vd and the changes those same ideals are now undergoing. 
T. The scope of the present work is more modest. It is a 
I study of the part which the United States plays in the 
great drama of world politics — a part which cannot 
help being important and which, although impossible to 
t prophesy about in detail, yet is affected by circumstances 
of geography and of national character, of history and of 
tradition, of economic and of social conditions susceptible 
of investigation. *•"" 

This book was originally prepared in the form of lec- 
tures which were delivered at the So^bonne in the winter 
of 1906-07 as the Harvard lectures on the Hyde founda- 
tion. Since then it has been entirely recast, but it doubt- 
less still retains traces of having been first addressed to a 
foreign audience, the more so as I have striven to preserve 
a neutral rather then a specifically American attitude. I 
have not felt called upon to offer a solution to all the 



vi PREFACE 

problems to which I have referred or to volunteer my 
opinion on every disputed question. For my last chapter 
I wish to make special acknowledgment to my friend 
Louis Aubert of Paris, whose interesting recent work, 
Americams et Japonais, I have found most helpful, besides 
being reminded by it of many pleasant discussions we 
have had together. 

A volume covering so broad a field and one so full of 
controversial matter as the United States as a World 
Power, is exposed at every point to charges of superficial- 
ity and partisanship. No book of the kind could satisfy 
every one or perhaps any one in all its details. I can only 
ask that mine may be judged as a whole rather than 
praised or blamed on the strength of detached passages. 
As most of the facts cited are well known or easy 
to look up, copious reference to authorities has seemed 

needless. 

A. C. C. 

Harvard University, 
May, 1908. 



CONTENTS 



PASS 

Introduction 1 

CHAPTER 

I. Formation and Growth 16 

II. Nationality and Immigration 40 

III. Race Questions 61 

IV. Ideals and Shibboleths 79 

V. The Monroe Doctrine 95 

VI. The Spanish War 121 

VII. The Acquisition of Colonies 134 

VUI. The Philippine Question 148 

IX. Economic Considerations 172 

X. The United States and France 184 

XI. The United States and Germany 196 

XII. The United States and Russia 213 

XIII. The United States and England 228 

XIV. The United States and Canada 245 

XV. The Isthmian Canal 267 

XVI. The United States and Latin America . . . 281 

XVII. The United States in the Pacific . . . . • 313 

XVIII. The United States and China 327 

XIX. The United States and Japan 341 

Index 375 



▼ii 



THE UNITED STATES AS A WOELD POWEE 



INTRODUCTION 

TWENTY years ago the expression "world power" was 
unknown in most languages; to-day it is a political 
commonplace, bandied about in wide discussion. But the 
term is lacking in exactness. Men differ as to its meaning, as 
to the countries to which it can properly be applied, and as 
to the moment when it first becomes applicable to them. 
Sometimes it seems to be appropriately used of a country 
in one connection, but not in another; and in a certain 
sense it may be applied to nearly all independent states, 
for all may be called upon to maintain their particular rights 
and interests in any quarter of the globe, and all may take 
part in framing regulations for the general welfare of man- 
kind. And yet, uncertain as the limits of the phrase may 
be, it conveys a pretty definite conception, — a conception 
that is of recent origin, although there is nothing new in the 
political sentiments to which it owes its birth. 

The idea that one people should control the known world 
is ancient enough, its most salient expression being found 
in imperial Rome and equally imperial China ; and it is not 
extinct even now. We may to-day condemn all mere lust 
of domination, and hope that, as civilization progresses, the 
stronger peoples will more and more regard the weaker ones 
as having rights as sacred as their own; but complete 
equality has never existed, and can never exist, between 

B 1 



2 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

states of greatly unequal strength. In practice the larger 
must tend to arrange many matters without consulting 
every wish of their numerous smaller brethren. The com- 
munity of nations cannot content itself with anarchy like 
that of the Polish republic, and submit to the liberum veto 
of its most insignificant member. As there have been in 
the past, so there will always be, certain leading states 
which, when they are agreed, will find some way of impos- 
ing their decisions upon the rest, and by their mutual 
jealousies will tend to establish a balance of power among 
themselves. 

Without stopping to trace the working of these principles 
in earlier days, we note that, by the close of the fifteenth 
century, certain states had assumed a position which en- 
titles them to the modern designation of " great European 
powers." The Holy Roman Empire, still first in dignity; 
France, after she had recovered from the Hundred Years' 
War and had broken the might of her great feudal nobles ; 
England, in the firm hand of Henry VII ; the newly formed 
kingdom of Spain, which had finally ended Moorish rule in 
the peninsula, — all these held a position unlike that of 
their neighbors. The difference between them and such 
powers as Denmark, the Swiss Confederation, and Venice 
was one of rank as well as of strength. Politically they 
were on another plane : they were not merely the leaders, 
they were the spokesmen, the directors, of the whole 
community. 

As time went on, changes took place in their membership. 
In the course of the sixteenth century, when the Empire 
became so dislocated that it was hardly a power at all, its 
place was taken by Austria, a strangely conglomerate for- 
mation, which protected the eastern frontier of Christendom 
against the Turks. Spain was for a while a real world 
power, overshadowing all the others, dominant in Europe, 
supreme in America, and dreaded even in remote Japan. 



INTRODUCTION 3 

The seventeenth century witnessed the decline of Spain, 
the primacy of France, and the temporary rise of Sweden 
and the Netherlands ; but the greatness of these last rested 
on too small a material foundation to support it after the 
countries themselves had outlived their heroic period. The 
eighteenth century saw them subside into relative insig- 
nificance, and in their stead two newcomers step to the 
forefront of European affairs. The huge semi-Asiatic em- 
pire of Russia was now, by the genius of Peter the Great, 
transformed into the outward semblance of a European 
state; and the little military kingdom of Prussia, the 
representative of Northern Germany, won for itself a posi- 
tion which its resources hardly warranted, but which, 
thanks to the extraordinary ability of its rulers and the 
sense of discipline of its people, it succeeded in maintaining. 

After the violent episode of the French Revolution and 
the .Napoleonic wars, the European continent settled down 
to what seemed to be a stable organization with five great 
powers, — Russia, England, Austria, Prussia, and France, 
for the skill of Talleyrand at Vienna prevented France from 
being even temporarily excluded after her disasters. The 
Ottoman Empire was still, in spite of Metternich, held to 
be not quite European ; and the weaker countries were con- 
sulted but little on general questions. It was not the formal 
meetings of all the representatives of the nations assembled 
that decided the affairs of Europe at the Congress of Vienna 
in 1814: it was a small committee of the leading states. 
What they, after much wrangling, agreed upon among them- 
selves, the others had to accept. 

This arrangement lasted for two generations, although 
the relative positions of the several states changed not a 
little. In the seventies, the German Empire, with a mighty 
development, inherited the international place formerly 
held by the Prussian kingdom, and a new member was 
added to the oligarchy by the formation of United Italy. 



4 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

Since then there have been six great European powers in- 
stead of five. This does not mean that they are equal in 
size and strength : there is, for instance, less difference 
between Italy, which is recognized as a great power, and 
Spain or the Ottoman Empire, which technically is not, 
than between Italy and Germany or Russia ; but the line, 
however artificial, has been clearly drawn by political usage. 

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century a new situa- 
tion, with a far wider horizon, gradually attracted the atten- 
tion of writers and statesmen. Great Britain, France, Spain, 
Portugal, and Holland had long owned extensive territories 
in many climes ; but the last three countries had ceased to 
be of the first rank. Although their distant holdings un- 
doubtedly added to their importance in the world, they could 
not make up for their weakness at home. As for France, 
she had formerly had the beginnings of a magnificent em- 
pire ; but she had sacrificed it in the pursuit of purely 
European aims, now recognized as of less consequence than 
what she gave up for them. Even England, who during 
the eighteenth century so successfully subordinated her con- 
tinental interests to her colonial ones, had a moment of 
uncertainty after the loss of most of her American pos- 
sessions, and for a time the theory prevailed in the mother 
country that her colonies must eventually fall away from 
her as ripe fruit falls from a tree (this was the simile usually 
employed). Nevertheless, the gigantic British Empire con- 
tinued to grow steadily, but as a result of natural causes 
rather than of fixed purpose. 

Suddenly, almost without warning, the nations entered 
upon a wild scramble for land wherever it was not strongly 
held or protected by competing interests. The conquests 
of Alexander the Great or of the caliphs did not equal in 
territorial magnitude the changes which the last twenty 
years have witnessed. The circumstances, the pretexts, 
the excuses, have differed in the case of each state which 



INTRODUCTION 5 

has taken part in the movement of expansion; but the 
fundamental reasons have been the same. Each country 
has honestly felt a certain reluctance, and has been convinced 
with truth that its hand has been forced by others; but 
each has also realized that, unless it were content to let 
itself be forestalled by its rivals, there was need cf haste. 
Hence the frantic hurry with which many of the annexations 
have been made. Hence, too, the indiscriminate seizure 
of regions which were of no immediate value, but which 
might be of profit some day, — a practice that Lord 
Rosebery has aptly called "pegging out claims for the 
future." 

In England, the imperial idea of Greater Britain, of 
which Beaconsfield was one of the first practical exponents, 
displaced the laissez-faire theories of the school of Cobden, 
and the empire was extended almost from year to year. 
France, who had with timid steps begun again in Algeria 
and* Cochin China the building up of a new colonial domin- 
ion, now, in spite of popular indifference, not to say 
opposition, rapidly added to her store in Indo-China and 
in various parts of Africa until, thanks to the energy of 
Jules Ferry and a few others, her colonies surpassed in ex- 
tent those which she had lost in earlier days. Germany, 
becoming aware that, despite her military power and her 
industrial development, she held but a small spot on the 
surface of the globe, eagerly began to clutch at new lands 
wherever there seemed to be a chance of seizing them, 
although Bismarck, representing the ideas of an older gen- 
eration, was never more than lukewarm in the cause. Italy 
decided that she also had need of colonies, and made a 
beginning on the African coast. The King of the Belgians 
acquired for his subjects a lien on the Congo Free State. 
Portugal, baulked in part by the rival ambition of England, 
tried, too late, to turn many vague claims into real 
possessions. 



6 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

Though this fever of rapid expansion affected nearly all 
the states of Western Europe, it was not confined to them. 
During the greater part of the nineteenth century, Russia 
had been pushing southward into the regions of the Caucasus 
and Central Asia ; now, while preparing for further progress 
in the same directions, she turned her chief attention to the 
extreme east. Long before, she had reached the Pacific, 
and had even crossed it far to the north ; but she had never 
had more than a slight hold on these distant and desolate 
shores. After the middle of the nineteenth century, how- 
ever, although she disposed of her American possessions, 
she so added to her domain in eastern Asia as to establish 
her power there on a new foundation; and a generation 
later, by the building up of her fleet, the gradual increase 
of immigration to Siberia, and the construction of the 
Trans-Siberian railway, she had revolutionized her position 
in the Far East. She who, at the time of the Crimean War, 
could muster but a few hundred soldiers in this whole part 
of the world, now became a menacing power in the Pacific, 
one that was for a while feared more than any other. 

At the same time, to the astonishment of all, including 
herself, America suddenly accepted the role of a power 
holding distant colonies. Already her extraordinary eco- 
nomic progress was bringing her more and more to the front ; 
but, though the annexation of Hawaii could be foreseen, 
no one was prepared for that of Porto Rico and the 
Philippines, or for the real, if unexpressed, protectorate 
over Cuba and Panama. Still greater surprise was excited 
by Japan, who in her war with China in 1894 first gave 
evidence of her new ambitions, as well as of her ability to 
realize them, and in her conflict with Russia ten years later 
furnished even more decisive proof of their remarkable in- 
crease. What will be their limits is indeed one of the 
most important questions of international politics at the 
present day. 



INTRODUCTION 7 

It was in course of the discussions provoked by this suc- 
cession of startling events that political writers, in formulat- 
ing the principles of the new state of affairs, began to employ 
an expression which has now passed into common use, — 
" world powers"; that is to say, powers which are directly 
interested in all parts of the world and whose voices must 
be listened to everywhere. The term is, as we have said, 
not scientifically exact; for each of the so-called world 
powers has spheres in which its interests are vitally im- 
portant, and others in which they are comparatively small, 
if not inferior to those of less powerful states. Thus Russia 
can hardly claim to be consulted much about South American 
questions; and the United States takes no part as yet in a 
matter so strictly European as the settlement of the affairs 
of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, both Russia and 
the United States are certainly world powers in the ordinary 
acceptance of the term. China, on the other hand, is not, 
although she is third in size among the states of the world, 
and has perhaps the largest, as well as the hardest-working, 
population. However great her potentialities may be, her 
actual military strength and political influence are not 
yet such as to entitle her to a place among the arbiters 
of mankind. This is truer still of Brazil and of the Argentine 
Republic, which, though they seem assured of more con- 
sideration some day, at present count for little in inter- 
national affairs. Even Austria and Italy do not come under 
the new category : they are both great European powers in 
every sense of the term, and as such hold a proud position ; 
but in spite of their armies and their navies, their glories 
and their high civilization, they have little political in- 
fluence outside of their own continent. In the case of 
Japan, the question may seem more doubtful; and if we 
should give a negative answer to-day, we might have to 
revise it to-morrow. Her prestige is very great. She has 
just emerged triumphant from a contest with an adversary 



8 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

of immense strength, during which she has astonished the 
world by her extraordinary progress and her wonderful 
display of national efficiency; she has allied herself with 
the British Empire under conditions which make it seem 
as if her aid had been sought for the protection of England's 
Indian frontier ; and she is regarded by many as threatening 
not only the colonial possessions of the United States in the 
Pacific, but even the whole western shores of the American 
continents. Be this as it may, since Japan takes no part 
in the affairs of Europe, western Asia, Africa, or most of 
America, she can hardly be called a world power, though 
she is without question one of the eight great powers of 
the world. 

Turning now to those states whose claim to the title is 
beyond question, we find that they are five in number, and 
all ruled by peoples of European blood, but in two of 
them the dominant whites at home are outnumbered by the 
colored inhabitants of the colonies. Of the five, Russia is 
the only one which had already attained to something like 
its present dimensions by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. 

In order to show how these states compare with one 
another in certain fundamental respects, such as area and 
population, it may be well to give here a few round numbers, 
and, without going into an analysis of these figures or a 
study of their values, to distinguish between the white 
population and the colored. Unscientific and misleading as 
this process may be, it is in many ways indispensable for our 
purpose ; for without venturing into the vexed questions of 
the relative superiority or inferiority of different races and 
their capabilities of development, we must recognize that at 
the present day, at least, all races are not of equal political 
value. A single Annamite or Sudanese may be worth more 
to France in every respect than a particular Parisian or 
Marseillais; but ten million Frenchmen in France mean 



INTRODUCTION 9 

something very different from ten million French subjects 
in Asia or Africa. Again, we should also bear in mind the 
difference between tropical and non-tropical territories. 
The white races have not succeeded in getting acclimatized 
in the tropics, and, except in a few favored spots, there is 
no immediate prospect of their doing so. Though white men 
in the prime of life can dwell almost anywhere as officials, 
soldiers, merchants, or employers of labor, white colo- 
nization on a large scale is, in general, possible in the 
temperate zone only. Finally, we must not forget that all 
the great empires of to-day contain large tracts of bad 
land, either wilderness or desert. Northern Canada and 
northern Siberia, central Australia and central Asia, the 
arid West in the United States and southwest Africa, are 
not without value, — they have their comparatively fertile 
districts, and are in places rich in minerals, — but all con- 
tain vast stretches which add little, except on the map, 
to the importance of their owners. With these considera- 
tions in view, let us look at the statistics. 

Of the five world powers, the British Empire stands easily 
first in area, and still more so in population, for in numbers 
it exceeds any two of its rivals. It extends over nearly 
eleven and a half million square miles, situated in every 
part of the globe, and has some four hundred million 
inhabitants. 1 Of these, however, less than sixty million 
are whites, of whom some forty-three and a half million 
live in the home country, most of the rest in Canada, 
Australia, and South Africa. The ruling white race is thus 
to the subject colored race in the dangerous ratio of hardly 
more than one to six ; but the whites are in the main 
homogeneous, although the Irish, the French in Canada, 
and the Dutch in South Africa form somewhat discordant 

1 Not including Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, together about 
eleven hundred and fifty thousand square miles, with twelve million 
inhabitants. 



10 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

elements. The colored population, on the other hand, is 
made up of an endless variety of races and nationalities, — ■ 
black, yellow, and all shades of brown, — far apart from 
one another in almost every respect. The great major- 
ity of them live in the tropics. As the mother country 
is by no means self-supporting in the matter of food, it is 
easy to understand why Englishmen feel that, although 
they do not need a large army, the possession of the most 
powerful navy in the world, one that will assure the safety 
of their communications, is for them a matter of life and 
death. 

Russia comes next in size, with a territory of a little less 
than eight and a half million square miles. 1 In contrast 
to the widely scattered British empire, the Russian is 
absolutely compact, with no outlying possessions, almost 
no islands of importance, and much general sameness in 
climate and conditions. Of its one hundred and fifty 
million inhabitants, about one hundred and twenty-five 
million are of Aryan or Semitic stock, — a larger white 
population than that of any other country; but although 
the whites are five times as numerous as the Asiatics, one 
race here melts into the other to an extent unknown else- 
where. The European element, besides being backward 
as a whole, contains several discontented nationalities, 
which, resisting absorption into the general mass, are in many 
ways a source of weakness rather than of strength. Even 
the purely Russian element is divided into three distinct 
branches. Russia's natural increase by the surplus of 
births over deaths is more than two million a year. Her 
undeveloped resources at home are indeed immense ; but 
she is still poor, and by recent events she has lost tempo- 
rarily in political influence. She has no territory in the 
tropics. 

Third among world powers comes Greater France, with 

1 Including Khiva and Bokhara, but not northern Manchuria. 



INTRODUCTION 11 

an area of perhaps four and a half million square miles, 
and some ninety-five million inhabitants. Her territory, 
like that of Great Britain, is dispersed over the world ; but 
more than half of it is in a solid, if irregularly shaped, block 
in northern Africa, and her share of the Sahara alone ac- 
counts for about two million square miles. The white 
population of France is not quite forty million, of which 
three-quarters of a million are in North Africa; the rest 
are in Europe, and barely increasing in numbers. The 
colored element, which is to the white as almost six to four, 
comprises over twenty million each of blacks and Mongolians, 
living in the tropics ; the rest are Berbers, Arabs, Malagasy, 
Hindus, South Sea Islanders, etc. Most of the colonial 
possessions of France are recent acquisitions, as yet little 
developed, but offering a wide field to the capital and 
enterprise of the mother country. Of them all, only North 
Africa and New Caledonia are suited to European settle- 
ment. The population of France herself, however varied in 
other ways, is more nationally homogeneous than that of 
any of her world rivals. 

The United States * is slightly below France in territory 
and population, with an area of three million, seven 
hundred thousand square miles, and ninety-three million 
inhabitants. On the other hand, it has a considerably 
larger white element than France, — about seventy-five 
million. The birthrate is not, as a rule, very high ; but the 
annual immigration has now risen to over a million and a 
quarter. The colored population, of some eighteen and a 
half million, is made up of ten million negroes and mulat- 
toes, nearly eight million Filipinos, and the rest Indians, 
Japanese, Chinese, Hawaiians, etc. Like Russia, the United 
States forms a compact mass; but it now has outlying 
dependencies, — Alaska far to the north, and a number of 
tropical islands. How much most of these possessions add 

1 Not including Cuba and Panama. 



12 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

to the real strength of the country is, however, a question 
about which there has been much dispute. 

Greater Germany, with only a little over a million and a 
quarter square miles (scarcely more than a tenth of the 
number in the British Empire), stands far below her rivals 
in area; but her white population of more than sixty 
millions, out of a total of seventy-five, is superior to that 
of Great Britain or France. These sixty million, which 
include several unwilling elements, are concentrated on a 
small tract of not very fertile territory; for the German 
colonial possessions, nearly five times the size of the 
home country, are for the most part situated in the 
tropics, and hence, with the doubtful exception of South- 
west Africa, can never support a large number of white 
settlers. In Germany the annual surplus of births over 
deaths is more than eight hundred thousand ; and the 
emigration, which was large a few years ago, is now, with 
the increasing industrial prosperity, under fifty thousand. 
It is not, then, to be wondered at, if the Germans are not 
satisfied with their present limits. 1 

Figures like the above are, of course, nothing but a 
slight framework for any serious comparison. In order to 
get a more precise idea of the relative resources of the five 
world powers, we should have to examine many other facts 
about each, — such as the extent of soil capable of culti- 
vation and its fertility, the wealth in forest and minerals, 
the climate, the water power, the means of communication, 
the acquired wealth, the industrial development, and many 
similar things. Nor would this be all ; for we cannot leave 

1 For purposes of comparison, we may note that the present Japanese 
Empire, not including southern Manchuria, extends over two hundred 
and fifty thousand square miles (of which only a few thousand are situated 
in the tropics), with sixty-three million inhabitants. Of these, forty- 
eight million are Japanese, three million are Chinese in Formosa and the 
Liaotung district, and ten to twelve million are discontented dependents 
in Korea. 



INTRODUCTION 13 

out of account the moral side, — the degree of civilization 
of the people of different nations, their industry, their 
habits of thrift, their skill, intelligence, etc. Any attempt 
at such a comparison would lead us a long way, and it 
is not necessary for a study of American international 
relations. On the other hand, it may not be amiss to note 
in passing the obvious truth that, although in the modern 
world certain great states tend more and more to have a 
dominant position as compared with that of their smaller 
brethren, they are not necessarily superior to them in 
civilization or more admirable in any way. From an 
ethical as well as from an aesthetic point of view, there is 
still much to be said in favor of small communities. 

One effect of the present international evolution has 
been to modify certain long-accepted formulas. Among 
these is the idea of a continent as a group of states, 
each of which has, besides historical traditions of its 
own, particular ties and interests common to them all, 
but nbt shared by the rest of mankind. This has in the 
past been more or less true of Europe, and as a sentimental 
bond it deserves respect. In actual politics, however, it is 
becoming a mere figure of speech. Are we to regard Im 
perial Britain as a European power, when the greater part 
of her external interests and difficulties are connected with 
her situation on other continents? Are not the vast major- 
ity of Englishmen more in touch in every way with Aus- 
tralians, Canadians, Americans, than they are with Portu- 
guese, Italians, or Austrians of one sort or another ? What 
strictly European interests does England represent, she 
who is now joined in close alliance with the Asiatic empire 
of Japan? Or is Russia European? Although the ma- 
jority of her inhabitants live on the western side of the 
open range of hills we call the Urals, much the larger 
portion of her territory is on the other, and in Europe itself 
she has many Asiatic elements. In character and popula- 



14 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

tion, there is indeed hardly more real separation between 
European Russia and Siberia than there is between the 
eastern and western parts of the United States. Of late 
Russia's foreign policy has been chiefly concerned with 
Asiatic questions, and it is likely so to continue. As for 
France, although her national life is, and will remain, centred 
in the European continent, her many colonies are scattered 
over the globe. Already some of them are represented in 
her chambers, and as time goes on they will become, more 
and more, parts of one organic dominion. A Frenchman 
born in Algeria regards himself as a European, and with 
good right ; but he is no more so than is the white Australian 
or the Canadian, or, except in the matter of allegiance, than 
the American. Under these circumstances, when people 
abroad talk about a union of the European powers against 
"the Asiatic peril" or "the American commercial invasion," 
they are appealing to a community of interests which does 
not exist. 

Between states of small territory and limited horizon 
a union especially for commercial purposes may be natural. 
It is quite conceivable, too, that one of the world powers 
may, from political as well as from economic motives, 
strive to group about itself a number of satellites, after the 
famous historical example of Prussia in the Zollverein. 
Many people in Germany would be glad to bring about a 
league of this sort in Central Europe, and the United States 
is accused of a corresponding design in its policy of Pan- 
Americanism. Such combinations are fair enough, and 
may be profitable to all concerned in them, but they are not 
likely to include more than one power of the first rank ; for 
the great powers, with their enormous fields for independent 
development, are in a position to work out their own des- 
tinies, and to take care of themselves without fettering their 
liberty of action. 

A recent writer has declared that, whereas the nineteenth 



INTRODUCTION 15 

century has been the age of nationalism, the twentieth 
will be that of national imperialism. 1 Though this rather 
sweeping prophecy takes too little account of the tendencies 
in another direction, especially those of a socialistic nature, 
and though it looks too far ahead, it is near the truth when 
applied to the international politics of the present, which 
have not been seriously affected by the progress of modern 
ultra-democracy. Indeed, in certain questions, — as, for in- 
stance, in the dispute over the admission of Asiatics into the 
United States, — the feeling of the laboring classes, so far 
from being the influence in favor of peace which it is often 
declared to be, is one of the chief difficulties in the situation. 
If, then, the political destinies of the globe are to be 
determined more and more by a few great nations, it is 
desirable that we should know as much as possible about 
them, and should try to understand the circumstances which 
determine their relations with one another. The United 
States may be a world in itself, but it is also a part of a 
larger world. There is no doubt that its power for good 
and for evil is very great. How that power is to be used 
is of consequence to all humanity. 

1 Reinsch, World Politics* 



CHAPTER I 

FORMATION AND GROWTH 

AS the world is constituted at the present day, no 
state that lacks a broad territorial foundation can 
hope to enjoy permanently a position of the first rank. 
In the past this has not been true to the same degree : 
Athens in antiquity, Venice in the Middle Ages, the 
Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century, not only 
made themselves immortal by their contributions to civil- 
ization, but were also able to cope with gigantic adver- 
saries, — Persia, the Ottoman Empire, Spain. In modern 
times, however, when the latest improvements of mechani- 
cal industry and military science may be equally the prop- 
erty of all who can pay for them, and when railways and 
telegraphs enable even the most unwieldy organizations 
to bring their full strength to bear, mere mass counts in 
a way it never did before. The size of Russia foiled 
Napoleon as it had foiled Charles XII, and it deprived the 
recent Japanese victories of much of the effect which they 
would otherwise have had. The Japanese, indeed, like 
the Germans, realize keenly the disadvantage of dwell- 
ing in a territory too limited in extent to offer a suffi- 
cient outlet to their surplus population or to admit of 
the full development of their economic energies. Fear- 
ing, therefore, that they may be unable to maintain their 
present rank among nations, they have, to the disquiet of 
their neighbors, been stimulated to a policy of active ex- 

16 



FORMATION AND GROWTH 17 

pansion. Because of their size, certain states now sec- 
ondary may look forward with confidence to a more 
exalted position in the future. Thus, it is safe to predict 
that, within a few generations, Brazil and Argentina will, 
unless they break up in the meantime, be of more conse- 
quence in international politics than Italy. Furthermore, 
though all civilized countries, in these days of keen in- 
dustrial competition and high protective tariffs, aim to be 
as nearly self-supporting as may be, especially in the great 
necessary staples, such independence is possible only to 
the owners of broad lands with much variety of climate 
and productions. The peoples with fewer resources at 
their command may, to be sure, do something to counter- 
balance their disadvantages by a higher display of energy 
and intelligence ; but society is tending toward a general 
level of enlightenment in which there can be no monopoly 
of ideas or of methods. More than ever before, political 
preeminence among nations now rests on quantity as well 
as on quality. 

Among the world powers, the United States is fourth in 
size as well as in population. If we compare it with the 
one next above it, Greater France, we note that, although 
no one section is the equal of France proper, the terri- 
tory as a whole is of higher value ; for about half of the 
French colonial possessions are in the Sahara, and most 
of the rest are in the tropics and therefore unfitted to 
support a considerable white population. The United 
States has, to be sure, its share of bad lands in Alaska 
and the arid West, and it has, too, its tropical holdings ; 
but it possesses in the temperate zone several times as 
much land as France. It is inferior in this respect to 
Russia ; but it has a greater variety of climate and a 
larger extent of really good soil. Moreover, it is, from 
its situation, practically invulnerable ; though, unlike 
Russia, it has important dependencies of which it might 



18 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

be deprived by an adversary that controlled the sea. 
Still, these are insignificant enough as compared with 
the mass of the home country, whose very size makes 
it secure against invasion. The United States could 
not be brought to its knees by one fierce blow at the 
heart, as England might conceivably be ; and it is also 
less exposed to attack than is either France or Ger- 
many. Economically, too, it is the most self-supporting 
of all modern powers. Even if it can furnish itself with 
but a small part of the tropical produce which it needs, 
it is not dependent on any one of its chief rivals, who at 
present all pay it an irksome tribute for their supply of 
cotton, one of the most necessary staples for modern 
manufacture. 

Though to a world power a diversity of climates and 
conditions is a source of strength, a state that is to hold 
together must have unity of some kind in its essential parts, 
whether of race, of sentiment, or of interests; and the 
more it has, the better. Here the influences of geography 
are to be reckoned with, though they are not infrequently 
overborne by what seems like mere historical accident. 
The strongest frontiers are not impassable. Nations 
in their wanderings stray beyond their natural bounda- 
ries, and unfriendly peoples have been brought into lasting 
union by some chance royal marriage. Well-protected, 
sharply defined peninsulas like Italy and India have been 
the scene of repeated invasion. They have been divided 
between hostile states, and ruled by distant foreigners ; 
while Austria-Hungary, a mere heterogeneous creation, has 
been a great power for nearly four hundred years. If we 
want typical instances of the working and of the failure of 
geographical influences, we find them in the history of the 
Spanish peninsula: the separation of Spain from France 
appears natural and inevitable; the growth of Spain and 
Portugal into two states inhabited by different nationalities 



FORMATION AND GROWTH 19 

is nothing but a freak of fortune. Since mankind may 
thus develop in opposition to mere geographical influences, 
it is dangerous to lay much weight on them; yet, though 
they may be neutralized, if not altogether overcome, it 
cannot be denied that they are forces of great magnitude. 
Soil, climate, and situation have always affected national 
character. Good natural frontiers against the outer world 
and easy means of communication within are aids in build- 
ing up the unity of a nation, and go far to insure the main- 
tenance of this unity when once achieved. 

The physical geography of North America has been 
described as " large, simple, and easily comprehensible." 1 
There is no such variety and confusion as in the configura- 
tion of Europe, with its extraordinarily fantastic outlines, 
its scattered ranges of mountains, its many divergent 
river valleys, and its obviously separate regions, like Scan- 
dinavia, Spain, Italy, and the Balkan Peninsula; but, on 
the otner hand, America has proportionately much less 
available coast-line. The interior, though not free from 
obstacles which in earlier times interfered with the ease 
of communication, contains no such formidable barriers 
as the Andes in South America, the Himalayas and the 
Thien Shan in Asia, and the Sahara in Africa. Like 
eastern Europe and northern Asia, North America appears 
as the setting for a few large states rather than for a 
mosaic of small ones. 

The United States (omitting its dependencies) occupies 
the middle of the continent, and like Europe, it is situated 
wholly in the temperate zone. No part is too cold for the 
raising of grain, — to find the American equivalent of 
northern Scandinavia or northern Russia, one must turn 
to Alaska and Canada, — and no part, except certain dis- 
tricts in low-lying sections of the South or in the deserts 
of the Southwest, is too hot for the white man, even when 

1 Shaler. 



20 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

of North-European descent, to work in the fields; nor ia 
any too cold for the black, though the latter takes naturally 
to out-door labor in the warmer regions only. The climate, 
as compared with that of Europe, is more continental, 
with greater extremes of heat and cold. The isothermal 
lines are nearer together, hence we find different zones 
of cultivation closer to one another. Almost all the 
products of the Old World have flourished in the New; 
and many of the chief staples of American cultivation 
to-day, like most of the animals, are of foreign origin, un- 
known at the coming of white men. The most notable 
exception to this rule is Indian corn, or maize. 

Turning to the configuration of the country, we mark 
its simple compact mass, — even more simple and compact 
than that of the Russian Empire, which can better be com- 
pared with the United States and Canada together than 
with the United States alone. On the east and the west 
the United States has the best of all natural boundaries, the 
ocean, — or, rather, it had, for since the republic has ac- 
quired outlying possessions, the Pacific coast no longer con- 
stitutes a first line of defence. Still, these new possessions 
seem so much like outposts which could be sacrificed without 
serious loss that Americans have hardly yet come to think of 
them as imperilling the excellence of their frontiers. The 
southern boundary of the country, determined in the main 
by the Rio Grande and the Gila depression, is not unsatis- 
factory as such lines go ; for it consists of clearly marked 
natural formations in a region for the most part thinly 
inhabited. It is not ideal, however, and even to-day has 
along much of its length a mixed population on both sides. 
The northern frontier is the result of historical accident, 
of a succession of compromises attained only after many 
protracted disputes. Through the eastern wilderness and 
along the Great Lakes the division is still tolerable, although 
the harbors of New England are, at least in winter, the 



FORMATION AND GROWTH 21 

obvious ports for most of Eastern Canada ; but farther west 
the boundary is one of the most unnatural in the whole 
world. For thousands of miles it clings to geographical 
parallels, heedless of the contour of the ground. The coun- 
try on both sides of it is the same ; the rivers and mountains 
run north and south ; and the inhabitants are one people, 
not only in language and character, but in vital interests. 
In spite of every artificial diversion of their trade and of 
their political sympathies, they are steadily drawn together 
by permanent forces, which will grow in strength as the 
region on both sides becomes more thickly settled. 

Within the United States itself, the great physical lines 
of division are few and simple. They run north and 
south, cutting the parallels of latitude and the zones of 
climate at right angles instead of coinciding with them. 
This fact has been of far-reaching political importance; 
for it has worked against sectionalism, and has produced 
cross currents of interests. Had the chain of the Alleghanies 
intervened between the free states and the slave states, we 
may doubt whether the Union would have been preserved, 
or even have been formed. 

Twice in the last two hundred years, but in opposite 
ways in the two epochs, it has seemed likely that the terri- 
tory which now constitutes the American republic would 
be divided among several owners. During much of the 
eighteenth century, it was fair to suppose that the North 
America of the future would remain in the hands of three 
nationalities, each of them holding an immense section, — 
the English having the smallest part, the Atlantic coast; 
the French, the interior plains, with the Mississippi, and in 
the north the valley of the St. Lawrence ; the Spanish, the 
extreme south and the southwest. The lines of separa- 
tion between the three would in the main have run from 
north to south, corresponding with physical barriers. 
Fate decided otherwise, and gave nine-tenths of the whole 



22 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

continent to the English-speaking peoples, between whom 
the chief lines of demarcation have run from east to west, 
leaping over natural obstacles. But no sooner was the 
Union assured of its extension from ocean to ocean, across 
mountains and rivers and deserts, than it was threatened 
with a division into a northern and a southern half, separated 
from one another by the arbitrary Mason and Dixon's line. 
The long-standing political divergences between these two 
sections culminated in a violent attempt at secession. Since 
that failed, the unity of the republic has been secure. 

The physical geography of the North American continent 
explains why the much more numerous English colonists 
penetrated into the interior so slowly as compared with 
the French settlers farther north. After the short episode 
of Dutch rule in New York, the English possessed the 
whole Appalachian coast from New Brunswick to the 
Spanish colony of Florida. At the time of their arrival, 
this strip was covered with thick woods, trackless to the 
white man. Numerous rivers, it is true, gave access to the 
interior, but none except the Hudson were navigable to any 
great distance for ships of considerable size. In the north 
the mountains approached nearer the coast ; farther south 
they receded, leaving a coastal plain of much wealth and 
fertility. To-day, penetrated in every direction by. rail- 
ways, and inhabited by a dense mining population, the 
Alleghanies cannot be regarded as a barrier; two centuries 
ago they were a formidable one, more formidable in reality, 
though less obvious on the map, than the Urals, the sup- 
posed dividing line between Asia and Europe. The colo- 
nists did not succeed in crossing them for several gen- 
erations. On the other hand, the Frenchmen, pushing up 
the St. Lawrence, whose tide-water extends to Montreal, 
had only to continue along the river to reach the Great 
Lakes, whence they soon found themselves in the valley of 
the Mississippi, and after that, naturally floated down- 



FORMATION AND GROWTH 23 

stream and explored the whole length of the " Father of 
Waters." If the population of the French colonies had 
been large, — France herself had at that time many more 
inhabitants than England, — a great French dominion 
might well have been built up which would have confined 
the Anglo-Saxon race permanently to the eastern coast. 

The English were slow in establishing themselves in the 
western hemisphere. A century after the discoveries of 
Columbus and the building up of an immense Spanish 
colonial empire, they had not yet gained any permanent 
foothold. When they did come, it was in a haphazard 
fashion. The Pilgrim Fathers, aiming for New Jersey, 
landed farther north, missing the mouth of the Hud- 
son, the best situation on the coast, which fell into the 
hands of the Dutch. Fortunately for the English, the 
line of whose settlement was thus cut in two at the most 
important point, the Dutch never obtained a really strong 
hold on the territory. When it was conquered by the Duke 
of York two generations later, some half of the population 
were already English; and the gradual Anglicization of 
the rest was a matter of no great difficulty. 

One after another, the British colonies in the New World 
were planted, and grew up in an independent irregular 
fashion. Circumstances favored them, for the spirit of 
enterprise that characterized the Elizabethan age, combined 
with the desire to plunder the Spaniards, had drawn atten- 
tion in this direction. The economic changes in England 
had made life so difficult there that the hope of better for- 
tune prompted adventurous spirits to cross the ocean. An- 
other stimulus to emigration was furnished by the religious 
disputes and intolerance of the time. While France, with 
the greater logic and the lesser political wisdom character- 
istic of her people, jealously preserved her colonies from 
the contamination of heresy, England regarded with com- 
parative indifference the theological vagaries of her stray 



24 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

children in distant lands. Dissenters, Separatists, Catholics, 
Quakers, could here enjoy a liberty that was refused at 
home; and many profited by the opportunity. 

With the foundation of Georgia in the eighteenth century, 
the list of the thirteen original colonies was complete. 
They had, for the most part, grown up independently of one 
another, and, varying much in size and strength and torn 
by mutual jealousies which were often exasperated by 
hopelessly conflicting boundary claims, they could not, for 
several generations, be brought to feel a common interest 
or to take united action. They were spread over the three 
divisions of the Appalachian coast country which we now 
call New England, the Middle States, and the Old South. 

New England, the smallest and poorest of the three in 
natural resources, had by accident received the greatest 
immigration. At the time of the Revolution, Boston was 
larger than New York. The preponderance of this section 
in which the population was homogeneous and of a strong 
Anglo-Saxon type has indeed had a profound influence 
on the destiny of the country ; for the New England element 
has, on the whole, been the dominant one in the formation 
of the American character. However relatively insignifi- 
cant this small section may be in the future, in the past it 
has played a role which can hardly be overestimated, — 
one which might almost be compared with that of Greece 
in European history. 

The Middle colonies were then, as now, more cosmopolitan 
than those to the north or to the south of them ; but, though 
the earlier foreign elements, the Dutch and the Swedes, were 
reinforced in the eighteenth century by the coming of many 
Germans, it was the English type which predominated, and 
even before the Revolution the future importance of New 
York, with its unequalled situation, could be foretold. 

The Southern colonies were the largest in area, but, with 
the exception of Virginia, the smallest in population. 



FORMATION AND GROWTH 25 

Already the existence of slavery on an extensive scale had 
developed social and economic conditions of a special nature. 
For some time, as we may see by the debates of the Con- 
stitutional Convention, it was generally believed that the 
southern half of the country would, on account of its size, 
its supposedly better climate, and its greater resources, 
develop faster than the northern, — a belief which, on the 
invention of the cotton-gin in 1793, was held more con- 
fidently than ever. The non-fulfilment of these hopes, 
which was attributed by Southerners to unfair tariff legisla- 
tion, was indeed one of the causes that ultimately led to 
the attempt at secession. In none of the colonies were 
what we should now call democratic ideas really prevalent. 
In the North the political power was in the hands of an intel- 
ligent middle class, who made up most of the population; 
in the South the whole economic situation tended to produce 
a planters' aristocracy, the so-called "slave barons" of a 
later day. 

In process of time, as was inevitable, the attempt on 
the part of the English colonists to push beyond the moun- 
tains came in conflict with the efforts of the French to 
establish an unbroken line of posts between their Canadian 
and their Mississippi possessions; and the result was a 
fierce struggle between the two peoples for supremacy on 
the continent. There had already been more than one 
contest between them, in the course of which France had 
lost what are to-day the Canadian maritime provinces. 
She still held, however, a much larger territory than her 
rival, and one with greater possibilities of future develop- 
ment ; but owing to the small number of her settlers, her 
hold on it was far weaker. When, therefore, the English 
colonists began to spread to the westward, they found 
nothing to oppose them but a thin chain of French military 
posts without adequate support. It has been said that 
France lost her Indian and American empires on the battle- 



26 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

fields of Germany; and it is undoubtedly true that, in 
defence of continental interests, real or fancied, she wasted 
in Europe energies which would have been better employed 
in defending her American possessions. It was also her 
irreparable misfortune that, at this critical moment, when 
the fate of empires hung in the balance, she was ruled by 
the indolent and worthless Louis XV, whereas the energies 
of Britain were stimulated by the fiery spirit of the elder 
Pitt. Voltaire's famous description of Canada as "a few 
acres of snow" shows that what we might call the anti- 
imperialist section of French public opinion was incapable 
of appreciating the gravity of the issues involved. 

On the disputed soil itself, the struggle was from the 
outset hopelessly one-sided. In spite of the greater unity 
of design and action on the part of the French authorities 
in Canada, and of the more military character of the popu- 
lation under their control, in spite too of the superior 
skill of most of their officers, the English and their American 
colonists won, as they could not fail to do in the end ; for 
not only were their available resources far greater, owing 
to the enormous numerical superiority of the English 
population in the New World, but, in consequence of 
England's command of the sea, they could obtain reinforce- 
ments in ways impossible to their adversaries. In this war, 
which decided the fate of the North American continent, 
the French gained most of the glory, but the English got 
all the profits. 

Twenty years later France obtained her revenge, though 
an incomplete one, in the war of the American Revolution, 
which deprived England of her most valued possessions 
and gave birth to the United States. To the young nation 
which thus came into the world, the question of the extent 
of its territories was second in importance only to inde- 
pendence itself. Had the new republic remained con- 
fined to the limits of the thirteen colonies, it would 



FORMATION AND GROWTH 27 

beyond doubt have had a very different history. Not im- 
probably, if Great Britain had insisted at Versailles on 
retaining the Ohio Valley, the American commissioners and 
government, unsupported by France, would have been 
obliged to yield on this point, and the westward movement 
of the American people, which has carried them to the 
shores of the Pacific, might have been checked at the out- 
set. But England, anxious for peace, was not disposed 
to haggle over terms with her disobedient children. While 
refusing, naturally enough, the demand of the Americans 
that Canada should be handed over to them, she yielded 
with surprising facility on the question of the Ohio Valley, 
most of which was indeed no longer actually in her hands. 
The conquest of this region by George Rogers Clark is 
rightly deemed one of the decisive events in American 
history, but it is no less true that the definite acquisition 
of it in 1783 was a stroke of extraordinary good fortune. 
Yet even this good fortune cannot prevent Americans 
from regretting that they did not at the same time 
obtain Canada, as they conceivably might have done ; 
for in that case they would have avoided many of the 
difficulties which have arisen between the United States 
and Great Britain since that day, as well as certain grave 
possibilities in regard to the future. If the success of 
Clark's enterprise is one of the events for which Americans 
have every reason to be grateful, the failure of the expe- 
dition of Arnold and Montgomery against Quebec is one 
of the disasters which they have most cause to regret. 

The years immediately following the achievement of 
independence are generally regarded as the most inglo- 
rious in American history. The form of confederation 
adopted by the new states soon proved itself quite insuf- 
ficient for the purposes of government ; but not till after 
many bitter experiences of its evils, would the states con- 
sent to sacrifice their more short-sighted views and selfish 



28 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

interests to the public welfare. Nevertheless, this inglo- 
rious period witnessed the promulgation of one of the most 
important legislative acts in the whole history of the coun- 
try, — the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which not only 
at that time proclaimed the principles by w r hich American 
expansion was to be regulated as long as it was confined 
to the continent, but which even to-day, when the United 
States has stretched beyond the seas, is still recognized as 
determining its policy, though it may not always be im- 
mediately applicable. By the Northwest Ordinance the 
wide vacant territory west of the mountains was declared 
a national domain, a reserve tract out of which, as the 
population increased, new states should be created with 
rights in every way equal to those of the old ones. Even 
before such states should come into existence, the settlers 
in this region were to be granted the right of possession of 
property, of habeas corpus, of trial by jury, and the other 
essentials of Anglo-Saxon liberty. 

The principle of the Northwest Ordinance was a new 
one in the history of democratic national expansion. Up 
to this time, colonies — unless, like the Greek ones, they 
separated themselves at the start — had been regarded 
as mere appendages or outposts of the mother country. 
They might have privileges and liberties of their own, but 
these privileges were personal : the territory did not form 
an equal part of the parent state, except in countries 
with an autocratic form of government, where all lands 
were at the disposal of the sovereign. Thus, though the 
emigrant to Eastern Siberia might feel that his position 
was exactly the same as that of his brother in Moscow, 
since both were subjects of a despotic ruler, the English- 
man in the colonies was not the equal of the one at home, 
for he could vote for no member of Parliament. No one 
of the English settlements had enjoyed complete self- 
government from the beginning; and the American colo- 



FORMATION AND GROWTH 29 

nies had not contested the right of the mother country to 
legislate for them. They had merely resisted, as a viola- 
tion of their inalienable rights as Englishmen, her attempt 
to impose taxes upon them without their consent ; and 
this resistance had led to the war for independence. Now 
that they had triumphed and had possessions of their own 
about which they must legislate, they wisely determined 
to treat the new sections as the equals of the old, and 
to impose upon them only such temporary restrictions 
as were necessary during the period of first development, 
when they were too weak to walk without guidance. Not 
only is the Northwest Ordinance thus of fundamental im- 
portance in the history of the United States, but it is a 
landmark in the story of government. 

At the census taken in 1790, the population of the newly 
constituted federal republic numbered a little less than 
four million inhabitants, unevenly distributed over an 
area of about nine hundred thousand square miles. Of 
these the greater number still lived close to the coast, much 
of the interior being uninhabited save by Indians and 
traders. The western movement had, however, begun. 
Kentucky, Vermont, and Tennessee were all admitted as 
states before the end of the century, and Ohio at the begin- 
ning of the new one. And the growth of the country con- 
tinued in two ways : not only was its area extended from 
time to time by the addition of broad tracts of land, until 
it was several times as large as the thirteen original colo- 
nies, but while these new lands were being opened up and 
developed with astonishing rapidity, the population of the 
older states was increasing by the surplus of births over 
deaths and by foreign immigration. Thus the great sur- 
face expansion of the country did not lead, as some feared 
that it might, to a dispersal of the resources and a general 
weakening of the fabric. On the contrary, at the opening 
of the twentieth century everv state in the Union, even 



30 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

mutilated Virginia, had more than doubled the population 
that it had at the beginning of the nineteenth, and New 
York alone contained a larger number of inhabitants than 
the whole republic did one hundred years before. Up 
to the time of the war with Spain, the lands acquired by 
the United States had been almost unoccupied ones ; but, 
with the exception of Alaska, they were so well fitted for 
white colonization that settlers soon began to pour into 
them in numbers sufficient to submerge the earlier ele- 
ments. There was consequently little difficulty in apply- 
ing to them the principles of the Northwest Ordinance, and, 
as time went on, in erecting new states on the same basis 
as the old. In Alaska this policy has not yet proved prac- 
ticable, and may never do so ; but this huge desolate waste 
offers no new problem of government, for its sparse Indian 
tribes may be treated as other Indians have been. Not 
indeed till the annexations beginning in 1898, which have 
brought under the wing of the United States regions 
already inhabited by very considerable alien populations, 
did the republic have to face the question whether American 
ideals and institutions were suitable to territories of this 
kind. 

According to the census of 1800, there were in the United 
States 5,308,483 persons, of whom about a million were 
blacks. The gain made in the preceding ten years had 
been extraordinary, especially as there had been no new 
accession of territory. Three years later, the area of the 
republic was doubled by the purchase of Louisiana, one 
of the most astonishing strokes of good fortune — for it 
was not the result of any special foresight — that ever 
befell a nation. Although the American government real- 
ized how serious in its consequences would be the cession 
of this great expanse on its western frontier to a strong 
power like France, it had not instructed its commissioners 
to try to purchase more than the island of New Orleans 



FORMATION AND GROWTH 31 

with an insignificant bit of land about it. The proposition 
for the sale of the whole came from Napoleon himself. 
His decision was startlingly sudden, was opposed by many 
of his counsellors, and was a complete surprise to the 
United States. The commissioners who signed the terms 
of the purchase acted without instructions; and President 
Jefferson, who ratified it, believed that he was committing 
an unconstitutional act, which was justified only by its 
immense advantage to the country. Many Frenchmen, 
naturally enough, have ever since deplored the surrender 
of the last chance of building up a great French-speaking 
community in the western world. It is doubtful, however, 
whether France could have kept this distant defenceless 
region against the inevitable attack of the English; she 
certainly could not have done so if the Americans had felt 
driven to ally themselves with Great Britain. France 
made her fatal mistake, not in 1803, but forty years 
earlier, when she ceded Louisiana to Spain. Had she kept 
it then and tried to fill it with settlers, she might, by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, have had French 
colonists enough to maintain permanently the national 
character of the region ; but even this is by no means 
certain. As it was, the fifty thousand inhabitants, French, 
Spanish, and black, who did not represent one per cent of 
the population of the country into which they were now 
absorbed, could not possibly retain their identity in the 
long run. 

.Whether the action of France was wise or not, the gain 
to the United States was incalculable. At one stroke its 
territory was increased twofold by the addition of a region 
which was a hundred years later to be the home of more 
than sixteen million inhabitants ; and at the same time the 
way was opened for further expansion westward toward 
the Pacific. Without Louisiana, the Americans could not 
have reached Oregon, which must before long have fallen 



32 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

into British hands ; and yet, as has often been pointed out, 
this first expansion in their history, which gave them the 
control of the Mississippi Valley with its untold possibili- 
ties, met with the same bitter opposition that we find in 
all the later and sometimes less justifiable instances. 

The purchase of Florida from Spain in the year 1819 was 
the natural termination of a long series of disputes about 
boundaries and other matters between the vigorous grasp- 
ing young republic and a decrepit neighbor. On account 
of the situation of Florida, the American people coveted 
it from the first, and their desire was greatly stimulated 
by their purchase of Louisiana; for after that event the 
peninsula was in their eyes a dangerous foreign excrescence 
which broke the continuity of their coast and also threat- 
ened one of their most important lines of communication. 
The weakness of Spain's hold, and the fact that Florida 
served as a refuge for runaway slaves, hostile Indians, and 
adventurers of all kinds, continually invited American 
interference, which more than once took place. Finally, 
therefore, in 1819, when the greater part of the Spanish 
colonies were already engaged in a successful revolt which 
might easily extend to Florida, the government at Madrid 
decided that the time had come to put an end to a continual 
source of dispute between the two countries, and to get 
something for the colony before it was too late. From the 
point of view of the Americans, the purchase was in every 
way advantageous ; for the seventy thousand square miles 
thus acquired, which to-day have a population of more 
than half a million, were of value in themselves, and from 
their position were almost a necessity to the United States. 
On the other hand, it is hard for any impartial writer to 
maintain that the treatment of Spain by the United States 
for many years before the sale can be justified either by 
international law or by morality. 

The census of 1820 showed that, if the area of the Union 



FORMATION AND GROWTH 33 

was more than twice what it had been when the century 
opened, the population, which now numbered 9,638,453, 
had increased at a nearly equal rate. During the next 
generation the American republic added to its domin- 
ions on four separate occasions, and dreamed of other 
ventures. This movement of expansion, which was popu- 
lar with ardent spirits in all sections, was twofold, one 
side of it being principally for the benefit of the Northern 
States, the other for that of the Southern, and it was stimu- 
lated by their rivalry. In both spheres it was successful, 
but not to the same extent ; for it was pressed with unequal 
zeal, and it was opposed by adversaries of very different 
force. 

The Northern States, in their dispute about the Oregon 
frontier, had less at stake than had the South in the affairs 
of Mexico, and had to deal with a great power, England. 
Under these circumstances the joint occupation of the 
territory from 1818 to 1846 ended, after much bickering 
coupled with threats of war, in a compromise. This settle- 
ment was roundly condemned in the United States as a 
weak-kneed surrender not only of American possessions but 
even of the sacred Monroe Doctrine itself. On the other 
hand, it has been regarded by Canadians as one more 
instance in which Great Britain sacrificed her colony in 
the interest of peace with the United States. When 
we remember that the complete claims of neither party 
rested on a very sound foundation, and that the line of 
compromise actually agreed on was the obvious one, — 
namely, the continuation of that which already existed 
for a long distance, — we may feel satisfied that the settle- 
ment was just and honorable to both parties. It gave the 
United States a tract of about two hundred and ninety 
thousand square miles, which in 1900 was inhabited by 
about a million two hundred thousand persons. 

In the South the situation was very different. The 



34 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

slave states felt that the acquisition of new territory, by 
the aid of which they could keep pace with the growing 
North, was for them a matter of political life and death. 
Realizing that by the Missouri Compromise they were shut 
off from all hope of penetrating above Mason and Dixon's 
line, they saw that they could add to their domain only 
at the expense of Spain and Mexico. However little we 
may defend the morality of the conduct of the Americans 
toward the Mexican republic at this period, we can per- 
fectly understand the tremendous temptation which a 
huge, valuable, and almost unoccupied region offered 
to a vigorous neighbor afflicted with land-hunger. His- 
tory and human nature show us that such conditions 
lead to but one result, — the spoliation of the weaker by 
the stronger. We have to comfort ourselves as best we 
may by the reflection that, in the hands of its new posses- 
sors, this region has been so developed as to become of 
much more value to mankind than it would have been had 
it remained the property of its former, legitimate owners. 

The insurrection of Texas in 1836 was a rising of Ameri- 
can colonists, aided by volunteers from across the border, 
against a distant alien government weakened by continual 
revolutions. One main object of the revolt was the estab- 
lishment of slavery, which was instituted as soon as the 
movement succeeded. When we consider all the circum- 
stances, and remember the dominant influence of the South 
at this period, we are rather surprised that Texas was not 
taken into the Union at once. This step was, however, 
prevented for a time by Northern opposition, the treaty 
of annexation failing in the Senate in 1844, and the measure 
being carried through in the following year only by a joint 
resolution of the two houses. From the point of view of 
the struggle against slavery, it is fortunate that the new 
state was not, as had been planned, divided into four states 
with eight senators, — an arrangement which might be 



FORMATION AND GROWTH 35 

desirable to-day if it were not too late. The territory 
thus acquired, about three hundred and ninety thousand 
square miles with one hundred and fifty thousand inhabit- 
ants, had in 1900 a population of some three millions. 

Mexico, as was natural, bitterly resented the loss of one 
of her most valuable provinces, and the strained relations 
between the two republics were made worse by boundary 
disputes and by the unconcealed desire of the Americans 
for California. Their high-handed action on the Texas 
frontier led to a war which was one-sided from the begin- 
ning. Although the hostilities were on a small scale, the 
story of the military operations was almost as creditable 
to the American name as that of the previous diplomatic 
dealings had been discreditable. By the treaty of Guada- 
lupe Hidalgo in 1848, the United States, in return for a 
payment of fifteen million dollars as a sort of conscience 
money, acquired a tract of about five hundred and twenty 
thousand square miles ; and five years later, by the Gadsden 
Purchase, the boundary was again changed for the benefit 
of the stronger power. The treaty of peace was almost 
immediately followed by the discovery of gold in California, 
and by the rush of immigrants to that region, which in 
consequence made rapid progress; whereas New Mexico 
and Arizona have gone ahead so slowly since the cession 
that they have not yet been admitted as states. In the 
territory thus taken by the Anglo-Saxon from the Latin- 
American republic, there are to-day some two million 
inhabitants, of whom, except in certain thinly settled dis- 
tricts, only a small percentage are Mexicans. 

In the half century beginning with the Louisiana Pur- 
chase and ending with the Gadsden Purchase, the United 
States tripled its size, and more than quadrupled its popula- 
tion, which in 1850 exceeded twenty-three million whites, 
of whom some ten per cent were of foreign birth, chiefly 
Irish, British, and German. 



36 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

Such a rate of progress cannot, of course, continue 
indefinitely, though the most noticeable change thus far 
has been in the quality rather than in the quantity of the 
development. Since 1850 the number of inhabitants has 
quadrupled again; but over eight million of them (more 
than the total population a hundred years ago) are the 
black, brown, and yellow brothers brought into the fold 
by the Spanish War; and twice as many are immigrants 
who have come from different parts of Europe. Even so 
the gross increase in millions has been less than that of the 
Russian Empire by the surplus of births over deaths 
during the same period. The territorial expansion of the 
United States in this time has been greater than that of 
Russia, but less than that of England, France, or Germany. 
It has covered an area larger than that of the thirteen 
original colonies, but it has not included one square mile 
to which the American people have as yet felt justified 
in granting the full self-government which the older regions 
enjoy. 

The annexations of the first half of the nineteenth cen- 
tury meant the taking over of land capable of being 
converted into new states of the same kind as the old, 
a process that will soon be completed. Contrary to expec- 
tation, the addition of fresh members to the Union has 
not weakened the ties that bind it together. Many 
patriots of an earlier generation prophesied that, if the 
country extended its boundaries, it must soon break up 
into several independent communities, and, in particular, 
that the original states and their younger sisters would not 
remain long together. Such fears now only provoke a 
smile. Modern means of communication have revolu- 
tionized our conceptions of time and space. As the vacant 
lands have filled up with settlers, and as railways and tele- 
graphs have multiplied, the different sections, instead of 
drawing farther apart, have come into an ever closer com- 



FORMATION AND GROWTH 37 

munity of interests, as well as of ideas and traditions. 
In the case of California, it is true, there was for a while 
a feeling that the new region differed materially from the 
rest of the country, and hence might wish to obtain its 
autonomy ; but all danger of a separation of this kind van- 
ished after the completion of the Union Pacific railway. 
New York and San Francisco are practically nearer to 
each other than Boston and Philadelphia were at the time 
of the Revolution, and the distance between them is short 
as compared with that between St. Petersburg and Vladi- 
vostok. 

The local antagonism which existed from the early days 
of the republic and grew steadily stronger until it led to 
civil war, was not between the new states and the old, or 
the seacoast and the interior, but between the North and 
the South. At the root of the trouble was the institution 
of slavery in the South, where, favored by peculiar natural 
conditions, it led to a peculiar economic and social develop- 
ment, which sought its protection in the creed of states' 
rights. The war put an end to slavery forever. Though 
the scars of the conflict are not entirely forgotten, there 
is no danger of its recurrence ; for the primal cause has 
been removed, and the constitutional question in dispute 
has been settled by force of arms. When the generation 
with personal memories of the struggle has passed away, 
even Southerners will more and more look upon it as an 
historical event of which they are proud on account of the 
heroism they displayed, but which has no bearing on their 
future interests. 

In the years immediately following the war, public opin- 
ion occupied itself but little with foreign affairs ; for the 
nation was engaged in recovering from the effects of the 
struggle. At such a moment, territorial expansion did not 
appeal either to statesmen or to the people, the general 
feeling on the subject being very different from what it 



38 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

had been just before 1860. Still, scarcely was the war 
over when America acquired by purchase half a million 
more square miles, — a step that met with some criti- 
cism, but produced little real opposition. Not that the 
vast expanse of Russian America, which was offered for 
sale at an insignificant price, was regarded as having much 
value in itself. Russia was glad to get rid of it because it 
was unprofitable from a pecuniary point of view, and could 
not be defended in the event of a war with England, an 
emergency which at that time seemed quite probable ; 
and the Americans bought it partly in accordance with a 
general principle of freeing the continent of European 
dominion, and partly in order to prevent Great Britain 
from acquiring the region either by force or by purchase ; 
for if Russia were anxious to sell, she would naturally turn 
to England next. Some believed, too, that the value of 
the fisheries and mines was sufficient to justify the expen- 
diture of the very moderate sum of seven million, two hun- 
dred thousand dollars. This last calculation has been more 
than confirmed by events; for, apart from its political 
advantages, the Alaska Purchase has turned out a very 
good bargain in itself, the annual value of its products 
being greater to-day than the whole sum paid for the terri- 
tory. In making an acquisition which it could not reach 
and defend by land, the United States seemed, to be sure, 
to be entering upon a new policy ; but it was argued that 
the new territory was on the same continent, and that by 
the annexation of Canada, which most Americans believed 
would take place sooner or later and many expected within 
a short time, Alaska would be united to the rest of the 
republic. 

In spite of the ease with which this matter went through, 
the feeling in America for over a generation remained 
hostile to further expansion. The treaties for the pur- 
chase of the Danish West Indies and the acquisition of 



FORMATION AND GROWTH 39 

San Domingo failed in the Senate, and that for the annexa- 
tion of Hawaii in 1893 was withdrawn from consideration 
by President Cleveland as soon as he came into office. 
For thirty years there was little sign that the United States 
would soon go beyond its bounds. It is true that the 
population increased to some seventy-five millions, and 
that there was a great industrial development ; and it is 
also true that, although there were still many vacant places 
in the country, there was no longer an internal "frontier" 
of colonization beyond which broad lands lay waiting for 
the settler. These facts made for a new era of expan- 
sion, but at the time few persons realized the drift of the 
current. There was indeed a general belief that the 
United States was destined to dominate the western world 
and to annex Canada, if not Mexico. No one, however, 
dreamed of aggressive action. To use a recent term, we 
may say that public opinion was anti-imperialistic. 

Suddenly, and without warning, the whole situation 
changed, and the country found itself engaged in a 
foreign war, and presently, without preparation or de- 
sign, launched on a career of conquest and expansion. 
But before inquiring into the causes and effects of this 
startling departure, let us look at the composition of the 
American people itself, and the nature of the political ideas 
which have guided it up to the present time. 



CHAPTER II 

NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION 

THE American Constitution begins with the words, 
"We, the People of the United States" ; and "We, the 
People" have, in practice as well as in theory, been the 
sovereign power in the country to an extent rarely equalled 
in the history of the world. At times the " We " have been 
negligent or deceived, and their desires have often been 
thwarted ; but in the end, if once they have definitely made 
up their minds, their will has always overridden every ob- 
struction and become the supreme law of the land. The 
sovereign American people are the master whose wishes are 
to be carried out by the servants whom he has appointed. 
To judge of the conduct of the servants in foreign as well 
as in domestic affairs, we have to begin by knowing some- 
thing about the master. 

There is another reason why the student of political 
affairs should devote attention to the character and com- 
position of the people of the United States : the nation is 
still "in the making." The character of the Americans — 
" Yankees," as they are called abroad rather than at home — 
is, indeed, well known, and is as definite as that of English- 
men or Spaniards; but, though they are stamping this 
character on newcomers to the country with extraordinary 
success, they are in danger, according to some persons, of 
being submerged by the ever increasing floods of these 
strangers. When, therefore, we look closely at the term 

40 



NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION 41 

"the People of the United States," we find that it is not 
always an exact expression. In 1787, for instance, it could 
hardly have been said to include the blacks : the negro 
slaves of the South did not "ordain and establish this Con- 
stitution ... in Order to form a more Perfect Union," 
and to "secure the blessings of Liberty" to themselves 
and their posterity. True, much has happened since then ; 
but we may hesitate to term the mass of the negro popula- 
tion part of the sovereign people at the present moment. 
And this sovereign people itself, — is it what it used to be ? 
What are the prospects that it will maintain its essential 
unity in the future ? With the ever growing influx of new 
elements and the declining birthrate of the native popula- 
tion, is there no danger that the Americans may some day 
be a group of separate nationalities instead of one nation ? 
In spite "of the cosmopolitan tendencies of modern social- 
ism, there can be no doubt that the spirit of nationality in one 
form or another is still a tremendous political force. The 
last hundred years are full of examples of its action in 
building up and in destroying. By welding together into 
national communities states long separated, and by throw- 
ing off foreign dominion, it has forged modern Germany, 
Italy, Roumania, Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria. It has 
nerved the resistance of Poles, Finns, Armenians, and others 
against the attempts of alien peoples to absorb them. 
Under its influence, Norway has separated herself from 
Sweden, Austria is in peril of going to pieces, and even Great 
Britain is weakened by Irish disaffection. But the same 
spirit of nationality that awakens the longing for inde- 
pendence also leads to the persecution of recalcitrant minori- 
ties. Race conflicts to-day are as intense in their fierceness 
as the religious ones of earlier times, and are even harder 
to adjust by fair compromise. When favored by fortune, 
the oppressed easily become the oppressors. Governments 
and nations fear ; and not without reason, that what is at 



42 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

first harmless pride in race and language on the part of some 
minority may easily take the form of political sedition 
dangerous to the existence of the state. If the American 
republic is ever threatened with the formation of distinct 
national communities within its borders, its unity for the 
future will cease to be secure. 

One difficulty in dealing with all such topics as this is 
the looseness in meaning of the terms we have to use. 
When we speak of a nation, we usually have in mind an 
independent people with a common language ; but the 
Swiss, the Belgians, the Austrians, are nations, and each 
composed of several nationalities with equally acknowl- 
edged rights. Nor need a nation be all of the same race, — 
according to the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, 
the people of the United States are not. Nor is it always 
politically independent : the Poles are a nation, though they 
are under several governments ; and the term is sometimes 
applied to the Jews, who have neither a common speech 
nor a common dwelling-place. Nevertheless, as the history 
of the last century has shown, the tendency nowadays is 
for nations and nationalities to correspond as nearly as may 
be, and for the idea of nationality to be based on language 
alone, regardless of descent or of the preferences of those 
concerned, — a tendency which the French have experienced 
to their cost in the case of Alsace, which was taken away 
from them on the ground that its inhabitants were Germans, 
whether they wanted to be or not, and hence properly 
belonged to Germany. The movement known as Pan- 
Germanism is a logical outcome of the same theory. The 
earlier nationalistic movements proclaimed the right of 
peoples to determine their own destinies; the later exten- 
sions have tended to look on nationality as a sort of higher 
law which is as much justified in overriding the opposition 
of minorities as were the Northern States of the Union in 
putting down the rebellion of the Southern. Such a doc- 



NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION 43 

trine may easily be pushed to great lengths : sweet reason- 
ableness, not to say common fairness, is seldom a char- 
acteristic of ardent champions of nationality, who, as a 
rule, calmly overlook the most obvious inconsistencies, 
and while warmly advocating a policy for the assimilation 
of all alien elements at home, cry out oppression if the same 
treatment is given to those of their ilk in foreign lands. 
The German who favors severe measures in order to dena- 
tionalize the Poles in Posen is sure to be full of indignation 
at the way in which the German language is discrimi- 
nated against in Hungary and in the Baltic provinces ; and 
many an American who has condemned the iniquity of 
trying to Russianize the Finns or the Armenians believes 
as a matter of course that the English language should 
be imposed as soon as possible on the inhabitants of Porto 
Rico. 

In spite of the very liberal policy followed until recently 
by the United States toward those who sought its shores 
as a refuge and a home, there has always been a certain 
amount of opposition among native Americans to the free 
admission of too many newcomers. Two generations ago, 
in the time of the Know-Nothing party, this opposition 
was stimulated by religious motives, by the dislike of Ameri- 
can Protestants for Irish Roman Catholics; in the days 
when German immigration was at its height, there were 
fears that some whole section of the country might become 
permanently German in character; and to-day, when ele- 
ments from eastern and southern Europe are predominant 
among the new arrivals, many persons dread the disappear- 
ance of the old American type in a flood of aliens belonging 
to what most so-called Anglo-Saxons regard as less highly 
developed, if not actually inferior, races. Race questions 
of all kinds are full of pitfalls for the unwary; and when 
we come to such a subject as the influence on national 
character of an infusion of foreign blood, we are in a domain 



44 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

in which there is a minimum amount of ascertained fact 
and the fullest play for fancy. In such a case, prophecy is 
nothing but guesswork. It does seem clear, however, that 
if the Americans are to impregnate all their citizens with 
their ideals and traditions, and thus to maintain the unity 
of the nation, it is of vital importance that newcomers 
should sooner or later adopt the national tongue instead of 
maintaining a speech of their own. Otherwise, how can 
they ever be completely absorbed into the general mass? 
That any language besides English has a chance of estab- 
lishing itself permanently in the country, few Americans 
believe. Some foreigners have been inclined to regard the 
question as an open one. 

If we turn to the tables of population as given by the 
census of 1900, there seems at first sight to be cause for 
alarm. Of the seventy-six million inhabitants of the United 
States proper, we find that at that date (leaving out of ac- 
count for the moment the colored races, which must be 
taken up separately) forty-one million were of native parent- 
age, ten million of foreign birth, and more than fifteen million 
of foreign parentage, — a total of more than twenty-five 
million aliens as compared with only forty-one million 
whites of native birth. When we remember, too, that the 
annual immigration has of late been over a million, and 
that the birthrate among the foreign population is higher 
than among the native, is there not some reason for 
anxiety ? Will not the United States of the future be like 
Austria or Russia to-day, a country inhabited by many 
different and often discordant nationalities? 

Natural as such fears are, a little study will convince us 
that thus far there is no cause for apprehension of this kind ; 
we may rest assured that the American of the future will 
speak English as his native tongue, except, perhaps, when 
he is born in Porto Rico or some other outlying possession. 
When the situation in the United States is compared in 



NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION 45 

detail with that in Russia or Austria, the difference is 
evident. In the two empires, although there is much 
mingling of population, each nationality has, as a rule, 
its particular district in whieh it outnumbers all others, 
— its own home, consecrated by history and traditions. 
Within the American Union, on the contrary, although the 
inhabitants of foreign origin outnumber the older natives 
in several states, in no single state does one foreign element 
predominate to such an extent that it threatens to become 
supreme, and in no part of the country are foreigners of one 
language and nationality massed in such groups as to be 
formidable to the national unity of the whole. The Germans 
in New York and in the Middle West, the Scandinavians in 
the North-Central States, the French Canadians in northern 
New England, are each so counterbalanced by other ele- 
ments that they are incapable of denationalizing the people 
about them. The different foreign contingents do not even 
seek to coalesce against the older sort of Americans ; it is be- 
tween themselves rather than between the earlier and the 
later comers that national jealousies are usually found. 

From the point of view of language, too, the significance of 
the census figures is greatly diminished by the fact that the 
English, the Scotch, the Irish, and the English Canadians, 
who together form more than one-third of the foreign-born, 
speak English as their native tongue, and hence are an in- 
fluence in favor of unity rather than of diversity. Moreover, 
if we examine in detail the composition of the fifteen million 
Americans of foreign parentage, we discover that one-third 
of them were only of half -foreign parentage, one parent being 
a native. They may thus safely be counted as Americans in 
every sense of the word, and so may most of the other two- 
thirds. Up to the present time, the United States has, in- 
deed, shown remarkable power of assimilation. Even when 
the foreign immigrant has come to the country too old to 
learn English himself, his child is almost certain to do so. 



46 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

According to the census of 1900, among the children of 
foreign parentage who were over ten years of age, the pro- 
portion of those ignorant of English was in only three states 
or territories more than eighteen per cent of the whole, — 
a striking testimony to the enormous influence of the Ameri- 
can public school in preserving the national unity. Mill- 
ions of children of Poles, Bohemians, Italians, Russian Jews, 
and of other aliens of many sorts come together in this 
common meeting-place, and in acquiring first and foremost 
a knowledge of the language of the country in which they are 
to live, get to feel that they are all equally Americans. The 
patriotism that is thus taught them may sometimes be of 
a crude, chauvinistic type, but it is of incalculable service 
in fusing them into one homogeneous mass of future 
American citizens. 

Another influence which until now has helped to draw 
the immigrant into the common interests of American 
life has been the keenness of political strife. The local 
politician never loses a chance to get votes. If he knows 
that in his district there is a colony of Italians or of Russian 
Jews who care nothing about American questions, but whose 
votes he may be able to obtain for his purposes, he is not 
likely to leave them long to themselves ; he may be trusted 
to hunt them out, and to persuade them to be naturalized 
and join the local party organization. His object in 
such cases is, of course, purely selfish, and the means 
of persuasion he employs are often far from admirable ; 
but in the long run it is certainly better for a democratic 
community that every element of the population should be 
interested in its government than that any should feel that 
they are foreigners without voice in the general welfare. 

The three parts of the Union in which, in 1900, more than 
eighteen per cent of the children of foreign parentage had 
no knowledge of English were Texas, Arizona, and New 
Mexico. It is worthy of remark that as this region repre- 



NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION 47 

sents a conquest at the expense of another civilized state, 
its Spanish-speaking population is of older date than its 
English. Without attributing too much importance to 
the resistance of the earlier language in this particular case, 
we may note the circumstance; for it helps to emphasize 
the immense advantage which the United States has en- 
joyed in other sections from the fact that the foreign 
element among its citizens is due not, as in Russia, to con- 
quest, or even to peaceful union, but to voluntary immigra- 
tion. The Russian goes as an alien to the other peoples in 
the empire, and endeavors to impose upon them his lan- 
guage and his way of thought; but, however justified his 
efforts may be from the point of view of the general good of 
the state, to the subject peoples his attempt to Russianize 
them, to deprive them of the nationality which they held for 
generations before he appeared in their land, is an act of 
oppression, which they fiercely resent. In the United States, 
it is the foreigner who comes of his own free will to live 
among strangers and to profit by the advantages which such 
residence offers; he has not, therefore, the same right to 
complain if they insist upon a certain conformity to their 
own type. The Pole, the Finn, the Armenian, feels very 
differently about having to learn Russian in his schools at 
home and about attending English schools in America. In 
the first instance, useful as the language may be in itself, 
he regards the requirement to learn it as an unjustifiable 
imposition if it is designed to supplant his own; in the 
second, he looks on the obligation as a privilege by which 
he is glad to profit. 

The mental attitude of the immigrant toward the people 
of his new country is of vital consequence in determining 
whether he is going to identify himself with them. If he 
feels that he belongs to a superior race, that he represents 
a higher level of civilization than they, he is not likely to 
strive to become one of them any more than is necessary for 



48 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

his material profit; he will keep his home life and all his 
more idealistic interests as unchanged as possible. On the 
other hand, if he has come as a wanderer to a promised 
land, to one where he will not only have greater oppor- 
tunities than he has enjoyed at home, but where he can 
learn from those about him much that will better his con- 
dition, the chances are that he will not live apart or cling 
too jealously to his former inheritance. 

The United States, being a prosperous, progressive com- 
munity, has had the good fortune to find in most of those 
who seek its shores people eager to learn its lessons and 
to share in its life. The immigrant may cherish his pride 
of nationality and love of his former country ; but usually 
he has no feeling of superiority to make him disinclined to 
become one of the nation about him. On the contrary, 
he arrives full of enthusiasms and dreams, some of which, it 
is true, are sadly dissipated later, but most of which are 
realized. Being an American means for him a rise in the 
social scale, as well as an increase in the comforts of life ; 
and he is not ungrateful. 

For a striking instance of the power of influence of this 
kind, we have but to turn to the history of the German 
settlements on the Volga. More than a century and a 
quarter ago several thousand German colonists were planted 
by the Empress Catherine II in this region, where they were 
provided with a liberal allowance of land and various privi- 
leges. It was thought not only that they would prosper 
themselves, but that, by the example of their higher civiliza- 
tion and superior thrift, they might affect for the better the 
Russian peasantry about them. The experiment has, how- 
ever, been a partial failure ; for although, thanks to their 
privileges and to their sterling qualities, the colonists have 
prospered, they have remained a class apart, keeping their 
own language and customs, and neither influencing their 
neighbors nor being influenced by them. Though perfectly 



NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION 49 

loyal subjects, they have never regarded themselves as 
Russians ; and they have resisted to the best of their ability 
the measures of the government to teach them the language 
of the empire. In recent years, as their special privileges 
have been curtailed, a number of them have emigrated to 
the United States, where a curious change is taking place ; 
for these same German colonists who have withstood for so 
long the influences of their Russian environment are yield- 
ing rapidly to their American one. They are beginning to 
acquire English, and in a generation or two will undoubtedly 
disappear in the mass of American citizens, a result due not 
so much to better conditions of life than those which they 
enjoyed in Russia as to their different attitude toward the 
people about them. We may note, too, that the German 
immigrants in southern Brazil have kept their mother tongue 
and their individuality to a greater extent than have their 
fellow-countrymen in the United States, a circumstance 
which may in this case be attributed, at least in part, to 
their feeling of superiority to their neighbors. Whether 
such superiority is real or fancied matters little ; the es- 
sential thing is not the grade of civilization, but the senti- 
ment of aloofness. 

In pure theory, the conceptions of religion and those of 
nationality have nothing to do with each other; but in 
practice, as all history shows, they are very often con- 
fused, and the idea of "our God" and a "chosen people" 
appeals strongly to the human mind. Doubtless there have 
been many violent race conflicts in which the rival elements 
have been of the same creed — as to-day in Austria-Hun- 
gary; but the worst are those in which each nationality 
is the champion of a particular church, and hence feels 
that it is fighting for its faith as well as for its individu- 
ality. In such cases the clergy, instead of being apostles 
of peace, whose mission is to allay passions, are promoters 
of discord. Differences in religious belief also prevent 



50 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

mixed marriages, the most effectual means of fusing two 
peoples into one. The fact that the lines of cleavage have 
not coincided has done more than anything else to preserve 
the peace between the nationalities and between the faiths 
in Switzerland. Among both the German and the French 
Swiss, Catholics and Protestants are so evenly divided that 
religious and national questions, instead of inflaming each 
other, act as mutual restraints ; but in western Russia, where 
religion and nationality are nearly inseparable, — Pole and 
Catholic, German and Protestant, Russian and Orthodox, 
meaning one and the same thing, — the task of combining 
these elements into one nation, or even of maintaining the 
peace between them is, indeed, formidable. 

Here, again, the United States has been singularly fortu- 
nate. Although at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
the Catholics formed but a small minority of the population, 
which was looked on somewhat askance by the rest, they 
had full religious liberty. The first Catholic immigrants to 
come in considerable numbers were the Irish, who, though 
they bore no love to England, spoke the English language, 
and thus never felt themselves to be foreigners in their new 
home. In spite of some natural friction with the American 
Protestant element, they soon became an integral part of 
the community. When later Catholics of foreign speech 
— Italians, Poles, Bohemians, French Canadians — began 
to arrive in force, they found to welcome them a Catholic 
church, large, flourishing, and so thoroughly patriotic in its 
feeling that, far from helping the newcomers to safeguard 
their own nationalities, it has served to Americanize them 
in language as well as in ideas. Another most fortunate 
circumstance is that the Catholic church in the United 
States is not sectional. Its adherents are scattered over 
the country, varying in strength in the different parts, 1 but 

1 Massachusetts, the home of the Puritan, is now a Roman Catholic 
state. 



NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION 51 

so thoroughly mixed up with others that they nowhere form 
a compact block, as they do in French Canada and in many 
parts of Europe. There seems to be little chance anywhere 
of such clear-cut divisions into Catholic and Protestant dis- 
tricts as we find in Germany and Switzerland. 

Owing to various causes, some of which are easy, others 
very hard, to determine, the divers nationalities among 
the immigrants to America are not assimilated with equal 
rapidity. Some of them — the Scotch, the Irish, the English, 
and even more the English Canadians — are, for practical 
purposes, assimilated from the beginning; for, although 
there is a certain clannishness among them, it does not 
seriously affect their value as citizens. The Irish differ more 
from the earlier American type than do the English; but 
they are more desirous of becoming citizens at once, and they 
play a prominent part in local politics, which have been 
much affected by their activity. Whatever may be the 
psychological influence of these elements in the make-up of 
the future American character, they constitute, from the 
point of view of language, a reinforcement to the earlier in- 
habitants and a powerful aid in the maintenance of national 
unity. 

In the last twenty years, Jewish emigrants from Russia 
have been coming into the United States in overwhelming 
numbers. Although they have spread over the country, 
they tend to congregate in the great cities, and particularly 
in and about New York, where there are now some seven 
hundred and fifty thousand of them. Very few, on their 
arrival, know any English ; and they differ much in men- 
tality from the average American citizen. On the other 
hand, they have no national idiom, but only a jargon to 
which they are seldom attached, and no people are more 
eager to learn English as soon as possible, or readier to 
adopt it as their medium of expression not only in public 
but in their homes, — a circumstance which often leads to 



52 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

a really tragic difference between parents and children, for, 
with the speech, the latter are apt to abandon the habits, 
the opinions, and even the faith of their fathers. 

In spite of this ready adaptability on the part of the Jew, 
there is in the United States an anti-Semitic feeling, new 
in its present intensity, and, as in France, quite at variance 
with the traditions of two generations ago. It is strong- 
est among the upper classes. In most American cities 
few or no outspoken Jews will be found in fashionable 
society; and even in the universities in which they are at 
all numerous, they are left much to themselves by the 
other students. The subject is rather carefully avoided 
by the newspapers; for the American Jews are already 
a power to be feared, and quick to take offence. 

In the United States, as elsewhere, the French are noted 
for their tenacity in maintaining their national individuality. 
If they had been more numerous at the time of the Louisiana 
Purchase, it is quite possible that a considerable section of 
the South might long have retained a French character. As 
it was, they were soon outnumbered by the American set- 
tlers; and as time has gone on, their significance has 
dwindled more and more. French society held its own in 
New Orleans till the days of the Civil War, but in the ruin 
of the planters which accompanied the conflict it received 
a blow from which it never recovered, and though French 
memories in Louisiana to-day are interesting and pictur- 
esque, they are not politically important. France herself 
has contributed few immigrants to the American population 
during the nineteenth century ; and those she has sent have 
not been agriculturalists, but have followed certain special 
occupations, and thus have scattered all over the country 
instead of concentrating in any one region. 

The quota of French Canadians has been of much more 
importance. Attracted by the high wages of the New 
England mills, the "habitants" have come down from 






NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION 53 

Canada in very considerable numbers, until, according to 
the census of 1900, there were three hundred and ninety-five 
thousand of them in the country and four hundred and 
thirty-six thousand children born in the United States, of 
whom the great majority are to be found in the northern 
New England States, and chiefly in a few manufacturing 
towns. As they keep much to themselves, they form an 
element which is but slowly affected by its surroundings. 
A few writers, who have not sufficiently investigated the 
question, have talked of the probability of their Frenchify- 
ing northern New England. There is no reason to expect 
anything of this kind, for, although the process of assimi- 
lation is more gradual in their case than in that of most 
others, it is just as surely at work. After they have settled 
in the United States, they are, for instance, less under 
the influence of the church, which has been one of the 
strongest forces in preserving their nationality in Canada ; 
and they show this independence even when they have 
their own priests, and not, as sometimes happens, Irish ones. 
They are also beginning to learn English, and to take an 
interest in politics. Although in certain important centres 
they form a large proportion of the population, and have 
occupied some abandoned farms, they have not yet spread 
over the country districts; and in Boston, the chief city 
of New England, their number is insignificant. Of late 
years the immigration of the French Canadians has de- 
clined, and it does not seem likely to begin again on the old 
scale. Their places in the mills are being taken to a certain 
extent by Portuguese, Armenians, and others. 

The Scandinavians, in spite of the fact that they cling 
to their own language with tenacity and often live rather 
secluded lives, are viewed with general favor ; for they have 
the reputation of being steady and industrious, and, unlike 
most of the other immigrants to-day, they go chiefly to the 
country rather than to the towns. In the northern parts 



54 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

of the land, they encounter conditions of climate and life 
resembling those to which they were accustomed at home ; 
and in the richer soil with its abundant crops they find 
opportunities to prosper such as they never knew before. 
They constitute a very important element, but not one 
large enough to threaten seriously the English-speaking 
character of the region. They are most numerous in 
Minnesota, where (including their children born in the 
United States) they number over half a million, or less 
than a third of the total population of the state. In 1900 
the two hundred and thirty-six thousand foreign-born 
Scandinavians in Minnesota were divided into sixteen 
thousand Danes, one hundred and five thousand Nor- 
wegians, and one hundred and fifteen thousand Swedes; 
but the three nationalities, in spite of their nearness of kin, 
do not always live on cordial terms with one another. 

The Italians, Poles, Bohemians, Slovaks, Hungarians, 
etc., who in recent years have sought the United States 
in ever increasing swarms, usually settle either in the cities 
or in the manufacturing and mining districts, and con- 
tribute little to the agricultural population. All of these 
elements are to-day more backward and ignorant, more 
alien to the native American in ways of thought and in 
habits of life, than were their predecessors of twenty years 
ago, a fact which, taken in connection with their large 
numbers, has caused some disquiet. But we must not 
forget that the ordinary statistics of immigration do not 
convey a perfectly correct impression: besides taking no 
account of arrivals by land (and thus leaving out the Cana- 
dians), they include immigrants who have been in America 
before, but have returned home for a time, a practice 
especially common among the Italians. Then, too, if we 
are to get at the true annual addition to the foreign-born 
population, — an addition greater in itself than ever before, 
but not a much larger percentage of the whole than it was 



NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION 55 

two generations back, — we must subtract all those who, 
for one cause or another, return to their own country. All 
this, of course, serves only to attenuate, not to change, the 
fact that a veritable flood of aliens arrives every year from 
southern and eastern Europe. Their presence, however, 
though it may aggravate certain social dangers, cannot yet 
be regarded as a political peril; for no one nationality 
among them can hope to acquire a permanent foothold as 
such, nor has any shown desire to do so. Moreover, the fact 
that the newcomers flock to the cities rather than to the 
country, if perhaps economically unfortunate, tends, never- 
theless, to bring them more quickly under the influence of 
their surroundings, and, through the powerful influence of 
the public schools, to promote the spread of English among 
the children. In some of the congested mining and manu- 
facturing districts the process of converting them into in- 
telligent American citizens is much slower. 

The Germans form the largest and the most important 
element from the European continent. In 1900 they in- 
cluded 2,669,164 foreign-born, and 5,155,283 children of 
German parentage, though of this number 1,580,874 had 
but one German parent. Can we marvel that patriotic 
Germans lament the loss of this enormous number of fellow- 
countrymen who, had they gone to Australia, or Brazil, or 
Argentine, might have built up a future great German state ? 
Most German writers have had to console themselves with 
the unsubstantial satisfaction of pointing out how beneficial 
these lost sheep have been to the New World, and with 
the hope that they will retain their national affections as 
long as possible ; but here and there a more imaginative 
spirit, excited perhaps by the brilliant dreams of Pan- 
Germanism, has managed to believe that they may hold to 
their national individuality and add to the number of 
German-speaking peoples in the world. A first glance at 
the figures may, indeed, seem to justify confidence of this 



56 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

kind; but a closer examination leads all whose judgment 
has not been warped by their patriotism to admit that such 
a prospect is hopeless of realization. 

Curiously enough, if there was ever a danger that a portion 
of America would become permanently German, the peril 
existed in the earlier, rather than in the later, period of the 
national history. During the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries there was a large German immigration into 
Pennsylvania: it has been estimated that at the time 
of the Revolution the so-called Pennsylvania Dutch formed 
one-half the population of the colony. These people 
led a life much to themselves, and, if they had received 
reinforcements at a later date, might perhaps have 
become the nucleus of a considerable German community. 
Such, however, was not the case. In the course of three- 
quarters of a century after the war for American independ- 
ence, the Pennsylvania Dutch, though still retaining many of 
their older characteristics, had become in the main Angli- 
cized ; and when the new current of German immigra- 
tion set in with force, it did not turn to this particular 
region, nor did it, indeed, concentrate itself in any one 
territory. 

The result of this dispersion is that, numerous as are the 
Americans of German origin, they are nowhere prepon- 
derant, the highest proportion in any single state — 710,000 
in Wisconsin, out of a total population of 2,009,000 — 
being little more than one-third of the whole population. 
The greatest number of Germans to be found in any state 
is 1,217,000 in New York; but even here they formed, in 
1900, barely more than one-sixth of the total population of 
7,268,894. Moreover, immigration from Germany has fallen 
off enormously in the last few years. Between 1880 and 
1890 it numbered nearly one million and a half (1,452,970) ; 
from 1890 to 1900 it was not much more than one-third as 
large (543,922) ; for the year 1906 it was about thirty-seven 



NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION 57 

thousand, or less than the total number of Germans from 
Austria, Russia, etc. Such small accessions as the German- 
Americans at present receive are not enough to make up for 
the continual loss which they suffer by death and by absorp- 
tion. Furthermore, even if economic causes in Germany 
should produce a fresh immigration on the old scale (which 
is hardly likely), the time is past when it could make a 
serious impression. 

One reason for this is the well-known truth, admitted 
by German writers themselves, that no elements of the 
foreign population, except the Russian Jews, are more 
eager than the Germans to learn the English language or 
readier to denationalize themselves and become patriotic 
Americans. This has long been the case ; and coupled 
with the sterling character of most of the German im- 
migrants, it explains why they have been regarded with 
particular favor. No mistake could be greater than to think 
of most of the children of German parents in the United 
States as foreigners. Not only do the great majority of 
them speak English rather than German by preference, but 
many avoid the language of their fathers, and some are 
even ashamed of it. Certainly they all deem themselves 
thoroughly American. For that matter, so do a large pro- 
portion of the German-Americans born in Germany. Those 
who have come to their new home at an advanced age cling 
to their native customs and language, keep up their societies, 
cherish old memories, and always feel a little strange in their 
new environment; but the young folks are little affected 
by such sentiments. So strong, indeed, is the loyalty of the 
German-Americans that, according to the opinion of com- 
petent observers, although they would regard a war between 
their adopted country and the Fatherland as a terrible 
calamity, they would nevertheless, in such an event, be true 
to the former. Another evidence of their denationalization 
is seen in the fact that in the United States to-day German 



58 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

schools and newspapers are declining in numbers, and 
German-American literature has taken no deep root. The 
situation may, indeed, best be summed up in the words of 
a recent German writer, "Das Deutsch-Amerikanerthum 
hat nur eine Gegenwart aber kerne Zukunft," — German- 
Americanism has only a present, but no future. 1 

Until recently the traditional policy of the Americans has 
been to welcome newcomers to their shores. They have 
proclaimed the right of expatriation as part of the inalien- 
able privilege of the freeman ; and with happy confidence 
in themselves, their land, and their institutions, they have 
felt sure that the foreigner would be only too glad to 
identify himself with them as soon as possible. Experience 
has shown that on the whole they have been right. For gen- 
erations the United States has been able to remain the land 
of liberty, with wide-open doors for the poor and the op- 
pressed, who have been taken freely into the family, and in 
return have not been wanting in gratitude, but have made 
good use of the hospitality accorded to them. 

Of late years a certain reaction has set in. Alarmed at 
the coming of so many aliens, of whom a smaller and 
smaller proportion belong to the English-speaking peoples, 
the Americans are becoming imbued with that advanced 
form of nationalism characteristic of the present day, 
which demands uniformity of language on the part of all 
the inhabitants of the state. Although they have not, like 
the Germans and the Russians, applied severe pressure to 
the national minorities, there has been a growing tendency 
to teach "patriotism," — for instance, in the cult of the 
flag, — and to insist on a prompt knowledge of English. 
People feel less safe than they did a generation ago in 
leaving matters to the quiet working of time. In certain 
western states where German was formeily the medium 
of instruction in some of the public schools, it has been 

1 Polenz, Das Land der Zukunft, p. 381. 



NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION 5$ 

displaced by English. In other states a knowledge of 
English is requisite for the suffrage ; and by the federal 
law of 1906 the ability to speak English is henceforth 
necessary for naturalization. This last step is an important 
departure from the earlier policy of the republic ; for it 
means that a larger contingent of immigrants will keep 
their foreign allegiance, a circumstance not only undesirable 
in itself, but likely to complicate the relations of the United 
States with other governments. Although there is much 
to be said in favor of the new provision, it cannot be denied 
that, whether wise or not, it belongs to the class of nation- 
alistic legislation which Americans are prone to condemn 
in other countries. 1 

Not merely in regard to the foreigners actually settled 
in the United States have precautions been taken, but 
immigration itself has recently been made more difficult 
than it used to be. Mormons, contract laborers, paupers, 
anarchists, diseased persons, are excluded with increasing 
rigor ; and in view of the ever greater tide of arrivals from 
southern and eastern Europe, the demand grows louder that 
some sort of barrier be erected to check this invasion. 
There is much division of opinion on the subject. The 
capitalists, wishing, as employers of labor, to obtain it on as 
cheap terms as possible, are entirely opposed to restrictions ; 
and they are supported by the older idealist sentiment that 
the land of liberty should be, as it has been, free to all, a ref- 
uge for the oppressed and the unfortunate. On the other 
hand, the labor-unions, in spite of the sympathy of the for- 
eigners among them for their fellow-countrymen, dread the 
competition to which unlimited immigration exposes them. 
Their fears are shared by disinterested thinkers who, anxious 

'The same statute curtails an old but growing evil, the practice by 
which foreigners have obtained American citizenship for no other purpose 
than that they might enjoy its protection in their own land, — an abuse 
which has made many troubles for American diplomats in the past. 



60 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

only for the welfare of the country as a whole, are seriously 
alarmed at the enormous quantity of new elements which 
American society is required to digest, and believe that 
it is time to call a halt. Several measures looking in this 
direction have been voted in the last few years, but the law 
of 1907 did not mark any great progress, for the provisions 
requiring an educational test of the immigrant and a higher 
property qualification were struck out of the bill. Still, 
fresh legislation on the subject is not improbable, especially 
if there is to be a period of financial depression, with a glut 
in the labor market. 

It is obvious that the American people of the future will 
have more variety in their ancestry than their fathers had, and 
this variety may, and probably will, produce serious changes 
in the national characteristics; but what these changes 
will be, no man can predict. There will be local differences, 
too, in spite of the increasing ease of communication due to 
modern invention ; and such local variations may be ac- 
centuated by a preponderance of one or another national 
strain in the blood. They will hardly be greater, however, 
than those of the Prussian and the Bavarian, of the Norman 
and the Provencal, of the Piedmontese and the Neapolitan 
to-day, with their long ages of local life and separate de- 
velopment behind them, and yet none of these differences 
seriously threatens the unity of Germany, France, or Italy. 
In the same way, the United States of the future bids fair 
to be an English-speaking community, of mixed origin, 
but fused by common traditions, interests, aspirations, 
and language into one essentially homogeneous people. 
Unfortunately this assurance leaves out of account a ques- 
tion of great magnitude. In all our considerations thus 
far we have been thinking only of the white race, and the 
conclusions reached apply to it alone. The problem of the 
colored races on the American continent is quite another 
matter. 



CHAPTER III 

RACE QUESTIONS 

ALL the world powers own land which they have won 
by the sword, and which they hold in subjection by 
sheer force. They all have to pay the penalty in one form 
or another. In a few fortunate instances — as in that of 
the territories which the Americans took from Mexico — 
the lands acquired have been practically vacant ; the earlier 
population has been so scant that it has soon given way to 
the later comers. Ordinarily, however, instead of disappear- 
ing, it has increased in numbers ; and, thanks often to 
the regeneration which better government has produced, 
it is now becoming insistent on what it believes to be its 
rights. Under a despotism, when all subjects are so far 
below the ruler that a little more or less is not of much 
importance, conquerors and conquered may be on about 
the same level, — their monarch is equally lord of them all ; 
but in these days of sovereign peoples, the subject ones are 
feeling more sharply the humiliation of their position. 
They, too, have had an awakening, and are beginning to 
clamor for liberty and equality. With such pretensions, a 
king by divine right need have no sympathy ; but a govern- 
ment based on democratic principles and the rights of man 
cannot logically reject them, except on the ground that the 
claimants are unworthy, — that is to say, that they belong 
to inferior, or at least backward, races. 

The treatment of alien races gives rise to complex 

61 



62 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

questions, some of them of infinite difficulty. The simplest 
ones relate to the peoples lowest in the social scale. It is 
comparatively easy to rule over mere savages, especially 
if they are, like the natives of tropical Africa, far enough 
away ; for in such cases firmness, honesty, patience, and 
common sense, qualities in which the English as colonial 
administrators have been preeminent, are the chief requi- 
sites. It is another matter to handle people with a 
higher grade of intelligence and with a history and civiliza- 
tion of their own, such as the Hindus, the Egyptians, or the 
Arabs of Algeria and Tunis ; for the more that is done to 
educate them and to improve their condition, the more 
impatient they become at being kept in a state of politi- 
cal inferiority. 

Every nation holding colonies will have to face such 
problems sooner or later. In this respect the Germans have 
least to trouble them ; for their outlying possessions are not 
numerous, and the few they have are inhabited by peoples 
who are in such a low state of civilization that it will be long 
before they can claim self-government of any kind. Many 
Germans, to be sure, think of the Poles within their own 
boundaries as an inferior breed ; but this inferiority would 
vanish at once if only the Poles would consent to be Ger- 
manized. Greater France contains more subjects than citi- 
zens, and the British Empire has some six inhabitants of 
the subject races to one of the ruling people. Both em- 
pires include — one in north, the other in south, Africa — 
possessions of the kind most difficult to manage ; namely, 
those where the native population is increasing rapidly, 
but where there are also not merely a few officials and 
merchants, but a large body of immigrant colonists. The 
same thing is true of Japan in Korea. It is in such cases, 
when conquerors and conquered meet in every walk of 
life, that it is hardest to establish good relations between 
them. The arrogance of the privileged poor white or the 



RACE QUESTIONS 63 

coolie is more galling than the domination of the official ; and 
the task of the home government in reconciling the support 
which it is obliged to give its colonists with its duty toward 
the natives under its rule is arduous in the extreme. France 
and Great Britain, however, enjoy, like Germany, the im- 
mense blessing of having no race questions in their home 
countries, no populations of different color : whatever may 
happen at a distance, house and home at least are secure 
from the horrors of race war. In this respect Russia is less 
favorably situated, for her various peoples all live in one 
unbroken block of territory, though most of them are 
within fairly definite separate areas. But they shade into 
one another to such an extent that it would be hard to say 
just where the inferior peoples begin. From top to bottom 
there is no such gap as there is between the American and 
the negro. 

Of all countries, the United States is afflicted with the 
most complicated race problems. The Filipinos and the 
Hawaiians are indeed far way, and America could get 
along pretty well without them ; but inside her own borders 
are populations whose presence brings with it difficulties 
that tax all the wisdom of her statesmen and make every 
demand on the self-control, not to say the generosity, of 
her citizens. Of these populations, only an insignificant 
fraction represents the original dispossessed inhabitants: 
the vast majority have inherited an even worse grievance, 
for they are the descendants of imported slaves. The 
proper treatment of these people is a matter of momentous 
importance for the future of the republic. All we have time 
for here is to note a few facts essential to an understanding 
of the present situation. 

Taken together, the various non-European elements in 
the dominions of the United States number about eighteen 
million persons, belonging to five separate branches of the 
human family, usually known as the Indian, the Negro, the 



64 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

Mongolian, the Polynesian, and the Malay. These five races 
differ from one another profoundly, in some cases perhaps 
more profoundly than they do from the white man ; and the 
questions which arise in dealing with them are not at all 
the same. Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics, 
not so much of the races themselves as of their relations 
with the whites, which are common to them all. 

To begin with, we have to reckon with the ingrained 
belief of the white man in his own superiority. This senti- 
ment is probably stronger among people of north-European, 
than among those of south-European, blood; and it is 
supposed, rightly or wrongly, to be especially developed 
among the English-speaking peoples. It is something that 
goes deeper than ordinary national pride ; it seems, indeed, 
a matter of physical instinct almost as much as of reason. 
The successes of Japan may have given a rude blow to the 
complacent assumption of the peoples of Europe and America 
that they were called upon to rule the world ; but this has 
not altered a whit the determination of the Californian or 
the Australian to keep his land, at any cost, " a white man's 
country." The man of European blood will gladly have 
servants of any sort; he will welcome the Asiatic (though 
seldom the African) as an honored guest in his university, 
and even in his home; he will like him and admire him; 
but he resents his coming into competition with him on 
even terms, and he would reject with indignation the sug- 
gestion that a man of another race might marry a member 
of his family. How many of the countless Englishmen and 
Americans who sympathized enthusiastically with the 
Japanese in the late war would prefer Japanese to Rus- 
sians as husbands for their daughters or sisters? And 
yet the Japanese have entered so whole-heartedly into 
European civilization, and have proved themselves such 
adepts at it, that we can imagine their being regarded as 
virtually one of the white peoples. 



RACE QUESTIONS 65 

In the matter of interbreeding between the white and the 
colored races we find curious inconsistencies. The white 
male has seldom shown much aversion to consorting with 
women of any color, and to having children by them. In 
India, in Japan, in the Philippines, — everywhere it has 
been the same story; and, when we reflect on the origin 
of the millions of mulattoes in the South, there is something 
almost comical in the heat of the feeling of Southerners 
about the danger of "miscegenation." There have, also, 
been legal unions with Asiatic and even with African women, 
but they have been rare ; and the white has always recoiled 
with horror from the idea of his womenkind having sexual 
intercourse with men of another color. In the eyes of the 
English colony in India, of the French in Indo-China, of 
the American in the Philippines, a fellow-countryman who 
weds a native woman, even one of exalted rank, loses caste, 
but a white woman who marries a native man is at once be- 
yond the pale. Such sentiments are, of course, not equally 
extreme in regard to all races; but the instinctive aver- 
sion is always there. 

Even if we were to admit that all such antipathies are 
based on prejudice and should vanish with increasing 
enlightenment and human brotherhood, there is still a 
reason why we should hesitate before approving of mixed 
marriages: it is by no means sure that the offspring of 
parents racially far apart are likely to be satisfactory. 
Among English-speaking peoples especially there is a strong 
conviction to the contrary ; and this conviction cannot be 
dismissed contemptuously as mere prejudice, for there is 
sound evidence in support of it. At all events, the popu- 
lar saying that children of mixed blood have the vices of 
both sides and the virtues of neither corresponds with a wide- 
spread belief. Granting that many an individual mulatto or 
Eurasian may be in every respect of a fine type of humanity, 
does it necessarily follow that a large population of this 



66 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

sort would be a good addition to mankind ? Or ; even if we 
think that the mulatto is superior to the unadulterated 
negro, do we want the white race to be thrown into the 
melting-pot in order to produce this blend? But we 
need not take up the question of superiority at all: mere 
differences may be sufficient, as in the case of certain ani- 
mals. Dogs, for instance, can often be profitably crossed if 
they belong to species not too far apart ; but if kinds that 
are too alien to one another are bred together, the product 
is a worthless mongrel. May not something of the same 
sort hold true of human beings ? The fact that the chief 
European nations of the present day have been formed 
by the mingling of several elements not greatly dissimilar 
does not prove it to be desirable that the American people 
of the future should be a compound of whites, negroes, and 
Chinese. 

The inhabitants of southern Europe seem to mix, not 
only more freely but perhaps with better result, with some 
of the darker races than do people farther north. For this 
there may be physiological reasons. But in all such ques- 
tions we are on very debatable ground, and our theories 
and beliefs cannot yet claim acceptance as ascertained 
scientific truth. One thing, however, is certain, — public 
opinion in the United States is overwhelmingly opposed to 
intermarriage with either Asiatics or Africans. This aversion, 
which goes so far as to produce strict prohibitory legislation 
in some states, is a fact of the utmost magnitude ; for as 
long as it exists there can never be amalgamation on a large 
scale between the different races in the country. We should 
entertain no illusions on this point. The colored elements 
may live in perfect agreement with the whites ; they may be 
thoroughly patriotic in sentiment, and may feel that they 
are as American as anybody; but they will still remain 
something different, with traditions and mentality not quite 
the same, — something insoluble in the body politic. Com- 



RACE QUESTIONS 67 

plete fusion is not even an ideal to be aimed at : all that we 
can hope to obtain is harmony and a community of ideals. 

In considering the position of the different non-European 
peoples in the territories of the United States, we may begin 
by disassociating those in the insular possessions from those 
on the continent. The problems connected with the former 
are in many respects the same as those which have to be 
dealt with by other powers owning dependencies, and may 
best be taken up in connection with the colonial policy of 
the country. But the latter class, the representatives of 
the colored races in the Union itself, by their presence im- 
pose on the Americans difficulties peculiarly their own. 

At the present day, the question of the American Indians 
is chiefly a sentimental one, and no longer of serious political 
importance. In 1905 there were 284,079 of them on reser- 
vations aggregating about ninety thousand square miles; 
a few thousand more are dispersed throughout the coun- 
try. Although no one will pretend that the history of 
the treatment they have received has been creditable to the 
Americans either in colonial times or since, there has un- 
doubtedly been a great deal of exaggeration on the subject. 
The idea that a dense native population has been swept 
away by the sword and the fire-water of the white man is 
not historically correct. When the New World was dis- 
covered, various peoples, scattered about in unequal 
numbers over vast regions, were in possession of the two 
American continents. Those occupying the territory of 
what is now the United States were for the most part 
warlike seminomadic tribes, who supported themselves by 
hunting, or by a little rough cultivation of the soil, carried 
on by the women. Although we cannot estimate accurately 
what the total Indian population was when the whites first 
arrived, there is no reason to believe that it was much 
greater than it is now. The tribes were numerous but 
small. Even the powerful confederation of the Iroquois, 



68 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

who terrorized a tract of the size of France, was never able 
to bring ten thousand warriors into the field. 

As in Siberia and in Australia, the native population was 
doomed from the first ; for, however picturesque and attrac- 
tive the noble savage may be, he is a savage, whom it takes 
long generations to convert from his nomadic habits to the 
humdrum work of civilized life. A race of lazy warriors 
cannot be transformed in a day into industrious farmers. 
Such a change might, indeed, have taken place in course of 
time, as it has in Mexico, if white immigrants had not 
come in such numbers as to upset everything. The colonist 
can never be made to see the justice of leaving great 
stretches of good land lying idle in the hands of an in- 
dolent red man when he himself is prepared to develop 
them, — for his own benefit, to be sure, but also for that of 
society. Under such circumstances he easily gets to feel 
that "the only good Indian is a dead Indian." 

The government at Washington has, in the main, tried 
to do its best for the wards of the nation; but the clam- 
orous demands of the frontiersmen, the pressing claims of 
greedy white adventurers with political influence, the dif- 
ficulty of preserving order and, still more, of preventing 
the illicit sale of liquor in thinly settled districts, and 
finally, owing to a deficient civil service, the appointment 
of unworthy local agents, — all these things have proved 
too much for the American people and their representatives, 
in spite of honest intentions. The tale of the relations be- 
tween the white man and the red in America forms one of 
the many unsatisfactory chapters in the history of dealings 
between the stronger and the weaker races of the world ; 
but this chapter is neither so disgraceful nor so important 
as has been made out. 

To-day the red men form less than a half of one per cent 
of the population of the Union ; and, though the birth- 
rate among them is about equal to the deathrate, they are 



RACE QUESTIONS 69 

apparently doomed to extinction. Already many so-called 
Indians have either white or black blood in their veins, 
and sooner or later they will all doubtless be absorbed by 
the surrounding population, which they are not numerous 
enough to affect materially. The virtues of the Indian 
have been such as to appeal to the imagination, and ro- 
mantic fiction has helped to make him popular. Any 
one who has seen an athletic team from one of the In- 
dian schools in the United States playing against white 
students of a university will bear witness to the fact that 
the red men have the sympathy of the crowd. They are 
also assured of the friendly feelings of their white antago- 
nists, antagonists who would never consent to play against 
a team composed of blacks. 

The foreign relations of the United States have been little 
affected by the presence of the Indian. The employment of 
savages by the mother country in the war against her colo- 
nists roused bitter feeling, and was one of the grievances 
set forth in the Declaration of Independence ; yet it may be 
doubted whether the patriots would have had any scruples 
themselves if they had been able to find valuable native 
allies. Again, some years later, the fact that the Spaniards 
were unable to control the Indians in Florida served as 
both reason and pretext for American interference. 

Far more difficult than the Indian question is the negro 
question in America. It presents one of the most serious 
problems which any nation in the world is called upon to 
solve ; but it is useless to try to shirk it. The facts must be 
faced as they are, whether pleasant or not. 

To begin with, the negro question is not going to solve 
itself. In the United States to-day are about nine million 
colored people, either blacks or mulattoes. These may be 
separated by fierce jealousies, and one may look down on the 
other; but in the eyes of the whites both are negroes. 
Moreover, far from being ready to disappear, they are 



70 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

steadily increasing in numbers; and there seems to be no 
reason why this increase should not continue, at least for 
some time. In fact, census figures show that in the so- 
called "black belt" the disproportion between the two 
races is becoming constantly greater; the presence of so 
many negroes militates against white immigration, and 
where the blacks have a considerable preponderance of 
numbers the whites tend to move away, and more blacks 
come in. 

Owing to the social system produced by slavery, the 
colored population before the war was continually receiving 
fresh infusions of white blood ; but this is no longer true, 
except in very slight measure. Marriage between the 
two races is sternly forbidden by the laws of many states, 
and even illegitimate connections are now frowned upon by 
public opinion in the South in a way unknown in old days ; 
hence the negro bids fair to revert in time to a more purely 
black type than that now prevailing. Amalgamation is 
quite out of the question. 

In the second place certain political truths must be 
recognized. Experience since the Civil War has proved 
that the Southern whites will go to almost any lengths 
rather than submit to "black domination." That the 
South, with its inherited slave-holding traditions, is an ab- 
solute unit on this point may not be surprising. What is 
surprising is that, within the lifetime of thousands of men 
who fought for the freedom of the slaves, the victorious 
North has accepted the Southern view to such a degree that 
the dominant Republican party has submitted, with very 
little murmuring, to a series of laws on the part of the 
Southern States designed to evade, if they do not actually 
violate, the amendments to the Constitution guaranteeing 
equality to the negro. This extraordinary change of atti- 
tude is due in part to the abuses committed in the period 
of negro domination, of the so-called "carpet-bag rule"; 



RACE QUESTIONS 71 

but the real causes lie deeper. The substitution in the 
North, during the last twenty years, of whites for blacks 
in such occupations as those of waiters and barbers seems 
to point to an increased, rather than a diminished, natural 
aversion. Now that the negro can no longer provoke the 
sympathy which he excited in the days of Uncle Tom's 
Cabin, he finds fewer champions. Moreover, the political 
philosophy of the day, with its theories of race inferiority, 
does not make for equal treatment. Only by force of arms 
can the South be obliged to grant him the promised rights ; 
and there is no disposition in the North to resort to any 
such pressure. On the contrary, many people in that 
section sympathize with the attitude of the Southerners, 
and pity them for having such a terrible burden on their 
hands. 

In the South, at the present time, the relations between 
the two races are, to say the least, very unsatisfactory, — 
worse, perhaps, than they were twenty years ago. Among 
the negroes, there exists a sullen resentment at the loss of 
their political rights, as well as at the increasing tendency to 
segregate them in the public conveyances and, in general, to 
impress upon them unmistakably that they belong to a lower 
order of mankind. Among the whites, the fear of negro 
rule has grown into a perfect frenzy of wrath against what- 
ever appears like an assertion on the part of the colored 
population of political or of social equality. Even their 
education is regarded with a suspicion that reminds one 
of the days of slavery; and the situation with regard to 
lynching is terrible. When the whites in country districts 
get to feel that their women, unless accompanied, are not 
safe against assault a few hundred yards from their own 
homes, their exasperation makes them capable of any act 
of savagery. An epidemic of social crime on the one hand 
has engendered an epidemic of wild lawless punishment on 
the other, leaving both sides more embittered than ever. 



72 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

To add to the difficulties, the two compete with each other 
in daily life to an extent unknown before. 

Under the system of slavery there was no actual rivalry 
between the black man and the white: each had his own 
sphere of action, somewhat as the different classes of society in 
mediaeval Europe had theirs. But the feelings of an ancient 
aristocracy forced to meet a newly emancipated lower class 
on even terms are mild compared with those of white work- 
men at the prospect that their standard of wages may be 
kept down to the lowest point by the competition of a former 
servile population of another color. It is small wonder 
that the labor-unions do not admit negroes to their ranks, 
but look on them as the ignorant tool of the capitalist 
and a peril to the white workingman. It is to be feared 
that the recent industrial development of the South may 
embitter, rather than allay, the existing hostility. 

In regard to the progress made by the negroes since they 
have had the gift of freedom, there have been hot disputes. 
Such statistics as we have are, on the whole, encouraging, 
whereas the violent criticisms that we hear rest on alle- 
gations not always easy to prove. These questions need 
not be discussed ; but it is worth remarking that the negro, 
unlike the Russian peasant, was not provided with land 
on which to support himself in his new liberty. True, the 
mujik with his land has not prospered in a way to give 
cause for envy ; but he has had disadvantages of his own to 
contend with. 

The probable result of the present tendencies in the South 
will be an increasing segregation of the two races. Except 
in the cities, they may come to inhabit almost separate ter- 
ritories, an outcome which might easily prove disastrous 
from an economic point of view. Some persons fear, too, 
that the negroes of the black belt, if left to themselves, 
may relapse into something very like barbarism. 

The negro question has more than once affected the for- 



RACE QUESTIONS 73 

eign policy of the United States: the desire to get new 
lands for slavery was the main reason for the annexation 
of Texas, for the Mexican War, and for the attempts to 
acquire Cuba a few years later ; and the hatred of the South 
for the emancipated slave prevented the recognition of Haiti 
up to the time of the Civil War. At the present day, the 
relations of the republic to the West India Islands, and in 
a lesser degree to Latin America and even to the Philippines, 
are complicated by the race problem at home. 

Abounding in troubles as the whole situation is, it has at 
least one good feature, — it is free from conflict of religions 
or of civilizations. The blacks and the whites in the United 
States do not represent two different types of culture. The 
negro, though an alien element, possesses no civilization of his 
own : such as he has, he has got from the white man. The 
blacks brought into the colonies for generations came from 
different tribes, speaking independent languages; and in 
no case were enough of them imported from any given 
region at one time for them to maintain their native tongue 
in their new home. The American negroes speak English, 
and nothing but English. They have been influenced by no 
foreign culture except that of their former masters, nor have 
they shown themselves capable of originating one of their 
own. Their standards may be lower than those of their 
white neighbors; but they differ in degree, not in kind. 
Their intellectual influence is a passive one ; and, as yet, 
they present a social problem, not a political danger. 

Colored soldiers have been used with good results, against 
the Indians and in Cuba. In the Philippines they did not 
prove so satisfactory; for, although they fought well 
enough, it was difficult to keep them in proper discipline 
in out-of-the-way posts, and their pursuit of the native 
women provoked much anger among the men, giving rise 
to fresh insurrection in districts which had been paci- 
fied. Their employment at all was bitterly resented by 



74 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

the Filipinos, who regard themselves as belonging to a race 
superior to the African. 1 Nevertheless, the latter un- 
doubtedly constitute an important military resource, and 
as an economic one they seem to be indispensable to the 
Southern States ; for it is their labor which produces almost 
the whole of the immense cotton crop. Whatever, there- 
fore, may be thought about internal perils, the presence of 
the black man in the territory of the republic cannot be 
said to diminish its external power. 

Compared with nine million negroes, the couple of hun- 
dred thousand Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, and Hindus 
in the United States appear insignificant enough; indeed, 
their numbers do not together equal even that of the North 
American Indians. Unlike the Indians, however, they are 
not the remnants of peoples that are disappearing. On the 
contrary, they form the vanguard of an army of hundreds 
of millions, who, far from retreating before the white man, 
thrive and multiply in competition with him. It is not 
they, but he, who retires from the field. 

We can easily understand why, in these days of easy 
communication, Chinese and Japanese should flock into a 
thinly populated land where the climate is perfectly suited 
to them, where there are vast resources not yet developed, 
and where wages are so high that, living as they do, they 
can hope to save in a few years a sum of money that will be 
a fortune at home. In the long discussion over their admit- 
tance, the two peoples have been the object of much unfair 
criticism. They have been inconsistently charged with 
taking money out of the country by the very people who 
make the loudest objections when they propose to stay 
permanently; they have been attacked on the ground of 
immorality, — a subject on which a good deal might be 

1 The Filipinos were infuriated at the suggestion, made in the United 
States, that their islands should be colonized by the surplus of the Ameri- 
can colored population. 



RACE QUESTIONS 75 

said with little result; and divers other complaints have 
been brought against them. Leaving all such accusations 
out of account, however, and condemning no one, we still 
have to admit the existence of certain social facts which 
American statesmen, however free from anti-foreign preju- 
dice, must take into consideration. 

In the first place if, as is generally thought, a racial inter- 
mixture of the newcomers with the white population is 
undesirable, it follows that they can never be entirely 
assimilated. Now the whole American theory of welcom- 
ing settlers from foreign lands has rested on the confident 
belief, which has thus far been justified by events, that 
sooner or later they will become Americans in every respect 
and be merged with the rest. When this is impossible, 
should immigrants, no matter what may be their virtues, 
be allowed to establish themselves in large numbers 
in the country ? In view of the terrible difficulties presented 
by the negro problem, is the United States going to saddle 
itself light-heartedly with the possibility of a Mongolian or 
a Hindu one ? This does not mean that we liken Orientals 
to negroes, or that the complications which their presence 
might give rise to would be the same in all respects. None 
the less, if the coming of Asiatics bids fair to burden the 
United States with another insoluble race question, is it not 
better to nip the danger in the bud by limiting admission 
from the start? 

This danger has still another aspect. All the evidence we 
have on the subject goes to prove that white men, as a 
working class, cannot maintain themselves in the long run 
against the competition of Chinese, Japanese, Hindus, and 
perhaps others. The reasons are not far to seek. It is not 
that Asiatics will content themselves with any lower wages 
than they can get, for experience has shown they are prompt 
enough to obtain whatever they can ; but as they are willing 
to work for longer hours, and have a lower standard of 



76 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

requisite comfort and a higher standard of sobriety than 
white men, they can afford to underbid them. We may 
grant that in time their conditions tend to approximate 
those of their neighbors, and that, if there were but a hand- 
ful of them, the solution might well be left to time ; but the 
few thousand Asiatics on the American continent have 
behind them the countless millions of their teeming native 
lands. If they come in any considerable numbers, the 
white capitalist, the white shopkeeper on a large scale, and 
certain kinds of white skilled laborers may be able to main- 
tain themselves in the midst of an Asiatic population, 
though even this would be doubtful in the long run ; but 
the white workman cannot. He must go to the wall, or he 
must leave. 

The question, then, may present itself in this way : Is the 
future population of the Pacific coast to be white or is it 
to be Oriental? If the Americans are constrained to face 
matters in this direct form, there can be little doubt that 
they will take measures to prevent what may come to be 
regarded as a deadly peril. Such measures might, of course, 
be tributes to the virtues, rather than to the vices, of the 
Asiatic, — the desire to exclude him might, like the determi- 
nation of the negroes to keep white men out of Haiti, be 
construed as an admission of his superiority. Be it so. A 
protective tariff may be called a confession of weakness, but 
that does not prevent nations from adopting it. No mere 
taunts will keep the American people from taking whatever 
steps they believe to be necessary to protect the standard 
of living of their workingmen, of which they are not a little 
proud ; and they will go to any extreme before they will 
allow their Pacific coast to become the domain of the yellow 
race or of any but the white. Such action need not be a 
reflection upon the Chinese and the Japanese. It simply 
means that, if white men and Mongolians cannot live side 
by side in the same land, the Americans, being white them- 



RACE QUESTIONS 77 

selves, will reserve their territory for the people of their 
own blood. 

In like manner, the Russians, who are traditionally sup- 
posed to be tolerant in their dealings with Asiatics, have 
been alarmed of late, and with good reason, by the prospect 
that their East Siberian possessions may be overrun by 
Chinese, a catastrophe which they will certainly do their 
utmost to prevent. We may, indeed, assert with confi- 
dence that there is not a state in Europe in which the 
annual arrival of, let us say, fifty thousand Chinese would 
not provoke such active opposition that means would soon 
be found to check the movement. 

As might be expected, there is much division of opinion 
in America in regard to Chinese and Japanese immigration. 
The western coast is particularly exposed to it, and is cor- 
respondingly hostile, and determined to repress it at any 
cost. The East, being less exposed than the West, is not 
so much in favor of restriction ; and even the South, in 
spite of its intense feeling on race topics, which makes it 
sympathize with California, sometimes thinks longingly of 
what its fields might be made to produce by the importa- 
tion of yellow laborers, so superior in steadiness to the 
black. Capitalists, too, desiring to get their workmen in 
large numbers and at as cheap rates as possible, would 
be glad to tap the inexhaustible supply in Asia. And 
the old-fashioned school of uncompromising liberalism 
still believes that the land of liberty should be open to 
all, and that such intelligent peoples as the Orientals 
could be brought before long to the level of the whites 
in every respect. On the other hand, the labor-unions 
are unanimous in their opposition ; and they are supported 
by a general feeling that the United States must remain 
"a white man's country." 

Unlike the problems in regard to the Indian and the 
negro, which are internal matters and not the concern of 



78 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

any foreign nation, the question of the Asiatic is one which 
the United States is not at liberty to settle off-hand ac- 
cording to its own impulses. In the case of the Hindus, 
Great Britain may be unable to remonstrate, for while she 
allows her own colonies to shut out her Asiatic subjects, 
she cannot complain if other states exclude them; but 
behind the Chinese and the Japanese stand two great 
empires, neither of which is indifferent to the treatment 
meted out to its citizens, and both of which have more 
than one way of retaliating if they conceive themselves to 
be injured. 



CHAPTER IV 

IDEALS AND SHIBBOLETHS 

ON March 4, 1897, Mr. William McKinley was inaugu- 
rated President of the United States. This date, 
hardly more than ten years ago, now seems strangely 
distant to Americans in view of the changes which they 
have witnessed since that time. Then they were quite 
unconscious that great events were impending. Though 
every one knew that the country was gaining in strength 
year by year, even the few who believed that it might soon 
be called upon to make use of this strength had little con- 
ception of what the broader results of such action might 
be. Foreign relations appeared to be following the normal 
course which they had taken for a generation. The United 
States was at peace with the world, and seemed likely to 
remain so. True, the continuance of the Cuban revolt 
was attracting more and more attention and sympathy, 
which might easily crystallize into a resolve to interfere ; 
but thus far the interest of the public in the matter was not 
equal to that of the newspapers. 

The American people as a whole were wrapped up in 
their home affairs, and in particular in the discussion of 
the proper remedies for the "hard times" through which 
the country had just been passing. The presidential elec- 
tion had turned on internal questions, the national platforms 
of both parties containing mere perfunctory declarations 
on the subject of foreign policy. The new President, who 

79 



80 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

had first become generally known as the father of a high- 
tariff bill, was primarily interested in the development of 
American industries; he had just been nominated and 
elected as the champion of a sound currency and of busi- 
ness interests, his opponent representing the spirit of 
dissatisfaction with existing economic conditions. Mr. 
McKinley was an honest, conscientious statesman, of ear- 
nest purpose and high sense of duty, a self-made man, — -in 
many ways a typical American of the time. He had never 
taken a prominent part in foreign questions ; indeed, 
like most of his fellow-countrymen, he knew and cared 
little about them. It is said that when on the day of his 
inauguration he was told by a retired general that the most 
important event in his presidency would be a war with 
Spain, he was astonished at the prediction. 

The Venezuela flurry was by this time happily over, and 
to the satisfaction of the American people, who were pleased 
with the stand which they had taken in the affair ; for their 
action, if somewhat emphatic, had been in their opinion 
conservative, as they had only reasserted and maintained a 
principle of self-defence which had long been dear to them. 
They were the more pleased at having got the best of the 
dispute for the reason that they had run very serious risks, 
more serious, in truth, than they had realized at the 
moment. But for this episode, the Democratic administra- 
tion of President Cleveland had been eminently peaceful. 
Whatever stray writers might predict about the future 
expansion of the country, there seemed no valid reason 
to expect any sudden change in its programme of tran- 
quil activity. 

In the one hundred and twenty years of their independent 
existence the American people had had time for a full 
development of their national individuality. While shar- 
ing many of the virtues and faults, ideals and illusions of 
others, they possessed characteristics of their own which 



IDEALS AND SHIBBOLETHS 81 

were sufficiently marked. They had their own position in 
the world, their accepted views of themselves and of others, 
and especially their cherished traditions, which usually 
guided and always influenced them in their management 
of their home affairs as well as in their dealings with foreign 
nations. In order to appreciate the changes of the last 
few years, we need to keep well in mind the heritage of 
temperament and of doctrines with which the people of 
the United States faced the new problems so soon to be 
presented to them. 

From the beginning of time, all nations have shown a 
tendency to divide mankind into two categories, Greeks 
and Barbarians, — that is, ourselves and everybody else ; 
and the idea that "we" are the chosen people is still far 
from being extinct. The Americans, like others, have cher- 
ished this pleasing belief, and they have also entertained 
to the full the ordinary national illusions, — for instance, 
that they have grown great by their virtues and by the 
disposition of a kindly Providence, whereas the progress 
of other nations has been marked by unscrupulous ra- 
pacity; that their support gives an extraordinary moral 
weight to any cause they espouse, and that no fair-minded 
person can doubt the honesty of their intentions, but that 
they must keep a sharp watch on the nefarious designs of 
their neighbors; that in their simplicity they are in con- 
stant danger of being overreached by wily adversaries; 
that their chief faults, as they modestly admit, are self- 
depreciation, admiration of foreign things, and too much 
good nature, — in short, that their hearts are better than 
their heads. 

In accordance with this common theory, the people of 
the United States were sure of their own good inten- 
tions. Their attitude toward the rest of humanity was 
friendly, for they were pretty well satisfied with the world 
in general and with themselves in particular, a content- 



82 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

inent not to be wondered at, and to be ascribed chiefly to 
the same cause that has helped to make optimism one 
of the salient traits in the national character, — the 
consciousness of success. In 1897 they had already long 
been imbued with the feeling, not since diminished, that 
the history of their country had been one of tremendous 
achievement. In a little over a century it had grown to be, 
without question, one of the greatest — in their opinion the 
greatest — in the world. In spite of the recent pinch of 
hard times, it was rich and prosperous; and its progress 
from year to year was eminently gratifying. The Americans 
were convinced that this progress was not all due to the 
favors which nature had lavished upon them, but that to 
an equal exent it was the result of their own endeavors. 
They were proud not only of the size of their population 
and of the wealth of their resources, but even more of their 
own energy and activity, of their achievements in industry 
and invention. They were proud of the freedom which 
had made their land a haven of refuge for oppressed mill- 
ions from the Old World ; proud of their popular govern- 
ment, which had stood the test of time and the strain of 
a tremendous civil war; proud of the courage, endurance, 
and self-sacrifice shown by both parties during that war; 
and, finally, proud of the way in which the wounds of the 
war had been healed, leaving the nation stronger and more 
united than ever. They believed their country to be the 
best, the freest, the richest, the happiest, in the world, 
and they gave due recognition to their own merits which 
had made it so. 

With the assurance of vigorous youth, they were dis- 
posed to attach little weight to the experience of others. 
The fact that others had done things in a particular way 
was no reason, in their eyes, why they should do them 
in the same way; and the failure of a European nation 
in a given task was no proof that Americans might not 



IDEALS AND SHIBBOLETHS 83 

be more successful. With this self-confidence we find an 
idealism which sometimes surprises foreign observers. Ac- 
cording to a common impression abroad, the people of 
the United States are a race of prosaic money-makers, who 
care for nothing but getting rich, unless it be for marry- 
ing their daughters to foreigners with titles. In reality, 
though European critics seldom perceive it, the Americans 
are not lacking in generous imagination, even if it does 
not crop out much in everyday life. Their ideals, as com- 
pared with European ones, may sometimes appear mate- 
rial rather than aesthetic, but they are none the less noble, 
and they are very real. 

The general feeling of self-satisfaction prevailing in the 
country at this period did not, of course, prevent clear- 
sighted men from recognizing that there were many shadows 
in the picture: the negro problem was becoming ever 
more difficult; the increasing antagonism between labor 
and capital, coupled with the growth of huge unions and 
trusts and with corruption in local politics, alarmed hon- 
est and patriotic citizens ; the recent financial depression 
had made bad feeling between different classes, and even 
between different sections, of the Union; the lamentable 
decay of the merchant marine, once the just pride of the 
nation, proved that Americans were not equally successful 
in all kinds of economic enterprise; and finally in the 
higher domains of literature, art, and pure science, the 
United States was not contributing a very notable quota 
to the wealth of the world. All this the broad-minded 
patriot had to admit and deplore ; but for the average man 
American optimism came to the rescue. With a fine self-con- 
fidence, public opinion, when forced to admit the charges 
brought against anything American, consoled itself with 
the belief that things would soon be better. There was a 
comfortable conviction that, if the Americans had failed 
in any respect, it was only because they had been too busy 



84 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

elsewhere to turn their attention in that particular direc- 
tion ; that, when once they had established their material 
conditions on a thoroughly firm foundation, they could 
attend to such matters as tinkering the weak places in 
the machine of government, or developing the aesthetic 
capabilities of the race. The saying ran: "When Chicago 
gets hold of culture, culture will have to hum." Many a 
traveller has been struck by the fact that in a new Ameri- 
can town the patriotic citizen will oftener talk about the 
future than about the present; that, however boastful he 
may be of what his own place has already achieved, he will 
declare that it is nothing to what it is going to be some 
day. Every inland mart means to be a new Chicago ; every 
port hopes to surpass New York. 

Crude as the expression of such sentiments may be, the 
frame of mind which they represent not only helps to make 
life pleasanter, but also constitutes an element of very real 
national strength. A robust faith of this sort enables a 
nation, as well as a man, to bear misfortune serenely, and 
to persist in the face of apparently overwhelming difficulties 
until success is wrung from an unwilling fate. A decadent 
philosophy may be more picturesque in itself; but when 
decadent individuals or peoples come into collision with 
self-reliant ones, they are at a disadvantage from the start. 
The peril of the American lies in the opposite direction. 
Like the Russian, he is too prone to think that, whatever 
his previous negligence may have been, in the last resort 
he will manage to "pull through somehow"; and conse- 
quently he has the same impatience of careful precautions, 
— impatience that may cost dear. 

The quality of boastfulness which so many foreigners 
have noticed as characteristic of the free citizens of the 
United States had declined since the Civil War. This self- 
assertion, besides being a sign of the exuberance of green 
youth, and betraying in its very extravagance an uncom- 



IDEALS AND SHIBBOLETHS 85 

fortable doubt that it might not bring conviction to the 
listener, had also been a reply to the condescension, kindly 
or unkindly, which the American met with in European 
society. With the growth of the country, there had come 
from outside a more general acknowledgment of its posi- 
tion, especially since the great events of the war, and the 
boastfulness of its citizens had diminished correspondingly. 
In spite of the fact that millions of people of European 
birth lived in the New World and that increasing numbers 
of American tourists visited the old one every year, in spite, 
also, of the presence of students who had attended German 
universities, of painters who had lived in France, of educated 
men and women who delighted in European literature and 
art, the attitude of the immense majority of people in the 
United States toward things European was at this time one 
of good-natured indifference, not to say superiority. Edu- 
cated Americans, it is true, knew, know, and ought to know 
more about Europe than Europeans about America; but 
the general public took little interest in the affairs of Euro- 
pean countries, and not much more in the external rela- 
tions of their own. A proof of this indifference may' be 
found in the little care with which the American diplo- 
matic representatives abroad were selected. With the excep- 
tion of the all-important office of minister to England, in 
which it was so evidently desirable to have a distinguished 
man that such a one was usually appointed, the American 
diplomatic posts were too often filled with more attention 
to political influence than to the suitability of the candi- 
dates. As for the consular service, it is strange that a 
nation of business men should have been content to recruit 
it in the same haphazard fashion. It was not until 1906, 
after many scandals in the history of American consulates, 
that the system at last began to be put on a sound basis. 
News and comment from across the ocean usually came 
through English channels, and Americans knew little and 



86 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

cared less about the opinions which foreigners might en- 
tertain of them. 

One unpleasant result of this indifference was the reck- 
lessness which prevailed not only in the American papers, 
but in the utterances of public men, in regard to foreign 
nations. If a Congressman believed that his remarks 
would please his constituents, it mattered little to him 
that they might make bad blood in Austria or Russia, 
and thus complicate the work of the state department. 
Even American diplomacy did not enjoy abroad a reputa- 
tion for good manners. At the same time, though it cannot 
be denied that American methods of treating international 
politics were, often, largely for "home consumption," it 
is possible to push this theory too far. Foreigners, Eng- 
lishmen in particular, have now and then made the mistake 
of thinking that the declarations of American statesmen 
were not meant seriously, when, as events showed, they 
were made in all earnestness. 

Another trait in the national character which more than 
once made difficulties for those in charge of the destiny 
of the republic, was an impatience of the bonds imposed 
by written agreements that were no longer deemed in 
keeping with existing conditions. When a compact ceased 
to be advantageous, there was a tendency to regard it as 
a dead letter ; and irresponsible members of Congress could 
always be found to give expression to this sentiment. In 
the notable instance of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the 
United States chafed so violently that England was in the 
end virtually forced to consent to its abrogation ; and, again, 
the conduct of the government at Washington in dealing 
with the subject of Chinese immigration was hardly in 
accordance with its pledged treaty word. It is true that 
an impatience of mere paper bonds, of "musty parch- 
ments," is a general characteristic of modern democracy, — 
witness, for example, the recent repudiation of the con- 



IDEALS AND SHIBBOLETHS 87 

cordat with the papacy by the French republic, — but it 
must be admitted that there is a strain of lawlessness in 
the American, a result of individualism and of the inde- 
pendence of his development. Although he recognizes the 
necessity of law, he does not look upon it as sacred, or 
even as indispensable on all occasions. His practical bent 
and his lack of understanding of the full value of social 
solidarity incline him to pay more attention to the neces- 
sities of the moment than to abstract general principles. 
At the 3ame time, the American people have shown as 
high a sense of honor as any other, and they usually take 
their moral obligations with all seriousness; indeed, no 
modern people has shown itself more willing to make 
painful sacrifices in order to carry out its principles. 

Nations, like individuals, are often inconsistent, thereby 
laying themselves open to the charge of dishonesty on the 
part of uncharitable neighbors. This is particularly true 
of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, whose minds are not so uncom- 
promisingly logical as those of the French or the Russians ; 
it explains, for instance, why the English have so often 
been accused of hypocrisy. When the Englishman or the 
American finds that his premises lead him to conclusions 
that he dislikes, he is pretty sure to kick over the traces 
and, regardless of the premises, to accept other conclusions 
that «uit him better. He never allows previous logical 
subtleties to tempt him into a position which his common 
sense condemns; but guided by a sound instinct, he acts 
as he thinks best in each instance, careless of the fact that, 
by any course of general reasoning, he will appear incon- 
sistent. For a striking example of the difference between 
Latin and Anglo-Saxon political conceptions, we have 
but to compare two well-known sayings, — the "Peris- 
sent les colonies plutot qu'un principe" of the French 
Revolution, and Cleveland's famous remark, " It is a con- 
dition which confronts us, not a theory." It is highly char- 



88 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

acteristic that even Jefferson, perhaps the most theoretical 
of all American statesmen, accepted without hesitation the 
responsibility of the purchase of Louisiana, although he 
believed that he had no constitutional right to take such 
action. 

This impatience of precedent has in no wise prevented the 
Americans from having traditions of their own, to which they 
have believed themselves to be strongly attached. In the 
main their foreign policy, up to the time of the Spanish 
War, had not been haphazard, whatever party was at the 
helm. The international relations of the country had, indeed, 
seldom been complicated; for it had kept out of general 
European affairs, and most of Europe had had no part in 
those of the United States. For these reasons, the Ameri- 
cans had not often been obliged to take into consideration 
more than one foreign power at a time in any question 
in which they were involved ; and since they achieved 
their independence they had had but one European war, — 
that with Great Britain in 1812. They had not, of course, 
been exempt from their share of miscellaneous disputes ; 
but most of their quarrels, being on such tangible matters 
as discussions of boundary, had not called for far-seeing 
statecraft, and none of them, except that with Mexico, had 
ended in actual hostilities. With time, the boast "We are 
a peaceful people" had become a fixed article of the national 
creed. The truth of this statement was, however, open to 
some doubt. If it meant that the Union had had few 
wars in the past and had made little preparation for any 
in the future, it was beyond dispute ; but if it signified 
that the Americans, individually or collectively, were of a 
peaceful temperament, it was far from being exact, for no 
people were quicker to resent a provocation or more de- 
termined to return blow for blow. Their comparative im- 
munity from the necessity of taking up arms had been due 
to their situation rather than to any innate gentleness of 



IDEALS AND SHIBBOLETHS 89 

disposition ; and yet, with a record of forty-seven disputes 
referred to arbitration, — more than half of all the cases 
thus submitted, — the United States could well claim that 
it had shown a real desire for peace and justice. 

In proof of their peaceful disposition, Americans pointed 
to the smallness of their military forces ; but it would, 
perhaps, have been more correct to ascribe this to their 
inherited English dislike of a standing army as a "foe to 
liberty," and, still more, to the careless confidence which 
trusted that, when necessity should arise, the means would 
be found to meet it. We need not wonder that their 
regular army had dwindled since the Civil War till it num- 
bered less than thirty thousand enlisted men, with no re- 
serve but a very imperfect militia organization : a country 
which has no fear of being invaded is apt to feel that it 
will always have time enough to find soldiers. What is 
more surprising is that the wealthy coast cities should have 
been left for so long without any modern system of defence, 
and that the navy, of whose past achievements all Ameri- 
cans were justly proud, should have been permitted to 
decline until, about 1885, it was hardly worthy of a third- 
rate power. Certainly no fair-minded observer could at 
that date have accused the United States of " meditating 
aggression" against any one. 

On the other hand, it was a gross mistake to think, as 
did many people in Europe, that the American republic 
would be kept from any course of action by fear of the 
greater military preparedness of rival powers. The people 
who, with thousands of miles of undefended coast-line and a 
still infant navy, were ready to risk a war with the British 
Empire on a question of principle about a matter of such 
slight intrinsic value as the exact location of a corner of 
the boundary of Venezuela, were not likely to shrink from 
any conflict, if their passions were aroused. The danger 
was just the opposite: it lay rather in the confidence of 



90 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

the American people that they could " lick creation," — a 
belief which tended to make public opinion recklessly irre- 
sponsible. Moreover, the larger part of the country could 
hardly, under any circumstances, be exposed to foreign at- 
tack. New York and San Francisco might be at the mercy 
of a hostile fleet ; but the citizen of Kansas City or Denver 
knew that he had nothing to fear, and hence was under 
small temptation to make concessions to an overweening foe. 
He might, to be sure, suffer economic loss sometime in the 
future, but he could easily overlook such a possibility in the 
excitement of the moment ; and at any rate, he need never 
see an enemy unless he went out of his way to find him. 
A rather curious contention, savoring of earlier years, 
was frequently expressed in the phrase " We are a plain 
people," — a notion based on the fact that in the United 
States there was no king or court or titled aristocracy, and 
not at all on any greater simplicity of living prevailing 
among Americans. True, the mass of the population lived 
plainly enough, — they do everywhere, — but the leisure 
class was already characterized by just as much luxury 
as in any country in the world ; and persons of moderate 
means enjoyed perhaps greater comfort than anywhere 
else. Life was as complicated, pleasure as riotous, display 
as profuse, as in other lands ; and yet the American people 
not only expected a republican simplicity in the demeanor 
of their officials, but, by the same token, generally under- 
paid them, with the undemocratic result that some of 
the posts, especially in the diplomatic service, could with 
difficulty be accepted by any but men of independent 
wealth. There was, too, a strange dislike to certain titles, 
as, for instance, to anything above lieutenant-general in 
the army, even more to the title of admiral in the navy, 
and most of all to that of ambassador. While repelling 
with scorn the suggestion that the United States should 
not be treated as the equal of any other great nation, many 



IDEALS AND SHIBBOLETHS 91 

Americans regarded it as democratic that their representa- 
tive abroad should be an official of only the second recog- 
nized grade ; but few of those who thought that the term 
"ambassador" sounded aristocratic realized that the full 
appellation which they preferred was " envoy extraordinary 
and minister plenipotentiary," a title hardly suggestive of 
simplicity. When the office of ambassador was at last in- 
stituted in 1893, the provision that created it was smuggled 
through Congress as quietly as possible for fear of a public 
outcry. 

In most essentials, American political ideals had not at 
this time undergone any revolutionary changes since the 
early days of the republic. The teachings of the fathers 
had not lost their force. The Declaration of Independence 
had proclaimed that "all men are created equal " and 
have " unalienable rights " to " life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness"; and even if the Declaration had been de- 
scribed as a tissue of glittering generalities, Americans still 
believed in liberty and equality. But these two terms can 
doubtless be understood in several ways. In the days 
before the Civil War, the South managed to reconcile 
them with the possession of negro slaves, just as the 
governing aristocracy in Poland, when the mass of the 
population was in hopeless serfdom, had believed that theirs 
was the only free country in Europe. Recently the South- 
ern States had by one means or another well-nigh disfran- 
chised the blacks in spite of the Constitution, and the North 
had not interfered. 

However we may feel about the consistency of all this, 
it would be unjust to accuse the people of the United States 
of hypocrisy. They had sympathized enthusiastically with 
the revolutions in France, in Italy, in Greece, in Hungary, 
in South America ; and they had given Kossuth such tre- 
mendous ovations when he visited them that he had been 
misled into expecting armed intervention in behalf of his 



92 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

cause. They had never let themselves be restrained by 
caution, or by politeness, from expressing their generous 
sentiments, or from proclaiming the superiority of their 
form of government. They had given asylum to countless 
political fugitives. They had favored broad laws of neu- 
trality, freedom of navigation in rivers and straits, an open 
door in the Far East, and modern and enlightened princi- 
ples in international dealings in general. True, they had 
once had the blot of slavery on their scutcheon, but they 
had washed it out with blood; and now the phrase "the 
land of liberty" was no mere flourish of patriotic rhetoric, 
but the expression of a truth that could not be gainsaid. 

Liberty, however, is a thing that men get used to. If 
they have always enjoyed it, it becomes, like health or 
fresh air, something taken for granted, — a priceless gift, 
but too much a part of everyday life to awaken ready 
enthusiasm. The Americans had learned by experience, 
too, that liberty was not a panacea for political ills. In 
addition, they were not so sure as they had once been that 
every people was capable of self-government, and that 
their own successful institutions were equally suited to 
others. They had applauded the independence of Latin 
America, but they had not been edified by the history 
of most of her republics ; for they were too orderly them- 
selves to approve of an uninterrupted series of revolutions, 
even if the uprisings took place in the name of liberty. 
Still they believed, as a general truth, that government 
(except for the Southern negroes) should be by the con- 
sent of the governed ; and they were proud of not owning 
foreign colonies that would have to be held down by brute 
force. They felt that they could moralize with comfortable 
superiority over the greed of the various European powers 
as shown in recent years in the furious scramble for lands 
in Asia and Africa. 

In their foreign policy, they had followed the same 






IDEALS AND SHIBBOLETHS 93 

general principles as other modern nations. In the many 
treaties they had concluded, they had aimed not only to 
cultivate mutually beneficial relations with other peoples, 
but to promote their own trade and to protect their 
citizens in every part of the world. Their efforts had 
been crowned with gratifying success, and they could pride 
themselves on the result. In all this there was nothing 
peculiar to them. What was peculiar was their follow- 
ing of certain precepts that have had a decisive influ- 
ence on the whole course of their foreign relations. The 
first of these was to avoid " entangling alliances." 

Washington, in his farewell address, — a document which 
in the American mind ranks second only to the Declaration 
of Independence, — solemnly warned his fellow-countrymen 
against foreign alliances. He himself had had experience 
with such things. The treaty with France, concluded in 
1778, had been of this nature; but, though it had led to 
the independence of the colonies and the humiliation of 
England, it had not proved entirely satisfactory to either 
of the contracting parties. At the conclusion of peace in 
1783, their interests had been divergent, and there had been 
some slight friction between them. Later a much more 
serious difficulty had arisen in the question whether the 
United States was bound to assist France when, after the 
fall of her monarchy, she found herself again at war with 
England. On the face of the text it certainly seemed so ; 
but the government of President Washington decided that 
circumstances were so entirely different from what they had 
been at the time the treaty was concluded that its provisions 
were no longer applicable to the existing situation. This 
decision was doubtless politically wise, and the judgment of 
Washington has been ratified by the unanimous approval 
of American historians ever since. On the other hand, 
members of his own cabinet to whom the question was sub- 
mitted; including Jefferson, the secretary of state, had given 



94 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

it as their opinion that the United States was bound by 
treaty to aid France ; and a man as high-minded as Wash- 
ington could hardly have helped feeling that the repudiation 
of a formal obligation of this kind, however justified, cast 
a shadow of suspicion on the honor of his country. The 
United States got out of its difficulties, but in a way that 
left an uncomfortable impression; and the lesson of the 
incident was reflected in the President's farewell address. 

The advice given in this famous document has been con- 
sistently followed by American statesmen ever since, and 
with satisfactory results. Again and again the United States 
has refused to become a party to agreements with European 
powers, basing its decisions on this very ground of avoiding 
entangling alliances. Except in the Far East, where joint 
action of the Christian powers has sometimes been neces- 
sary, it has preferred to follow out its own interests sepa- 
rately, even when they have coincided with those of other, 
and friendly, nations. 

This policy has, to be sure, caused occasional irritation 
abroad, where the Americans have been accused of selfish 
unwillingness to take part in work for the common good ; 
but from the American point of view it has so far been 
wise. Whether it can be maintained in our new period 
of world questions is open to doubt. 

Another peculiar principle of American foreign policy 
has, however, by its originality and its importance, attracted 
far more attention abroad, and is more vital to-day. When 
any foreigner begins to talk of the attitude of the United 
States toward the rest of the world, one of the first things 
he will be sure to mention is the Monroe Doctrine. 



CHAPTER V 

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

I^HE late Mr. John Hay, for nearly seven years secretary 
of state, and one of the best that his country ever had, 
once said of his policy that the Monroe Doctrine and the 
Golden Rule were a sufficient basis of action. "The prin- 
ciples which have guided us," he added, "have been of 
limpid simplicity." To his mind, at least, there was no 
contradiction between his two principles, no matter what 
may be the difference between them. The Golden Rule is, 
let us say, a precept as commonly, or as uncommonly, 
observed by one people as by another ; the Monroe Doctrine 
is something specifically American, and cannot claim respect 
on quite the same grounds. Its origin, its meaning, and its 
justification have been the subjects of long controversy 
both at home and abroad. Here we need repeat only so 
much of the well-known story as serves to bring the essential 
features clearly before us. 

The Monroe Doctrine was promulgated on December 2, 
1823. It was based on the idea, then common in the 
United States, that there was a natural separation between 
the Old World and the New. As ex-President Jefferson 
put it, "Our first and fundamental maxim should be never 
to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe ; our second, 
never to suffer Europe to meddle with cisatlantic affairs." 

The immediate cause of the famous declaration was two- 
fold, — a dispute with Russia over the limits of her posses- 

96 



96 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

sions in the northwest, and alarm at French intervention in 
Spain. This last step awakened a fear that the powers of 
the Holy Alliance might attempt to aid the Spanish King 
to regain control of his revolted American colonies, and 
thus perhaps acquire territory for themselves in the New 
World. When the British Prime Minister, George Canning, 
suggested a joint declaration on the part of England and the 
United States that they would oppose any such attempt, his 
plan was at first received with favor in Washington; but 
finally, under the influence of the secretary of state, John 
Quincy Adams, President Monroe decided on an independent 
expression of policy. 

\ The two questions at issue were taken up in the same 
message, but they were not connected in such a way as 
to call for a declaration of general principles which should 
apply to both ; they were, in fact, separated from each other 
by a considerable quantity of intervening matter. The de- 
cisive passages run as follows : — 

(1) " The American continents, by the free and indepen- 
dent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are 
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future 
colonization by any European powers;" and (2) "In the 
wars of the European powers in matters relating to them- 
selves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport 
with our policy so to do. . . . The political system of the 
allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that 
of America. This difference proceeds from that which 
exists in their respective governments ; and to the defence 
of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much 
blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their 
most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed 
unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We 
owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations 
existing between the United States and those powers to 
declare that we should consider any attempt on their part 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 97 

to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere 
as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing 
colonies or dependencies of any European power we have 
not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the govern- 
ments who have declared their independence and maintained 
it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration 
and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any 
interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or con- 
trolling in any other manner their destiny, by any Euro- 
pean power in any other light than as the manifestation 
of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." 
The principle thus enunciated may be briefly summed 
up as one of " Hands off," or of "America for the Ameri- 
cans." 

From the date of its appearance down to the present day, 
this doctrine has met with almost universal, approval 
at home. For many reasons it appealed immediately to 
popular imagination and at the same time commended 
itself to the judgment of statesmen. In the eyes of the 
Americans, it was a proclamation of their cherished ideals, 
of their belief in the right of free peoples to determine their 
own destinies. l By it the United States declared that, while 
respecting existing institutions of which it did not approve, 
it would never consent to let similar ones be imposed by 
force on any of the inhabitants of the New World who had 
already freed themselves from such trammels. In other 
words, it announced that it was not only a land of liberty, 
but likewise the protector of liberty. Surely here was 
just cause for national pride. In the President's message 
there was, furthermore, an expression of the feeling that 
the New World, as something essentially different from the 
Old, should have its independent development. Already 
ardent patriots were dreaming of a future epoch in which 
the glories of the western hemisphere should outshine those 
of the earlier homes of civilization ; they believed that the 



98 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

whole of both American continents should be included in 
the Promised Land. 

While sentimental considerations of this sort roused 
honest enthusiasm, the practical merits of the new policy 
were also such as to assure it of favor. Nations have 
always found it convenient that their nearest neighbors 
should be inferior to themselves in strength, and have been 
prone to resent the approach of their equals as a menace. 
This idea has been a fundamental principle of British policy 
in regard to India. Similarly, the Americans dreaded the 
thought that dangerous enemies might hold military po- 
sitions close to their borders. They also realized that, for 
commercial as well as for political reasons, it was to their 
advantage to keep all of the western hemisphere that they 
could in what would to-day be termed their " sphere of 
influence." In supporting the stand taken by President 
Monroe, they at the same time extended a protecting hand 
over their weaker brethren, and followed the behests of 
enlightened self-interest. 

The last feature of the doctrine that went to make it 
popular was its appearance of unusual daring. The young 
American republic, with its scant ten million inhabitants, 
and almost without an army, appeared to be throwing down 
the glove to the great military monarchies of Europe. This 
was enough to stir the blood of patriots. In actual fact, the 
peril was not serious ; for as long as England was on the side 
of the United States, the Americans, being at a safe dis- 
tance, had nothing to fear from the continental powers. 
And the views of the British government on the South 
American question were well known. Though the news 
had not reached Washington, Canning had already told 
Prince Polignac, the French ambassador, that Great 
Britain would not tolerate any European interference in 
Spanish-American matters, and Polignac had replied that 
France had no thought of interfering in them. Neverthe- 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 99 

less, the apparent triumph of the new doctrine was com- 
plete. All talk of intervention soon died out, a result 
which the Americans of course assumed to be entirely due 
to their attitude. Even Canning gave countenance to 
this belief by declaring proudly, if inaccurately, "I called 
the New World into existence to redress the balance of the 
Old." 

We may note here a curious similarity between the pol- 
icy pursued by England in 1823 and that followed in 1902. 
On both occasions, finding herself isolated and in oppo- 
sition to the chief military states of continental Europe, 
she sought her ally at a distance, regardless of any senti- 
mental twaddle about the community of European nations. 
She acted, in short, like a true world power, unfettered by 
local prejudice. If the United States had accepted Can- 
ning's overtures and joined with Great Britain, as might 
quite conceivably have happened, the parallel would have 
been more exact ; or we may imagine that Japan, if she had 
felt strong enough, might have preferred to proclaim on her 
own responsibility the doctrine of "Asia for the Asiatics." 
Russia, however, was a very different menace to Japan in 
1902 from what she was to the United States in 1823. 1 
K When we compare the two passages in which the Monroe 
Doctrine was proclaimed, we see that, although disconnected 
and dealing with different matters, they are, after all, ex- 
pressions of the same idea of hostility to European inter- 
vention in American affairs. Of the two, the second passage 
has enjoyed the greater celebrity, partly because it is a 
careful argument not, like the first, a mere pronouncement, 
but chiefly because of its reputed brilliant success in 
blocking the proposed intervention of the Holy Alliance 
in the troubles of the New World. It also emerged tri- 

'And yet Secretary Adams had said to the British minister, October, 
1820, "I find proof enough to put down the Russian argument; but how 
shall I answer the Russian cannon ? " 



100 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

umphant when its principle was violated by Napoleon III 
in his attempt to create, with the aid of French troops, a 
Mexican empire for Archduke Maximilian of Austria. 1 No 
one can well call it obsolete to-day ; for it frequently appears 
in discussion, and it would be maintained with vigor if a 
case that came under its provision should arise. None 
the less, we may question whether the Monroe Doctrine in 
its present form does not rest satisfactorily on the President's 
simple statement about European colonization. 

In the longer declaration there is much that is now some- 
what antiquated. Wedded as the Americans are to a re- 
publican form of government, they have to admit that a 
monarchy is not necessarily a despotism ; that in most of 
the countries of Europe the people are the real sovereigns ; 
and on the other hand, they have seen examples of a very 
queer sort of liberty in some of the republics of Latin Amer- 
ica. Although, in the Venezuelan dispute of 1895-1896, 
the old cry about the protection of republican institutions 
in the New World was raised, it was difficult for any intel- 
ligent American to believe that the inhabitants of the 
disputed territory would be worse off or less secure of the 
"unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi- 
ness" under the rule of Queen Victoria than under the sway 
of a Venezuelan dictator. The American objection to Euro- 
pean interference in the western hemisphere is in reality 
no longer based on any "hereditary differences of political 
systems." The United States would oppose just as reso- 
lutely an attempt of the French republic to acquire new 
lands in South America as it would similar action on the 
part of the Russian Empire. Even if the arguments used 
in the two cases might not be the same, the reasons would 
at bottom be identical. 

1 Curiously enough, Mr. Seward, in his long discussions with the French 
government, never once referred to the Monroe Doctrine as the basis of his 
arguments. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 101 

The announcement that the "American continents are 
henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future coloni- 
zation by any European powers" contains the kernel of the 
Monroe Doctrine. But the meaning of the word "coloniza- 
tion" has been expanded until it covers not only all ac- 
quisition of territory, but also, and to an increasing degree, 
forcible intervention for nearly any purpose. It is true 
that the contingency which called forth this clause soon 
passed away; for by the treaty of 1824 the southern 
boundary of Russian America was agreed upon to the satis- 
faction of both parties. President Monroe's message prob- 
ably had no influence on the settlement of the dispute; 
indeed, he said nothing on the subject that had not been 
already said to Russia with more emphasis by his secretary 
of state. And the only foreign country that paid any par- 
ticular attention to the President's dictum about colonization 
was England. Canning did not relish the thought that he 
had "called the New World into existence" to prevent 
Great Britain from acquiring more territory in it ; nor could 
he "acknowledge the right of any power to proclaim such 
a principle, much less to bind other countries to the observ- 
ance of it." He termed the declaration "very extraor- 
dinary," and one which His Majesty's government was 
"prepared to combat in the most unequivocal manner." 

In spite of these brave words, the "very extraordinary" 
declaration has continued to guide the policy of the United 
States ever since, and has come out victorious from many 
encounters. ^Not that the Americans have always had 
things their own way; for in their disputes with Great 
Britain they have had to make concessions which have 
been attacked as surrenders of principle. Nor can it be 
denied that the English possessions in the western hemi- 
sphere are larger to-day than they were in 1823 ; what was 
then a shadowy protectorate in Belize has grown into 
actual ownership of the colony of British Honduras; and 



102 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

by the Oregon boundary treaty of 1846 lands which the 
Americans had claimed as theirs were awarded to Great 
Britain. Still, the fact that the United States has been 
obliged to compromise with a nation of equal strength 
does not signify any abandonment of principle on its part. 
It has even gone to the length of inviting a European 
sovereign to decide as to the justice of a contention; for 
instance, in 1871 it made the Emperor of Germany arbi- 
trator in the San Juan da Fuca controversy. If his de- 
cision had been in favor of Great Britain, we may suspect 
that the Americans might have declared that he ought 
never to have been called in at all ; but as it was, they had 
no cause to complain of his participation, for the islands 
in dispute were allotted to them. 

Although the message of President Monroe attracted some 
attention abroad at the moment, it was soon forgotten by 
all but a few ; only within very recent years, indeed, has the 
European public recognized its importance, or even realized 
that it existed. Meanwhile, in the country of its origin it 
had become a part of the national creed. The maxims 
set forth in it were accepted as beyond dispute, and the 
government, no matter what party was in power, was ready 
to act in accordance with them. There were, to be sure, 
some lapses from consistency, the most noticeable being the 
signing of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with England, a step 
that was soon repented of; but an occasional slip of this 
kind was not enough to weaken the general principle. As 
new cases for its application have arisen, new conclusions 
have been drawn from it, 1 until it has been amplified in a 
way not foreseen by its first expounders. 

1 The declaration of President Polk in 1845 that the United States could 
not permit any European intervention on the North American continent, 
on the one hand, pushed the theory farther than it has been carried out in 
practice, and, on the other, it restricted the original idea by failing to 
include the southern continent. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 103 

In the discussions about Cuba and about the Isthmian Canal, 
we find it quoted again and again ; but the world did 
not wake up to its full significance till the year 1895, when, 
to the astonishment of all beholders, the Americans sud- 
denly showed themselves ready to go to war with England 
over a question which few persons had heard about, and 
which affected the direct interests of the United States in 
hardly the slightest degree, — the settlement of the bound- 
ary between Venezuela and British Guiana. 

Secretary Olney, in his despatch of July 20, 1895, not only 
urged the claims of Venezuela and demanded arbitration, 
but also proceeded to restate the Monroe Doctrine and to 
explain its history and application in full. Some of his 
remarks were sufficiently startling. After speaking of the 
differences between the two hemispheres, he declared, 
"That distance and three thousand miles of intervening 
ocean make any permanent political union between an 
European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient, 
will hardly be denied"; and, he added, "The states of 
America, South as well as North, by geographical proximity, 
by natural sympathy, by similarity of Governmental Con- 
stitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and politi- 
cally, of the United States." Nor was this all. "To-day," 
he continued, "the United States is practically sovereign 
on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to 
which it confines its interposition. . . . There is, then, 
a doctrine of American public law, well founded in principle 
and abundantly sanctioned by precedent, which entitles and 
requires the United States to treat as an injury to itself 
the forcible assumption by an European power of political 
control over an American state." 

Lord Salisbury, in reply, flatly denied Secretary Olney's 
contentions, asserting that the Monroe Doctrine was neither 
international law nor applicable to this particular contro- 
versy. Thereupon President Cleveland laid the whole corre- 



104 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

spondence before Congress. He proposed that the United 
States should appoint a commission to investigate and de- 
cide upon the merits of the boundary question, and should 
then enforce the decision. "In making these recommenda- 
tions," he added, "I am fully alive to the full responsibil- 
ity incurred, and keenly realize all the consequences that 
may follow." 

The effect of this message was instantaneous. Heretofore 
Mr. Cleveland had shown himself so peaceful and con- 
servative a statesman that no one had foreseen violent 
action on his part. Now, all at once, a wave of passion 
swept through the country. The newspapers, with few 
exceptions, were loud in their denunciation of Great Britain ; 
and both political parties rallied to the support of the 
President. When the more conservative elements had 
a chance to express themselves, when stocks and bonds 
came tumbling down, and when the nation began to realize 
the undefended condition of its coasts, a reaction did in- 
deed take place ; but there can be little doubt that the 
majority of the American people were fully determined to 
fight rather than to yield in the question at issue. 

In England the first feeling was one of utter bewilder- 
ment; for, if the American public had known little about 
the Venezuelan dispute, the English knew even less, and 
they had never dreamed of it as a matter of serious con- 
sequence. The storm of violent abuse in the American 
press provoked sharp replies ; but the government remained 
cool. As it had no thought of going to war over an insig- 
nificant matter of this sort unless absolutely forced to do 
so, it proceeded to extricate itself from the situation with 
as little loss of dignity as possible. To this end, it nego- 
tiated with Venezuela for a treaty of arbitration, and thus 
settled the affair without awaiting a report from the Ameri- 
can commission. The English people felt some soreness 
over the incident; but they soon found an outlet for the 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 105 

pent-up anger which had not been discharged against the 
Americans by venting it on the German emperor when he 
sent his famous telegram to President Kruger at the time 
of the Jameson raid. It is fortunate that the raid did 
not occur before President Cleveland's message ; for it was 
owing to the good temper shown by the British people, as 
well as by the government of Lord Salisbury, that the 
Venezuelan war cloud vanished so quickly. 

Although the decision of the arbitrators awarded the 
larger part of the disputed territory to Great Britain, 
the outcome of the dispute was a notable triumph for the 
United States. Even if many Americans would still hesi- 
tate to indorse all the views of Secretary Olney, most 
of them may be said to accept his exposition of the 
Monroe Doctrine as an official statement of a policy 
now more popular than ever. Since 1896 they have seldom 
let slip a chance to reiterate their belief in it. At the close 
of the first peace congress at The Hague, the American 
delegates signed the resolutions agreed upon, but with the 
reservation that "nothing contained in this Convention 
shall be so construed as to require the United States of 
America to depart from its traditional policy of not entering 
upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political 
questions of international administration of any foreign 
state, nor shall anything contained in the said Convention 
be so construed as to require the relinquishment, by the 
United States of America, of its traditional attitude toward 
purely American questions." The Republican platform 
of 1900 proclaimed, "We reassert the Monroe Doctrine in 
its full extent;" and the Democratic, not to be outdone, 
announced, "The Monroe Doctrine as originally declared 
and interpreted by succeeding Presidents, is a permanent 
part of the foreign policy of the United States, and 
must at all times be maintained." Finally, President 
Roosevelt has again and again, in speeches and messages^ 



106 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

referred to the Monroe Doctrine and expounded its prin- 
ciples. 1 

Another result of the Venezuelan controversy of 1895 
was that it brought the Monroe Doctrine much more promi- 
nently to the notice of the outside world. The European 
powers have at last realized that, whether they like the 
idea or not, they must recognize that this principle is a 
corner-stone of American foreign policy, and that no one 
can venture to disregard it except at the peril of imme- 
diate trouble with the United States, — a truth further 
emphasized by the angry suspicion with which American 
public opinion viewed the sending of British and German 
warships to Venezuela in 1902. Under these circumstances, 
European nations have shown a certain readiness to ac- 
quiesce in the doctrine, not indeed with enthusiasm, but as 
a thing which exists and must be reckoned with, and which, 
in view of the strength of the United States, might as well 
be accepted with good grace. Most of them have made 
no definite declaration on the subject; but England, the 
power which in the past has most frequently come into 
collision with American political aims, now seems to have 
made up her mind to make the best of them. In 1903 the 
Duke of Devonshire declared, " Great Britain accepts the 
Monroe Doctrine unreservedly," a pronouncement which 
may be regarded as an official statement of the attitude of 
the British government to-day. Whether other states fol- 
low this example or not is a matter of no great conse- 
quence. 2 What is of consequence to them, as well ar 

1 Perhaps the best recent exposition of the doctrine is to be found in 
Captain Mahan's article in the National Review of February, 1903. 

2 The declaration of Germany on December 11, 1901, that in her pro- 
posed measures against Venezuela she had "no purpose or intention to 
make even the smallest acquisition of territory on the South American 
continent or the islands adjacent," has been regarded as an acknowledg- 
ment of the principle, but it was nothing but a statement of intentions on 
a particular occasion and in no way binding for the future. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 107 

to the United States, is the question of the exact nature 
and scope of the doctrine at the present time. 

Before attempting to examine this subject from the posi- 
tive side, let us begin by clearing out of the way certain 
mistaken ideas. In the first place, the Monroe Doctrine 
is not an international " impertinence," as Bismarck is said 
to have called it, and as some foreign writers are still 
prone to regard it. Such an epithet cannot be seriously 
applied to the well-considered policy of one of the first 
nations in the world, — a policy successfully upheld for 
generations, and one which the country will support at 
any cost. 

Secondly, the Monroe Doctrine is not a part of inter- 
national law, although many Americans have said that it 
was, and although President Roosevelt has expressed the 
hope that it may be some day. Even if it were to be ac- 
cepted by all nations, it would remain simply an expression 
of individual policy, respected on account of the might 
of the nation that asserted it. Though based on sound 
considerations, it is not in itself a general principle, but 
belongs to the same class of dogmas as, let us say, the French 
objection to the seating of a German prince on the throne 
of Spain, or as the British protectorate of the Persian Gulf 
and the maintenance of buffer states on the Indian frontier. 
Legitimate as these tenets may be, no one would call them 
part of international law. 

Thirdly, it is not a doctrine of expansion, but only of 
self-defence. Although the ultimate result of measures 
of self-defence may conceivably be aggrandizement, the 
Monroe Doctrine in itself does not warrant anything of the 
sort. Since it presupposes the right of people to govern 
themselves, the Latin-American states have nothing to fear 
from it, — a point which has been emphasized by Secre- 
tary Root in his recent South American journey. Like 
other growing countries, the United States has, in the course 



108 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

of its history, sometimes been guilty of aggression, of add- 
ing to its territories by force, and it may be destined to 
expand still more in the future ; but, whether we approve 
of aggrandizement or not, we have no right to accuse the 
Monroe Doctrine, which, like anything else, may be made 
to serve unfair purposes. 1 Even the Golden Rule may be 
distorted into a pretext for rapacity. 

Fourthly, the Monroe Doctrine is no longer the literal 
teaching of President Monroe. Although first expressed in 
his famous message, it has in course of time been developed 
to meet new conditions, a fact overlooked by Lord Salisbury 
when he said that it was inapplicable to "the state of 
things in which we live at the present day." 2 The question 
whether its application to any particular set of circum- 
stances would have met with the approval of Monroe and 
his advisers, is one which belongs to the history of politi- 
cal theories, but has no bearing on actual politics. 

While some of the ideas set forth by the fathers of the 
doctrine have grown, others, as we have seen, are no longer 
an essential part of it, even if the public has not always 
recognized the fact. For instance, educated Americans 
know not only that the United States is nearer in almost 
every way to Europe than to South America, but that 
the average American has more in common, not with the 
Englishman alone, but with the German, the Frenchman, or 
the Russian than with the Mexican, the Peruvian, or the 
Brazilian. This has, indeed, always been true ; but it was 
less realized at a time when it seemed possible to divide 
civilized peoples into two categories, — those who were 
ruled by irresponsible authority and those who enjoyed 
self-government. Such a division is now out of date, and 
race feeling, on the contrary, is more active than ever. 
When we remember how small and mixed is the white 

1 As for instance by President Polk when he wished to seize Yucatan. 

2 Venezuelan Correspondence. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 109 

element in some of the Latin-American countries, and how 
strong the prejudice against colored blood in the United 
States, we can appreciate some of the difficulties in the 
way of union of soul with the sister republics. 

After all, we ask, would not a close bond between the 
United States and Greater Britain, and one between Spain 
and her former revolted colonies, be more in keeping with 
the tendencies of the day ? Anglo-American friendship and 
Pan- Americanism can, of course, exist side by side ; but 
they might easily conflict, and the question might arise as 
to which had the more natural foundation. In this age of 
world powers, geographical divisions are disappearing even 
faster than differences of government. If "Europe" is 
antiquated as a political conception, why is not "America" 
equally so ? If it is, the Monroe Doctrine would appear to 
rest upon a fiction. 

But this is going too far. The geographical situation of 
the United States, and its "paramount interest" in the 
affairs of the western hemisphere, impose upon it certain 
rules of policy toward its immediate neighbors, whether 
there be an inborn communion of sentiment between them 
or not. Furthermore, it is wise to cultivate good and 
profitable relations of every kind with all countries. The 
reasons for cordiality will vary according to circumstances. 
For instance, the grounds for friendship between France 
and Spain are quite dissimilar to those existing between 
France and Russia. A certain community of institutions, 
interests, and ideals does exist between the republics of the 
western hemisphere, though it would be hard to say just 
how far it extends. Nothing, therefore, could be more legit- 
imate than the attempt to strengthen and multiply these 
ties. To make them more real, it is wise to dwell fre- 
quently upon them. 

It must be admitted that there are persons, even in the 
United States, who think it would be better if certain parts 



UO THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

of Latin America were under the control of some European 
power, instead of being left to the guidance of their own 
unrestrained wills. If we accept this view, we cannot defend 
the United States for protecting their independence ex- 
cept on the ground that such protection is necessary for 
the furtherance of legitimate, if selfish, American interests. 
In that case, the question as to what would be best for 
the world and for civilization might be rather delicate. 
However, it is unfair to say that the Monroe Doctrine is 
an entirely selfish policy. It may not be so full of altru- 
ism as Americans are inclined to think; but it has at 
least been unselfishly applied so far as the states of Latin 
America are concerned. No one who has studied the ex- 
pansion of Europe in the last part of the nineteenth 
century can escape the conclusion that the partition of 
lands in Asia and the scramble for Africa might, but for 
the Monroe Doctrine, have been accompanied, or followed, 
by a movement of the same sort in Latin America. The 
conditions in many of her states have been such as to 
give plenty of pretext for foreign interference ; and here, 
as well as elsewhere, the rivalry of the great powers would 
only have hastened the seizure of lands weakly held. There 
may never have been any deep designs of this kind, but 
expansion has often been haphazard. The danger was none 
the less there. 

In return for the immense service it has thus rendered, 
the United States has as yet demanded absolutely nothing. 
Of course in its attempts to promote friendly relations be- 
tween Anglo-Saxon and Latin America, it has not forgotten 
material advantages, and it has made the most of friendly 
sentiments in order to help American commerce to the ad- 
vantage of all parties. Motives of this sort are fair enough 
in themselves, and are usual under like circumstances in 
private, as well as in public, life. The Latin Americans are 
not forced to buy goods from the United States if they can 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 111 

get them elsewhere with more profit. So far, then, they 
have good cause to be grateful for the existence of the 
Monroe Doctrine, and for the way in which it has been 
applied up to the present day. 

As has been well said by Captain Mahan, "The precise 
value of the Monroe Doctrine is understood very loosely by 
most Americans, but the effect of the familiar phrase has 
been to develop a national sensitiveness which is a more 
frequent cause of war than material interests." The appli- 
cation of the theory may well vary according to the temper 
of the time or the views of the administration ; but it Has 
steadily tended to become broader. Thus the Venezuelan 
controversy of 1895-1896 may be regarded as having settled 
the point that, in a boundary dispute between a European 
power and an American one, the former must be willing to 
submit to arbitration ; but so far the United States has not 
demanded that the arbitrator should be an American : 
indeed, at the very time when the Venezuelan discussion 
had reached its most critical phase, a long-standing differ- 
ence as to the frontier of French Guiana and Brazil was 
referred to the Emperor of Russia for decision without 
raising a protest from Washington. 1 

Nevertheless, American public opinion is increasingly 
opposed to European intervention of any kind in trans- 
atlantic affairs, and may be expected to forbid in the 
future things which it has tolerated in the past, — a change 
which may be ascribed to a consciousness of greater 
strength, as well as to the keen chauvinism of the national 
sentiment to-day. Although admitting in theory the right 
of European nations to obtain redress from delinquent 
American ones, even by force, the United States has in 

1 In spite of the declaration of Mr. Frelinghuysen (January 4, 1883), 
that "The Department of State will not sanction an arbitration by 
European states in South American difficulties even with the consent of 
the parties." 



112 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

practice become very suspicious of such action, and is hostile 
to any landing of European troops on American soil. The 
experience of Egypt, for example, shows how easily a tem- 
porary occupation may become a permanent one, even when 
a promise to evacuate has been made in perfect good faith. 

While the United States was occupied with the Civil War, 
the Spaniards, heedless of its protests, reestablished their 
former sovereignty at San Domingo. They did so with the 
consent of the Dominicans, though they were soon driven 
out again. With this case in mind, President Grant de- 
clared in 1870 that "No European power can acquire by any 
means, — war, colonization, or annexation, — even when 
the annexed people demands it, any portion of American 
territory." 

A still further extension of the principle is the idea, now 
generally accepted, that no transfer of American territory 
from one European power to another can henceforth be 
allowed, — a proposition that was set forth in the particular 
case of Cuba as early as 1808. The United States permits 
the existence of foreign colonies in its neighborhood, but 
will resist any changes in their alien ownership ; for such 
changes would be in the nature of the colonization which it 
forbids. We may feel sure that it would risk all the hazards 
of war rather than acquiesce in the sale of St. Thomas to 
Germany. This might seem to be pushing the doctrine 
pretty far ; for it would limit the right of free transaction 
between two independent nations, one of them a world 
power. Nevertheless, it would not be unprecedented, and 
might be justified by the importance of the interests in- 
volved. The establishment of such a fortified coaling sta- 
tion within a short distance of the American coast would 
be something which the United States would no more toler- 
ate, so long as it was capable of effectual resistance, than 
England and France would agree to the transfer from 
Spain to Germany of the African fortress of Ceuta. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 113 

Other complications in the West Indies are also conceiv- 
able. It has been asserted * that, if Holland were to 
become part of the Germanic Confederation, the United 
States could not consent to the inclusion of the Dutch 
colonies of the western hemisphere. This view, we may 
surmise, would almost certainly be taken by the Ameri- 
can government and people if a union between Holland and 
Germany were brought about by some sudden act. In 
case, however, of the gradual absorption of Holland into 
the German Empire by some slow process- of ever closer 
alliance, it might be hard to say when or how the Americans 
could interfere, although they would doubtless wish to do 
so. They would also, in all probability, object to the cession 
of Guadeloupe and Martinique as an indemnity, if France 
were defeated in a war with Germany or Great Britain. 
If this supposition is correct, they thus practically guar- 
antee to France her possessions in the Caribbean Sea. 

It may be noted in passing that since the declaration of 
President Grant there has been a transfer of American terri- 
tory from one European power to another, and that it met 
with no opposition on the part of the United States. When, 
in 1878, Sweden ceded to France the little island of St. 
Barthelemi, the Americans took no notice of the proceed- 
ing, an indifference which may be explained partly by their 
lack of interest in foreign affairs so soon after the Civil War, 
and partly by the insignificance of the island ceded, which 
did not materially add to the strength of the French in West 
Indian waters. It is nevertheless strange [that no atten- 
tion whatever was paid to the transaction, and that, though 
it seems to present a certain analogy to a sale of St. 
Thomas to Germany, it seems to have escaped the notice of 
writers on the Monroe Doctrine, as well as of American 
historians generally. 

The extreme interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine may 
1 By Captain Mahan, in the National Review, February, 1903. 



114 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

be found in the assertion, first made officially by President 
Grant, that "The time is not so far distant when, in the 
natural course of events, the European political connection 
with this continent will cease ;" and the same idea has often 
been repeated since, notably by Secretary Olney, with his 
usual emphasis, in 1895. No wonder that European nations 
holding territory in America have been disquieted by it, 
even though there is as yet no serious foundation for such 
a fear. Monroe himself said explicitly, "With the existing 
colonies or dependencies of any European power we have 
not interfered, and shall not interfere," — a declaration of 
policy which has ever since been scrupulously observed by 
the United States, except in the case of Cuba, where circum- 
stances were of a peculiar nature. The Americans may be 
counted upon to sympathize with any people in the western 
hemisphere who are struggling to emancipate themselves 
from the rule of a European mother country ; but no Euro- 
pean nation need apprehend aggressive action on the part 
of the United States so long as its colonies are contented 
with their lot. 

Thus far we have been considering the Monroe Doctrine 
from its positive side, — that of its advantages to America. 
Let us now look at the negative, — at the obligations which 
it "entails. We may, of course, say that it does not entail 
any, if we believe that it is a matter of selfish policy, upheld 
by physical force only. That it does depend chiefly on force 
is obvious, — it would never have been accepted by other 
nations on account of its inherent virtue ; and yet in up- 
holding it, the Americans justify their action by moral 
considerations, and admit the existence of duties on their 
part. What are, then, some of these duties? 

The first question that arises is, Are the Americans bound 
to carry out the doctrine they have proclaimed, even when 
it is contrary to their interests to do so ? Such a limitation 
would be out of keeping with the practical nature of the 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 115 

Anglo-Saxon, which makes him dislike being subject to mere 
theories. As a matter of fact, in spite of the applause 
which greeted Monroe's words, American public opinion 
showed itself lukewarm about the Congress of Panama, 
a meeting called shortly afterwards with the avowed inten- 
tion of furthering the new creed. The country preferred to 
reserve its own liberty of action without hampering itself by 
outside agreements. In the course of debate on the subject, 
Henry Clay declared that the President's message was meant 
to enlighten opinion at home and not to be construed as a 
promise to any foreign nation. When, on various occasions 
since that time, the United States has refused to listen to 
appeals for assistance from one or another of the Latin- 
American states, it has, of course, always been charged with 
treason to its principles ; but it has felt free to act according 
to its own judgment. In the case of the French interven- 
tion in Mexico, for instance, the government at Washington 
did not adopt an attitude of resolute opposition until the 
Civil War at home was nearly over. On the other hand, in 
1895 Secretary Olney, supported by President Cleveland, 
took the ground that the Monroe Doctrine "entitles and 
requires" the United States to intervene in behalf of Vene- 
zuela. If we accept this view, we admit the existence of a 
serious obligation; but a country whose "fiat is law" is 
likely to decide for itself whether the situation "requires" 
action on its part or not. Americans are far too realistic to 
sacrifice themselves on the altar of their own shibboleths. 
When they find these becoming antiquated, they will never 
hesitate to adapt them to circumstances or, if need be, to 
abandon them altogether. 

One obligation imposed by the Monroe Doctrine has 
recently been coming into unpleasant prominence. If a 
Latin-American state is guilty of an injury to a European 
power for which redress can be fairly exacted, and if there 
is no effective way in which punishment can be applied 



116 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

except by occupation of American soil, what will happen? 
Although the government at Washington has repeatedly 
declared that it will not protect any state in wrong-doing, 
and has not prevented punishment in the past, public 
opinion is becoming more and more unwilling to permit a 
European occupation of American territory for any reason 
whatsoever. This means that the United States must 
accept the responsibility of satisfying the injured party, 
a thing which it can very likely do only by taking action 
against the wrong-doer. But the role of "international 
policeman" in American affairs is one which the country 
has no desire to assume ; for it would very soon lead to 
conflict with some of the other republics, who, while they 
welcome the Monroe Doctrine as a protection against 
Europe, dread nothing so much as interference on the part 
of their powerful sister at the north. Moreover, besides act- 
ing as guardian of the peace, the United States would have 
to play the arbiter as to the right and the wrong of any 
question under dispute ; in fact, there is no end to the 
difficulties in which it might become involved. 

These difficulties are now well recognized. President 
Roosevelt deserves credit for having been one of the first 
to perceive and to face them. Unluckily, even facing a 
difficulty does not remove it. The policy of the govern- 
ment at the present time seems to be to make the best of 
each case as it comes along, to try to persuade all parties 
to be reasonable, to warn the Latin-American republics that 
they will not be shielded, and may have to be punished, 
if they misbehave, but at the same time to keep the Monroe 
Doctrine prominently before the eyes of Europe. A con- 
spicuous instance of an attempt of this kind to arrange mat- 
ters equitably between a debtor American state and its 
European creditors is seen in the agreement with San 
Domingo. The trouble with this opportunist policy of the 
administration is that every intervention of a strong power 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 117 

in the affairs of a weak one tends to establish a protectorate 
of some sort. 

The theory of a natural separation between the New 
World and the Old is an essential part of the reasoning on 
which the Monroe Doctrine was based. In conformity with 
this idea, in the same breath in which it protests against 
European colonization of America it announces with equal 
emphasis, "In the wars of the European powers in matters 
relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor 
does it comport with our policy to do so." This declaration 
has been repeated in one form or another many times, 1 and 
has been adhered to. President Monroe himself had in- 
tended to put into his message of December, 1823, an 
expression of sympathy with the Greek revolution, but was 
persuaded by his secretary of state, Mr. Adams, not to do so, 
as it would appear like an interference in European affairs. 
The same policy has been followed ever since. American 
public men have sometimes criticised European events with 
a frankness, not to say a rudeness, which has provoked 
anger on the other side ; but they have had no thought of 
taking action in affairs which did not concern them. Not 
that the United States has not felt the duty of protecting 
its citizens and its commerce when they have been in 
danger of suffering injury. This is a right common to all 
states; but such a thing, let us say, as the sending of an 
ironclad to Smyrna to look after American missionaries 
would be a very different matter from taking part in a 
congress to discuss the Eastern question. The United 
States, while looking after its own interests wherever they 
have been affected, has sedulously kept out of general 
European politics. 

President Monroe talked only about Europe and America, 
without taking into consideration other parts of the world. 
What is the bearing of his doctrine upon Asia? Is the 
1 Notably at the first Hague Conference. 



118 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

United States confined by traditional policy to the western 
hemisphere? or, since Asia is not mentioned in the Presi- 
dent's message, is that continent open to every kind of 
American activity? 

Europe would have been glad to see the first view pre- 
vail, and this was the one indorsed by the Democratic plat- 
form in 1900. In truth, it seems absurd to assert that the 
Atlantic is a natural barrier between peoples, but that the 
Pacific is not. Nevertheless, the second interpretation has 
won the day : the Americans have taken an active part in 
the opening up of Eastern Asia, they have frequently 
joined with other powers in common action, and they have 
established themselves in the Philippines. After all, it 
would have been strange if they, the nearest civilized 
neighbors to the Far East, had sat by while their European 
competitors disposed of it to suit themselves, and this, for- 
sooth, because a principle which they had themselves in- 
vented for a totally different set of circumstances might 
be construed as restricting their liberty of action ! The 
Americans are not given to doctrinaire weakness of this 
sort. When the question came up in a concrete form, they 
decided that their rule of non-interference in European affairs 
did not prevent them from acquiring islands in the Pacific, 
no matter in which hemisphere they were situated. Cap- 
tain Mahan says: "In my apprehension, Europe construed 
by the Monroe Doctrine would include Africa with the Le- 
vant and India. ... It would not include Japan, China, 
nor the Pacific generally." This definition, though some- 
what arbitrary and not final, represents fairly well the 
present geographical limits of the doctrine in the Ameri- 
can mind. 

There is, however, another side to this Asiatic question 
which is usually overlooked in the United States. If Asia 
does not come within the scope of the Monroe Doctrine, why 
should the Asiatic powers feel bound to observe it ? If it 






THE MONROE DOCTRINE 119 

has not prevented the Americans from establishing them- 
selves in the eastern hemisphere, how can it exclude the 
Japanese from the western ? Would Japanese possession of 
Ecuador, let us say, be more serious for the United States 
than American ownership of the Philippines is for Japan? 
We can only reply that facts have to be taken as they are. 
Ten years ago Japan was not in a position to defend the 
principle of "Asia for the Asiatics"; and to-day she has 
to accept the existing situation, just as the United States 
has to with regard to European possessions in the New 
World. True as this may be, the Americans, in forbid- 
ding Asiatic interference in the western hemisphere, cannot 
fall back on the argument of reciprocity which they apply to 
Europe. 

Yet even toward Europe their policy is not quite what 
it once was ; for it cannot be denied that of late years they 
have shown a greater disposition than of old to take part 
in European questions. As a civilized nation the United 
; States has, of course, appeared at various international 
: scientific and philanthropic meetings ; it was also repre- 
sented at the Berlin conference of 1885, which laid the 
foundations of the Congo Free State, and at Algeciras in 
1906, where it helped to regulate the affairs of Morocco, even 
signing (if with some reservations) the general act of agree- 
ment. Furthermore, Secretary Hay protested against the 
oppression of the Jews in Roumania, and in his official 
capacity transmitted to Russia a Jewish-American petition 
about the Kishinev massacre, — acts which, whether we ap- 
prove of them or not, were scarcely in consonance with the 
traditions of American foreign policy. None of these things 
have been of decisive consequence in themselves, but they 
may be taken as indications of a rather different attitude 
toward the future, the more so as they are in keeping 
with the growing tendency among all nations to be in- 
terested everywhere. In the event of a repetition of the 



120 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

Armenian massacres of 1895, the United States, whatever 
may be the precepts of the Monroe Doctrine, would prob- 
ably not remain as passive as it did then ; and we can con- 
ceive of its taking action to protect the natives in the 
Congo Free State. 

Now if this is so, if the United States is going to aban- 
don that portion of the Monroe Doctrine which forbids 
interference in European affairs, how can it nsist that 
Europe shall not meddle in those of America? Logically, 
perhaps, it can not ; but, on the broad ground of national 
welfare, it might maintain that its interests were " para- 
mount" in one region without necessarily being non- 
existent elsewhere. An attitude of this sort would, 
however, be somewhat weak morally, and would give the 
European powers a legitimate cause of complaint against 
the restrictions now imposed upon them. This is one reason 
why the Americans are anxious to keep out of purely 
European questions. Whether they will be able to do so 
is another matter. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE SPANISH WAR 

EARLY in the year 1901, a foreign ambassador at Wash- 
ington remarked in the course of conversation that, 
although he had been in America only a short time, he 
had seen two different countries, — the United States before 
the war with Spain, and the United States since the war 
with Spain. This was a picturesque way of expressing the 
truth, now generally accepted, that the war of 1898 was 
a turning-point in the history of the American republic. 
The reason therefor is usually summed up in the phrase 
that since that date the United States has been a world 
power. This assertion is, however, vigorously disputed by 
two sets of opponents, and on exactly opposite grounds. 
Some writers labor to prove that the United States is not, 
or if it is, ought not to be, a world power to-day; others 
maintain that it has always been one, because ever since its 
independence it has been interested in affairs in many 
parts of the world, — which is also true of Holland. Evi- 
dently the term has not the same meaning to the two 
parties. But without entering into discussion, we can con- 
fine ourselves to the indisputable fact that the Spanish War 
brought about in American public feeling a change im- 
portant enough to mark the beginning of an epoch. 

When we come to analyze the causes of this sudden evolu- 
tion, we must concede that at first sight the magnitude of 
the result seems out of all proportion to that of the military 

121 



122 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

operations. The war was a short, bloodless one between two 
nations of very unequal resources. There were but three 
battles worthy of the name, — two on the water and one 
on the land. The two sea-fights were brilliantly conducted, 
and the completeness of the success, coupled with the almost 
entire absence of loss on the part of the Americans, consti- 
tuted a pleasing testimony to the efficiency of their new 
navy; but the difference in strength between the com- 
batants made the victory a foregone conclusion. The one 
battle on land was marked by creditable fighting on both 
sides, rather than by any display of generalship, and the 
forces engaged and the losses incurred were too small for 
the encounter to deserve the name of a great battle. 
Though the United States had good reason to be satisfied 
with the outcome, there was, when all is said, no cause for 
undue elation ; nor had there been any severe strain on the 
country. 

In considering the causes of the war, we should re- 
member, to begin with, that the relations between Spain 
and the United States had never been really cordial, nor 
was there any reason why they should have been. The 
Americans had inherited the anti-Spanish prejudices of 
their English ancestors, and the traditions of their feuds, 
and as colonists they had taken part in the wars of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is true that 
Spain had fought on their side in their struggle for inde- 
pendence, but under compulsion as the ally of France, and 
after expressly warning the French against the perils of 
such a course of action. The Spaniards, in spite of their 
old hatred of England, could not but see that the success- 
ful revolt of the British colonics would prove a dangerous 
example to their own; accordingly, at the peace nego- 
tiations in Paris in 1783, the Spanish government did 
all that it could to keep the territory of the new re- 
public within as narrow limits as possible. The Ameri- 



THE SPANISH WAR 123 

cans, on their part, had a separate understanding with 
Great Britain about the northern boundary of Florida, — 
an understanding which led to a prolonged boundary dis- 
pute with Spain. 

This boundary dispute was but the first of a series that 
lasted for more than a generation. The plain truth was 
that the Americans coveted the valuable and thinly settled 
Spanish territories which shut them off from the Gulf of 
Mexico. On one side, we find a lusty, rapidly growing 
nation, keenly alive to its own rights and interests and 
not too mindful of those of others. Opposed to it was a 
weak people with a decrepit government, unable to occupy 
effectively much of the land it held, and too feeble to keep 
order in its possessions or to prevent legitimate cause of 
complaint on the part of its neighbors. As might have 
been expected, the conduct of the Americans was rough and 
high-handed, that of the Spanish shuffling and dilatory. 
For years these controversies continued until they were 
ended by the sale, almost under compulsion, of East Florida 
to the young republic. West Florida had been previously 
occupied by force. 

Almost before these matters were settled, the Americans 
gave fresh cause of offence by recognizing the independence 
of the revolted Spanish colonies, — a recognition that 
would have been granted earlier if the government had 
not wished to make sure of Florida before offering Spain 
further provocation. A worse blow soon followed. In the 
minds of the Americans, the Monroe Doctrine was prima- 
rily directed against the Holy Alliance, not against Spain. 
Though they did not believe that she could reconquer 
her lost possessions, they did not contest her right to 
try. None the less, from the Spanish point of view, the 
adoption of this principle was a grievous injury ; for it cut 
Spain off in her hour of weakness from the hope of outside 
aid, without which she was unable to recover her territories. 



124 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

Surely she could not be expected to feel anything but 
resentment for unfriendly conduct so persistent and so 
unprovoked. Yet in time old grievances might have been 
forgotten, had no new ones been added. After her insur- 
gent children had achieved their independence, she no 
longer held a foot of land on either American continent, so 
there would have been nothing left to quarrel about if it 
had not been for Cuba. 

A glance at the map is enough to convince any one of 
the unique importance of this island to the United States. 
Strategically it commands at one end the entrance to the 
Gulf of Mexico, — the outlet to the huge Mississippi Valley, 
— and at the other it fronts on the Caribbean Sea and any 
future isthmian canal. Its situation may be compared 
with that of Crete in the Eastern Mediterranean, but Cuba 
is much the larger and the richer of the two. 

The worth of this " Pearl of the Antilles" was so evident 
that the Americans appreciated it from the first. Even 
Jefferson, who was a cautious, conservative statesman, dis- 
inclined to an adventurous foreign policy, admitted that he 
had always " looked on Cuba as the most interesting addi- 
tion which could ever be made to our system of states." 
After the purchase of Florida, the thought of owning the 
farther side of the entrance to the Gulf became more attrac- 
tive still. In any event, the Americans were determined 
that, if Cuba could not be theirs, it should not pass into the 
hands of any strong naval power. For a while they were in 
equal dread that Napoleon might get possession of it, and 
that the English might forestall him in doing so. In 1808 
President Jefferson officially declared that the United States 
would view with alarm the cession of Cuba to either 
England or France. The same fears came up again at 
the time of the French intervention in Spain in 1823; 
and two years later the government at Washington sent a 
circular note to its ministers abroad with the declaration 



THE SPANISH WAR 125 

that it would oppose the transfer of the island to any other 
European power. At a later date we find fresh anxiety 
of the same kind. In 1840 the United States went so far 
as to offer to guarantee Cuba to the Spaniards against 
foreign aggression, but refused to join England and France 
in a triple agreement to this end. Contrary to their usual 
principles and to the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, the 
Americans did not even wish to see the island independent, 
preferring that it should remain as it was rather than fall 
into any hands but their own. They regarded it as of 
immense value to them, and they never had anything but 
contempt for the military strength of Spain. For many 
years the real clew to their policy was to be found in the 
negro question at home. 

Unlike most of the Spanish-American colonies on the 
mainland, Cuba contained a large servile population, whose 
numbers, after the nominal abolition of the slave-trade, 
were kept up till about 1860 by clandestine shipments. 
Independence by the aid of South America, where slavery 
had disappeared with Spanish rule, meant emancipation of 
the negroes, and, since at that time the whites were in 
the minority, probably black domination in the end. Such 
a prospect was more than enough to excite violent alarm in 
the South. It is true that even the Southern States had 
sympathized with the revolt of Latin America; but they 
had never consented to recognize the republics of Haiti and 
San Domingo, and had looked askance at the Congress of 
Panama because those states had been invited to participate 
in it. 1 To the Southerners a republic of emancipated slaves 
was not only a thing abhorrent in itself, but in their near 
vicinity it meant a source of contagion, a menace to the 
whole structure of their society. The American govern- 
ment therefore set its face against proposed attempts on 

1 Haiti and San Domingo were not recognized by the United States 
until after the outbreak of the Civil War. 



126 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

the part of Mexico and Venezuela to continue the war of 
liberation by extending it to the Spanish islands, and it 
thus helped preserve them to Spain for another sixty years. 

As the nineteenth century advanced, the slaveholders of 
the South became more eager in their desires. Here, at 
their door, was a fresh supply of slaves, a commodity 
whose price was rising steadily, and, what was of still 
greater consequence, material for two or three new slave 
states by means of which the dreaded preponderance of 
the North might be averted. In the West, where the suc- 
cesses of the Mexican War had stimulated a strong senti- 
ment in favor of national expansion, annexation had also 
many partisans. Between 1845 and 1860, therefore, we 
find Congress continually debating the Cuban question, 
and successive administrations forming new plans to get 
hold of the coveted territory. In 1848 and 1853 attempts 
were made to buy it from Spain, but these were sharply 
repulsed at Madrid. In 1854 the American ministers to 
London, Paris, and Madrid met and issued the "Ostend 
Manifesto," which proclaimed the right of the United States 
to take Cuba by force in case a reasonable offer of purchase 
were refused. They had gone, however, farther than the 
country was ready to follow, and were disavowed in Wash- 
ington. By this time, too, opinion in the Northern States 
was becoming roused to such vigorous opposition that an- 
nexation finally ceased to be feasible, and a discreditable 
chapter in American annals came to an end. It was an 
important fact during the whole period that the population 
of Cuba itself remained quiet and apparently contented. 
There was no rising of sufficient size to offer a decent pre- 
text for outside interference. 

Soon the situation was reversed. Just as the Americans, 
after the Civil War and the emancipation of the Southern 
slaves, had ceased to want the island, an insurrection broke 
out there, which a few years earlier would have tempted 



THE SPANISH WAR 127 

them to intervene. In 1868 an uprising took place that 
the home government was unable to subdue, in spite of the 
large number of troops brought into the field. For ten 
years the struggle dragged along, without any decisive 
results, but with continual and unavoidable friction between 
Spain and the United States. Cuban sympathizers pre- 
pared filibustering expeditions on American soil, some of 
which were checked by the authorities, while others either 
escaped notice or were connived at in ways that gave rise 
to much recrimination between Washington and Madrid. 
The ill treatment of American citizens residing in the 
island (usually persons of Cuban origin) was a perpetual 
cause of complaint, and various inconveniences, especially 
the disturbance of trade, kept up irritation in the 
United States. Finally the shooting of Americans captured 
on the filibustering vessel Virginius almost brought on 
war. Yet, after all, peace was preserved, and the Span- 
iards were allowed to settle their affairs without direct 
intervention, although this would surely have come if the 
fighting had continued much longer. By the Convention 
of Zanjon, Spain made concessions to the insurgents, who 
thereupon laid down their arms. 

Then followed seventeen quiet years. Slavery was 
abolished, and the island prospered. The Americans were 
too busy at home to pay much attention to it, and if 
the Spaniards had succeeded in contenting the natives, 
would have continued indifferent. Meanwhile a consider- 
able amount of American capital had been invested in 
Cuba, the holders of which were not in favor of rebel- 
lion or of disturbance from any quarter ; but their presence 
made it certain that if disorders should again arise, the 
government at Washington would have to interest itself, 
whether it wished to or not. In 1895 a new revolt 
started, which soon gathered strength enough to defy 
the efforts to suppress it, and as it went on fruitlessly 



128 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

month after month and year after year, the feeling grew 
ever stronger in the United States that the situation was 
intolerable. It was not merely that the Americans had a 
natural sympathy for the insurgents as a people striving 
to free themselves from tyranny, but they were tired of a 
commotion at their very door. The conviction took firm 
hold that something must be done for the " abatement 
of a nuisance," if on no other account. Then occurred 
the mysterious incident of the blowing up of the Maine 
in Havana harbor, which greatly excited the nation and 
hastened, but did not in itself cause, the actual outbreak 
of hostilities. 

There is a curious resemblance between the conduct of 
the United States at this time and that of Russia before the 
Turkish war of 1877-1878. In each case we find at the 
head of the government a man of peaceful disposition, 
who consented slowly and reluctantly to a conflict forced 
upon him by the pressure of public opinion and by difficul- 
ties which seemed otherwise inextricable. In each country 
the popular passions were for many months continually 
inflamed by fresh incidents. The risings of the small states 
of the Balkans and the Cuban insurrection appealed to 
the sympathies of the masses in Russia and America re- 
spectively, the sentiments aroused being at bottom the 
same, though cloaked under different names. In one in- 
stance, the appeal was that of fellow-Christians, of brother 
Slavs, to their traditional friend and protector; in the 
other, it was that of fellow-Americans straining to 
cast off a European yoke and looking hopefully to 
the great republic which had always represented the 
cause of liberty. The Bulgarian atrocities and the 
horrors of reconcentration, both awful enough in them- 
selves, were described and exaggerated by a sensational 
and sometimes unscrupulous press, till the feelings of 
Russia in 1877 and of the United States in 1898 were 



THE SPANISH WAR 129 

wrought up to such a pitch that the governments deemed 
that they had no choice but to yield. Both Russians and 
Americans began war with a declaration that they were 
acting from unselfish motives, a statement which, as far as 
the great majority of the people were concerned, may be 
regarded as true. Later, when the wars ended in vic- 
tory, and both countries believed that they had a right 
to compensate themselves for their expenditure of effort 
and for their losses, they were at once accused of hypocrisy 
by the outside world, which declared that their motive 
from the first had been sheer greed. But we note a 
difference in the outcome. After a far more exhausting 
struggle, the triumphant Russians got much less in return 
than did the Americans; not because they deserved or 
desired less, but because the political situation was such 
that it was worth the while of other powers to restrain 
them by force if necessary. We may also note that the 
position of Cuba after Spanish evacuation was not unlike 
that of Bulgaria immediately after the treaty of Berlin. 
Fortunately for themselves, the Americans showed much 
more tact in dealing with a delicate situation than did the 
Russians. 

In order to demonstrate that the United States was 
acting from no selfish motives, Congress, in declaring war 
against Spain, proclaimed that its intention was to free 
Cuba from Spanish rule, and not to annex the island. This 
self-denying ordinance was voted in a moment of excitement, 
and in all sincerity. When the war ended, the country felt 
that a promise had been made ; and the promise was kept, 
in spite of much temptation to break it, and in spite of the 
usual specious reasoning to prove that it need not be 
regarded as binding. History has shown that the most 
solemn assurances of the sort, even when made in perfect 
good faith, somehow or other lose their force as time goes 
on. Other nations may talk loudly of violated pledges, 



130 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

but the one interested can prove to its own satisfaction 
that it is no longer bound by the word rashly given. We 
must admit that by the Piatt amendment the Americans 
attached conditions to the independence which they be- 
stowed ; but, though we may regret that there was a flaw 
in their generosity, recent events have proved that the 
conditions were wise. Whatever may be the fate of Cuba 
in the future, the treatment she has received at the hands 
of the United States in the decade since she was made 
free will remain something to be proud of. 

The liberation of Cuba was not the only result of the 
Spanish War; the effects on the United States were many 
and important. Considering how little fighting took place, 
the territorial changes brought about by the conflict were 
very large. They gave the Americans a stronger strategic 
position in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Caribbean Sea, 
coaling stations in the Pacific, and a base of operations in 
the Far East. But, though they made the United States 
stronger for offensive purposes, in some ways they weak- 
ened it for defensive ones. Up to 1898 Alaska was the only 
possession which could be seized by a foe with a superior 
fleet ; now Hawaii, the Philippines, and other Pacific islands, 
as well as Porto Rico, could hardly be defended against an 
adversary who controlled the sea. None the less, however 
the gain and the loss may balance, they both represent far- 
reaching changes in the military position of the country ; 
yet even these are not sufficient to account for the differ- 
ence in the American attitude before and after the war. 

Like so many other things, an attitude has two faces, a 
subjective and an objective one. The people of the re- 
public, if not actually transformed by their short victorious 
conflict, were much affected by it, both as they saw 
themselves and as others saw them. To the greater part 
of Europe the war itself, and the course which it took, 
came as an unpleasant surprise. During most of the nine- 



THE SPANISH WAR 131 

teenth century the United States had enjoyed a remarkable 
popularity abroad. Many Englishmen were well disposed 
toward it because it was inhabited by their kin ; Frenchmen 
were proud of it because they had assisted in its creation ; 
Russia was a traditional friend ; liberals all over Europe 
sympathized with its democratic institutions; zealous 
Roman Catholics were pleased with the flourishing con- 
dition of their church across the water. Countless Euro- 
pean children had delighted in the Indians of Fenimore 
Cooper, and millions of kindly souls had read and wept 
over Uncle Tom's Cabin. Travelling Americans, though 
sometimes forth-putting, were open-handed and good- 
natured. In the later years of the century American 
students in numbers had frequented the art schools in 
Paris and the universities in Germany, and had given a 
good account of themselves. The fame of the country's 
wealth and prosperity, of the ingenuity and practical abili- 
ties of its. inhabitants, and especially of their eagerness to 
make money, was wide-spread. But in the great game 
of international politics they took little part. European 
statesmen could usually leave them out of their reckonings. 
Well-informed persons were aware that the United States 
was a power of great resources, — how great in a military 
way had been shown by the Civil War, — and that, as the 
Mexican, and quite lately the Venezuelan, incident had 
proved, it was resolved to stand by its traditional policy. 
But if one let that policy alone and kept clear of the 
Monroe Doctrine, in which most of Europe had small in- 
terest, then in practice the United States need not often 
be taken into consideration. It belonged, so to speak, 
to a different world. 

All this was changed by the Spanish War. Continental 
Europe, without defending Spanish misgovernment in Cuba, 
regarded the action of the Americans as brutal aggression 
against a smaller nation. How could it be pleased with 



132 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

the cry, so often raised across the sea, that European rule 
in the western hemisphere ought to be brought to an end ? 
But the Americans did more than expel the Spaniards from 
Cuba and Porto Rico : they proved that they possessed 
a most efficient modern fleet, they crossed the Pacific and 
established themselves in the Far East, they threatened 
to send ships to attack Spain in her own waters. It was 
evident that they had assumed a new position among 
nations ; that henceforth they would have to be counted 
with as one of the chief forces in international affairs. 
Although, as usually happens for the victorious, a revulsion 
of sentiment soon took place in their favor, and many per- 
sons hastened to testify that they had always been on 
their side, still the appearance of a new factor of such 
magnitude interfered with many old calculations. The 
former easy popularity of the United States was gone, 
probably never to return. Some idealists mournfully de- 
clared that what the Union had gained in political impor- 
tance it had lost in moral greatness ; that it had forfeited 
its real eminence, and was now only one more huge, 
aggressive, selfish power. Be this as it may, its situation, 
for better or for worse, was radically changed in the eyes 
of the outside world. 

The change was equally decisive in the consciousness of 
the Americans themselves. The war aroused within them 
a feeling of strength which had until then been latent. It 
opened their eyes to new horizons, suggested new outlets 
for their energies, and made them confident that they 
could deal with problems which had never before attracted 
their attention. They had always been proud of their 
country, — aggressively so, foreigners thought, — but they 
had regarded it as something different from the others, and 
leading its own life apart. Now, all at once, they were 
willing to give up their isolation and plunge into the fray. 
They felt that the day had come when they were called 






THE SPANISH WAR 133 

upon to play a part in the broader affairs of mankind 
even at the cost of sacrificing some of their cherished 
ideals. They were indeed unable, as well as unwilling, to 
return to their earlier point of view. Full of joyous self- 
reliance, they were prepared to meet all the difficulties and 
to accept all the burdens of their new position. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE ACQUISITION OF COLONIES 

DURING the negotiations which preceded the war with 
Spain, as well as in the course of the struggle itself, 
the American people, regardless of party, supported the 
policy of the government almost with unanimity. This 
unanimity vanished when it became necessary to decide 
what use should be made of their victory. While the public 
as a whole hesitated between respect for its cherished tra- 
ditions and the allurements of the new prospects, the more 
partisan on both sides wrangled fiercely over the question 
whether the country should or should not retain its new 
acquisitions. The two points of view are usually called the 
Imperialist and the Anti-imperialist ; but whereas the Anti- 
imperialists have adopted their name and gloried in it, the 
so-called Imperialists have never quite accepted an epithet 
fastened on them by their adversaries. After all, the title 
is hardly in keeping with American republican ideals, what- 
ever may be the truth about the policy which it represents. 
In the long and bitter disputes as to what should be 
done with the new insular possessions, argument centred 
on the retention of the Philippines. Anti-imperialists 
did, indeed, condemn the annexation of Hawaii. They 
declared that the revolution by which the queen had 
been overthrown was a usurpation of power by a handful 
of foreigners who would never have succeeded but for the 

134 



THE ACQUISITION OF COLONIES 135 

landing of American troops, and that the islands properly 
belonged to their native inhabitants, — a view which 
President Cleveland had taken when he withdrew from 
the consideration of the Senate the treaty submitted by 
his predecessor. The annexation was carried out during 
the excitement of the Spanish War, not by treaty, — for 
fear that the necessary two-thirds majority could not be 
secured in the Senate, — but by joint resolution of the two 
houses of Congress. However, no one could deny the 
unique naval situation of Hawaii in the Pacific ; and, much 
as the Anti-imperialists might condemn the means by which 
the territory had been acquired, the fact that the natives 
now formed a small and dwindling minority of the pop- 
ulation rendered it difficult to put them once more in 
control. In the case of Porto Rico, although again the 
extreme Anti-imperialists were opposed to acquisition, they 
were deprived of their strongest plea by the evident 
willingness of the inhabitants to enjoy the benefits of 
American rule. In regard to the Philippines no such excuse 
could be put forward. Here there was no pretence of a 
wish to come under American domination ; on the contrary, 
the islands had first to be conquered from a people that was 
doing the very thing with which Americans had been taught 
to sympathize, — striving to obtain its independence. 

Amidst the multitude of conflicting statements at this 
time, we can recognize a few main contentions which re- 
appear again and again. In the first place, the Anti- 
imperialists asserted that there were plenty of unsolved 
problems at home to which the nation should devote all its 
energies instead of squandering them elsewhere, especially 
as the Americans had no experience in colonial matters. 
To this, reply was made that every colonial power had 
duties to discharge at home, but that the management of 
domestic affairs, far from being interfered with by the care 
of distant possessions, gained from the knowledge and the 



136 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

sense of responsibility required in dealing with them ; that 
a state could never have too many outlets for the energies 
of its citizens; that, even if the Americans lacked ex- 
perience in colonial matters, they could profit by the 
experience of others, and they were starting unfettered by 
previous mistakes. They were not inferior in intelligence 
to other ruling peoples ; why, then, should they not succeed 
even better? The political and commercial arguments 
employed on both sides turned on such topics as the rela- 
tive advantages of extension and concentration, — on the 
question whether trade follows the flag, and kindred de- 
batable themes, — with the result, of course, that neither 
side was in the least convinced by the other. But the 
fiercest and most effective attacks of the Anti-imperialists 
were based on the charge that the new policy was an aban- 
donment, not only of the wise traditions of the fathers of 
the republic, but of the noble ideals which had made the 
Union honored throughout the world. Even the Monroe 
Doctrine was called into service, but elicited the reply that 
it had no reference to Asia. Besides, it was not a lifeless 
bond, but one which could be adapted to meet new cir- 
cumstances. 

The advocates of a policy of expansion met the assertion 
that, according to American ideals, government should be 
by the consent of the governed, with the declaration that 
this was true only when the governed were capable of 
taking care of themselves; that, when they were not, the 
progress of the governed — which meant also the advance- 
ment of civilization — was more important than their 
consent. This at once raised the question whether the 
Filipinos were capable of self-government, and if so to what 
extent, — a point which no mere argument could settle. 
With a certain inconsistency, the Democratic party, which 
had, at least tacitly, accepted the Southern view that the 
negroes could not be allowed to vote where they were 



THE ACQUISITION OF COLONIES 137 

numerous, proclaimed, none the less, that the Filipinos were 
quite capable of ruling themselves. As the Republican 
party, on the other hand, had abandoned the attempt to 
impose negro suffrage on the South, its refusal of inde- 
pendence to an "inferior race" in the tropics was less 
illogical. 

The charge that the acquisition of colonial possessions 
was contrary to the traditional policy of the United States 
was met in one of two ways, — either by admitting its truth 
but declaring that the time had now come for a change, or 
by denying the historical accuracy of the statement. Ac- 
cording to the writers who support the latter view, coloni- 
zation has been the dominant characteristic of the whole 
growth of the country. Not only has the United States 
been from the first a rapidly expanding power, adding to 
its territories in every generation, but it has repeatedly 
held lands which were virtually colonies, whose inhabitants 
did not enjoy the rights of self-government. Not to speak 
of the Indians, — "the wards of the nation," — we must 
not forget that in Louisiana, Florida, New Mexico, and 
California, there were French and Spanish populations 
which were in no way consulted when they were handed 
over to the United States. In each of these cases the form 
of government first instituted was a military despotism, 
albeit one of short duration. After all, one might ask, 
what is a colony? If we declare that the title cannot be 
applied to contiguous territory, then it is a mistake to 
term Siberia and Central Asia colonies of Russia, as has 
often been done. The settlement of Siberia has taken place 
in much the same way as the opening up of the Ameri- 
can West. What importance has mere separation by a 
stretch of water? It has never been the custom to call 
Ireland an English colony, even if it does not touch Great 
Britain, and was held down by force in the past and at 
one time systematically colonized. Colonization is nothing 



138 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

but a form of national growth, which, from being internal, 
becomes external when the home territory no longer offers 
a sufficient field for expansion. It is no mere coincidence 
that, only when the interior frontier disappears from 
American history, does the extension of the frontier be- 
yond the continent begin. Both movements are but parts 
of the same healthy process of development. 

The main trouble with the above argument is that it 
leaves out of consideration the essential difference between 
the acquisitions of the United States before and after 1898. 
Granting that in each case we have a process of expansion, 
and that the second not unnaturally came after the first, 
this does not alter the fundamental distinction between 
the two movements. All the territory acquired by the 
Americans before the Spanish War was in regions suitable 
for white colonization. Whatever may have been the char- 
acter of its inhabitants at the time it was obtained, there 
was no doubt that before long they would be submerged 
by an American population similar to that in the older 
parts of the country. Military or even territorial govern- 
ment was thus but a temporary measure for a period of 
transition : the newest lands would sooner or later be in 
every way on an equal footing with the oldest. The one 
exception was Alaska, where, owing to the inhospitable 
climate, there was not, and may never be, a sufficient 
population to form an independent state. But it must be 
remembered that in 1807, when Alaska was purchased, 
most Americans believed that Canada would shortly come 
into the Union, after which Alaska would cease to be a 
detached fragment, and become the natural northwestern 
frontier of the country. At any rate, a possession whose 
incapacity for complete self-government arises only from 
lack of inhabitants does not present any arduous political 
problems. 

Tropical lands already thickly settled by natives foreign 



THE ACQUISITION OF COLONIES 139 

in speech and civilization come under a different cate- 
gory, for in them we cannot expect a speedy triumph of 
Anglo-Saxon ideals, or an immigration of Americans suf- 
ficient to modify the population. When this population 
belongs to races which may not for centuries be capable 
of governing themselves with a fair amount of law and 
order, the attempt to apply the old system breaks down. 

The American people have in the past been aware of this 
distinction, and have more than once shown their repug- 
nance to holding alien dependencies. We have an instance 
of this in the history of their relations with Liberia. In 
1820 a band of negroes sent by the American Colonization 
Society founded a settlement on the west African coast, 
the United States taking no official part in the affair 
except to send government supplies at one time to keep 
the colonists alive. In 1837 they formed themselves into 
a commonwealth, and ten years later assumed the title of 
a sovereign state, which, owing to the feeling against free 
negroes in the South, was not recognized by the United 
States until 1862, after the outbreak of the Civil War. 
One might have expected the Americans to maintain some 
sort of protectorate over the little black republic, especially 
as they have had occasion to make representation to 
powers in its behalf. In this connection, Secretary Freling- 
huj^sen, in 1884, used the phrase "a quasi-parental relation- 
ship"; but such a relationship is unknown to international 
law. Although the Americans would not view with indif- 
ference the forcible annexation of Liberia by a European 
power, the}' are not likely to push their concern for her 
farther. For additional examples of the policy of keep- 
ing free from outlying territories inhabited by people of 
another race, we may turn to the refusal of the Senate 
to ratify the treaties for the annexation of St. Thomas (1867) 
and San Domingo (1870), and to President Cleveland's 
withdrawal of the Hawaiian treaty (1893). 



140 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

From the beginning of the Spanish War, there has been 
another tale to tell. In July, 1898, Hawaii was annexed, 
and at the end of the same year the peace of Paris assured 
to the United States possession of Porto Rico, of the Philip- 
pines, and of Guam in the Ladrones. In 1899, as the 
result of a treaty with Germany and Great Britain, the 
Americans acquired the island of Tutuila and its depend- 
encies (in the Samoa group) as a naval station. In 1902 
they concluded an arrangement for the purchase of the 
Danish West Indies, but the treaty was not ratified by 
the Danish senate. In 1903 they got from the newly con- 
stituted republic of Panama practical possession of a strip 
of land on each side of the future Isthmian Canal. In 
1906 the collapse of the Cuban government in the face of 
an insurrection led to the landing of American troops, with 
consequences still hard to determine. 

For better or for worse, the United States has thus become 
a colonial power in the fullest sense of the word. Its lat- 
est acquisitions, near and far, are all situated in the tropics, 
and are therefore subject to the limitations imposed by 
tropical conditions. They are small in extent as com- 
pared with the holdings of Great Britain, France, Holland, 
Portugal, or even Germany ; but they are thickly settled, 
and have been so long used to European rule that they 
have acquired a more or less civilized, if foreign, stamp. 
Owing to certain peculiar characteristics, the problems they 
present are not quite the same as those of the colonies of 
the various European nations ; and as the special ideals of 
their American owners add another element of variety, 
their relation to the country which holds them is in some 
ways novel. 

Before the American government could regulate the status 
of the new lands which had so suddenly come under its j 
care, it had first to clear up the uncertainty about their 
position under the American Constitution, a document 






THE ACQUISITION OF COLONIES 141 

not framed to meet contingencies of the kind. This fun- 
damental question was settled in a rather extraordinary 
manner by the two " Insular Decisions" of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. In each case the court gave 
its verdict by a vote of five to four, and the majority was 
transferred from one side to the other by the vote of one 
judge, who followed a course of reasoning which appeared 
inconsistent to his eight colleagues, not to speak of the 
general public. According to these decisions, new terri- 
tories belonging to the United States are from the date of 
their acquisition parts of the country, not mere possessions; 
but only those, which, like Texas and Hawaii, have come 
in by the action of both branches of Congress, enjoy from 
the first the full rights of the American Constitution. Terri- 
tory obtained by a treaty, like that gained from Spain, is 
subject to legislation of Congress, as if it were a mere pos- 
session. Consequently, tariff duties cannot be imposed on 
importations from Hawaii, but may be, and were for a 
time, on goods from Porto Rico, and are still on those 
from the Philippines. 

We need not dwell on the details of the form of gov- 
ernment instituted in most of the American colonies. 
Tutuila and Guam are mere coaling stations, suitable for 
naval purposes, and they have so few inhabitants that 
they are easy to rule. The Hawaiian Islands, too, are of 
interest chiefly on account of their commercial and strategic 
value. In their social structure they are unlike the ter- 
ritories obtained by the Spanish War; for, although 
Americans form but a small minority of the total popu- 
lation, their influence has been dominant for many 
years. Whatever civilization the natives have acquired 
is of Anglo-Saxon origin, and English is the language of 
the government and the schools, as well as of the public 
life. 

The administration of Hawaii does not differ materially 



142 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

from that of an ordinary American territory. The gov- 
ernor and the judges are appointed from Washington, and, 
owing to the political immaturity of the natives, who have 
at times controlled the legislature, the veto power has been 
frequently applied. At bottom, the chief difference between 
the regime in Hawaii and the system of which there have 
been so many examples in the United States itself, lies in 
the fact that, on the mainland, territorial government has 
been regarded as transitory, as destined before long to be 
replaced by full statehood, which has not been presupposed 
for Hawaii. 

In Porto Rico the aboriginal Indians died off many gen- 
erations ago, and their places have been taken by the descend- 
ants of Spanish settlers and of imported negro slaves. 
As Spanish immigration continued throughout the nine- 
teenth century, the white inhabitants to-day — at least 
on paper — outnumber the colored, most of whom are 
mulattoes. According to the census of 1899, out of a 
total population of 953,243, 589,426 were whites; but 
these figures, we must remember, like similar ones in other 
countries where there is a difference of race, must be accepted 
with much allowance. The census takers have often no 
way of determining the color of the persons they put down 
on their lists, except by the statements of those in- 
terested ; and in view of the social prestige of the white 
race, we may feel sure that every doubtful case, besides 
many that are not doubtful, will be decided in its favor. 
This practice repeated on a large scale must vitiate the 
statistics. It remains true, however, that Porto Rico is 
not only a thickly inhabited territory, but one in which 
the majority of the inhabitants regard themselves as being 
of white, that is to say, of Spanish, blood, and so heirs to 
Latin civilization. Although this is enough to force us to 
the conclusion that they will not be satisfied with the posi- 
tion of an inferior race, incapable of self-government, un- 



THE ACQUISITION OF COLONIES 143 

luckily it does not prove at present that they really are 
capable of it. 

The annexation of Porto Rico, being a natural consequence 
of the Spanish War, met with little opposition from any 
quarter. At the time of the signing of the armistice, the 
Americans had already overrun a large part of the island, 
and in a few days more would have become masters of 
the rest. Nowhere had they met with hostility from the 
inhabitants; on the contrary, they had been welcomed 
by them in a way which made a painful impression upon 
Spain, for it had been supposed in the mother country 
that, because the Porto Ricans were submissive, they 
were loyal. In truth, they were excited by the hope 
of liberty — an alluring term of whose meaning they had 
but vague conceptions — and by the prospect of financial 
prosperity, to result from their connection with the United 
States. The Americans, on their side, were determined 
to expel the Spaniards from the western hemisphere. 
They had taken Porto Rico, and, not being bound by any 
promise of disinterestedness, as they were in regard to 
Cuba, they saw no reason why they should not keep it. 
The island was too small to set up a government for itself, 
and since Porto Rico is an obvious stopping-place between 
Europe and Panama, its strategic value was great in view 
of an isthmian canal. In this instance, the American 
Anti-imperialists themselves made no serious protest ; they 
were busy enough elsewhere. 

After a first stage of military rule, which was beneficial 
during the period of transition, when the resident Span- 
iards had occasionally to be protected against the revenge 
of their former subjects, the present system of govern- 
ment in Porto Rico was established. But the inhabit- 
ants, though granted such liberties as they had never 
known before, were bitterly disappointed: they had 
fondly imagined that their island would at once be made 



144 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

a full-fledged state in the American Union. This arrange- 
ment did not commend itself to public opinion in the 
United States, where it was felt that a territory with a 
mixed population of whom but seventeen per cent could 
read or write, and with no experience in self-administra- 
tion, must pass through a process of education before it 
could manage its own destinies. The Americans were 
sincerely anxious to treat their new fellow-citizens as 
liberally as possible ; and they did act with kindness as 
well as with discretion. Even the temporary imposition 
of a tariff duty of fifteen per cent on Porto Rican goods 
brought into the Union, a step roundly condemned at 
the time as an act of oppression, was only an assertion of 
principle on the part of Congress. The duty (which was 
soon abolished) did not, while it existed, perceptibly inter- 
fere with trade; and the sum of money collected by it 
was presented to Porto Rico, and has since been of wel- 
come service for internal improvements. 

The form of government established for the island, 
though a novelty as an American institution, is not in itself 
original. It is much like that of several of the English 
crown colonies, where we find the same sort of provision 
for an assembly consisting of two chambers, the lower 
chosen by the people, the upper composed of the chief 
officials and of native members who, as well as the gov- 
ernor and the judges, are appointed by the home authori- 
ties. In local affairs the Porto Ricans elect their own 
officers, but there is a low property and educational 
qualification for the suffrage. 

Under this system, thanks to wise administration and to 
the good sense shown by the people themselves, the land 
has been able to profit by its natural resources, and by 
the advantages of its connection with the United States. 
Prosperity did not come at once, to be sure, for at first the 
sudden severance of its old relation with Spain produced 



THE ACQUISITION OF COLONIES 145 

an economic disturbance, and in 1899 a terrible hurricane, 
the most disastrous in the history of the island, destroyed 
about nine-tenths of the coffee bushes. When we remem- 
ber that the coffee crop was the chief source of export 
in Spanish days, and that it takes coffee bushes seven 
or eight years to reach maturity, we can appreciate the 
extent of the disaster. It is, indeed, not likely that 
Porto Rican coffee will ever be as profitable again. On 
the Spanish market it was favored by protective duties 
which it no longer enjoys; in the United States it has 
to compete with the long-established supply from Brazil. 
The American people are great coffee drinkers; and as 
the bean is not raised in their own country, coffee is 
one of the few imports that pay no duty. It is therefore 
hardly to be expected that the country as a whole will 
submit, for the sole benefit of Porto Rico, to a tax on 
an article of almost universal consumption. The place of 
coffee in the island has been taken by other productions, 
especially sugar and tobacco, the export of which has in- 
creased enormously, the total value of trade in 1906 being 
almost three times as large as it was five years earlier. 
Most of this growth has been due to commerce with the 
United States. Foreign capital has been chary in com- 
ing in ; for the measures taken to prevent the island 
from being exploited by powerful financial organizations, 
though perhaps necessary, have tended to keep away pos- 
sible investors. Public works of various kinds have been 
undertaken, and the number of children in the schools is 
increasing steadily. All told, the record of American rule 
has been satisfactory and creditable. 

The political future offers some uncertainty. Thus far, 
the Porto Ricans appear to have made good use of the rights 
that have been granted to them, though they plunge 
into politics with a zeal out of proportion to the issues 
involved, which are too often personal. It stands to 



146 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

reason, however, that they will not remain satisfied with 
their present privileges, which may indeed seem sufficient 
to outsiders, but which, so long as they are not the equal 
of those of other American citizens, bear with them a cer- 
tain stamp of inferiority. Now, in these days there are 
fewer and fewer peoples who are willing to regard them- 
selves as inferior, or as incompetent to take charge of 
their own destinies. The demand of Porto Rico for 
more liberties will be hard to deny; for the plea of a 
territory whose population is larger than that of more 
than a third of the states already in the Union, appeals 
to the American sense of fairness as well as to the old 
liberal tradition. On the other hand, many Americans 
do not believe that the Porto Ricans, who are still very 
young in political experience, will soon be qualified for 
the difficult work of governing themselves properly. Once 
a state, Porto Rico cannot be kept in leading-strings; 
and there is no provision in the Constitution for tak- 
ing away the privilege of statehood, however much it 
may be abused. It is not strange that the Americans 
hesitate before committing themselves beyond recall. 
The Porto Ricans, on their part, may well lament the 
course of recent events in Cuba: the people of the two 
countries are so similar that there is no obvious reason 
why one island should be more capable of self-govern- 
ment than the other. If the Cubans are not competent 
to manage their own affairs, why should their kinsmen 
be more so? 

Another question of no small difficulty is what degree 
of assimilation the United States is entitled to expect, 
or can rightly demand, of its new territory. Here the 
matter of the language is perhaps crucial. As the people 
all speak the same tongue, and that a great European one, 
Spanish, which has a glorious literary heritage, they will 
be slow to abandon it for English, in spite of all the 



THE ACQUISITION OF COLONIES 147 

efforts of the schools. Would it be any more just to 
attempt to enforce such a change than it was for the 
Russians to try like measures in Finland, a proceeding 
which called forth lively indignation in America? Porto 
Rico may become a state in course of time, for Ameri- 
can traditions in favor of equality are still very strong; 
but we cannot foresee any near future when it will 
cease to be a somewhat alien element in the body politic. 
Happily it is not large enough to be a source of positive 
danger, or even of serious trouble. For the same rea- 
son, it has attracted but little attention to itself, and 
cannot, in the importance of the problems it presents, 
be compared with Cuba or the Philippine Islands, a fact 
for which Americans have every reason to be thankful. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 

PREMEDITATION and deep design are qualities which 
nations are prompt to attribute to one another, and slow 
to acknowledge in themselves. Each is conscious of its own 
hesitations, fears, changes of mind, but it judges the inten- 
tions of others by results only. This is especially true when 
the results take the form of territorial gains. The rest of 
the world will never believe them to be accidental : it will 
always find proof to its own satisfaction that they are the 
fruit of long-matured plans. 

In Europe this charge has often been made about the ac- 
quisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States; 
yet seldom has an event of the kind been less due to fore- 
sight or premeditation. We may admit that among those 
who dreamed dreams about the Pacific, there were per- 
haps a few who hoped that the weak, ill-governed insular 
possessions of Spain might fall into American hands some 
day, and naval officers have had visions of coaling stations 
in all sorts of places, but it is safe to say that, when orders 
were sent to Admiral Dewey to proceed to Manila, Presi- 
dent McKinley and his cabinet had no thought of getting 
possession of the three thousand odd islands which have 
since come into American hands. 1 The feeling of the 

1 " At the beginning of the war there was perhaps not a soul in the 
whole Republic who so much as thought of the possibility of his nation 
becoming a sovereign power in the Orient." — Reinsch: World Politics, 
p. 64. This is a bit emphatic. 

148 



THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 149 

people about the Philippines at the time has been well 
described by a satirical writer who said, "They didn't 
know whether they were islands or canned goods." 

One good reason why the American fleet was sent to 
Manila at the outbreak of the Spanish War was that there 
was nothing else very obvious for it to do. It could not 
remain in Hongkong or another neutral port ; it could not 
make an inglorious retreat to the Pacific coast without 
exciting anger at home; and the only course left was to 
seek the enemy at his own headquarters. A proof of the 
absence of ulterior design on the part of the government 
may be found in the fact that no provision had been made 
for taking advantage of Dewey's victory. 

When, after destroying Montojo's fleet off Cavite, the 
American admiral telegraphed that he could capture Manila 
at any time but needed troops to hold it, the authorities 
at Washington felt that they had no choice but to follow 
up his success. It has been said that he might have been 
ordered to sail away at once and return home for supplies 
and repairs. Many people, including all Anti-imperialists, 
have regretted ever since that this was not done, and have 
declared that a fatal mistake was committed at this junc- 
ture. But such a step would have required great courage 
on the part of the President and his advisers, even if they 
had been convinced, as they were not, that it was the 
proper one. At a moment when the American people were 
wild with delight over the brilliant triumph of their young 
navy, popular disappointment would have been intense if 
the victorious fleet had thereupon turned round and skulked 
home. Sober-minded critics would, moreover, have con- 
demned the whole expedition as a useless raid without any 
bearing on the course of the war. When Admiral Dewey 
asked for troops, the natural thing to do was to send them. 
To the question of how many were needed, he replied five 
thousand, — an optimistic estimate which was not accepted 



150 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

by the general appointed to command the expedition, who 
insisted that he must have twenty thousand, and got them. 
But as there were none available then and there, and as no 
means of transport had been provided beforehand, months 
elapsed before they reached the scene of action. 

Meanwhile, many things had happened. By the time 
the American army was ready to take the offensive, not 
only were the insurgents in Luzon masters of the whole 
open country, and besieging Manila from the land, but the 
Spaniards had been beaten in Cuba, and were anxious for 
peace. Owing, however, to the fact that early in the war 
cable communication with the Philippines had been severed, 
the American troops attacked and, after a pretence of 
resistance, captured Manila before news reached them that 
an armistice had already been signed in Washington put- 
ting an end to hostilities, and handing over the city to their 
keeping. Some dispute arose in consequence as to the 
tenure of the Americans, — whether they held the place 
by right of conquest or under the terms of the agreement. 
After all, it mattered little. What did matter was that this 
fresh exploit, prearranged as we now know it to have been, 
excited a popular clamor in the United States for the reten- 
tion of the town, which appeared more precious as a trophy 
than as a pledge. 

In the Washington armistice there was a vaguely worded 
clause by which the American government intended to 
reserve the question of the disposal of the Philippines to its 
own later decision. Not only the administration but the 
public were undecided enough on the whole subject. When 
the peace commissioners set out for Paris, they were divided 
in opinion among themselves, and had no definite instruc- 
tions from President McKinley, who had not yet been able 
to make up his mind as to what was the best course to 
pursue. He appears very truly on this occasion not as the 
leader, but as the representative, of the American people 



THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 151 

in their hesitations, groping rather blindly and thinking 
out loud. 

-WSeveral courses of action seemed possible. The first 
was to retire from the islands, perhaps keeping one of them, 
or a mere port, as a coaling station, and leaving the Span- 
iards and the Filipinos to settle affairs between themselves 
as best they might ; but after the alliance between Dewey 
and Aguinaldo this would have been called a betrayal. 

Another way was to force Spain to evacuate the whole 
group and to hand it over to the insurgents; but many 
people in America doubted the capacity of the Filipinos 
for self-government. They also feared foreign greed. 
Whenever a nation hesitates whether or not to appropriate 
something, this old cry is raised. Some rival is pointed 
out as impatiently waiting to profit by the opportunity, 
and this real or imaginary danger furnishes an effective 
argument in favor of annexation. In the Philippines the 
dreaded rival was Germany ; for the presence of a strong 
German fleet in Manila Bay had awakened much suspicion, 
not to say wrath, in the United States, where it was be- 
lieved that the Germans were on the watch to pick up 
any territory they could get, and would upon the with- 
drawal of American authority promptly establish their 
own, — a proceeding public opinion was not disposed to 
tolerate. 

The third obvious course was for the United States to 
take the Philippines and keep them. Owing to the success 
of the war, the country was not in a mood to abandon 
anything, or to shrink from peril or responsibilities, and 
this feeling of elation contributed more than anything else 
to turn the scale. Without quite knowing how they wished 
to dispose finally of the islands, the American people and 
government came to the conclusion that the immediate 
thing to do was to put an end to all Spanish connection 
with them. Orders to this effect were sent to the com- 



152 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

missioners in Paris, and were carried out in spite of the 
protests of Spain. 

After the signing of the treaty of Paris, December 10, 
1898, the Americans, from their own point of view, were 
in legal possession of the Philippines, which, in return for 
a money payment, had been formally ceded by their pre- 
vious owners. Unluckily this possession much resembled 
what is known by the homely phrase of " getting the sow 
by the ears": it was equally hard to hold on or to let go. 
In actual fact, although the Americans commanded the 
sea, they controlled little on the land but the city of Manila. 
Nearly everything else in the islands, except where Spanish 
garrisons held on here and there, was in the hands of the 
insurgents. With them relations had already become 
strained, for the situation had been false from the outset. 
In the violent controversy which has raged over this whole 
subject, even the most ardent defenders of American policy 
have seldom maintained that the history of the transaction 
was wholly satisfactory, and intemperate Anti-imperialists 
have declared that the conduct of the United States tow- 
ards its former allies was marked by black treachery and 
ingratitude. 

It will be remembered that Aguinaldo, the leader of the 
last native revolt against Spanish rule, had retired to 
Hongkong on the conclusion of a treaty of pacification and 
the payment of a sum of money. Here the Americans 
entered into negotiations with him, and, after coming to 
an agreement, brought him to the islands in a ship of war, 
and aided him with arms and ammunition. Thus stimu- 
lated, the movement of insurrection spread with great 
rapidity, for the Spaniards, caught between two fires, and 
unable to transport troops by sea, had no means of repress- 
ing it. With Aguinaldo master of the country up to the 
gates of Manila and the fleet of Admiral Dewey holding the 
bay, the outlook for the Spanish garrison was hopeless. 



THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 153 

For this reason, though it was capable of serious defence, 
it surrendered the city by agreement as soon as the place 
was assaulted. But for the insurgents, this would not have 
occurred, and we need not wonder that they were incensed 
at being rigorously excluded from the captured town, 
which some of them had hoped to pillage. As time went on, 
it became more and more evident that the conflicting de- 
signs of the two former allies would soon lead to open hos- 
tilities. The situation was indeed one which it was diffi- 
cult to adjust by peaceful means unless one side or the other 
were willing to surrender its ambitions. 

There has been much heated discussion about the extent 
to which the Americans committed themselves to the sup- 
port of Aguinaldo in their original compact with him. He 
and his partisans have asserted that he came to the islands 
with the assurance of their aid in achieving the independence 
of his country ; and the assistance actually granted him is 
certainly prima facie evidence in his favor. The American 
government has maintained that it gave Aguinaldo no 
promise whatever. Indeed, Admiral Dewey and the consul 
at Hongkong could in no wise commit the administration in a 
matter of such importance. There was nothing but a bargain 
for mutual aid at a moment when the interests of the 
two parties coincided. In trying to reconcile the different 
versions of what was agreed upon, it must be remembered 
that the negotiating was done through an interpreter. 
Translations of this kind, with the best intentions and every 
precaution, are notoriously unsafe. If many a treaty, 
even in recent times, has been found to differ in the two 
texts adopted, a verbal agreement is obviously far more 
liable to error. We have no proof that the words exchanged 
between Aguinaldo and Mr. Wildman in Hongkong, in 
May, 1898, were correctly rendered from one to the other. 
Who knows whether the interpreter even tried to be exact ? 
And admitting that he did, a misunderstanding is easy to 



154 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

conceive. We may also suspect that both sides realized 
that their ulterior plans might not be in harmony, and 
preferred not to look too far ahead. It was enough for 
the moment that they were so situated that each was glad 
of aid from the other, leaving the future to take care of 
itself. This was all very well for the instant, but it now 
seems extraordinary that so few Americans at the time fore- 
saw that any kind of alliance with Aguinaldo inevitably 
meant becoming involved in Spanish internal affairs from 
which it would be hard to withdraw. Bringing into the 
game a third party who could not be left out of account 
in the dual reckoning must give rise to later complications. 
At the time, the American authorities in the Far East were 
doubtless thinking only of the military conditions which 
confronted them, and as yet probably few of them im- 
agined that their country would wish to retain these distant 
territories. 

In the events that followed, Aguinaldo had an advantage 
which enabled him to act more consistently and seemingly 
in a more straightforward manner than his later antag- 
onists : he had a clear, definite aim, which he had no reason 
to conceal, — the independence of the island, with himself 
as the natural head of the new republic ; and he bent every 
effort in this direction. The Americans were in a more 
complicated position. The military commanders on the 
spot were only subordinates, without much influence on 
the policy of the government, and in Washington, and 
indeed throughout the United States, as we know, it was 
long before a decision was arrived at. By the time it was 
reached, and people were ready to put it into force, the in- 
surgents had made themselves masters of nearly all the 
islands; they had proclaimed a republic with a modern 
constitution, had organized a working government, and had 
despatched an agent to Washington to treat for recognition. 
It may be supposed that the two armies encamped month 



THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 155 

after month cheek by jowl with one another entertained no 
friendly feelings, and the wonder is not that they finally 
came to blows, but that the outbreak of hostilities did not 
occur sooner. It would have done so if both sides had not 
wished to avoid taking the initiative. As it was, the news 
of the outbreak came just in time to influence the waverers 
in the Senate to vote for the ratification of the treaty of 
peace with Spain. 

When fighting had once begun, there was a fresh explo- 
sion of patriotism in the United States. American blood 
had been shed, and whatever might be decided about the 
ultimate fate of the islands, there could be no talk of 
negotiation until all armed opposition had been crushed 
out. This patriotic fervor began to cool, however, when 
the war degenerated into a fatiguing, inglorious, and end- 
less guerilla contest, 1 and the Americans had to undergo 
the same experience that the English had had in Burmah, 
and the French in Tongking, some years before. It is not a 
severe task for a well-trained army to defeat a disorganized 
Asiatic host in the open field, but it is another matter to 
stamp out insurrection in a land of tropical jungle, where the 
seemingly peaceful villagers come out to greet the invaders 
with gifts, if they arrive in force, but take to bushwhack- 
ing at night, and are ever ready to massacre small detached 
parties. Dacoits, Blackflags, and Ladrones, half robbers, 
half patriots, have represented in varying degrees the same 
sort of resistance ; always apparently on the point of being 
suppressed or exterminated, they reappeared again and again 
to give the lie to official optimism and to weary public 
opinion at home. In their exasperation the Americans 
retaliated savagely, and resorted to that very policy of 
reconcentration for which they had loudly condemned the 
Spaniards. 

1 Annexation was not definitely decided upon until after the report 
of the first Philippine Commission in its favor. 



156 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

As might be expected, a reaction soon set in in the 
United States, and affected both political parties. Many 
Republicans, while insisting that the insurrection must at 
all costs be subdued, admitted that this was only making 
the best of a bad job, and they would have been only too 
glad to see a satisfactory way of getting rid of the islands 
and everything connected with them. The Democrats, not 
being in power, were free to criticise the acts of the gov- 
ernment with severity. They condemned its conduct in 
scathing terms, and proclaimed themselves in favor of 
evacuating the Philippines, and turning them over to the 
native inhabitants. Some, it is true, conceded that order 
must first be restored, but a number of the more violent 
Anti-imperialists went so far as to give the insurgents open 
encouragement, — encouragement which, it is said, helped 
to delude them into prolonging their resistance. 

Here we come upon a difficult question of ethics, which on 
two notable occasions in recent years has aroused intense 
feeling. If a nation is engaged in war, are those of its citi- 
zens who conscientiously believe that that war is unjusti- 
fiable, not to say wicked, in duty bound to conceal their 
opinion until the war is over and the iniquity consummated ? 
This appears monstrous ; but if, as in the case of the Philip- 
pine and the Boer wars, the attitude of the minority at 
home helps to encourage the official enemies of the country 
to prolong a hopeless struggle, what then? Excited 
patriots in America and England averred, with some show 
of reason, that these irresponsible critics were to blame for 
untold useless suffering, for the sacrifice of many valuable 
lives not only of their fellow-citizens but of the very people 
that they pretended to champion. It is easy to understand 
the exasperation of those who have lost sons and brothers 
in a war which they are convinced would already have 
come to an end but for the interposition of their com- 
patriots, whom they brand as traitors and little short 



THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 157 

of murderers. This formidable moral question, which 
Nelson solved in his own simple way, — "my country, right 
or wrong," — is a very old one, but it has been rendered 
more acute by modern means of communication, which 
may make an imprudent speech or newspaper article 
known to the enemy within the space of a few hours. 

Another circumstance which disgusted the American 
people was the reports that came back of the cruelties com- 
mitted by their own troops, and notably the use of the 
"water cure." In peaceful communities the general pub- 
lic cannot appreciate the fearful strain to which soldiers are 
subjected when fighting against savage or even semi-civi- 
lized enemies who mutilate the dead, torture the wounded, 
and transform themselves from effusive friends into mur- 
derous guerillas if they can do so with safety. Under 
such conditions the best disciplined troops are guilty of 
reprisals to an extent seldom realized. Tales of harsh, not 
to say barbarous, treatment of Filipinos by Americans 
were repeated in an exaggerated form by the press, and 
were made the most of by the Anti-imperialists. 

All this helped to make the country so tired of the 
affair that, if in 1900 a direct vote could have been 
taken on the abstract question of the retention or the 
surrender of the Philippines, it is certain that there would 
have been a large majority in favor of evacuation. 1 
But complicated problems can seldom be solved in such 
a simple manner : there are too many outside factors to 
be taken into account. In the presidential campaign of 
1900, the Philippine question was indeed the subject of 
heated debate, but there were other things to be con- 
sidered, — the personality of the candidates, the possibility 
of bringing up again the free silver issue, the maintenance 
of the protective tariff. Though it is beyond doubt that 

1 The sentiment was much the same as that in France about Tongking 
in 1885. 



158 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

the election was decided by a multitude of considerations, 
nevertheless, when President McKinley and his party T ~ T ere 
given a new lease of power, they felt that the country had 
indorsed their Philippine policy. Military operations were 
prosecuted steadily, Aguinaldo was captured, and one island 
after another was pacified, until native resistance survived 
only in the form of occasional outbreaks of Ladronism. 

Meanwhile, the administration at Washington and its sup- 
porters, vigorously as they replied to their adversaries, could 
not help being moved by the criticism to which they were 
subjected. They were too intelligent to blind themselves to 
the fact that they seemed to be trampling on American 
traditions, and too upright not to wince under the taunt 
that their war, begun for the liberation of the Cubans, had 
ended with the enslavement of the Filipinos. Ever since the 
Declaration of Independence, the right of a people to control 
its own destinies had been too often proclaimed for any 
American statesman to defend the holding of subjects on 
the ground of mere material advantage. While unshaken in 
their belief that they were acting in a manner which, under 
the existing circumstances, was both wise and just, they 
knew that this justice and wisdom could only be proved by 
the use they made of their victory. It was for the United 
States to set an example unparalleled in the history of 
colonization. American rule must mean not only material 
benefit, but the moral elevation of the subject race to 
the level of the ruling one. The Filipinos must be treated 
as wards of the nation, not yet competent to manage 
their own affairs, but needing and enjoying protection 
until they should be fitted for the responsibility of rul- 
ing themselves or of taking an equal share in the life of the 
American republic. Thus were the older ideals to be recon- 
ciled with the new conditions. The right of self-govern- 
ment was not denied in theory, but was temporarily in 
abeyance in the case of a people too immature for complete 



THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 159 

emancipation. This view, that of Presidents McKinley and 
Roosevelt, is the starting-point for the policy associated 
chiefly with the name of Secretary Taft, — a policy novel in 
many of its details, and condemned equally by the two 
other schools of thought in colonial matters. 

Ever since 1899 there have been three conflicting doctrines 
as to the proper course for the Americans to follow in regard 
to the islands. The first and simplest is that of the Anti- 
imperialists: that the Americans should simply get out as 
soon as possible and hand over everything to the natives. 
The arguments in favor of this course are based on moral 
grounds, on the history of the republic, and on the unsatis- 
factory results, so far, of its colonial experiences. The 
Anti-imperialists laud the virtues of the Filipinos, whom 
they pronounce quite capable of self-government, and they 
fraternize openly with the most discontented elements 
among them ; they condemn the Taft policy as hypocritical, 
or as incapable of realization, — human nature being what 
it is, they say, people will always find excuses for declaring 
that the natives are not yet capable of taking care of them- 
selves, and the longer the Americans remain, the harder it 
will be for them to leave. The partisans of these views, 
who are most numerous in the northeastern states, stand 
on firm moral ground in their appeal to the higher prin- 
ciples, to the sense of justice, to the old ideal of liberty, of 
the American people. They are derided by their opponents 
as visionaries, but they disturb the conscience of the na- 
tion; and their altruistic arguments are reinforced by a 
widespread impression that, for purely selfish reasons, the 
country would be better off without its Philippine encum- 
brance. 

At the other extreme from the Anti-imperialists are the 
more outspoken expansionists, who laugh at sentimentality, 
and declare that the Philippines are a possession fairly 
acquired and worth retaining. They admit that it is the 



160 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

duty of the United States to give the islands as good govern- 
ment as possible, but there should be "no nonsense about 
it" ; they would have them ruled justly but firmly, without 
any pretence that the inhabitants are capable of taking 
more than a very small part in the work. Nothing, in their 
opinion, could be more absurd than to talk of half-naked 
Orientals in the tropics as if they were Americans, with 
all the aptitude for self-government acquired in fifty gen- 
erations. The Filipinos belong to a race which has never 
shown any capacity for independent civilization, and 
which cannot reasonably be expected to do so at any time 
that can now be foreseen ; but under wise American domi- 
nation they will enjoy such benefits as they never dreamed 
of before, and if they show themselves ungrateful for this, 
it is merely one more proof of their incapacity. There is 
nothing particularly new in the problems to be solved; the 
English have been familiar with them for a long time, and 
recently in the Malay protectorate, a neighboring territory 
inhabited by people of the same race as the Filipinos, 
they have set an example of almost perfect administration, 
a cardinal feature of their policy being the encouragement 
of Chinese immigration. This is just what the Philippines 
need as a means of supplying them with better laborers for 
the development of the neglected natural resources than 
are the lazy, shiftless natives. 

In its extreme form, this opinion is probably not held by 
many people in the United States, but it gets its weight 
from the success with which the English have carried 
out in their colonies the principle it advocates. It also 
seems to gain authority from being held by the majority of 
the Americans living in the islands, — traders, soldiers, 
and even officials, — and is thus brought home by the 
passing traveller, who retails it as the "real truth" gath- 
ered from "those who know." We must remember that 
foreign colonies of a dominant race are seldom on good 



THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 161 

terms with the people amongst whom they are called upon 
to live. Even among nations of the same civilization, 
groups of exiles are apt to have no affection for the 
country in which they have found shelter. Between Euro- 
peans and Asiatics the antagonism is much stronger: the 
Englishman in India, the Frenchman in Tongking, the 
American in the Philippines, especially if he belong to 
the trading class, is there to make his living, and he 
is little interested in the natives except in so far as they 
contribute to this object. He and they belong to two 
different worlds, which he has no desire to bring closer 
together. Indeed, one of the chief causes of his resent- 
ment against the missionaries is that their standpoint 
is different, and he regards the white school-teacher as an- 
other enthusiast of the same type. Under such circum- 
stances race prejudice reigns supreme. The American 
commercial colony in Manila looks on the Filipino much 
as the Anglo-Indian does on the Hindu, and resents almost 
equally any thought of intermarriage. From the nature 
of their position, the official classes are freer from such 
intolerance, but they are not exempt from it. 

This arrogant, but not incomprehensible, attitude cuts 
to the quick the sensitive vanity of the Filipino, who, in 
his heart of hearts, cares more for social than for political 
recognition. A wealthy and educated citizen of Manila with 
European blood in his veins, regards himself as one of the 
heirs of all Latin civilization, and does not relish being 
looked upon as a " nigger" by every "Yankee adventurer." 
As in several of the British possessions, the presence in the 
Philippines of a commercial element of the dominant people 
tends, in spite of the fact that American investment and en- 
terprise are crying needs of the islands, to embitter rather 
than to improve relations between conquerors and conquered. 1 

1 The coming of the Spaniards in greater numbers after the opening 
of the Suez Canal was one of the causes of the increased discontent in 
the islands in the last half of the nineteenth century. 



162 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

Between these two extreme schools we find the opinion 
of Secretary Taft and those who, from the President down, 
support his policy. It is summed up in the phrase "the 
Philippines for the Filipinos." Its fundamental conception 
is that at the present day the people of the islands are in- 
capable of complete self-government, and that, as long as 
this continues to be true, the Americans must take a part 
of the burden on themselves ; but that it is their bounden 
duty not only to develop the country and insure material 
prosperity, but, even more, to educate the natives, who 
are to be given greater liberties as fast as they show 
themselves worthy of them. In pursuance of this idea, 
extensive public works have been undertaken, the laws 
have been revised, an efficient administration has been 
introduced, and capable officials of both American and 
Filipino origin are laboring unselfishly for the good of the 
lands committed to their charge. The most notable 
feature of the system is the extraordinary attention paid to 
the schools. Hundreds of teachers have come over from 
the United States, and they have helped to train a still 
larger number of native ones. With such energy has the 
work been pushed that there are now more than half a 
million children attending schools of one kind or another, 
and it is hoped that soon all those of school age, except 
among the savage tribes, will be receiving some sort of 
instruction. Never have the Americans given more strik- 
ing evidence of the value they attach to popular education ; 
and whatever may be the result of this first attempt to 
impart modern western knowledge to the whole new genera- 
tion of an Asiatic community, it will be interesting to watch 
its fate. 

One evidence of this principle of seeking the moral eleva- 
tion of the natives rather than the most profitable ex- 
ploitation of the islands appears in the resolve to forbid 
Chinese immigration. Although the prejudices of the Amer- 



THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 163 

ican labor-unions were of influence here, the decision may 
be ascribed chiefly to solicitude for the Filipinos. If, in 
the midst of the arduous and delicate experiment of try- 
ing to reconstruct their system of society on a foundation 
of American democratic ideas and general education, they 
were to be exposed to an unrestricted competition of Chinese 
labor, the outcome might well be disastrous ; for, like so 
many others, the pleasure-loving, indolent Filipino is no 
match for the hard-working, thrifty Chinese. The new 
dispensation, whatever may be its ultimate success, will 
in its early days be a hot-house plant, needing careful 
protection. 

With characteristic promptness, the Americans began, 
even before the end of hostilities, to associate the Filipinos 
in the work of administration. The new commission of 
seven, which, under the governor, was to control the 
islands, was made to include two native members. The 
same practice has been pursued ever since : natives are to 
be found in many of the most important positions, and in 
an even greater proportion in the subordinate ones. There 
are Filipino judges in the Supreme Court; the provincial 
governors are Filipinos, some of whom fought under 
Aguinaldo ; and the election of municipal officers is in the 
hands of the people themselves, the right to vote being 
subject to an education qualification. The next step has 
now been taken, that of creating an elective assembly, 
with somewhat the same power as the lower chamber in 
Porto Rico or in an English crown colony. 

As was to be foreseen, all this is condemned by those 
who hold either of the other two views of the best way 
to treat the islands. So far it has been carried out in the 
face of many difficulties, mainly by the efforts of a very 
few men, high in authority. Many of their subordinates, 
who serve them from a sense of duty, have little belief 
in the ultimate success of the experiment. It has to over- 



164 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

come American prejudice and selfish interests, and at the 
same time, it fails to satisfy the natives, who, believing that 
they are competent to manage their own affairs, are not 
content with the promise that their great-grandchildren 
may perhaps be given the privileges denied to themselves. 
The prevalence of this discontent was shown by the victory 
of the partisans of independence in the elections for the 
new assembly. In spite of all, American public opinion so 
far seems to support-, if in rather a blind way, the present 
policy ; but this support is not an assured quantity, nor is 
the policy itself beyond the reach of change. By its novelty 
it is in keeping with the. American scorn for precedents, and 
the belief that the United States can accomplish things 
impossible to other countries ; by its high ideals it appeals 
to the best side of the American character ; but for its 
triumph it demands a long-continued unselfishness. 

Admirers of the English and Dutch colonial sj'stems 
overlook certain elements of the Philippine situation which 
make the problem to be solved unlike any that the English 
or the Dutch have to deal with, and which are chiefly due to 
the historical development of the inhabitants. The Filipinos 
are, it is true, of the same race as the natives of the Malay 
Peninsula and of Java, but, with the exception of the Moham- 
medans in Mindanao and Sulu, who may well be governed 
by English or Dutch methods, they are no longer on the 
same plane with their kinsmen. It must not be forgotten 
that as the Philippine Islands have been governed for cen- 
turies by a European power which converted its subjects, 
the Filipinos have been for the same length of time under 
Christian influences, and that the upper class have the edu- 
cation and tradition of Latin civilization, of which they 
believe themselves to be the children. It is easy enough to 
laugh at this assumption as childish vanity ; to point out 
that this same upper class are not pure natives at all, but of 
mixed blood ; to sneer at their culture as being the merest 



THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 165 

veneer; and to declare that they are nothing but a very 
small minority of the population, separated from the half- 
naked peasants by a gulf. Be all this as it may, the upper 
class is a representative of the people, and an expression of 
what they are capable of. The greatest man that the Malay 
race has produced, the novelist Rizal, was of almost, if 
not of entirely, pure Malay descent ; Aguinaldo is a full- 
blooded native. As for the masses, they are Christians, 
and even admitting that they know little of the exact 
nature of their faith, the same is true in many countries. 
For centuries the Filipino peasant was under the close super- 
vision of the church, indeed was almost completely con- 
trolled by the Friars, and though it is impossible to say 
exactly how this has affected his mentality, we may safely 
assert that his mentality is not the same as that of the 
savage Mohammedan of the peninsula, who has just come 
under British rule, or of the Javanese whom the Dutch have 
so scientifically exploited, rather than enlightened, for many 
generations. Moreover, though the claim of the Filipinos 
to be regarded as a Latin people may provoke a smile, it 
is almost as well founded as the same pretension on the 
part of the inhabitants of some of the so-called Latin- 
American states: the proportion of white blood is not so 
much greater in Bolivia or Ecuador than it is in the Philip- 
pines, and the American Indian can hardly look down on 
the Malay. Why, then, should we admit the contention of 
one and deny that of the other ? We must remember, too, 
that if a people cherishes a belief of the sort, this is an 
important fact in itself, more important, often, than the 
question whether the belief is or is not well founded. 
Whatever our opinion may be, the educated Filipinos are 
imbued with the idea that they are Latins and that the 
Americans, with their rougher, ruder, if more efficient, 
culture, are in a sense barbarians. And these educated 
Filipinos cannot be contemptuously brushed aside, for they 



166 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

are the natural leaders of the others. One may at least be 
thankful that the natives of the islands, on account of 
their European affiliations, are not separated from their 
conquerors by a seemingly impassable gulf, as are, for 
instance, the Annamites from the French. They are also 
unlike any Asiatics that the English have to govern, and 
they may perhaps best be compared to their distant kindred 
in Madagascar, now under the rule of France. The Protes- 
tant Malagasy, who have been subject to English influences, 
maintain somewhat the same attitude towards the French 
that the Catholic Filipinos, with Spanish culture, do towards 
the Americans, but as Madagascar was never actually sub- 
ject to English rule and its Christianity is recent and not 
widespread, the parallel is incomplete. 

One consequence of the Filipinos' Christianity and of their 
quasi-European character is often overlooked. The sug- 
gestion has been made that, in return for some compen- 
sation, the islands might be handed over to Japan; but 
though this has seemed to some persons an excellent way 
for the Americans to escape from an embarrassing dilemma, 
in reality the idea is preposterous. Religious sentiments 
may not play in the political world so great a part as they 
once did, but it requires a stretch of the imagination to sup- 
pose that Christian America would hand over some seven 
million fellow-Christians against their will to the rule of 
any non-Christian nation, however enlightened. What- 
ever malcontents may say in the heat of passion, we may 
take for granted that if such a proposal were seriously urged, 
the Filipinos would protest with frantic indignation. It 
matters little that they have sufficient Asiatic sympathies 
to find satisfaction in the triumph of the Japanese over the 
Russians, and that they have been encouraged by this proof 
that the white race is not invincible. It means nothing that 
those who hope to cast off American authority turn to Japan 
as, in their opinion, their most likely ally ; for they would 



THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 167 

welcome as eagerly Germany or Mexico, if they could hope 
for aid from either of those quarters. In spite of im- 
aginary ties between the inhabitants of the two groups of 
Asiatic islands, the last thing the Filipinos dream of is being 
ruled by the Japanese, whom they look upon as inferior to 
themselves, as representing a lower civilization. 

But aside from considerations of history and religion, 
the peaceable transfer of the Philippines to any one without 
the consent of the inhabitants is now barely conceivable. 
The people have too much national self-consciousness, and 
they have been treated too long as intelligent beings with 
a right to take part in shaping their own destinies, for them 
to be calmly bartered off like cattle. The public conscience 
in America would never permit such a transaction, and there 
is no real indication that the Filipinos would prefer any 
other foreign rule. They did not revolt against Spain for 
the purpose of coming under the United States, and they are 
not hoping for liberation from the dominion of the United 
States in order to belong to some other power under whom 
they might easily fare worse. What the discontented ele- 
ments demand is liberty to manage their own affairs, and 
the mere suggestion that their country is regarded as salable 
property is enough to excite their legitimate anger. 

Advocates of Philippine independence, whether Americans 
or Filipinos, usually do not propose the severance of all 
political connections between the United States and its 
Asiatic colony, but they talk vaguely of some sort of " pro- 
tectorate." This term is so loosely used that we are wont 
to forget what it implies. Any state which undertakes to 
protect another assumes toward the rest of the world re- 
sponsibility for its good behavior, — the more complete 
. the protection, the more extensive the responsibility, — and 
this responsibility involves a duty to interfere, if need be. 
In Cuba, and to a minor degree in San Domingo, the 
Americans have just had experience of this truth. It is, 



168 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

indeed, one of the difficulties which the maintenance of the 
Monroe Doctrine may force them into in their relations 
with other Latin-American republics. If the United States 
is to be the guardian of the Philippines, it is bound to inter- 
vene in case of disorders there, and to take measures to 
prevent their recurrence. Moreover, there is no panacea in 
the word " protectorate/' for a dependency may have less 
liberty than a colony: the "East Africa Protectorate" is a 
benevolent despotism; Cape Colony enjoys a large measure 
of self-government. In the end, the power responsible for 
the maintenance of order must determine the extent of the 
local privileges. To be sure, some declare that the Filipinos 
are capable of orderly self-government, and therefore will 
make no difficulties for the protecting power; but the 
American people, with the example of Cuba before them, 
are likely to be slow in accepting this assurance. 

Another common suggestion is that the islands should be 
" neutralized." To which we may reply, why should they 
be? Where is the quid pro quo as far as the powers are 
concerned? Of course every weak state would like to be 
neutralized, — that is to say, to have the strong ones 
promise not to touch it ; but only in exceptional cases have 
the latter found it worth while to bind themselves in this 
way. When they have done so, from mutual jealousy, as 
they have for Belgium and Switzerland, there is no cer- 
tainty that the promise will be respected if there is a strong 
temptation to break it. Some one has to be ready to sup- 
port the guarantee by force of arms. But why should the 
Americans do this if they retire from the Philippines them- 
selves? Provided they keep any naval station they want, 
and the principle of equal opportunity for all is preserved, 
why should they care if England or Germany should step 
in? In point of fact, many of them feel to-day that, if 
they can only get safely and honorably out of the tangle 
in which they are involved, the islands, as far as they are 
concerned, may go to the devil. 



THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 169 

It is still too early to sum up the results of American 
rule in the last eight years. In many ways it has been a 
disappointment, for up to the present time it has brought 
neither content nor general prosperity. Serious mistakes 
have been made in details. Taxation is heavy, and there 
is room for criticism about the way in which some of the 
money has been spent. It seems, too, as if a common mis- 
take in French colonization had been repeated in creating 
an unnecessarily elaborate administrative machine. The 
salaries paid to the American officials appear unwarrant- 
ably high to the natives, who flatter themselves that they 
could do as well for much lower pay. Unfortunately, this 
grievance is unavoidable : if we admit that Americans are 
needed at all, we must also admit that what is wanted 
is the best, and that these can only be obtained by a re- 
muneration which shall be some sort of recompense for the 
sacrifices demanded by a life in the distant tropics. Among 
those not in sympathy with the policy of the government 
there has been much criticism in regard to public educa- 
tion, which, it is declared, will serve only to make the 
natives lazier than they are now, while on the other 
hand the violent partisans of the Filipino condemn as 
both a tyranny and an absurdity the use of English as a 
medium of instruction in the schools. The reply to the 
first charge is that care is taken to make the system of 
popular education as practical as possible; to the second, 
that there is no one native Philippine tongue, but many 
widely differing dialects, and that it is for the advantage 
of the people to have the mastery of one of the great civil- 
ized languages. As between English and Spanish, it is 
pointed out that, in the long centuries of Spanish posses- 
sion, the speech of the ruling race was never taught to the 
people. Previous to the nineteenth century, immigration 
from the mother country was discouraged; and until the 
end of Spanish domination, the all-powerful Friars preferred 



170 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

that the villagers under their charge should know nothing 
but their own dialect, embellished, perhaps, by a few words 
of Latin. The result is that at the present day only some 
ten per cent of the whole population know Spanish, so that 
there is no harshness in displacing it from its position of 
authority and replacing it by English, which will be a 
more valuable means of communication with the outside 
world. The Spanish language in these regions is doomed 
to speedy extinction. 

Criticise as one may the details of the present policy, no 
impartial observer will deny that since 1898 the Americans 
have accomplished a great deal in their task of transforming 
the islands. Improved means of communication, public 
works of all kinds, modern sanitation, justice, public security, 
honest and efficient government, popular participation in 
the government, and a system of general education form a 
record to be proud of. In all this, good fortune has counted 
for but little, for in the last decade the Philippines have been 
sorely tried : they have suffered from war and from pesti- 
lence ; from a plague which carried off great numbers of 
the buffalo, almost the sole source of wealth of many of the 
peasants; from the loss of the Spanish market; from the 
low price of sugar ; and from the failure of the native tobacco 
to become popular in the United States. All these, and 
other evils, have borne hardly on the people. American 
capital has not come in in the way that was expected, partly 
on account of the legislation passed to protect the natives 
against exploitation, but more particularly because people 
have found it safer and more profitable to invest their money 
nearer home. 

As in all times of distress, there have been bitter com- 
plaints against the government, though no fair-minded 
person would question the devotion to duty that has 
characterized its chief members. There is a clamor for 
relief measures of one kind or another. Capitalists recom- 



THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 171 

mend the admission of Chinese labor ; but though it might 
be good for the Philippines, it would very possibly spell ruin 
for the Filipinos. What Secretary Taft has demanded with 
unwearied persistence is that the insular exports should be 
admitted into the United States free of duty, — a privilege 
which would be most advantageous to the islands, and 
might be profitable to the Union itself. The concession 
appeals to the sense of justice and to the generous in- 
stincts of Americans, and it has been urged upon them 
as their sacred duty to the weak people for whose des- 
tinies they have made themselves responsible, and whom 
they have deprived of their former markets without open- 
ing new ones to them. Shall it be said that the Philip- 
pines are in any way worse off now than they were under 
Spain ? 

All this cannot be gainsaid, but there are other circum- 
stances to be considered. Such concessions cannot long 
be one-sided, but must mean reciprocity, and the closer 
the ties between any country and its clients, and the 
greater the number of interests in each dependent upon 
the other, the less will be the chance of their being sepa- 
rated in the future. Those who desire Philippine indepen- 
dence should realize that if the islands are enriched by 
American capital, and become a favorite field of American 
trade, the prospect of their ever shifting for themselves will 
become more remote. But there is an objection of another 
nature which must be taken into account. In the Philip- 
pines the Americans have given to the rest of the world 
practical proof that they adhere to the principle of the 
"open door," which they are so eager to enforce upon others. 
How can they continue to insist on it as fair to all, if they 
do not observe it themselves? Here we return to inter- 
national politics. 



CHAPTER IX 

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 

IF we would understand the attitude of the American 
people after the war of 1898, we must take into ac- 
count the forces which, unknown to them, had been gradu- 
ally making them ready for a new departure. The policy 
which they then adopted was accidental in many of its 
details; it was as often dominated by events as itself 
dominating them ; but it was not what it had been before, 
for fresh elements had entered into it. If, let us say, 
President Grant had intervened in the Cuban insurrection 
of 1868-1878, and had brought on a war with Spain, and 
if the military successes of the United States had been 
as decisive as they were later, the after effects would 
not have been the same. In 1898 the country, though 
unconscious of the change that had been wrought in it, 
was prepared to meet the situation with a spirit quite 
unlike that which would have animated it twenty years 
earlier. This change was due to several causes. 

One reason why the public was ready just then to run 
after strange gods was that it did not happen to be pre- 
occupied with other things. Many of the old issues that 
had aroused it in years past had now lost their burning 
character ; in some cases had altogether ceased to be inter- 
esting. During the larger part of the nineteenth century 
the negro question in the South had been in one form or 
another a brand of discord between two sections of the 

172 



ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 173 

country. The prolonged struggle of the Civil War left 
bitter memories, and it had been followed by the period of 
Reconstruction, and in some states by negro rule, which had 
caused savage ill feeling among the whites. Not till a gen- 
eration after the war did the men on either side of Mason 
and Dixon's line accept a settlement tolerably satisfactory to 
both parties. Then, on the one hand, slavery had disap- 
peared forever, and all thought of secession had been aban- 
doned ; on the other, the North, after some hesitation, had 
accepted the fact that the whites of the South could not, 
and would not, allow themselves to be ruled by the blacks, 
and had acquiesced, with but few murmurs of dissent, in 
the virtual disfranchisement of the colored population in 
one state after another. The Spanish War gave an oppor- 
tunity to former Confederates to serve again in the army of 
their country, and thus to set the seal upon the reconcilia- 
tion. Proudly as the Southerners cherished the memories 
of their former glories, and suspicious as they were of 
everything that suggested interference in the race question, 
they were willing to let bygones be bygones, all the more 
as the rapid increase of their manufactures and the pros- 
perity of their ports were creating a new South, which looked 
to the future and not solely to the past. In the North the 
Civil War was becoming a memory almost as venerable as 
that of the Revolution. 

Another smaller trouble was also ending. The hard 
times and the financial crisis of 1893, with their inevi- 
table suffering, had produced much discontent, which in 
some parts of the country had taken the form of sectional 
antagonism. The farmers of the Middle West, who, year 
after year, had seen the value of their crops decrease and 
their mortgages increase in their despair attributed their 
misfortune to the lack of sufficient currency, and talked of 
a conspiracy on the part of Eastern capitalists. The cur- 
rency question became, indeed, the main issue of the presi- 



174 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

dential election of 1896. But soon afterwards it lost its 
acute interest. The constant growth of the output of gold 
in South Africa put an end to the fear of a deficiency in the 
circulating medium, and in the West a series of good years, 
which enabled the farmers to pay off their mortgages, 
removed their grievances. 

Even the tariff issue, although it still divided, had ceased 
to agitate public opinion; for after the passage of the 
Dingley Bill, in 1897, foes as well as friends of protection 
were disposed to leave matters alone. Within a few years 
the country had seen three great tariff measures voted by 
Congress ; now the general cry was for stability in order that 
business interests might have something on which to base 
their calculations. For the while people had had enough of 
uncertainty. With the return of good times, the relations 
between labor and capital had improved ; and the question 
of trusts had not yet come to the fore. All told, internal 
affairs, however important, were not at that moment either 
new or very exciting, so the public was ready to turn its 
attention elsewhere. 

The story of the recent marvellous prosperity of the 
United States has been told repeatedly, with fresh addi- 
tions as the record of each year's success surpassed that 
of the previous one. Never, in the history of the world, 
has such a spectacle been witnessed on so tremendous a scale. 
Friends and rivals were alike impressed, and among Ameri- 
cans themselves it awakened a sentiment often little short 
of intoxication. The pessimist might shake his head over 
the many evils which such circumstances created ; the 
economist might prove that a period of exaggerated pros- 
perity must be followed by a reaction ; but the man in the 
street did not feel called upon to look so far ahead. When 
he knew that he was making money, that he was successful 
in his enterprises, he saw no reason why he should not suc- 
ceed still better in the future. Americans had long been 



ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 175 

accustomed to proclaim that theirs was the " greatest coun- 
try on earth," and after 1898 it seemed as if facts were 
coming to their aid in a way that must convince all doubt- 
ers. Throughout the nineteenth century the United States 
furnished to Europe several of the staples necessary to the 
support of mankind and to the development of modern 
industry. In the export of wheat and petroleum its 
sole rival was Russia ; in that of cotton it had been 
supreme for many generations ; in that of sheep and wool 
it came next to Australia; in the number of its cattle 
it was ahead even of Argentina. Of late it has taken the 
lead in one after another of the chief industrial commodi- 
ties : in the production of both iron and coal it has surpassed 
Great Britain, which so long led in those staples that her 
primacy seemed unassailable ; in copper the American out- 
put is more than a half of the world's supply. But it is not 
only in raw materials that the country has made such 
startling progress; its manufactures have developed with 
even more wonderful rapidity : the American silk industry 
is second to none but the French; the cotton is inferior 
to that of Great Britain only ; the iron and steel leads the 
world. Between 1896 and 1906 American exports almost 
doubled in value, passing in 1901 those of England, which, 
since the creation of modern mechanical industry, had been 
the first exporting nation on the globe. The huge immigra- 
tion, which has risen to over a million a year, has been in- 
sufficient to supply the demand for labor ; and the railway 
system, though larger than that of all Europe, is inadequate 
to the needs of transportation. All this contributed to a 
prosperity which was not confined to one part of the land, 
or to one class of the community. Both capitalists and 
laborers shared in the dispensation. The Americans would, 
in truth, be more than human if they had not at times lost 
their heads in the midst of their unparalleled achievements. 
In 1898 this new era had only just begun, but it had 



176 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

got enough of a start for the people, with their inborn 
optimism, to be full of confidence in their powers. What 
in ordinary times might have seemed prudence now 
passed for cowardice ; any arguments based on caution 
were out of keeping with the popular temper; hostile 
criticism from a foreign source was attributed to jealousy 
or fear, and was thus more flattering than praise. The 
whole country was bursting with a consciousness of 
strength. It could, then, scarcely be expected to give 
up its hold on the Philippines, which seemed to offer a 
new field for enterprise, and a base for the expansion of 
trade in the Far East. America was now in a position to 
take up her share of "the white man's burden," with all its 
incidental advantages. 

The economic progress of the United States in the last 
few years has inevitably influenced the national policy in 
various ways, and will continue to do so. Until a short 
time ago the country belonged to the debtor rather than to 
the creditor class of states. It was well off, but it had no 
investments of consequence beyond its borders, and it owed 
the development of its resources in part to foreign capital. 
To-day the situation is radically different : the Americans 
have bought back much of their paper formerly held abroad, 
and, though they are continually borrowing afresh in order 
to carry out the countless undertakings in which they are 
engaged, they are no longer in the same situation as before. 
There is a distinction between the poor man who has to 
ask for a loan from a well-to-do neighbor in order to set his 
business going, and the wealthy financier who invites others 
to take shares in a profitable enterprise; and the United 
States is now in the position of the latter. It still needs 
foreign capital ; but the Americans are themselves the great- 
est capitalists in the world, and though as yet they find 
uncertain ventures at a distance — as in the Philippines — 
less attractive than investments at home, where they do 



ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 177 

see an alluring prospect, — as in Cuba and Mexico, — they are 
not backward in risking their money. Of late, too, they 
have begun to hold the bonds of foreign governments. 
They may, therefore, now be regarded as belonging, and 
likely to belong more and more, to the class of creditor, 
rather than of debtor, nations, and their sympathy will go, 
not with the repudiation of debts, but with the payment of 
them. In any case where they themselves have large sums 
at stake, they will never permit their government to re- 
main indifferent; witness the present occupation of Cuba. 
Though the United States has not been long enough in 
this new position to have modified profoundly its foreign 
policy, there has been a change : a generation or two 
ago it might have hailed the Drago doctrine with enthu- 
siasm, — ten of its states have in the past repudiated 
their bonds, — now it has supported at The Hague only a 
much softened version, and it has aided San Domingo to 
satisfy her creditors, not to defy them. Throughout his- 
tory the world has often seen communities rent by the strife 
between rich and poor; it may yet see the community of 
nations divided into creditor and debtor states, arrayed 
against each other by questions of financial interest potent 
enough to overcome ties of geography or of nationality. 

Another element affecting the international relations of 
the United States is the transformation which is taking 
place in its export trade. Greatly as its exports of raw 
materials have increased, those of manufactured goods 
have grown faster still. In 1880 they formed but twelve 
and one-half per cent of the total, in 1896 they were 
twenty-six and one-half per cent, in 1906 thirty-four 
and one-half per cent, and the future appears to belong to 
them. With the growth of the population at home, the sup- 
ply of wheat for exportation must diminish, and may soon 
disappear altogether. The development of an immense cot- 
ton industry which makes an increasing home demand on 



178 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

the crop leaves less and less for foreign countries, several 
of which are to-day making strenuous efforts to find an 
independent source of supply in their own colonies. On 
the other hand, South America, Africa, and Asia produce 
sufficient food for their own wants and are rich in metals, 
and in raw materials — Argentine wheat, Indian and Egyp- 
tian cotton, and Burmese petroleum. It is obvious that ex- 
ports to such regions must consist chiefly of manufactured 
articles. 

The political consequences of this change are already 
felt. In the days when the United States sent abroad 
nothing but the great staples which all the world needed, 
when its rivals were mostly backward states, and it had 
little to fear from hostile tariffs, it could tax as it pleased the 
imports from foreign countries without much danger of 
retaliation. Now it finds itself competing on equal terms 
with the highly developed industries of England, Germany, 
France, and other manufacturing countries, — and every 
civilized country to-day aspires to be a manufacturing 
one. Each of these countries pushes its trade by every 
means in its power, and most of them protect their indus- 
tries by high duties wherever they are able to impose 
them. 

In course of time it dawned on the minds of Americans 
that they could no longer afford to look on indifferently at 
the legislation or the political activity of their neighbors. 
Merchants and statesmen, seeking for new markets, realized 
that within a few years the greater part of Africa had been 
partitioned among the European powers ; that much of Asia 
had undergone the same fate ; and that the integrity of the 
vast Chinese Empire was menaced. This scramble for ter- 
ritory had been precipitated by economic reasons. Every 
power feared that, unless it acted at once, it might be antici- 
pated by a rival ; and where there was no agreement before- 
hand, all but Great Britain protected their own commerce 



ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 179 

in their new acquisitions by duties discriminating against 
foreign goods. Even England, under the stress of compe- 
tition, might follow the general example : mutterings were 
beginning to be heard of the advantage of an imperial 
Zollverein. 1 America was thus confronted with the pros- 
pect of being cut off from the markets which she would soon 
need for her rapidly growing industries. Already she was 
beginning to suffer from the change. She had just had, for 
instance, in Madagascar, an object-lesson, on a small scale, 
of what might be repeated elsewhere with more serious 
results. In 1896, when the island was annexed by France, 
American exports to it amounted to nearly five hundred 
thousand dollars; in 1899 they had sunk to eleven hun- 
dred and thirty-four dollars. It was useless to complain, 
for the French, in imposing a protective tariff, had acted 
strictly within their legal rights as owners of the place; 
but the incident, though too small to attract much atten- 
tion, served as a warning in Washington, where it was 
not forgotten. 

When American statesmen set themselves to face the 
situation, they perceived that the policy of aiding and pro- 
tecting the national exports must be adapted to circum- 
stances. In dealing with the European powers and their 
colonies, no originality was required: the United States 
was meeting equals and, in most cases, rivals. There was 
room for a mighty development of trade, but the government 
could do little to further it except by insisting on fair treat- 
ment, by improving its consular service, and lastly, by con- 
cluding profitable commercial treaties, — a matter in which 
it was less hampered by the demands of foreign countries 
than it was by the unreasonableness of the ultra-protection- 
ists at home. Since the larger half of Asia, almost all of 
Africa, and the whole of Australia were in the hands of 

1 First definitely outlined by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain in a speech 
delivered June 8, 1896. 



180 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

European peoples, a good part of the world was accounted 
for. There remained, however, two regions where the 
Americans believed they saw splendid possibilities for the 
future. But to make the most of those possibilities they 
must take decided action. 

In the republics of Latin America there was no highly 
developed native industry to be feared as a rival. There 
was nothing but the competition of Europe, which had too 
long had the field to itself, and the Americans were con- 
vinced that they could meet this competition victoriously 
if only they made the best of their natural advantages. 
A first step was to draw closer to these fellow-republicans 
to the south, for the benefit of all concerned. This led to 
the policy known as Pan-Americanism, which we shall take 
up later. 

The other tempting field for American enterprise was in 
the Far East, where hundreds of millions of human beings 
were just waking up, at the rude contact of the outside 
world, to the advantages of dealing with and imitating 
the hated foreigner. Here, indeed, were magnificent op- 
portunities. Ardent imaginations pictured the countless 
population of the Middle Kingdom lighted by American 
petroleum, working with American tools, dressed in Ameri- 
can cottons. The competition of Japan and the new 
activity of the Chinese themselves had not yet come to 
mar these fair visions. Unfortunately, even as it was, they 
were already threatened with destruction. 

Ever since the war with Japan, China had seemed on the 
point of breaking up, and in danger of partition among 
foreign powers, who would probably introduce preferential 
tariffs for their own manufactures, and then — good-by to 
the dreams of American trade. The peril appeared ex- 
treme, and difficult to meet. Single-handed, the United 
States could not maintain the integrity of the Chinese 
Empire against the rest of the world, especially if that 



ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 181 

empire insisted on going to pieces of itself. It might, to 
be sure, take part in the general scramble and claim a 
sphere of influence of its own ; but it had come into the 
field rather late to get a good share, and public opinion at 
home would never tolerate such a proceeding. The Ameri- 
cans' only other course was to take up and echo the newly 
invented British cry of the "open door." On the face of 
it, there was something rather ludicrous in the spectacle 
of the nation which had just voted the Dingley Bill waxing 
so enthusiastic over the justice of equal commercial oppor- 
tunities for all. This attitude might be natural enough in 
Great Britain, which for half a century had been the free- 
trade power of the world, and could well assert that she 
had consistently stood for the "open door" policy; it was 
hard to see exactly how the Americans had done so, except 
in forcing the door open in Japan. But nations are guided 
in such matters not by logic, but by their interests. When 
the English, with intelligent appreciation of the value of 
American aid in the Far East, proclaimed that the two 
peoples had always been the defenders of the "open door," 
the latter cheerfully assented. It mattered not that the 
door which they wished to keep open was that of some- 
body else, not their own, and that, as in the case of most 
tariff doors, it was to open but one way. They did not 
stop for abstract considerations. Unless they were pre- 
pared to see many of the possible outlets for their trade 
closed against them at short notice, it behoved them to 
take a firm stand. Accordingly they fell into line with 
Great Britain and demanded the "open door" of equal 
chances for all, whatever territorial rearrangements might 
take place. 

The first application of this principle came in a way that 
the Americans had not at all expected. When they had 
embraced the doctrine, they had had no thought that it 
might apply to them, and by the time that they had 



182 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

acquired colonies as a result of the Spanish War, they had 
committed themselves to it. How would they act now 
that the shoe was on their own foot? In Porto Rico and 
Hawaii, in spite of some grumbling on the part of their 
English friends, they made no pretence of observing the 
maxim. But there the situation was simple. In the Philip- 
pines it was more complicated. How could the United 
States proclaim the principle of the " open door " in the Far 
East, maintaining that Russia should not impose discrimi- 
nating duties on American wares in Manchuria, or Germany 
in Shantung, if at the same time it penalized European 
goods in territories under its control? That it could not 
was too evident to be well gainsaid ; and the treaty of 
peace with Spaii :•, by providing that Spanish goods should 
for ten years be admitted on terms of equality with Ameri- 
can, has insured an "open door" for that time. But to- 
day Secretary Taft and other friends of the Filipinos are 
anxious for free trade between the islands and the republic, 
— free trade which can only mean the application of the 
American tariff to the Philippines. Beneficial, almost 
necessary, as this might be, it would seriously weaken the 
moral authority of the American attitude. It is all 
very well to explain that the Philippines and China are 
two very different places, and that the present owners 
of the Philippines have inherited from the Spaniards the 
right to make what tariffs they please ; such distinctions 
are seldom convincing to other nations. The Philippines 
were won by the sword, as Manchuria was won and lost. 
The sacrifices which they cost were not one tithe of those 
which Japan made for Korea and Southern Manchuria. 
The moral position is not very different, except that the I 
United States will soon be unhampered by treaty stipula- 
tions or promises to outsiders. Though no other country , 
is in a position to oppose the taking of the Philippines into 
the American customs union, the act will be resented, I 



ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 183 

and may serve some others as a precedent. At any rate, 
it will be quoted to show the hollowness of Yankee pro- 
fessions when they clash with Yankee interests. And yet 
the advantage to seven million Filipinos appears so great 
that one may well hesitate before coming to any conclusion. 
To-day the "open door" idea is no longer confined to 
Asia, since it has been accepted at Algeciras as one of the 
conditions of Morocco. True, it is not applicable every- 
where. The United States, for instance, will take good 
care that it never penetrates to the western hemisphere, 
where it might interfere with Pan-Americanism. Still, it 
is, within the geographical limits to which it applies, one of 
the cardinal principles of American policy. Its maintenance 
involves trouble and responsibilities; but, with the ex- 
pansion of the national trade and the keen commercial 
rivalry which this brings, such trouble and responsibilities 
are unavoidable : they are part of the price which the 
country has to pay for its new greatness. 



CHAPTER X 

THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 

IN any review of the relations between the United 
States and the powers of continental Europe, it is 
but natural to begin with France, the earliest friend of the 
republic. On two occasions in American history the action 
of the French government has been of so momentous 
consequence that one can hardly conceive what the destiny 
of the Union would have been if that action had been 
different. Without French aid, it is very doubtful whether 
the revolted thirteen colonies could have achieved their in- 
dependence when they did. Without the Louisiana Pur- 
chase, the movement of Western expansion would have 
produced other results. Had France held Louisiana long 
enough to plant there a considerable French population, 
two rival nationalities might be struggling to-day for su- 
premacy in the Southwest. Had she lost the territory 
to England, and had England joined it to her Canadian 
possessions, what would have been the future of the 
United States? 

French and American writers often speak in somewhat 
different tones when describing the aid granted by the 
government of Louis XVI to the insurgent English colonies. 
The former point out the immense service rendered by 
France to the American cause, and are inclined to talk of the 
whole transaction as if king and nation alike had been moved 
by a spirit of pure generosity. American historians, on their 

184 






THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 185 

side, dwell on the desire of the French to avenge their late 
humiliations, and attribute their intervention, not to love 
of American freedom, but to hatred of England, a senti- 
ment for which one need owe them no particular thanks. 
But the masses in the United States, with more generous 
instinct, have recognized that whatever may have been the 
justifiable calculations of the statesmen at Versailles, the 
aid given to their country in a moment of extreme need 
was not wholly selfish. French sympathy for the Americans 
was genuine ; and the Americans have shown their appre- 
ciation of this by their remembrance of Lafayette, whose 
fame, as a hero of the Revolution, is second in the popular 
memory to that of Washington only. 1 The United States has 
been, and is, grateful to France, even if such gratitude 
counts for little at moments when there is a clash of interests. 
In return, France has usually had for America that fondness 
we often feel for those who are under obligation to us, a sort 
of paternal pride in the greatness which, but for us, might 
never have existed. 

The close alliance formed in 1778 between the two countries 
won its proudest triumph at the surrender at Yorktown, 
which led to the recognition of American independence by 
Great Britain. There was, it is true, some little friction over 
the peace negotiations in Paris, where the American com- 
missioners thought they had not sufficient support from 
their allies in their territorial demands. Suspecting, 
rightly or wrongly, that the French were negotiating 
behind their backs, they made their own terms with Eng- 
land, to the anger of Vergennes when these were com- 
municated to him. American writers in commenting on 
French lukewarmness at this juncture are prone to forget 
that France was the ally of Spain as well as of the United 

1 In the United States to-day we find one mountain, five counties, 
twenty-nine townships, dozens of streets and squares, and one university 
bearing the name of Lafayette. 



186 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

States, and was justified in paying attention to Spanish 
wishes in determining the limits of the new republic. Ver- 
gennes could feel that he had done enough for the Americans 
in any case, especially as they had always made it clear that 
they would not tolerate a French reconquest of Canada. 
Here, perhaps, they were short-sighted, for a French Canada 
might, like Louisiana, have been sold to them some day. 

After the conclusion of peace the relations between the 
two countries continued cordial. Their close alliance re- 
mained in force until France became involved in a new war 
with England under circumstances which, in the opinion 
of the American government, released the United States 
from its treaty obligations. From the point of view of in- 
ternational law this may be disputed ; but the situation 
was beyond ordinary rules. 

As was natural, the Americans hailed the outbreak of the 
French Revolution, in which they saw a continuation of 
their own. Thomas Jefferson at Paris was on intimate 
terms not only with Lafayette, but also with Barnave, 
the Lameths, and others of the Feuillants. To be sure, 
his successor, Gouverneur Morris, was in close relation with 
the court and the aristocracy ; but Monroe, who came 
after Morris, went to such lengths in his demonstration of 
republican enthusiasm as to compromise his official dignity. 
American sympathy with the new revolution was so strong 
that if the French republic had been fortunate enough to 
send as its representative a more able man than the Giron- 
dist Genet, it is not improbable that the United States 
would have been drawn into war with England. To the 
injury of the cause that he served, Genet showed much 
more zeal than discretion. His lack of tact and his arrogant 
defiance of American laws helped to produce a revulsion of 
public feeling, and even Jefferson was obliged to reprimand 
him sharply. Conservative people in the United States 
were, moreover, soon alarmed by the increasing violence of 



THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 187 

the French revolutionary movement. When Americans saw 
their former champion, Lafayette, in exile, and the king 
who had come to their assistance sent to the scaffold, many 
of them began to feel that the new France was not the 
one to which they owed a debt of gratitude. 

President Washington's proclamation of neutrality was 
issued in 1793. For the next twenty years American foreign 
policy chiefly consisted of not very successful efforts to get 
that neutrality respected. In their prolonged and des- 
perate struggle the two mighty combatants, France and 
England, paid little heed to the rights of weak neutrals, 
especially when these neutrals found the conflict lucrative 
to themselves. In 1799 hostilities actually broke out be- 
tween France and the United States, but they were of short 
duration and were confined to some small encounters at sea. 
The difficulties with England culminated in the War of 1812. 

It was in the interval of quiet which followed the peace of 
Amiens in 1803 that Napoleon, after extorting Louisiana 
from Spain, suddenly sold it to the United States. The 
Emperor had no particular love for the transatlantic repub- 
lic, indeed there was no reason why he should have ; and 
Americans, on their part, owe him no gratitude, though 
the benefit to them was inestimable. Still, the transaction 
constitutes another historical tie between the two nations 
concerned, and as such has helped to promote good feeling 
between them. 

During the period of the Restoration and of the reign of 
Louis Philippe, Franco-American relations were few and 
unimportant. The French conquest of Spain in 1823, by 
awakening fears of European intervention in what had 
once been the Spanish colonies, led to the Monroe Doctrine ; 
but this was not specifically directed against France. The 
long tiresome wrangle about the French Spoliation Claims 
may be passed over. Napoleon III was unfriendly to the 
Union. During the Civil War he would have recognized 



188 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

the independence of the South if he could have been sure 
of the cooperation of the English. His Mexican expedition 
was a deliberate attempt to build up a Latin-American 
barrier, supported by France, against the preponderance of 
Anglo-Saxons on the continent. The complete failure of 
this undertaking prevented any lasting resentment in the 
United States, where people were inclined to look on the 
enterprise as the personal policy of the Emperor, for which 
his nation could not fairly be held responsible. Americans 
did not, however, forget their grievance against him, as 
was shown at the outbreak of the war of 1870. 

Of late years, relations between the two countries have 
been excellent, although the Spanish War gave rise to a 
temporary but lively anti-American sentiment among the 
French. This hostility awoke a certain anger in return ; 
but the more fair-minded among Americans recognized that, 
in view of the close connection between France and Spain, 
French disapproval of the war and. sympathy with the 
Spaniards were to be expected. The conduct of the French 
government was, from first to last, irreproachable, and 
its representative in Washington showed much tact in the 
delicate task of bringing about negotiations for peace. 
French disapproval was further excited by what seemed 
an incomprehensible lack of American enthusiasm for the 
Boers in their struggle for freedom. At one time, too, 
the opposition of the United States in the Far East to 
Russia, the ally of France, threatened to make more ill-will 
between the two republics. But these clouds have now 
happily blown over. The American evacuation of Cuba, 
which very few Europeans believed would ever take place, 
created a favorable impression abroad; and President 
Roosevelt's initiative in the ending of the Russo-Japanese 
War was most welcome to France, as was also the friendly 
attitude of the Washington government during the Morocco 
dispute. Recent international amenities, like the Rocham- 



THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 189 

beau mission, the reception of the American sailors sent 
to get the body of John Paul Jones, and, at an earlier 
date, the presentation of the Bartholdi statue of Liberty, 
though not very important in themselves, have helped to 
make good feeling. The efforts of the Alliance Francaise in 
the United States, and the frequent visits of French lecturers 
in recent years, have been influences in the same direction, as 
have the lectures at the Sorbonne of professors from Har- 
vard University. Never during the last century have Franco- 
American relations been on a more satisfactory basis than 
they are at the present day, and, as far as we can judge, 
there is no good reason why they should not continue to be 
excellent. Small disputes will occur now and then, but 
in no part of the world have the two countries interests 
which seriously conflict. 

A few years ago, one could not have said this ; but cer- 
tain possible causes of trouble then existed which have since 
disappeared. The dispute about the boundary between 
-Brazil and French Guiana, unlike the Venezuela controversy, 
has been adjusted without bringing in the United States. 
The recent settlement of the long-standing fisheries question 
between France and England has put an end to the remote 
eventuality that the Americans, by some strengthening of 
their ties with Newfoundland, might become involved in the 
affair. Another and very real danger has been eliminated 
by the failure oi the French Panama Canal Company, and 
by the sale of its property to the United States. If the 
canal had been constructed by a foreign corporation, the 
interests of the stockholders would, sooner or later, have 
come into conflict with the political claims of the American 
people. France could not well have left unprotected a 
company in which the savings of so many of her citizens 
were invested, and the result might have been a situation 
something like that which so long existed in regard to 
Egypt and the Suez Canal, and which ended in the triumph 



190 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

of the greater interest over the older historical right. Such 
situations are extremely dangerous. In the Egyptian ques- 
tion, war was barely averted ; in that of Panama we may 
be glad that the rights of France were liquidated as they 
were without more ill-feeling, though we may regret that the 
price paid was not a little more generous. The French may 
find some consolation for their failure in the thought that 
the cost of the enterprise, as is now evident, was too gigan- 
tic for private means. When the canal is completed, they 
will be entitled to their share of glory for actually under- 
taking a work which others had merely talked of, and 
also for having met and overcome many formidable initial 
difficulties. 

In France political writers sometimes profess fears of 
American aggression against her West Indian Islands. 
One is not surprised at this when one remembers the re- 
marks of President Grant, Secretary Olney, and others on 
the unnaturalness of the connection between any European 
power and its American colonies ; nevertheless, there is no 
real cause for apprehension. If the French colonies, like 
Cuba some years ago, were seething with disaffection, and 
if exiles were trying to excite sympathy and to organize 
liberating expeditions in the United States, a dangerous 
situation might ensue ; but as there is no sign of such a thing, 
we need not anticipate the contingency. As long as France 
and the United States remain on friendly terms, the former 
has no cause to fear any extension of the Monroe Doctrine 
at her expense. On the contrary, the doctrine is developing 
in a sense favorable to her; for if the Americans will not 
tolerate in their vicinity a transfer of territory from one 
European power to another, France is safeguarded against 
the loss of her West Indian possessions in the event of any 
misfortune to herself. 

French authorities on the affairs of Oceanica sometimes 
refer to American designs on Tahiti, an island whose im- 



THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 191 

portance as a stopping-place will increase after the com- 
pletion of the Panama Canal. American naval officers, like 
those of other nations, doubtless dream, as we have already 
said, of new coaling-stations in all regions of the world; 
but that is a part of their profession. Most people in the 
United States are hardly aware that Tahiti exists. 

In the Far East, since the war between Russia and Japan, 
which has modified the political situation, the interests of 
the United States and France seem to be in harmony. Now 
that the partition of China, once so much talked about, has 
been indefinitely postponed, and foreign powers are more 
doubtful of holding what they have got than desirous of 
making fresh acquisitions, the principle of the " open door " 
may be regarded as reasonably secure. Some Americans 
may construe the recent Franco-Japanese treaty as a proof 
that in the rivalry between the United States and Japan 
in the Pacific, France must be counted on the side of the 
latter. Should the Americans further get it into their 
heads that, according to the guarantee in the treaty, France 
would be bound to interfere if the United States, after a 
successful war with Japan, should think it wise to deprive 
her of Formosa, then their irritation might be serious. For- 
tunately, this is going far afield. The Americans are not 
looking forward to war, and still less are the French think- 
ing of quarrelling with them for the sake of the Japanese, 
treaty or no treaty; indeed their own Asiatic possessions 
stand in somewhat the same relation as the Philippines to 
Japan, who has been freely accused of coveting both. 

Since both France and the United States are great manu- 
facturing powers, they come into competition in many 
markets, where each does its utmost to push its own trade. 
Their direct dealings with one another are hampered by 
the many considerations which affect the policy of countries 
blessed with influential and highly protected industries, and 
which make commercial treaties complicated and thorny 



192 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

matters. And yet there should not be over many obstacles 
in the way of equable concessions and profits; for the 
triumph of French skill has been chiefly in articles requir- 
ing taste and care difficult to find under modern American 
industrial conditions, and in the rougher productions 
in which French industry cannot hold its own against 
American, it has already had to give way to English and 
German. 

In the United States, popular ideas about foreign lands 
have from the first been affected by prejudices incident 
to an Anglo-Saxon heritage, and also by the English sources 
from which Americans have derived much of their general 
information. Even in the days when public opinion was 
most hostile to England, educated Americans, being nurtured 
on English literature, unconsciously imbibed British views 
on many topics and notably about the character of the 
French, in spite of the facts that more of them have learned 
French than any other foreign language and that the ties 
between the United States and France have been not only 
independent of England but actually opposed to her. Then, 
too, the press, from motives of economy and from sheer 
provincialism, often took not only its news but its opinions 
on foreign affairs, except in matters which concerned America 
itself, from the London Times or from the English weeklies. 
Thus there have been for generations but few native Ameri- 
cans who have not obtained most of their conceptions of 
European questions through a British medium, which has 
colored whatever has passed through it. In recent years, 
the English control of the great cables of the world and of 
the news agencies has been used with effect. In the South 
African War, and even in the Russo-Japanese, the tidings that 
reached the American public were likely to be as much in 
conformity with English views as circumstances would 
permit. Indeed, when one considers the extent to which 
the Americans have been dependent on the English for 



THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 193 

instruction, one sometimes wonders that they have ever 
proved capable of disagreeing with their teachers. 

This provincial condition is now being outgrown. Every 
year the number of Americans who visit Europe increases, 
and if those who take the trouble to master a foreign lan- 
guage are still all too few, translations are more numerous 
and more prompt in appearing than of old. Thanks also to 
the growth of the American reviews, the reader who is igno- 
rant of French and German and is eager to instruct himself 
on foreign matters, is no longer confined to English sources. 
Several of the American newspapers now have direct 
communication with distant lands, and the Associated 
Press is competent to get its own news almost anywhere. 
But since the English will always be nearer to the European 
continent and necessarily better informed as to what is 
going on there, the American public will remain somewhat 
dependent on them for its knowledge ; hence we may expect 
its opinions about French affairs to be favorably affected 
by the present entente cordiale, which renders English com- 
ment to-day so favorable to France. 

The number of Frenchmen living in America is small, 
and nowhere are many gathered in one place. The Ameri- 
can colony in France is concentrated in Paris. It includes 
a few business men, a good many students and artists, who 
are often poor, and a contingent of the idle rich. Foreign 
colonies of this sort seldom enjoy genuine popularity in the 
lands where they are settled; but the Americans in Paris 
seem to have made themselves about as much liked as could 
reasonably be expected. In many individual cases they 
have been very kindly received. They and their hosts do 
not always succeed in understanding each other, for their 
point of view is not always the same. To many Frenchmen 
the American is the typical millionnaire, rough, restless, 
active, in every way the parvenu, whose sole idea is money, 
and whose womenkind care only for the spending of it 



194 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

with as much splurge as possible. On the other hand, it 
is not an uncommon belief in the United States that France 
is politically and morally decadent. This impression is 
based on doubts as to the stability of the government, on 
the fact that the population is stationary, and still more on 
the impression of moral corruption which modern French 
literature serves to spread abroad. It is hard for a foreigner, 
especially at a distance, to appreciate the extraordinary 
vitality and power of achievement which, though not always 
evident on the surface, are inherent in the French nation. 
Characteristically enough, both the French and the Ameri- 
cans (as well as others) are convinced that they themselves 
lead the world in civilization, and neither nation realizes 
that the other looks on it with a certain condescension. To 
tell the truth, their conceptions of what is meant by the word 
" civilization " are apt to be different. To the Frenchman the 
term suggests art and literature ; to the everyday American 
it means efficient telephone service and improved plumbing. 
There is no doubt that the Americans are as superior in such 
important matters as public libraries, organized charities, 
and particularly in generous gifts on the part of private 
citizens, as they are inferior in the comprehension of much 
that goes to make life beautiful. Still, educated Americans, 
though sharing to a certain extent the inborn British preju- 
dice against the Southern European, are quicker than the 
English to appreciate the French point of view, and some 
have more than an admiration, they have a real love, for 
France. 

The influence of French thought on Americans has been 
great. It is true that they have not imitated French insti- 
tutions, for the republic of the New World is the older of the 
two, but the fathers of the Constitution were steeped in 
Montesquieu, whom they quoted on every occasion. Rous- 
seau did not appeal to their national temperament except 
in the case of certain individuals, the most notable of whom 



THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 195 

was Jefferson. Of later French political writers, the one 
who most affected the Americans was De Tocqueville, who 
furnished them with what was for long the standard philo- 
sophical study of their character and development. The 
influence of French literature, art, fashions, has been great 
from the start and shows few signs of waning. Paris has 
always been the Mecca of American students of the arts, and 
even in the field of learning there has been, of late years, 
something of a reaction among American scholars against 
German models and in favor of French ones. 

Unlike most of the countries of Europe, the United States 
is not directly affected by the example of France in political 
matters, nor is it bound to her by close ties in foreign 
affairs. Nevertheless, it cannot be indifferent to what 
happens to its sister republic. France is a world power, 
with a territory and a population larger than those of the 
Union, a great army and navy, and extraordinary wealth, 
and, in spite of the assertions of hostile critics, her national 
genius seems far from exhaustion. She still plays a leading 
role among the peoples of mankind. Americans should not 
overlook, either, the immense prestige that she has, and is 
likely to keep, among the other Latin countries. Paris will 
long remain the capital of the Latin, including the Latin- 
American world. It is through the medium of the French 
mind and language that the other Latin peoples have often 
to be reached ; and even in the political world, any state 
that has to deal with a Latin one will find a smoother path 
if it appears as the friend, rather than as the enemy, of 
France. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 

IF history and traditional sentiment count for much in 
the relations between the United States and France 
and present politics for comparatively little, precisely the 
reverse is true of the United States and Germany. Here the 
all-important facts are the recent ones, the story of the last 
ten years, the questions of the day, the aims and aspira- 
tions of the two countries. In any survey of the past we 
have also to make a distinction, now ceasing to exist, be- 
tween the relations of the Americans with the Germans as 
a people and with the modern German Empire as a state. 
The Germans have played a part in American affairs since 
the early days, the German Empire is little more than a 
generation old, and only within the last decade have political 
relations with it become so important for the United States 
that they outrank all others except those with England and 
with Japan. 

In America German immigrants have been welcome. 
They have been preeminently steady, hard-working folk, 
who have minded their own business, and who have formed 
a valuable part of the population wherever they have set- 
tled. In the Civil War they played a creditable part, and 
they have shown themselves ready to support their 
adopted country on all occasions, even — if necessary — 
against their native one. The small interest they have 
taken in politics, as compared, for instance, with the Irish, 
has prevented one possible cause of dislike ; indeed, the 

196 






THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 197 

general feeling toward them has always been cordial. On 
the other hand, considering their large numbers and their 
excellent quality, they have had surprisingly little influ- 
ence in forming American public opinion or in affecting its 
attitude toward their Fatherland. It is not they, but Ger- 
mans in Germany and the native Americans who have been 
to Germany, who have done most to make the two nations 
understand and appreciate one another. 

The historical ties between the two were long slight but 
friendly. The people of the United States have known 
that Frederick the Great, in his resentment against Eng- 
land, looked with favor on their war for independence, 
and that he admired the character of Washington ; they 
have regarded the unfortunate Hessians who, in a quarrel 
not their own, were sold to fight against them, as victims 
rather than enemies; and they remember that a Prussian 
officer, Baron von Steuben, rendered valuable service to 
the colonies by drilling and disciplining the raw revolu- 
tionary army. In their turn, the Americans sympathized 
with the German struggle for liberty and with the achieve- 
ment of German unity. Their dislike of Napoleon III, and 
of the manner in which the Franco-German War was ap- 
parently brought about, rendered many of them pro-German 
during the conflict. They admired the genius of Bismarck, 
the triumphs of the German army, and the splendid energy 
of the whole nation in every department of human activity. 
Scholars from all parts of the world have flocked to the Ger- 
man universities, particularly since 1870, and have returned 
singing their praises and eager to copy the methods which 
have given them such preeminence. Among these visitors 
have been throngs of Americans, most of whom have come 
back with a very sincere enthusiasm for modern Germany as 
a country which their own has much reason to respect and 
none to fear. 

The first slight quarrel occurred in 1888, in connection 



198 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

with the far-away Samoan Islands, where both had certain 
claims. Overzealous local officials made the rivalry more 
intense, each of the home governments sent ships of war 
to the scene, and the situation there grew critical, until a 
storm destroyed the two fleets. After this, matters were 
patched up by an agreement signed in Berlin, that provided 
a hybrid form of government for the islands. Under this 
arrangement they continued to make trouble until, in 1899, 
they were divided by a new treaty which gave each side 
what it wanted — Germany a colony, the United States a 
coaling station. 

The incident of 1888 was of a kind to be expected between 
two states whose political activities were beginning to ex- 
tend far beyond their own borders. Its importance lay in 
its effect on the American people, who now began to think 
of Germany as a grasping power with ambitions that 
might conflict with their own. They were rather proud of 
having defended their claims in a dispute with the great 
Bismarck himself at a time when the rest of the world was 
inclined to bow down before the chancellor, and they were 
determined to maintain their rights just as vigorously on 
any like occasion that should occur. The episode also 
strengthened the demand in the country for a stronger navy. 
After it closed, relations with Germany resumed their normal 
course. 

Ten years later, when the Spanish War broke out, the 
Americans made the unpleasant discovery that the sym- 
pathy of continental Europe was overwhelmingly on the 
side of Spain ; so much so, in fact, that there was even 
rumor of a combination to restrain the United States. The 
result was an outburst of wrath. It is all very well to talk 
of the moral effect of the opinion of the outside world ; 
but when a nation in the heat of a struggle — the United 
States with Spain, Great Britain with the Boers — sees that 
its neighbors condemn it, it ascribes their attitude to envy, 



THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 199 

hatred, and malice, and is not at all shaken in its belief in 
the justice of its own cause. As might have been expected, 
the Americans fiercely resented all adverse criticism, and 
were ready to fight any one and every one rather than yield 
an inch. Some of them might admit that there was a cer- 
tain excuse for France, owing to her close connection with 
Spain, but they saw none for Germany. Their anger against 
the latter was soon fanned into hot flame by her conduct 
about the Philippines. 

The exact circumstances connected with the despatch of 
the squadron of Admiral Diedrichs to these islands have 
never been made public, and perhaps never will be. It is 
well that at the moment people in America were unaware 
of the relations which existed for some weeks between the 
American and German fleets, relations so strained that, but 
for the attitude of the English commander present, they 
might perhaps have degenerated into actual conflict; but 
what the people did know was enough to arouse their anger. 
After the battle of Manila Bay, while other countries, as 
is usual under such conditions, sent a few ships of war to 
look after the interests of their citizens, Germany, without 
any obvious reason, hastily despatched to the scene of 
action her Pacific squadron — a force equal in strength to 
the fleet of Admiral Dewey. The Americans believed that 
this force came in no friendly spirit, but in the hope of 
taking advantage of the confusion to pick up something 
for Germany; and their distrust was intensified by the 
reports they heard of its behavior. Fear that the Ger- 
mans might establish themselves in the Philippines was one 
of the motives that induced the United States to take over 
the islands. When, later, they purchased from Spain the 
Carolines and the Ladrones, this was taken as proof that 
the suspicion had been well founded. From this time on, 
many Americans were firmly convinced that Germany was 
not only a covetous, greedy power, but also one that, from 



200 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

jealousy, was willing to do the United States an ill-turn, 
if she could. As this opinion was expressed by the news- 
papers with their usual intemperate freedom, it provoked 
anger on the other side and violent retorts. Indiscreet 
words on the part of American officers helped to envenom 
the situation. Naval authorities everywhere are wont to 
form their plans with more or less reference to some par- 
ticular foreign fleet ; for Americans, the German was now 
the one to keep in view as a standard for the strength 
of their own. 

Here, again, the influence of the English press must not 
be forgotten. Since the fall of Bismarck, the relations be- 
tween Great Britain and Germany, except at the moment 
of the Jameson raid, had in the main been cordial ; but 
about 1899 they began to change for the worse, and they 
have never regained their former heartiness. As the 
English have been at the same time quarrelling with the 
Germans and cultivating their new friendship with the 
Americans, it was but human nature for them to strive 
to blacken the character of their Teutonic rivals, and to 
prove that the ambitions of the latter were equally danger- 
ous to both Anglo-Saxon nations. It is true that the Ger- 
mans retorted in kind, but in spite of the aid of their trans- 
atlantic kindred, they were not so well able to put their 
views before the American public, who can be reached more 
easily by the London Times than by the New-Yorker Staats- 
zeitung. 

Events in the Far East did not help to mend matters. 
The United States as well as England disapproved of the 
seizure of Kiauchau, and though the principle of Secretary 
Hay's famous note on the "open door" was officially ac- 
cepted at Berlin, many persons were convinced that Ger- 
many was instigating Russian aggression in order to bring 
about the partition of China — an outcome which America 
was anxious to prevent. During and after the Boxer rising, 






THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 201 

the severity shown by the Germans was in opposition to 
the American policy of treating the Chinese as leniently as 
might be. 

The growing alienation between two states long on amica- 
ble terms grieved and alarmed well-wishers in both. Ac- 
cordingly, various means were tried to bring them together 
again. If we may charge the Germans with having given 
most of the provocation in the first instance, we must 
admit that the attempts at reconciliation have come from 
their side. The Emperor in particular has made several 
efforts to allay American suspicion. His most notable act 
of the sort was the sending of his brother, Prince Henry, to 
make a tour of the United States and to present a gift to 
the new Germanic Museum of Harvard University. The 
visit of the prince was in a measure successful : personally, 
he created a favorable impression everywhere, and the 
American people were amused and pleased at the attention 
paid them ; but if any one imagined that they would 
take the whole thing very seriously, he misconceived the 
character of a nation which is too well satisfied with itself 
and with its own institutions to feel unduly flattered by 
attentions from any foreign prince. Still, the effect of the 
visit was good, though a little marred by an inopportune 
dispute between the English and the German press as to 
the attitude assumed by the representatives of their respec- 
tive countries at Washington at the outbreak of the Spanish 
War. More unfortunate was the mistake in tact made by 
the imperial government a few months later in present- 
| ing to the United States a statue of Frederick the Great 
when the French Rochambeau mission was in America. 
The moment was ill-chosen. The Americans, without 
attaching too much importance to the Rochambeau fes- 
1 1 tivities, which attracted less attention than the visit of 
all Prince Henry, felt that the Germans would have done 
;, ;j better to keep quiet for a while. It took some imagination 



202 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

to believe that the services of Frederick the Great in 
their behalf could be compared with those of Rocham- 
beau. At all events, there was no good reason for an- 
nouncing the gift at this juncture, when it placed the 
administration at Washington in an awkward position, 
and, in the eyes of the American public, looked as if 
the Germans, after having had their fun, were trying 
to spoil that of the French. Trifles of the sort were, 
however, soon forgotten in the graver dissatisfaction 
produced by the turn events were taking in Venezuela. 

The intervention of Germany, England, and Italy in 
Venezuelan waters provoked a violent irritation in the 
United States. Rightly or wrongly, the Americans were 
convinced that Germany was "trying it on" to test the 
Monroe Doctrine, and for greater security had persuaded 
the other two powers to join her. The loud and almost 
universal condemnation by the English people and press 
of the action of their government prevented resentment 
against England, and since Italy scarcely attracted at- i 
tention, all the vials of American wrath were poured j 
on Germany. For a while the situation was somewhat 
critical, and the tone taken in Washington was serious. 
Finally, after President Roosevelt had declined the request 
that he should act as arbitrator, the matter was, as he sug- 
gested, referred to The Hague. The decision there pro- 
nounced awoke fresh dissatisfaction in the United States; 
for the lien given to the creditors on the Venezuelan cus- 
toms looked like a beginning of European control of an 
American state, and the recognition of the priority of the 
claims of the belligerents over those of powers which, like 
the United States and France, had kept quiet, might well | 
encourage the use of force elsewhere under similar circum- 
stances. On their part the Germans had small cause to con- 
gratulate themselves, for though victorious in the matter 
in dispute, they had been taught that the United States 



. 



THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 203 

was determined to oppose even the slightest encroach- 
ment, and that the mere suggestion of another inter- 
vention of this kind would excite American feeling to a 
dangerous degree. It was also evident that public opinion 
in England would never permit the government to aid 
Germany against America. 

Since then, passions have had time to cool down, and 
though there still may be some latent resentment on the 
German side and watchful suspicion on the American, the 
relations between the two countries are again good. 
Before deciding whether they are likely to continue so, we 
must first understand why their interests may clash, and 
this without the fault of any one. 

To begin with, the United States and Germany are trade 
rivals whose competition is keen. If we look at the great 
manufacturing states of the world to-day, we see that all 
are eager, as a matter of economic life and death, to 
find markets for their surplus goods. England and France 
appear to us like two rich, long-established, and some- 
what old-fashioned commercial houses. They have com- 
peted with one another for generations, they have their 
specialties and their traditions, and they are often inclined 
to let well-enough alone rather than to run unnecessary 
risks in seeking new fields. Compared with them, Germany 
and the United States are like two young pushing firms 
who have their way yet to make. Confident in their own 
intelligence and energy, they have little doubt that in many 
branches of trade they shall be able to drive their older 
competitors from the field. Already their achievements 
have excited the alarm of their staid rivals, and they might 
look forward joyously to more brilliant triumphs in the 
future, if each were not worried by the presence of the 
other. 

Different as have been the methods by which the Germans 
and the Americans have attained this astonishing economic 



204 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

success in the last few years, the results in the two cases 
are similar : each has developed gigantic industries, capable 
of supplying goods of many kinds, and often the same 
goods, in almost unlimited quantities; each protects itself 
at home by means of a tariff, though not of equal severity ; 
each is supremely desirous of securing new markets abroad ; 
and each realizes that, in the fierce struggle for preeminence, 
the other is its most formidable rival. The Germans were 
slightly the first in the field, and we can well understand their 
deep chagrin when the Americans appeared on the scene. 
The situation is doubly trying, because Germany is in more 
pressing need of outside markets for her activity than is 
the United States, and is at the same time much inferior to 
it in natural resources. Long-cherished dreams, which had 
appeared not too difficult of realization, must now remain 
unfulfilled. The Americans, on their part, looking out for 
fresh commercial worlds to conquer, see almost everywhere 
as their chief competitors the hard-working, energetic Ger- 
mans. In the Chinese Empire, both have been so successful 
that they had visions of dominating the markets until their 
ideas received a rude shock from the appearance of a still 
younger rival, modern Japan. In South America, the Ger- 
mans were convinced that they had found a field of splen- 
did possibilities, and their progress in recent years has been 
startling in its rapidity ; but to South America the Ameri- 
cans are turning much of their attention, and with the aid 
of Pan-American sentiment, they hope to win the first place 
for themselves. Wherever on the globe there is a good 
opening for trade, there we may expect to find the 
Germans and the Americans striving in ardent rivalry. 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising if the con- 
tinual clash of equally legitimate interests sometimes pro- 
duces ill-feeling between the competitors, which is soon 
reflected in the press and heightened by publicity. 

A second source of difficulty between Germany and the 






THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 205 

United States may be found in the Monroe Doctrine, in 
regard to which the Americans will hear of no argument or 
compromise, and are prepared to maintain their position 
at any cost. Now that England has explicitly accepted it, 
they are inclined to believe that Germany is the only power 
from whom they have anything to apprehend in this respect. 
They know that, although the imperial government has 
shown a discreet reserve, the Pan-Germanists have raged 
furiously against the doctrine, and that others, of a less 
chauvinistic stripe, regard it with lively resentment. Many 
Americans are convinced that Germany would jump at any 
safe opportunity to get a foothold in the western hemisphere, 
that she was taking a first step toward one in her Venezuela 
intervention, that she would purchase the Danish islands 
if she dared, and that she used secret influence to prevent 
their being sold to the United States in 1902. In short, they 
regard her whole relation with Latin America with watch- 
ful suspicion. 

If this suspicion rested on any supposed wanton rapacity 
on the part of the Germans, we might dismiss it with scant 
ceremony. What is more disquieting is that we can see 
lawful reasons why German efforts should be directed 
toward South America in a way that may bring them into 
collision with American interests. And we can blame no 
one, since the trouble lies in the situation itself as nature 
and history have created it. We must, however, distinguish 
between German political dreams, often of an irresponsible 
nature, and legitimate commercial aspirations. It is true 
that the two melt into one another, and that the United 
States is in the way of both. 

In spite of the extraordinary achievements of the modern 
German Empire in peace and in war, and of its splendid 
organized strength, if it is to keep in the future the com- 
manding position it holds in the present, it will have 
to overcome grave disadvantages. Many of its leading 



206 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

men, conscious of the overcrowding of its great population 
on a small and not very rich territory, are convinced that 
their country must either expand or stifle. Its industry, 
its energy, its trained efficiency, imperatively demand 
broader fields in which to display themselves. Its few 
colonies, with one barren exception, — a part of South- 
west Africa, — are in the tropics, and incapable of sup- 
porting any large number of white settlers. For trade with 
the Far East it is less well placed than the United States, 
and in China it will find it ever harder to compete with 
Japan. Imperial customs preference would threaten its 
commerce with the colonies of the British Empire. There 
remains South America, a whole continent of vast resources, 
all of whose inhabitants put together are hardly equal to 
one-half of those of Germany, and many of whom are not 
of the white race. Here, then, would seem to be a splen- 
did opening for German enterprise, a unique chance for 
the nation to control permanently a territory comparable 
to that held by the Anglo-Saxon and the Slav. In the 
last quarter of a century the Germans have made long 
strides in this part of the world, not by colonization — 
for few have emigrated there — but by founding steamship 
lines and banking houses, by constructing public works, 
by making investments, and by building up their trade in 
every way. They are firmly intrenched, skilful and ener- 
getic, and are advancing steadily. Their chief obstacle to 
complete success is American competition. 

This competition, which bids fair to become keener every 
year, fills the Germans with apprehension. They may 
think they can hold their own on even terms, especially as 
they have a good start ; but are the terms even ? Hamburg 
is, it is true, little farther from the southeastern coast of 
South America than is New York, and if the Germans could 
get a port in Morocco, they would have an outpost nearer 
than the United States to this, the most important, part of 



THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 207 

the South American continent ; but for trade further north 
they are relatively less well situated, and for the whole 
west coast their disadvantage is manifest. Their inferi- 
ority in position is, however, small compared with their 
inferiority in resources, and this makes the prospect of com- 
petition rather depressing. They are also justified in re- 
garding the Pan-American movement as unfavorable to 
their interests ; for though optimists may declare that South 
America offers room for the commerce of many countries, 
it would be hard to deny that whatever success the 
United States may gain there, will be to a certain ex- 
tent at the expense of Europe, and particularly of Ger- 
many. This may be in the common order of things, and 
the fault of no one, but it will not promote mutual good 
feeling. And this is not the whole story. Germans have 
dreamed that their economic preponderance in parts of 
South America might be made permanent by becoming also 
a political one. It is not necessary to accuse them of covert 
designs against any South American state : what they have 
done is to entertain the hope that sooner or later, in the 
nature of things, by peaceable attraction or as a result of 
collision provoked by misgovernment, some of the Latin- 
American republics would fall into the hands of the superior 
race. This dream may appear fantastic to many people, 
even in Germany itself, but we need not wonder at its 
existence, or deny to it a measure of reasonableness. 

When German public opinion began to recover from the 
exultation which followed the founding of the new Empire., 
gradually some unpleasant doubts asserted themselves. 
Men came to realize that powerful and glorious as was the 
new Fatherland, it occupied only a small part of the earth's 
surface compared with the domain of the Anglo-Saxon, the 
Latin, and the Slav, and that however satisfactory was the 
immediate situation, the prospect ahead looked less attrac- 
tive. This consciousness of great actual strength coupled 



208 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

with anxiety about the future has led to a growing restless* 
ness, to a feeling that something must be done. Germans 
no longer regard their unity as achieved, as they did in the 
first glow of triumph after 1871 : they now hope for a greater 
Germany, to include all in Europe who speak their tongue. 
Even this is not enough, — they have visions of a world em- 
pire, the equal of others, one that will give full play to all 
their energies, and furnish homes for their superabundant 
children, who may thus preserve their nationality instead 
of becoming "the fertilizer" of other peoples, and assure the 
sway of the German language as the idiom of hundreds of 
millions of human beings. 

The party known as the Pan-Germanists have expressed 
freely the extreme of ambitions which many quieter 
patriots cherish in some degree. Unfortunately for such 
aspirations, there are but few parts of the temperate zone 
where it would still be possible for German colonists to 
transplant themselves in sufficient numbers to form new 
branches of the race, and those few parts are guarded by 
their present owners and by international jealousies. Aus- 
tralia, with its huge area, occupied by a small and slowly 
increasing population, is a British colony; in Asia Minor, 
the Turk is not to be lightly dispossessed, and both Russia 
and England may be counted on to oppose Germany ; in 
Morocco, England and France stand in the way; in the 
United States, though millions of Germans have settled 
there, Deutschtum has no chance of being preserved. 

There remains only South America ; and here, in the three 
southern provinces of Brazil, is a population of some four 
hundred thousand Germans, who, thanks to their high birth- 
rate, are increasing fast, and who, so far, have succeeded in 
maintaining their individuality. If the few thousand immi- 
grants who wandered there more than half a century ago 
have grown up into so considerable a nucleus, can we won- 
der that enthusiasts have dreamed of the building up of 



THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 209 

a German state in this part of the New World? But 
how different the whole situation would be to-day if the 
Prussian government had not from 1856 to 1893 made the 
fatal mistake of forbidding the departure of colonists for 
this region, and if but a tenth of the swarm who in those 
years were lost to the Fatherland by going to the United 
States had made their homes in Brazil ! We can well 
understand the despair of the German patriot when he 
thinks of the magnificent opportunity so wantonly sacri- 
ficed. Is Deutschtum, then, to be reckoned as without a 
future in this part of the world? Pan-Germanist writers 
have declared that it is not too late to hope and to act, and 
they have outlined possibilities magnificent enough in their 
eyes, but unluckily quite out of keeping with the Monroe 
Doctrine. Their flights of fancy, which English writers 
have taken care should not pass unnoticed, have sharply 
directed American attention to every movement of the 
Germans in Brazil, and there can be no doubt that German 
interference there would mean war between Germany and 
the United States. 

Looking dispassionately at the situation of the German- 
Brazilians to-day, one cannot help thinking that, if left to 
themselves, they will find it difficult to maintain a separate 
existence. In the provinces where they have settled they 
are everywhere in a minority ; even in Santa Catarina, where 
their proportion is highest, they form scarcely a quarter of 
the population. To-day they are receiving almost no rein- 
forcements, partly because German emigration in any direc- 
tion has decreased in the last few years, but also because the 
Brazilians, alarmed by the danger they have foreseen, are 
now discouraging, instead of favoring, newcomers from 
Germany. As an offset they have been bringing in large 
numbers of Italians, who are as prolific as Germans and 
more easily Brazilianized, and they are about to introduce 
Japanese. Finally, well as the German-Brazilians, on the 



210 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

whole, have preserved their original type, some of them, 
especially in the towns, show signs of departing from it, 
and very few, whatever their national sympathies may be, 
have any desire to come under the bureaucratic rule of 
Berlin. If matters go on quietly, as they are doing at 
present, it appears probable that, in spite of the influence 
of consuls and merchants, of teachers and preachers and 
patriotic literature from the Fatherland, sooner or later 
here too the Germans will end by being lost in the sur- 
rounding population. 

On the other hand, this may not happen. The rapid 
natural increase among the German settlers in the country 
districts may more than counterbalance losses in the towns. 
The old immigration may begin again, even if it is hindered 
by the opposition of the Brazilian authorities, and also by 
the fact that the population of modern Germany is increas- 
ingly urban rather than rural, and therefore less suited to 
the opening up of unsettled regions. Or the Brazilian 
Germans may hold their own and be drawn closer to their 
kinsmen by commercial, literary, and sentimental ties, with- 
out wishing to be under the same government. To this the 
United States could have no objection. The greatest dan- 
ger to peace would arise from an antagonism between the 
Germans and other Brazilians that should lead to armed 
conflict, during which subjects of the Emperor might also 
suffer. It would then be very hard for the government at 
Berlin to resist the pressure of popular sentiment in favor 
of rendering some sort of aid to the struggling brothers 
across the sea. But such intervention would at once lead 
to action on the part of the United States. Even if the 
Germans felt that their navy was strong enough to risk the 
perils of a conflict with the United States alone, they would 
also have to take into account not only Brazil, but prob- 
ably a South American coalition against them, and there is 
no one from whom they could expect help. Doubtless all 



THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 211 

this is perfectly appreciated by the statesmen at Berlin, 
even if it is not by the Pan-Germanists. 

At all events there is no present cause for anxiety. In 
a study of international relations one is sometimes in danger 
of paying attention to irresponsible utterances in a foreign 
country to which one would not give a thought in one's 
own. There is indeed no more reason why the imperial 
government should let itself be led astray by Pan-Ger- 
manic clamor than that the authorities at Washington 
should heed the vaporings of the American yellow press. 
Nor should the fact that we can discern clouds on the hori- 
zon make us necessarily expect a storm. Relations be- 
tween the United States and Germany are excellent, and 
the present trend is towards an even better understand- 
ing. In the isolation in which the Germans now find 
themselves in Europe, they are more desirous than they 
were before of American good-will, and are more dis- 
posed to second the efforts to obtain it which the Em- 
peror has been making for some time past, — efforts the more 
successful because his picturesque character has always 
appealed to the imagination of Americans in much the same 
way as that of their own President, with whom he has so 
often been compared. They may not be much impressed by 
interchanges of university professors, but they do realize 
that the Germans are trying to be friendly, and they are dis- 
posed to be so themselves in return. They have now made 
their interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine so clear that 
no one can have any excuse for misunderstanding it, and 
whatever irresponsible individuals may have said, the 
German government since 1903 has shown no enmity to 
it or sign of desire to call it in question. Suspicion in 
the United States has in consequence subsided and given 
place to good-will. Then a slight sense of loneliness 
which the Americans feel in the midst of all these treaties 
concerning the Far East in none of which they are included, 



212 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

and uncertainty about their own future relations with the 
Japanese, increase their readiness to welcome German 
advances. They have the less difficulty in doing so because 
even in the days when they mistrusted the intentions of 
Germany the most, they could not refuse to her the tribute 
of their sincere admiration. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 

OF all the powers of to-day, no two present a more 
striking example of similarity and of contrast than 
the United States and Russia. Their huge unbroken bulk 
gives them a self-sufficing continental character, which not 
only offers them a seemingly limitless field for internal 
development, but renders them, except at their extremities, 
almost invulnerable to outside attack. Each has been a 
world in itself, and both have been regarded as menaces, 
though in different ways, to the historic lands of older cul- 
ture. From one another they can have little to fear, and 
they may conceivably be of great mutual service. In the 
past the sympathies between them have been curious and 
interesting, but so far their political dealings have not been 
highly important. 

At the time of the war for American independence, the 
Empress Catherine II happened to be out of conceit with 
England. This temporary unfriendliness, combined with 
her high sense of the dignity of her empire, prompted her 
to get up the League of Armed Neutrality; but though 
this was directed against the English, it was of no particular 
service to the Americans. The Empress was not at all 
moved by sympathy for the revolted colonies — she had 
a thorough dislike of insurrection, and regarded such an 
example as infectious ; she therefore let the agent sent to 
St. Petersburg by the Continental Congress wait in the city 
for about two years without granting him an audience. 

213 



214 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

Cordial relations were not established till the reign of 
Alexander I. Though the Emperor's political methods in 
his later years were the antithesis of American ones, and 
though he was the founder of the Holy Alliance, which all 
good Americans abhorred, he seems, at least in his earlier, 
liberal period, to have been well-disposed towards the United 
States. 1 He corresponded with Thomas Jefferson ; and on 
two occasions he sent for a copy of the American Consti- 
tution, which was probably studied by his minister Speran- 
ski when planning a reform of the imperial government. 
Russia at this date was herself an American power, and it 
was precisely her attempts to extend her territory to the 
southward that called forth the protests of Secretary Adams, 
whose views were repeated by President Monroe in his 
famous message. The actual difficulty as to the boundary 
of Russian America was ended by the treaty of 1824. Some 
years later, the Russians abandoned as unprofitable the 
trading settlement which they had made in California, 
where, though they had not claimed political possession, 
they had remained in defiance of Spanish protest, and were 
looked at askance by the United States. Otherwise the 
connection between Russia and America was slight, but 
they remained on good terms, and on several occasions 
they acted in harmony in the Far East, where both bene- 
fited by the victories of the English and the French which 
opened up China. There is little further to note until 
the outbreak of the American Civil War. 

From the very beginning of the war, Russia took her 
stand as the unwavering friend of the federal govern- 
ment. In 1861 she warned it that attempts were being 
made to form a coalition against the United States, and 
by her outspoken disapproval of all such plans she 
helped to discourage them. Her despatch of a fleet to 
American waters in 1863 attracted great attention. The 

1 American visitors to St. Petersburg were conspicuously well treated. 



THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 215 

relations of the United States with England and France 
were then so strained that they seemed likely to end in 
open hostility, and many persons were convinced at the 
moment, as others have been since, that the Russian squad- 
ron was not only sent as an amicable demonstration, but 
was the bearer of sealed orders directing it to give aid in 
the eveni: of an appeal to arms. Though it is now generally 
believed that this last impression was erroneous, there is no 
gainsaying the open and emphatic friendliness of the atti- 
tude of the Russian government in contrast to that of most 
of the other European ones in this the hour of sorest trial 
to the United States. We may ascribe this attitude to a 
disapproval of insurrections, to a cordial sentiment toward 
the American republic, and, most of all, to a sympathy 
with the effort to abolish slavery on the North American 
continent at a time when Russia herself was freeing her 
serfs. The two proclamations of emancipation were not 
far from synchronous, and the men engaged in carrying 
out these two social revolutions, among the most important 
in history, were naturally well-disposed toward one another. 
The Empire of the Tsars had also sound political reasons 
for drawing close to the Union ; for in this same year, 
1863, a revolt in Poland led to the diplomatic interven- 
tion of England and France, which almost culminated in 
a European war, and hence the idea of a Russo-American 
alliance against common foes was rational enough. How- 
ev:/, we are not called upon to go behind the fact of 
the 'ndisputable genuineness in Russian good- will at this 
time. 

As an expression of gratitude for this friendly behavior, 
Congress, after the close of the war, seized the occasion 
of the escape of Alexander II from an attempt against his 
life to send a special envoy to convey to him its congratu- 
lations. The mission was received with imposing cere- 
monies, and in return the young Grand Duke Alexis was 



216 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

despatched to America, where he was welcomed with popu< 
lar enthusiasm, though trouble between the administration 
and the Russian minister at Washington interfered with 
the perfect success of the visit. 

Following these international amenities came the pur- 
chase by the United States, in 1867, of the Russian territory 
in North America. This transaction, which was accom- 
plished without preliminary disputes or wearisome negotia- 
tions, soon proved a good bargain to the United States; 
and it helped to confirm American liking for a country 
that had parted with its possessions on reasonable terms, 
and had peaceably withdrawn from the western hemisphere, 
thus freeing one more portion of it from European and 
monarchical rule. 

For a generation after these events the friendship be- 
tween Russia and America was an accepted commonplace 
in both countries; and, if not deep-rooted, it was at least 
sincere. Between Russians and Americans there are, along- 
side of many radical differences, not a few likenesses — in 
temperament, in the problems they have to solve, and in 
their relation to the rest of the civilized world. Both 
have regarded themselves as young peoples with the future 
before them, and this has led in both to a certain contempt 
for the "effete" nations of western Europe. The conscious- 
ness of rapid growth, of being the owners of vast territories 
with huge undeveloped resources, has inspired both with 
the same buoyant confidence that their role in the world is 
just beginning. In both Americans and Russians we find 
the same general absence of pettiness, — the " broad na- 
ture," as the Russians love to call it, — the same happy- 
go-lucky belief that they can make up by an effort at the 
critical moment for any amount of previous negligence and 
carelessness. For both, the questions of material develop- 
ment have been much the same, and both, though under 
different conditions, have been occupied with the task of 



THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 217 

fusing many heterogeneous peoples into one great nation- 
ality. When Russians and Americans have met, they have 
usually fraternized without difficulty. The Americans have 
found the Russians "good fellows" without that shade of 
condescension in their attitude which has sometimes been 
irritating in Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Germans. The 
Russians, on their side, have looked on the Americans as 
folk much like themselves, for they have been the quicker 
of the two in appreciating the resemblances between them. 
They have studied American progress, and have often copied 
American methods as those most applicable to their own 
conditions. Even in their high tariff they have imitated 
pretty directly the example of the United States ; and the 
hopes which they founded upon it were based in a measure 
on the prosperity which the Americans have obtained under 
a similar system. Russians also used to believe that the 
two countries had one and the same hereditary national 
enemy, England, with which both had fought in the past 
and would some day fight again. Finally, the absence of 
conflicting interests has seemed to be a good guarantee 
against serious dispute. Such a friendship bade fair to 
be lasting. 

Nevertheless, towards the end of the nineteenth century 
American sentiment about Russia began to undergo a 
change. In the form and in the practice of the Slav autoc- 
racy there was too much that was repugnant to the ideals 
of Americans for them to approve of it in the long run. 

! Their feelings on the subject grew stronger when, after the 
death, in 1881, of the liberal Emperor Alexander II, a policy 

j of reaction set in under his successor. Tidings of the ever 
sterner rule of the imperial government made their way 
across the Atlantic. In 1888-1889 the articles of Mr. George 
Kennan on the Siberian prison system were widely read, 
and created a lasting impression. Soon afterwards the 
repressive measures enacted against the Russian Jews 



218 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

aroused a sympathy among Americans which was more than 
academic, for the meaning was brought home to them by an 
immense immigration of these same unfortunates. Thirty 
years ago there were few Jews in the United States ; to-day 
there are some three-quarters of a million in and about New 
York alone, and this is the direct result of the action 
of Russia. As might be expected, this influx of des- 
titute aliens has awakened some alarm, mingled with 
resentment against the country which has unloaded 
them on her neighbor. The Russian answer, that the 
United States is at perfect liberty to keep out the Jews 
if it doesn't like them, is perhaps sufficient from the 
point of view of international law, but it is otherwise quite 
unsatisfactory. If you believe in a liberal policy yourself, 
it is no consolation, when the conduct of another puts a 
strain upon your kindness, to be informed that you can 
always protect yourself if you wish to. A reply of this 
sort is nothing if not irritating. 

The persecution of the Russian Jews brought its own 
punishment, for wherever they went they carried with 
them the tale of their suffering, and everywhere they could 
count on the sympathy of their brethren. Although the 
power of the Jews in the United States is of but recent 
origin, it is already considerable, especially in the worlds 
of finance and of journalism. Not only do they control 
many of the public prints, but their strength and cohesion 
are such as to make the rest afraid to offend them. It was 
no slight thing for Russian popularity in the United States 
to array itself against a force of this kind ; for even with- 
out the inevitable exaggeration, there were too many 
truths that might be told, of a kind to awaken the 
indignation of the American people. Nor were the Jews 
the only fugitives from Russia to spread a hatred of 
the land they had left; for, whereas most of the 
other immigrants into the United States are sincerely 



THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 219 

desirous of promoting good feeling between their old and 
their new countries, the various Russian exiles, like the 
Irish, have brought with them a deep hostility to those whom 
they regard as their former oppressors. Very few genuine 
Russians, except stray revolutionists, have immigrated to 
America. The people classed as such in the census have 
been Jews, Poles, inhabitants of the Baltic provinces, 
Armenians, and others, for the most part animated by an 
intense dislike of their former masters. By means of the 
public press, and the tales which they have told in private, 
they have transmitted their sentiment to other elements of 
the population. And here, again, we must remember to how 
great an extent the Americans get their outside news, and 
the comment on it, from English sources which have rarely 
been friendly to Russia. 

Profound as has been the effect of these various influ- 
ences, the traditional friendship was not to be easily shaken. 
We may say that, in spite of everything, Russia and the 
United States remained on satisfactory terms until about 
1898. The changed relations which characterized the next 
few years may be ascribed to the direction taken by the 
political activity of the government at St. Petersburg, both 
in internal and foreign affairs. 

Although the American people applauded the idea of 
the Hague Conference, which won for Emperor Nicholas 
a short-lived popularity, the favorable impression which 
this step had produced was soon obliterated by the aggres- 
siveness of Russian diplomacy, and by the growing 
tyranny of the internal administration, culminating in the 
regime of the late Baron von Plehve. As tales of the sav- 
age repression of everything resembling liberal tendencies 
reached the American public, often doubtless in a distorted 
form, yet with only too much truth, indignation waxed hot. 
The withdrawal of the liberties of Finland excited wide- 
spread compassion; the complaints from Poland and the 



220 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

Baltic provinces found an echo across the water ; the suffer- 
ings of the Armenians evoked pity. Above all these, the 
massacre of Kishinev filled millions of people in America 
with horror ; for they believed it to be due, not to a mere 
outburst of mob fury, but to the instigation of the authori- 
ties. So strong was this feeling that the government at 
Washington took the extraordinary step of meddling in 
the internal affairs of another great state, by asking if a 
petition of American Jews would be accepted in St. Peters- 
burg. A negative answer was, of course, returned, but the 
wording of the petition had been repeated in the inquiry, 
and was thus given the widest possible publicity. 1 The furi- 
ous rejoinders of the Russian press and of its allies, calling 
attention to the details of lynchings in America and of the 
"water cure" in the Philippines, counted for nothing: the 
American people are not in the habit of reading foreign 
newspapers, least of all Russian ones. Whether the nation's 
horror about the Kishinev massacre was expressed in a cor- 
rect diplomatic manner or not, it was genuine, and to as- 
cribe it, as many foreigners did, to Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy, 
showed superficial judgment. The condemnation of the out- 
rage at Kishinev was strongest in those parts of the United 
States where lynching is unknown, and where its existence 
in the country is regarded as a stain on the national honor. 
Even in the regions where it is not so generally deplored, 
people maintained that there was no parallelism between 
the two cases, and though we may perhaps question their 
logic, we cannot doubt their sincerity. The impression which 
the story of Kishinev produced was universal and profound. 
In the meantime a revolution was taking place in inter- 
national relations. After the Spanish War, England could 
no longer be looked upon as the permanent foe of the United 
States as well as of Russia ; on the contrary, the two Anglo- 

1 President Roosevelt gave expression to the national sentiment about 
the massacre in his annual message of 1904. 



THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 221 

Saxon countries were now on the best of terms. In the Far 
East, America had adopted the English formula of the 
"open door"; indeed, during the temporary effacement 
of England at the time of the Boer War, she had appeared 
as its chief champion. In 1899, when Secretary Hay 
demanded that the powers adhere to the doctrine, all gave 
at least their nominal approbation, but Russia so worded 
her answer as to leave its exact meaning obscure, thereby 
arousing American suspicion. By a curious chance it hap- 
pened that it was in northern China, and especially in 
Manchuria, that American trade had lately grown with 
particular rapidity, and the political preponderance of 
Russia there appeared a menace to it, the more so as the 
advance of the Russians was accompanied by strenuous 
efforts, at enormous expense, to develop the resources of 
the country for their own sole benefit. Ordinary competition 
on even terms the Americans were not afraid of. They had 
admired the building of the Trans-Siberian railway, and 
they did not begrudge Russia any legitimate advantages 
she might derive therefrom. What they did object to was 
competing against subsidized industries, and, still more, 
being kept back by the various hindrances which a rival 
in control of Manchuria could easily put in their way. 
The conduct of the Russian authorities in the years pre- 
ceding the war with Japan was most unskilful ; at least, 
if the Russians cared to retain the good-will of the United 
States. Americans, when their interests are concerned, 
may not be more scrupulous than other people ; but they 
are frank — not to say brutal — rather than tortuous, and 
they appreciate frankness in others. If, after the Boxer 
rising, the government at St. Petersburg had declared its 
intention of retaining possession of Manchuria, as the spoils 
of conquest, the Americans might have grumbled, but in 
their heart of hearts they would have accepted the decision 
as not extraordinary. Instead, the Russians repeatedly, 



222 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

and even unnecessarily, announced an intention of evacuat- 
ing the territory, while at the same time they strengthened 
their position and made every preparation to remain. 
Though this contradictory behavior may be explained, 
in part, by a struggle of opposing opinions at court, 
the American public, which had long accepted the Eng- 
lish tradition of the wiliness and unscrupulousness of Rus- 
sian diplomacy, regarded the whole proceeding with 
unconcealed wrath, — wrath mixed with disgust aroused 
by tales of the boundless corruption of Russian officials 
in the Far East. These facts in themselves are sufficient 
to explain why the Americans, even apart from their 
old fondness for Japan, had become so thoroughly pro- 
Japanese by February, 1904. 

When war finally broke out, to the surpiise of the 
Russian government, and to the perfect bewilderment of 
the people, who had never taken the dispute in the Far East 
seriously, their first thought was that the Japanese would 
never have ventured to run such a risk without the prompt- 
ings of some stronger power. Popular cartoons represented 
a small Japanese showing fight on the strength of the en- 
couragement he was getting from a big Englishman and a 
big American in the background. That England should 
favor Japan was to be foreseen, — she was her ally and the 
constant enemy of Russia, — but that the United States, 
whom the Russians had supposed to be their friend, should 
thus desert them, was a grievous surprise, for they were 
unaware of any change in American sentiment and had sup- 
posed that the transatlantic republic was still their well- 
wisher. Their astonishment, of course, turned to anger, 
which was heightened by the emphatic tone taken by the 
American government in protecting the neutral rights of 
its citizens. For their part, the Japanese, as was natural, 
did what they could to increase the estrangement by 
committing their citizens in Russia not to English but 



THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 223 

to American care, during hostilities, and by giving promi- 
nence to the demonstrations of sympathy from across the 
water. 

Since then there has been a reaction towards the old bet- 
ter feeling. The Japanese have shown that they did not 
need the help of the United States or of any one else in 
order to carry on a successful war. The vast majority of 
Russians hated the conflict, and they were thankful to 
President Roosevelt for taking the first step towards its 
termination. His act also proved that the United States 
was not hostile to them, but only to a policy for which no 
one in Russia itself now has a good word to say. Ameri- 
can opinion is again disposed to be friendly, and particularly 
to sympathize with the efforts of Russian liberals in their 
struggle for a new system of government. The causes which 
have alienated the two countries have for the most part 
disappeared, while several of the factors which in the past 
made for amity still remain. In the affairs of Eastern Asia 
their interests ought not to clash again as they once did. 
To be sure, this may happen, and for the same reasons as 
before ; but it is perhaps less probable than an understand- 
ing between them in regard not only to China but to Japan, 
an understanding which in case of serious complications 
with the latter might be of great value to the United 
States. Until Russia has worked out of her internal crisis, 
whose end no one can now foresee, her influence must re- 
main diminished among nations. But though she is far 
from the proud threatening position which she held five 
years ago, the real sources of her strength have not been 
touched by war or revolution. She will remain one of the 
leading powers in the world, and Americans will do well 
to strive for a reestablishment of the genuine good feeling 
which so long prevailed between the two nations. 

As for the other states of continental Europe, we need 
not linger here over American relations with them. With 



224 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

all, there have been the usual interchanges of expressions of 
good-will and negotiations of various commercial and other 
treaties. The present conditions of intercourse with them 
are normal and satisfactory. 

Now that Spain no longer owns a foot of land in the New 
World, Americans have towards her that kindly feeling 
which people are wont to cherish for those over whom they 
have triumphed without too much cost to themselves. 
It is worth noting that Americans, and in particular Ameri- 
can officials connected with Cuba or the Philippines, appre- 
ciate better than they did of old the difficulties with which 
Spain had to contend in governing her possessions. They 
are much less inclined to sweeping condemnation of her 
methods than they used to be, — in truth, they find not 
a little to admire in them. With Spain herself the dealings 
of the United States are now insignificant ; but with the 
children of Spain in the New World they are of ever 
growing consequence. 

With Austria-Hungary the United States has never had 
much to do. It applauded the Hungarian insurrection of 
1849 ; it hailed the visit of Kossuth with tremendous 
enthusiasm. In 1853 occurred the affair of Koszta, a 
Hungarian refugee who had declared his intention of be- 
coming an American citizen. He was seized in a Turk- 
ish port, and put on an Austrian man-of-war, which was 
obliged to release him upon the threat of an American 
vessel of superior strength to take him away by force. In 
1866, after the withdrawal of the French soldiers who 
supported Archduke Maximilian as emperor of Mexico, 
the American government vetoed a plan of filling their 
places with Austrians. Of late years Austria and Hungary 
have furnished a large contingent to the immigration into 
the United States. 

For the Italians in their struggle for liberty Protestant 
America felt the warmest sympathy. She welcomed the! 



THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 225 

new kingdom of Italy into the community of nations, and 
the two were long on excellent terms. This harmony was, 
however, rudely disturbed by the famous lynching in New 
Orleans, on March 15, 1891. It should be remembered 
that this incident cannot be compared with most of the 
lynchings which have done so much to disgrace the 
country in the eyes of foreign nations. The New Orleans 
" massacre" was a deliberate act of leading people in the 
town, who took the law into their own hands because they 
believed that, under the system of terrorization established 
by the Mafia, the courts of justice were incapable of 
bringing the culprits to punishment. The object aimed at 
was attained, for there was no more trouble with the 
Mafia; but the lawlessness of the episode put America 
in a deplorable light in the eyes of the world. It also 
placed her in an awkward situation when Italy made 
complaint of the treatment inflicted upon her citizens. 
The Americans had no fear of forcible measures on the 
part of the Italians, although the latter at that time had 
the stronger navy ; but they realized that their form of 
federal government left the Washington authorities with- 
out means of defending foreigners against popular vio- 
lence. Secretary Blaine made the best that he could 
out of the case, declaring that the United States was 
bound by treaty to protect Italian citizens only in so far 
as it could its own, and it could not protect them in 
New Orleans. This reply, which was rather a humiliating 
confession in itself, failed to satisfy the government at 
Rome. On both sides the ministers were withdrawn, and 
for some months there was a diplomatic coolness, until, in 
1892, Congress voted an indemnity to the families of the 
Italian subjects who had been lynched, and Italy accepted 
this reparation. The New Orleans incident has been but one 
of several which have caused no little vexation to the United 
States. On these occasions the republic has appeared, in 

Q 



226 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

the eyes of the outside world, as a power unable to enforce 
in its dominion the observance of the rights of foreigners 
which it has formally guaranteed, rights which it expects 
other nations to defend in the case of its own citizens abroad. 
Attention has just been sharply drawn to this state of affairs 
by the anti- Japanese disturbances in San Francisco, and 
President Roosevelt has urged legislation on the subject. 
In consequence of the large number of Italian laborers in 
the country and the dislike felt towards them by some of 
their competitors, outrage upon them is always possible. 
Its occurrence would excite justifiable indignation in Italy. 
Otherwise relations are pleasant enough, though some 
Italian chauvinists may regret the fact that the United 
States would as effectually prevent Italian intervention in 
aid of their fellow-countrymen in the Argentine Republic 
as it would German action in Brazil. 

With the Ottoman Porte the United States has been 
on an amicable footing despite the openness of American 
sympathy with the different Christian nationalities subject 
to Turkey, in their desire for freedom, and notably with 
the Greeks in their war for independence. American in- 
dignation about the Armenian massacres was so intense 
that in the event of their repetition the United States might 
be roused to intervene, contrary to its traditions as such 
action would be. In the case of Turkey, as in that of China, 
one of the most difficult tasks for the Washington govern- 
ment and the officials on the spot is the protection of the 
American missionaries. Impartial testimony is distinctly 
in favor of the good work which they do. They may 
doubtless have lacked tact, and have yielded, from the best 
of motives, to the temptation to meddle in matters not of 
their concern ; but we can well believe that the majority 
of the charges brought against them by the Turkish au- 
thorities have been grossly exaggerated when not wholly 
false. It is the clear duty of the home government to sup- 



THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 227 

port the missionaries against persecution as long as they do 
not go beyond the rights guaranteed them by treaty. On 
the other hand, we can understand why the Turkish au- 
thorities should regard them as a dangerous nuisance. Even 
if they carefully refrain from teaching disloyalty, the whole 
spirit of their instruction cannot tend to make the dissatis- 
fied elements of the population more content with existing 
Turkish rule. The mere presence of these protected strangers, 
the representatives of a higher and freer civilization, must 
stimulate aspirations which the Turks regard with aversion. 
We can also understand why the government of the Sultan 
should strongly object to the return of its native Syrian or 
Armenian subjects who, by emigrating, have obtained the 
privileges of American citizenship. In its eyes they are 
firebrands of the worst kind, and this belief is not without 
justification. 

If the United States were to interpose its protection be- 
tween the Turks and their subjects, it would soon be involved 
in the mazes of the Eastern question, which, like the various 
European balances of power, has hitherto possessed for it 
only an academic interest. Until now it has steered clear 
of strictly European affairs ; and it has had nothing to do 
with the partition of Africa, except in so far as it has safe- 
guarded its trade interests. In the future, even if it cannot 
always avoid entanglements which it has escaped in the 
past, it may well hesitate before abandoning the policy 
which has spared it many burdens and responsibilities. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 

IN the diplomatic service of any country there is usually 
one foreign post of prime importance and special honor, 
which is looked upon as the crown of a career. Until 
lately the United States has had no real diplomatic service, 
preferring to make its foreign appointments in a haphazard 
fashion, seldom taking the matter very seriously. One 
place, however, has been appreciated at its true value from 
the first, and has been well filled. The office of American 
representative to London has been one often of weighty 
responsibility and always of high consideration, for the rela- 
tions of the United States with Great Britain have been, 
first and last, more important than with any other power 
on the globe. 

The reasons for this are plain. The American republic 
is of English origin and inheritance. Its people, many of 
them of English descent, speak English as their language, 
and have more ideas in common with the inhabitants of 
England than with those of other lands. The largest 
foreign trade of America has always been with the British 
Isles. Great Britain holds in Bermuda and the West 
Indies outposts of the utmost strategic importance for the 
Atlantic seaboard of the United States, and farther north 
the two powers have a contiguous frontier several thou- 
sand miles long. In the past their relations have rarely 
been harmonious. Their interests have clashed, their 

228 



THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 229 

passions have again and again been excited against one 
another; and although they have had but one actual 
war since the Americans established their independence, 
they have been several times on the verge of hostilities, 
indeed there has never been a period of ten years in which 
they have not had some prolonged controversy, not to say 
a heated dispute. Yet now, in the face of all this, the 
intercourse between the two governments is marked by an 
extreme cordiality, which fairly reflects the sentiment pre- 
vailing between the two peoples. The spectacle is so new 
that the rest of the world has not yet got quite used to it, 
and finds it difficult to believe that violent friendship fol- 
lowing so fast on traditional dislike can be of long duration. 
But before venturing any prediction about the future 
relations between the two countries, we must view the cir- 
cumstances which have alienated them from each other 
in the past, and those which have brought them together in 
the last few years. 

After the close of the American Revolution, the causes 
of ill-feeling between England and her former colonies 
were still manifold. We need not wonder that the long 
years of struggle had engendered much bitterness on both 
sides. The Americans, who had experienced all the hard- 
ships of a war about their own homes, especially resented 
the use against them of Indians and of German mercenaries. 
The mother country, smarting under her defeat, could 
scarce be expected to entertain a kindly disposition toward 
the undutiful children who had allied themselves with 
her old enemies against her. On the other hand, a part 
of the nation had always condemned the acts which 
had driven the colonies to resistance, — Englishmen could 
put the blame for what had occurred on the blind obstinacy 
of the King and his counsellors, — and there was room 
for hope that it would be easy for the Americans, as it 
generally is for the victors, to forgive and forget. As soon 



230 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

as hostilities came to an end, a brisk trade again sprang up 
between the recent foes, and there seemed good prospect 
that with the healing influence of time their relations might 
become amicable. 

Unluckily, the carrying out of the terms of the treaty 
of peace gave rise to prolonged disputes. The weak govern- 
ment of the American Confederation w r as unable to enforce 
the promises it had made, in not very good faith, of giving 
compensation to the American loyalists who had been 
despoiled of their property. In their turn, the English 
delayed the evacuation of military posts in the western 
territory which they had by treaty recognized as American, 
and this provoked sharp protest and rejoinder. These 
first quarrels were soon followed by others of a commer- 
cial nature, and then came complications caused by the 
treatment of American neutral vessels in the years of con- 
flict between Great Britain and Napoleonic France, — com- 
plications that led to the War of 1812, which sowed a 
fresh crop of hatred and settled nothing. 

The long list of Anglo-American dissensions between 
that date and this need not be repeated here in chrono- 
logical order; for our purposes a clearer idea of them 
may be gained by grouping the most important according 
to the nature of the subject. 

Among the first to begin and the last to end have 
been the boundary disputes between the United States and 
Canada. By the treaty of peace in 1783 the St. Croix 
River had been fixed as the line of division in the extreme 
east ; but unhappily it was discovered later that people 
were not agreed as to what was the St. Croix River. For 
many years the debate dragged on to no purpose. The at- 
tempts to arrive at a solution at the peace of Ghent in 
1814 ended in failure; the award made by the King of the 
Netherlands, in 1827, was accepted by neither side, and 
it was not until the Ashburton treaty of 1842 that the 



THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 231 

matter was at last disposed of. The middle section of the 
boundary, extending from the Great Lakes to the Rocky 
Mountains, had been established with little trouble in 
1818, but in the regions beyond the mountains, where 
neither party was willing to concede the other's demands, 
a provisional status of joint occupation had to be accepted. 
This was renewed in 1827 ; but postponing an agreement 
meant keeping open a sore which steadily got worse, and 
finally the arrangement was denounced by the United States. 
Then followed threats of war, until, in 1846, the affair was 
compromised in the obvious and rational manner by pro- 
longing the line of the middle section westward to the 
sea, a solution that might just as well have been reached 
in the beginning. Even this did not prevent a later dis- 
agreement about the island of San Juan da Fuca, which 
the United States obtained in 1871 by the arbitral award 
of the Emperor of Germany. With Alaska, the Americans 
acquired another disputed boundary, which was not settled 
until 1903, one hundred and twenty years after they had 
begun to establish the line of demarcation between their 
territories and those of Great Britain. 

A second set of quarrels, also due to proximity, have been 
those connected with the fisheries. The most persistent has 
been the one relating to the status of the American fisher- 
men in the waters of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, where, 
as British subjects, they had enjoyed rights previous to 
the Revolution which they were not willing to forego after- 
wards, and where by the treaty of peace they had gained 
concessions whose extent has been wrangled over ever 
since. Questions of this sort are notoriously complicated, 
owing to the many uncertainties connected with fishing, 
and to difficulties about the limits of maritime jurisdiction. 
Until the treaty of 1904 England long had an even worse 
disagreement with France. That with America still con- 
tinues, but, with the reference of the matter to the Hague 



232 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

Tribunal, there is hope of a satisfactory termination in 
the near future. In the Behring Sea controversy, in which 
the United States supported a cause that was good morally 
but weak legally, it was worsted at the Paris Tribunal 
of 1893. The result has been the virtual extermination 
of the seals. Finally, among other disturbances due to 
proximity, we might quote the abortive and absurd Fenian 
raids in the sixties, of which Canada had just cause to 
complain. 

Another batch of contentions, which the Americans car- 
ried on chiefly under the banner of the Monroe Doctrine, 
grew out of the interests of the British in Central America 
and the desire of both peoples to control the proposed 
isthmian canal. The Americans were not long in repent- 
ing of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, which had 
brought about a temporary calm, and they chafed under 
the restrictions it imposed until these were done away 
with by the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901. 

During the Civil War, at the moment of the Trent affair 
and before the detention of the Confederate cruisers, the 
United States and Great Britain were on the verge of hos- 
tilities, and they might soon have been again if the latter 
power had not yielded in the matter of the Alabama claims. 
In spite of the ample satisfaction which the Americans on 
this occasion received by the award of the Geneva Tribunal, 
they were long in forgiving the unfriendliness which in 
their hour of need had been shown them by the English, 
the people who had been loudest in condemnation of 
slavery. As for the Southerners, they felt no gratitude for 
sympathy which in the end had availed them nothing, 
when what they wanted and had hoped to obtain was 
material assistance. 

Remembering that all these and various other contro- 
versies between England and the United States were carried 
on not only in the despatches of statesmen, but even more 



THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 233 

in the public press, which envenomed them and excited 
passion on both sides, we cannot wonder that the two 
nations were constantly irritated with one another. This 
was particularly the case in the United States, for such 
quarrels loomed larger in the foreign horizon of the 
American republic, where they held the chief place, than 
among the world-wide interests of Great Britain. For a 
similar reason the American mind was inflamed, by popu- 
lar education and by current literature, about matters 
which had almost ceased to attract the attention of the 
British public. 

It is an accepted theory that a foremost duty of the 
school history, and of the teacher who explains it, is to 
imbue the youthful mind with patriotic principles, to 
train the child to admire the national heroes, to arouse 
his enthusiasm for the triumphs of his country; but such 
teaching carries with it the inevitable temptation to repre- 
sent the enemies of the country somewhat in the character 
of the villain in the play. Until the Spanish War of 1898 
the United States had never had a conflict with a Euro- 
pean power except England. It had, to be sure, had a 
Civil War on a gigantic scale, and a war with Mexico, 
not to speak, of many encounters with Indians; but the 
Indian battles had been small affairs which had long 
ceased to be of much account, the victories of the Mexican 
War had been over a weaker nation that had been forced 
into the conflict, and the Civil War, full as it was of heroic 
episodes, was a strife between brothers, a thing which good 
patriots should not dwell upon too much. There remained 
only the glories of the struggle for independence and the 
achievements by sea (not by land, except at New Orleans) 
of the War of 1812. England was thus marked out as the 
natural foe, defeated in the Revolution, repulsed in 1812, 
but ever threatening and dangerous. The effect of such 
teachings on millions of children is not to be lightly esti- 



234 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

mated, especially as it was reinforced by boys' stories, 
sensational novels, Fourth of July orations and other elo- 
quence of the kind. 

Still another element making for hostility to England 
was furnished by the immigrant population. For over 
three-quarters of a century the Irish have been coming 
in swarms until they and their children are now numbered 
in the United States by millions. With a warm affection 
for their own unhappy land they have brought a corre- 
sponding hatred of the people whom they have regarded 
as their hereditary oppressors. They have told the tale 
of their woes, they have continued to sympathize with the 
sufferings of their brethren at home, and they have never 
forgotten their enmity against the hated Saxon. In a 
measure, the loyalty to the mother country of the English 
and Scotch immigrants has tended to counterbalance this ; 
but these latter have shown less interest in their former 
homes, have held together much less, and have not taken 
so prominent a place in public life. The important part 
which the Irish have played in American politics has given 
them an influence out of proportion to their numbers. It 
has also made it particularly worth while to win their 
favor; and what was an easier and cheaper way for the 
American politician to do this than by "twisting the lion's 
tail"? Naturally, the politician made the most of his 
opportunity. If he could gain votes in this way, that was 
enough for him. It is true that the largest contingent of 
the immigrant population, that from Germany, long had no 
motive for disliking England. Of late, however, owing to the 
changed relations between the two countries and to the effort 
of both to stand well with America, the German-Americans 
have been inclined to be anti-English. The rest of the 
European-born have no strong feeling on the subject, one 
way or the other, but most of them are recent arrivals, 
and in the nineteenth century all of them put together 

i 



THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 235 

did not play on American soil a political role comparable 
to that of the Irish. 

For long the English enjoyed one distinction which we 
may take as an involuntary tribute to them. They alone 
have been able to make the American people angry by their 
remarks. In times past, abuse from others rarely got 
across the ocean, and when it arrived it was received with 
indifference, or was looked on as a sign of malicious envy, 
which was complimentary rather than the reverse; but 
English criticism instantly stung the Americans to a wrath 
which found vent in violent answer. 

The feeling of the English towards the Americans was 
much less marked. It was not hatred, but, rather, con- 
temptuous dislike. Englishmen, not without reason, were 
inclined to think of their transatlantic kin as noisy, ill- 
mannered, vain, and boastful. They resented the diatribes 
launched against them; they objected to the aggressiveness 
of American policy, which so frequently came into col- 
lision with their own ; and they detested the high commercial 
tariff in the United States, which they believed to be aimed 
at them especially, and to be a serious injury to their 
interests. It was hard for them to understand how any 
one could sin against the sacred doctrine of free trade except 
from malicious motives. All told, especially among the 
upper class, their opinion of the Yankees was far from 
flattering. 

So numerous indeed were the causes of antagonism be- 
tween the two English-speaking peoples that it was easy to 
forget the influences which were in steady operation to 
bring them together. The two were, after all, of one stock, 
with a common language, a common literature, the same 
system of law, the same ideals of government and well- 
being, the same standards of morality and taste, — in 
short, much the same outlook on life. Commercial and 
other ties brought them into continual intercourse with 



236 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

one another, an intercourse which the decline of provincial 
self-assertion, on one side, and of conservative prejudice, 
on the other, made more easy than of old. Mr. James 
Bryce's remarkable book on The American Common- 
wealth at the same time made the United States better 
appreciated in England and pleased Americans by showing 
that the English were capable of appreciating them. Eng- 
lishmen and Americans meeting in any foreign land at 
once felt they were closer to each other than to any of the 
people about them. The famous saying " Blood is thicker 
than water" does represent a truth, which, though it may 
be forgotten for the moment, cannot help telling in the 
long run. You may hate your brother, but this does not 
alter the fact that you belong to the same family, and have 
something in common, shared by no outsider, something 
which is always there to bring you together if you can get 
over the grounds for estrangement. 

Since hostility had always been less active on the part of 
the English, they were the first to entertain friendlier senti- 
ments. As a race they have always had an honest admira- 
tion of success, and the Americans of late had been amaz- 
ingly successful. By degrees public opinion in Great Britain 
came more and more to have about the United States the 
sort of feeling that a father has for a son who has often been 
disobedient and is still disrespectful, but who, after all, has 
grown up into a fine, lusty young fellow, a little uncouth, 
but very vigorous, — in short, one a father may well be proud 
of. This benevolent disposition had grown strong enough 
by 1895 to survive the violent shock of the Venezuelan dis- 
pute, which, in spite of its rather humiliating termination, 
left surprisingly little rancor in the English mind. People 
accepted it as another bit of American assertiveness, dis- 
agreeable in itself, but showing an energy that deserved 
respect. 

Meanwhile American sentiment about England was going 



THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 237 

through a somewhat similar modification. This had pro- 
gressed farther than was apparent on the surface, even if 
it was still too weak to prevent an outburst of anti-English 
chauvinism in 1895. Three years later we find a very dif- 
ferent state of affairs. 

There has been much discussion about the attitude of 
several of the European powers at the moment of the out- 
break of hostilities between the United States and Spain. 
We may never know the full truth on the subject, but 
there is reason for supposing that some sort of collective 
intervention to check the Americans was talked of — we 
cannot say how seriously. The assertion of the English 
that their attitude alone prevented a European coalition 
has been denied emphatically by other nations : no one will 
now admit having thought of such a thing. Whatever 
may be the facts in the case, there is no doubt that the 
general sentiment in most of the European countries, 
especially at first, was altogether in favor of Spain, while 
the sympathy of Great Britain — of both government and 
people — was with America. English neutrality through- 
out the war was of the friendliest kind, and Americans 
felt that, in case of need, they could rely on English good- 
will and moral support, if not on something more. The 
impression which all this produced in the United States 
was decisive. The national pride had been lashed to fury 
at the mere suggestion of a hostile league of the Euro- 
pean powers, and the very different tone taken by the 
English awakened a lively sense of gratitude. The Ameri- 
can people, all at once, abandoned the tradition that the 
British were their natural enemies, and acclaimed them 
instead their friends and brothers. It was a rather violent 
transformation, but this new era of cordiality between two 
peoples whose sentiments towards one another had been 
the reverse of cordial has lasted to the present day. 

The reasons for the pro-American attitude of Great 



238 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

Britain in 1898 appear to have been twofold. First, there 
was a very genuine popular feeling that the Americans 
were kinsmen, to whom, in their struggle with a decaying 
power and an unenlightened government, English sympathy 
should go out. The new war was only one more in the long 
series of contests between the Anglo-Saxon and the 
Spaniard, which had followed one after another since the 
days of Philip II, and which had done so much to change 
the face of the world. Secondly, there were sound practi- 
cal considerations to guide the instincts of the masses as 
well as to determine the conduct of statesmen. The posi- 
tion of Great Britain during the closing years of the nine- 
teenth century was difficult. Her policy of "splendid 
isolation" had thus far failed to produce satisfactory 
results. In the Near East she had found herself reduced 
to helplessness, at the time of the Armenian massacres, by 
the combination of Russia, Germany, and France, and in 
the middle of this crisis America had threatened her with 
war from another direction. In Persia and China, the 
Russians were ominously active, and England might be 
called upon at almost any moment to oppose them by 
force of arms. In the Sudan, Colonel Marchand was 
already approaching Fashoda, and the British govern- 
ment, which more than suspected this fact, was fully 
determined to fight France rather than permit him to 
remain. It was certain that a fresh crisis would occur 
before long in South Africa, and recollecting the Ger- 
man Emperor's telegram to President Kruger after the 
Jameson raid, Englishmen might well doubt whether a 
Boer war would not soon lead to a general European one, 
in which the British Empire would have to fight for its life. 
Vast as were England's resources, she could not face the 
whole world at once. In view of the menacing questions 
which pressed for solution in Europe, Asia, and Africa, what 
could be wiser than for her to free herself from all appre- 



THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 239 

hension in at least one quarter? The friendship of the 
United States at this moment was well worth serious sacri- 
fices, not only of pride but of material interests. 

Seldom has the wisdom of a policy of concession been so 
fully justified in so short a time. When the South African 
War broke out in the autumn of 1899, public opinion on the 
European continent was overwhelmingly pro-Boer. Europe 
expected, too, that American sympathy would, as a matter 
of course, be enlisted on the same side — an expectation 
that was quite justifiable. If we look at the whole history 
of American ideals, since the earliest days of the inde- 
pendence of the nation, we may say that there never was 
a cause more calculated to arouse the enthusiasm of the 
people than that of the handful of Dutchmen fighting hero- 
ically for their freedom against the infinite resources of the 
greatest empire of the world. The Boers were more like 
the "embattled farmers" of Lexington and Bunker Hill 
than any other insurgents in the last hundred and twenty 
years, and the enemy they had to face was the same. The 
analogy of the two struggles was so obvious that it seemed 
as if it must appeal to the American imagination; and in 
truth, it did so appeal, but it was met and neutralized by 
counter-considerations. If the Boer War had occurred 
a few years earlier, there can be little doubt that sympathy 
in the United States would have gone out unreservedly 
to the Dutch farmers, who would have been continually 
compared to the heroes of the Revolution. Now the 
situation was changed. Young as the new Anglo-American 
friendship was, it had already struck deep root. When 
England had stood by the United States against the enmity, 
and — as the English declared — against a coalition, of the 
European powers, was the United States to combine with 
those same powers when England in her turn found 
herself isolated? Such an act would look like the black- 
est ingratitude. If the English and the Americans were 



240 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

brothers, as had just been so loudly trumpeted, should 
not brothers support each other in time of need? It 
may be imagined that the English were not sparing in 
their use of this argument, of which the Americans recog- 
nized the force. 

There was also another crucial reason why the American 
public did not feel free to declaim about English oppres- 
sion in the good old way : the insurrection in the Philippines 
was just then in full blast, and though it was all very well 
to declare that the Filipinos and the Boers were very dif- 
ferent people, and that the senseless revolt of the Malay 
islanders against their benevolent protectors was quite 
another matter from the heroic struggle of the Dutch 
pioneers to maintain their independence, nevertheless an 
uncomfortable consciousness remained. If one lectured 
the English on their sins, the retort was too obvious. Al- 
together, it was not a happy moment for the Americans to 
hold forth on the sacred right of " government with the 
consent of the governed." 

The cause of Great Britain would in any case have found 
partisans in the United States. The struggle in South 
Africa could be depicted as one for Anglo-Saxon supremacy 
or as one between modern progress and hide-bound con- 
servatism. The contention of England that all she had 
demanded was fair treatment for her citizens settled in the 
Transvaal appealed to American love of justice. In conse- 
quence of all these opposing claims on their sympathy the 
attitude of the Americans on the subject of the South 
African War was singularly hesitating. There were warm 
friends of both combatants; still more people condemned 
neither of them, and all were glad when the wearisome con- 
flict came to an end. But this attitude of hesitation was 
of immense service to England. If the United States had 
from the outset shown itself in favor of the Boers, the 
European powers who wished to intervene might well have 



THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 241 

taken heart to do so, and have brought on a war whose 
results would have been incalculable. 

From this time on nothing occurred to ruffle the good 
relations between the two English-speaking people, except 
the short episode of Anglo-German intervention in Venezuela 
in 1902, which indeed angered the Americans; but when 
English public opinion unanimously, as well as vociferously, 
condemned the action of the ministry, they turned all 
their ire against the Germans. Since then Great Britain 
has continued her policy of " graceful concessions." By 
the second Hay-Pauncefote treaty she consented to release 
the Americans from the irksome Clayton-Bulwer agreement, 
and to give them a free hand on the isthmus for the con- 
struction of an interoceanic canal. In the settlement of 
the Alaska boundary dispute, they again got the better of 
the bargain, either on account of English desire to be con- 
ciliatory, as the Canadians have charged, or because they 
really had the better case, as is more likely; for the high 
character of the English arbitrator, the only impartial 
member of the commission, appears a sufficient guarantee 
that the decision was just. To be sure, it would be foolish 
to expect the Americans to be grateful for what they 
have obtained in this way, — the winner in any contro- 
versy believes that his success is but a proof of the right- 
eousness of his cause, — still, they appreciate the fact that 
the English in the last few years have gone out of their way 
to be agreeable to them, and they are themselves well 
disposed in consequence. At the present day, the two 
peoples are on the friendliest footing, and both believe that 
there is every reason why they should remain so. 

Most foreigners are inclined to doubt this, and to point 
to their many quarrels in the past ; but the causes of the 
majority of these quarrels have now, in one way or another, 
been removed : the boundaries are at last fixed, the 
canal question is settled, England has accepted the Monroe 



242 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

Doctrine even to the extent of withdrawing most of her 
forces from American waters, all but a few of the seals in 
Behring Sea have been killed off ; only the fisheries ques- 
tion remains, and this last is soon to be adjudicated by the 
Hague Tribunal. The patriotic imagination of young 
America no longer needs to look on England as the heredi- 
tary foe. Romances can now deal with the Spanish- 
American War, or the contest in the Philippines, or the 
march on Peking. New subjects of dispute may spring 
up, but to-day the horizon is serene. In the Far East 
the two countries have followed of late the same policy, 
for their interests have coincided. Grave complications 
between the United States and Japan might put Great 
Britain in an awkward position, but Great Britain her- 
self is not entirely free from difficulties with Japan. Al- 
though trade rivalry will continue to exist, it is not 
so keen between England and the United States as it is 
between each of them and Germany. Even the American 
tariff is no longer looked on as a specifically anti-English 
invention ; some Englishmen indeed are envious of it, 
and there can be no doubt that the prosperity of the 
Union under a highly protective system has done much 
to stimulate the movement in Great Britain for " tariff 
reform." x 

Meanwhile, the progress of time and the improvement of 
means of communication are having their influence. Mere 
proximity, whether physical or intellectual, is not neces- 
sarily a reason for affection, and it may be just the 
reverse ; but where good feeling already exists, it makes 
for mutual understanding. Every year more people travel 
and interchange ideas between England and America; 

1 If this movement should triumph, the Americans will not be the 
gainers. So far they have enjoyed unrestricted access to British markets, 
but an imperial customs union or high preferential duties would almost 
certainly be unfavorable to them. 



THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 243 

already there is a considerable American colony in Lon- 
don, and international marriages are not infrequent; the 
Rhodes scholarships bring some American students to 
Oxford (though most prefer the continent) ; there are in- 
ternational races and tournaments of various kinds ; impor- 
tant books appear simultaneously in Great Britain and the 
United States, and any really successful play is sure to be 
seen in both, — in short, visible, as well as invisible, ties 
bind the two countries ever closer together. 

One last question to be considered in judging of the per- 
manence of Anglo-American harmony is whether the present 
friendship is in keeping with the general trend of the mod- 
ern world. We can affirm without hesitation that it is. 

At different periods in the history of mankind nations 
have shown a tendency to group themselves according to 
one or another common sentiment. At times it has been 
the religious motive : witness the Christian coalition of the 
Crusades against the Mohammedan East, and again the 
hostile Catholic and Protestant leagues in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. At other moments similar prin- 
ciples of government have led to political groupings, as 
when, after 1815, monarchical Europe gathered about the 
Holy Alliance, while the idea that the free republics of 
the West have a natural community of interests was the 
basis of the Monroe Doctrine. But in the nineteenth cen- 
tury the feeling of nationality was the most potent instru- 
ment in uniting peoples, notably in the case of Italy and 
Germany. This last sentiment is still in full force, as is 
shown by the present Pan-Germanic and other movements, 
and it is coming to include not merely members of the 
same nationality, but, in some vague way, the people of 
kindred nationalities. We thus have the Pan-Slavic agita- 
tion, the dreams of Latin union, Pan-Iberianism, and even 
some Pan-Teutonic aspirations, although the last named 
are not flourishing just now. Whether any of these broader 



244 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

movements will lead to permanent political results may 
perhaps be doubted, but, taken together, they prove that 
at present kinship, real or imaginary, is potent in deter- 
mining the sympathies of nations. Looked at from this 
point of view, the recent revolution in the feeling of the 
two English-speaking peoples, instead of being an isolated 
event, is but a manifestation of a general tendency. The 
discovery that " blood is thicker than water" is but the 
Anglo-Saxon way of expressing a belief which has affected 
most civilized peoples in recent times. It matters not 
that American blood in the future will be quite a differ- 
ent mixture from English — children by adoption count as 
members of the same family. Many people in Italy and 
France hail the South American republics as " Latin sisters," 
though some of them are rather black or brown ones. 

To sum up, we may say that there seems to be good 
reason for optimism about future relations between Eng- 
land and the United States. We must not forget, how- 
ever, that if the disappearance of past causes of dissen- 
sion, on the one hand, and the strengthening of natural 
ties, on the other, promise well for the continuance of the 
present cordiality, they cannot guarantee it. There may 
again be such sharp divergences of interest as to reawaken 
former animosities, if not to lead to actual conflict. Eng- 
lishmen and Americans would equally deprecate any such 
occurrence, and, as far as they alone are concerned, there 
is small ground for apprehension. But in the dealings of 
the United States with Great Britain, the Dominion of Can- 
ada must be of increasing importance. Before many years 
elapse, Americans may be called upon to put their relations 
with the Dominion in the forefront of their national inter- 
ests and cares. If this should happen, it could not fail to 
affect their attitude toward the mother country, which pro- 
tects Canada; and it would be additional ground for de- 
siring her good-will. 



CHAPTER XIV 

V 

THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 

IN any consideration of the political future of the 
Dominion of Canada, and particularly in a survey of 
its relations with the United States, we should begin by 
recalling two fundamental facts. They are sometimes lost 
sight of by Canadians, and they are, we may admit, less 
important than they once were, but they are permanent, 
and will always exert an influence. 

The first of these facts is that, as has been well said by an 
eminent Canadian writer, " whoever wishes to know what 
Canada is, and to understand the Canadian question, should 
begin by turning from the political to the natural map. The 
political map displays a vast and unbroken area of territory, 
extending from the boundary of the United States up to 
the North Pole and equalling or surpassing the United 
States in magnitude. The physical map displays four 
separate projections of the cultivatable and habitable part 
of the continent into arctic waste." These four "projec- 
tions" are the Maritime Provinces, Old Canada, the North- 
west, and British Columbia. They are separated from each 
other by thinly inhabited wildernesses or by mountain 
ranges, and though this separation is less marked than it 
was when Mr. Goldwin Smith wrote the above words and 
will become less marked still as Canada fills up, nevertheless 
it remains true that the Dominion consists and will consist 
of four separate geographical regions. This might not matter 

245 



246 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

in itself, were it not that each of these regions has a closer 
natural connection with the American territory to the 
south of it than it has with the nearest Canadian section. 

Secondly, along the four thousand odd miles of frontier, 
for the most part accidental and artificial, the population 
north and south of the dividing line is largely the same. 
An exception must be made in the east, where, in spite of 
the large Canadian colonies south of the boundary, there 
exists a national as well as a fairly satisfactory geographical 
separation between the French Canadians and their neigh- 
bors of New England and northern New York. Everywhere 
else we find essentially the same folk on both sides: they 
speak the same language ; they have the same laws, ideas, 
and general characteristics. The Nova Scotian is more like 
the New Englander than the New Englander is like the 
Virginian ; between the people of Ontario and those south 
of the Lakes the difference is slight ; and from Lake Superior 
to the Pacific there is virtually none anywhere. From one 
ocean to the other the differences between the English-speak- 
ing population on the two sides of this far-flung line are 
smaller than those between the inhabitants of northern and 
southern France, Germany, or Italy, and are insignificant 
compared with those between the dwellers in English and 
French Canada. 

In view of these truths, and that they are such is hardly 
to be gainsaid, we cannot avoid the double conclusion that 
the union of Canada into one Dominion, less than half a 
century ago, was a somewhat artificial process, and that the 
present separation of Canada and the United States is the 
result, not of natural forces, but of historical accident. Both 
the union and the separation may, none the less, be per- 
manent. Modern science has overcome many obstacles, 
and, thanks to transcontinental railways, the Canadian 
provinces are now bound to one another in a way that 
would have been impossible a century ago. Moreover, in 



THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 247 

the last few years, there have grown up a sentiment for 
Canada and a pride in her which have created, over and 
above the old common loyalty to the British crown, a 
new, stronger bond of common patriotism, felt in all the 
Dominion, by French as well as English. There is, then, 
a Canadian nationality, as there is a Swiss and a Belgian, 
and this nationality, when not actually hostile to the 
Americanism of the United States, is at least consciously 
differentiated from it. The question of the future is, Which 
are going to prevail in the long run, the geographical 
and ethnographical influences that tend, and must tend, to 
draw Americans and Canadians together, or the historical 
circumstances which keep them apart? 

After the cession of Canada to Great Britain by the peace 
of 1763, most of the colonists who had the means to re- 
turn to France left the New World. There remained only 
some seventy thousand peasants, with no one to guide them 
save their priests. These held them firmly together, and 
have remained their leaders till the present day. At first 
the English government tried to Anglicize its new subjects; 
but later it abandoned this policy, to the regret of ardent 
patriots to-day, who declare that a little persistent firmness 
would in time have made Canada English in every respect. 
This assertion appears hazardous when we remember the 
tenacity shown by the French Canadians in the maintenance 
of their own nationality. If they had been oppressed, they 
might in their discontent have thrown in their lot with their 
neighbors across the border. As it was, when the American 
Revolution broke out, they did nothing of the kind. They 
had no reason to love Great Britain, but the British American 
colonists were their particular hereditary enemies, for the 
colonial wars of the eighteenth century had been carried 
on less by the regular troops from home than by the settlers 
on both sides, and had left a legacy of ill-feeling behind. 
What the Canadians would have preferred was a return to 



248 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

French rule, but this the Americans would not consent to 
under any circumstances. It was clearly understood in the 
treaty of alliance of 1778 that France might regain all that 
she could in the West Indies, but was not to claim her former 
possessions in the North. The readiness with which she 
agreed to this — the Americans were not in a position to 
enforce such terms — may be ascribed to the exaggerated 
importance attributed to the West Indies in the eighteenth 
century, and to the absurdly inadequate understanding of 
the value of Canada. It is not certain that the Americans 
have not lost by this policy. As has been said, if Canada 
had become French in 1783, it would not improbably have 
fallen to the United States ere now. 

English and Canadian writers have descanted eloquently 
on the aid rendered by the Canadians to Great Britain dur- 
ing the American war for independence. There is exaggera- 
tion in this, for in the critical days when Montgomery and 
Arnold attacked Quebec in 1775 and 1776, the local popula- 
tion remained almost neutral. Later, it is true, they took 
a more active part, when they had been embittered by 
the lack of respect shown by the colonial troops to the 
Catholic churches, and by the fact that the soldiers perforce 
paid for the stores they took with the continental currency, 
which was worthless to the recipients. The failure of 
Arnold decided that Canada should not be a part of the 
United States. The defeat of Burgoyne, on his counter- 
invasion of New York, assured American independence. 
In the peace negotiations at Paris, Franklin asked for 
Canada, in order to avoid further dispute between England 
and America; but when his suggestion was rejected, he 
did not press the matter, feeling doubtless that, as the 
region was wholly in English hands, he had no tenable 
claim. The Americans did succeed in obtaining the Ohio 
Valley, which, in spite of the protests of the colonies after 
its cession by France, had been united to Canada, but 






THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 249 

had been conquered by the Americans during the war. 
Patriotic Canadians have deplored this as the first of the 
series of England's "surrenders" of their welfare to "Yankee 
claims." 

For Canada, the most immediate result of the Revolution 
was that she received all at once a larger accession of 
English population than she would otherwise have got 
for many years. The Revolution had been a prolonged 
civil war, in which, as happens in such cases, the defeated 
party had suffered severely at the hands of their neighbors. 
First and last, some fifty thousand Loyalists, or Tories, fled 
to Canada, where the British government did its best for 
them, settling them in the Maritime Provinces, and more 
especially in the present province of Ontario. They 
brought with them the memory of their sufferings, and the 
intense bitterness against their oppressors which is peculiar 
to exiles who have been driven from their homes by political 
strife. The story of their hardships has been handed down 
to later generations, and must be taken into account in any 
study of the causes of Canadian hostility to the United 
States. By the Canada Act of 1790 the home government 
divided its territory into the two provinces of Upper and 
Lower, or English and French, Canada, which were equally 
unfriendly to the new republic. 

The War of 1812 is recounted very differently in American 
and Canadian histories. American writers describe it as 
having been brought about by a succession of British out- 
rages on the high seas. They devote comparatively little 
space to the rather insignificant battles by land, except 
to the defeat of the attack on New Orleans. Their atten- 
tion is taken up with the gallant exploits of the young 
American navy. Canadians depict the war as a mean 
attempt of the United States to grab their country at a 
time when Great Britain was engaged in a life-and-death 
struggle with Napoleon. They show slight interest in the 



250 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

battle of New Orleans and none at all in the sea-fights. 
Instead, they dwell on the patriotism of the Canadian 
population of both nationalities, the gallantry of their 
militia, the brilliant and successful defence of a long line of 
frontier against a foe of greater power. They look back 
on the conflict with a proud satisfaction, seldom sus- 
pected by most people in the United States, who are 
unaware of the importance their neighbors attach to it, 
and fail to realize that north of the frontier the memories 
of the war are still cherished and help to keep the two 
nations apart. 

It was inevitable that the long-spun boundary disputes, 
beginning with the one about the northern frontier of Maine, 
too ambiguously determined in 1783, and ending with the 
establishment of the boundary of Alaska in 1903, should 
make bad blood between the two parties. The Canadians, 
as the weaker, have felt a more vital interest in these 
contentions, and having, on the whole, got the worst of 
the agreements, they have attributed their ill fortune to 
the readiness of England to sacrifice them in order to avoid 
trouble with the United States; and they have been cor- 
respondingly embittered. This belief, we may remark, rests 
on the comfortable assumption that they were in the right 
on every occasion, and that whatever they lost in the final 
decision was a "surrender." 

During the nineteenth century the growth of Canada, 
though steady, was not rapid. In 1841 the two provinces 
were united, and in time immigration from Great Britain 
made the English-speaking inhabitants a majority. The 
number of settlers from Scotland and from the North 
of Ireland has been so great that this sturdy, loyal 
element forms a much more considerable ingredient of the 
population than it does farther south. As for the Irish 
Catholics, circumstances have assigned to them an es- 
pecially important role, not wholly in keeping with their 






THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 251 

behavior elsewhere, that of moderators; for it is they 
who prevent national and religious antagonism in the 
provinces from coinciding. The extreme Protestants of 
Ontario and the devoted French Catholics of Quebec are 
separated from each other by a deep religious hostility, as 
well as by their differences of speech and of racial charac- 
teristics. It is most fortunate, then, that there is a strong 
Irish contingent to lean to one side in questions of language, 
to the other in matters relating to the church. 

With Lord Elgin's treaty, in 1854, a new period began in 
the history of the trade between Canada and her southern 
neighbor. So profitable did this prove to the former coun- 
try that the latter came to feel that it had got the worst of 
the bargain. It was also incensed by the sympathy which 
Canada showed for the South during the Civil War. In 
consequence, when the period for which the trade treaty 
was made came to an end in 1865, the agreement was 
not renewed. Justifiable as such action may have been 
from a commercial point of view, it was none the less 
short-sighted. If the Americans believed that Canada would 
one day come into the Union, they should have prepared 
the way for the event by cultivating close trade relations, 
even if the weaker state did in the meantime get the greater 
profit from them. Wise foresight would have dictated the 
same sort of policy in the United States as was shown by 
Prussia in her formation of the German Zollverein, — a will- 
ingness to sacrifice small temporary advantages in favor 
of large aims for the future. But a popular government 
is seldom guided by such long views if they mean im- 
mediate loss. 

The purchase of Alaska by the United States, in 1867, was 
an unwelcome stroke to the Canadians. Thanks to it, the 
Americans, especially since the boundary dispute was set- 
tled to their advantage, have held British Columbia, with 
her small sea-coast, as it w«re in a vice. The steady 



252 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

attraction of the same neighbors to the south, the north, and, 
for half her extent, to the west of her must exert an influence 
in uniting territories so obviously belonging together. 

In the same year, 1867, the present form of the Canadian 
federal union was established. In Washington, the House of 
Representatives protested against the step in an extraordi- 
nary resolution, declaring it to be contrary to the spirit of 
the Monroe Doctrine, a piece of gratuitous impertinence 
which Canadians have not forgotten. The Dominion was 
at first an artificial creation, favored by the home govern- 
ment, and acceded to slowly and unwillingly by the Maritime 
Provinces, and by British Columbia, the latter joining in 
1871. Prince Edward's Island came in in 1873; Newfound- 
land still holds aloof. 

For a generation the new Dominion grew but slowly t 
and until the building of the Canadian Pacific its constitu- 
ent parts had little to do with one another. We must 
remember that British Columbia, lying beyond the Rocky 
Mountains, was far distant from Canada proper and 
by sea in direct communication with England from the 
opposite direction ; and Manitoba was naturally much 
more closely connected with Dakota and Minnesota than 
with Ontario. At each Canadian census the slow progress 
of a country with such splendid possibilities awoke fresh 
disappointment. Contrasted with the rapid growth of the 
republic to the south, it was painful to national pride. 
Then, too, the desire for American markets was strong in the 
minds of many Canadians, and as the years softened the 
memories of former disputes, there was for a time a con- 
siderable, though never active, feeling in favor of annexa- 
tion. With a little fostering care the Americans might 
have nursed this sentiment into a real force, instead of 
which they never troubled their heads about it. 

One thing above all others grieved patriotic Canadians — 
the steady emigration across the border. Settlers were 



THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 253 

attracted to the southward by the greater activity and 
prosperity which they found there, and year after year 
they went over in thousands, obtained profitable employment 
and remained permanently. According to the United States 
census of 1900, there were then nearly twelve hundred thou- 
sand people of Canadian birth in the United States. If 
we add to them the children born in the United States of 
Canadian parents, we get a total of some two million, two 
hundred thousand lost to the Dominion, or about thirty 
per cent of what its total population would have been at 
that date if they had remained at home. Even this does 
not tell the whole story, for it leaves out of account many 
immigrants to Canada from Great Britain who have after- 
wards gone southward. The English-speaking Canadians 
have scattered throughout the Northern States, and have 
followed occupations of all kinds. In most cases, they 
have soon had themselves naturalized, and are not to be 
distinguished from the Americans about them. The French 
Canadians also, in spite of the efforts of the clergy to 
keep them back, have wandered away in large numbers, 
and have settled chiefly in the mill towns of New England. 
At first they left Quebec with the intention of returning, as 
many have done, but most have come to stay in their new 
homes. To counterbalance this terrific loss, the Canadian 
census of 1901 could show only 127,899 Americans in the 
whole Dominion. 

With the opening years of the twentieth century, the tide 
at last began to turn. Although the population of the 
Maritime Provinces remains almost stationary, and that of 
the central region is not increasing very fast, the new western 
part of the Dominion is advancing by leaps and bounds. 
Men have discovered that wheat can be cultivated much 
farther north than had previously been supposed ; indeed, 
the conditions of climate and soil appear to be more favor- 
able to its growth in Canada than in the territory im- 



254 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

mediately to the south of her. Moreover, as the United 
States is daily getting more crowded, and as it has now no 
great new regions left to open up, it may before long cease 
to produce more than enough grain for its own consump- 
tion. Its place as the chief wheat-exporting country in 
the world is coveted by Canada. And grain is not her 
sole reliance : her forests will be called on more and more 
to supply the lumber which their depleted American rivals 
will be unable to furnish; her fisheries, both in the east 
and in the west, are of untold value ; she has copper north 
of Lake Superior, coal in Nova Scotia and elsewhere, mineral 
wealth of all kinds in her Rocky Mountains only waiting 
to be exploited, and near the Alaska frontier the gold of 
the Klondike. These resources, which are just beginning 
to be developed, hold forth a brilliant promise for the 
future. Thanks to all this, and also to very strenuous 
advertising, immigration, which in 1901 was still under fifty 
thousand, in 1906 had risen to 215,912; and, a greater 
triumph still, the number who came from the United 
States had risen in these years from less than eighteen 
thousand to nearly sixty-four thousand. The Canadians 
are tasting the sweets of revenge. 

One need not wonder if this new-born prosperity has had 
an almost intoxicating effect on their imagination. Their 
dreams are indeed of the rosiest kind. They see no limit 
to their growth, and talk of the day when their land shall 
support hundreds of millions of inhabitants. As they put 
it, "The United States has been the country of the nineteenth 
century, Canada will be that of the twentieth." Even the 
climate, which is rather dreaded by people at a distance, 
is lauded as one of the attractions of the Dominion. 

Of course, we must not take the words of such enthusiasts 
too seriously. Americans, in particular, are so familiar at 
home with the buoyant optimism which revels in a fair 
future, while overlooking some of the ugly realities of the 



THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 255 

present, that they can afford to be indulgent when they find 
it in others, especially when there is so much justification. 
There is no doubt that Canada is at last developing 
rapidly, that she has immense unexplored resources, and is 
capable of supporting a population several times larger than 
the one now living within her borders. We may not share 
all her admiration for her climate, — it has been well said 
that the heat of the stove is as debilitating as that of the 
sun, — yet the winter is not only endurable for the white 
race, but it is, on the whole, healthful and bracing. In 
character and resources Canada resembles Siberia more than 
she does any other territory ; but her climate is less rigorous, 
her scenery finer, and the proportion of her good land is 
somewhat greater. Granting that her wheat-fields, like 
Siberia's, extend much farther north than was once sup- 
posed possible, she has, after all, a vast extent of barren 
wilderness which can never be of much value. Wheat 
lands, too, desirable as they are, do not need a very large 
population to work them in our day of improved machines 
and extensive cultivation. Canada can never possess 
the variety of staples produced by the United States with 
its much more varied conditions. Cotton, silk, tobacco, 
sugar-cane, rice, many kinds of fruit, and other Southern 
products are, in the nature of things, impossible of culti- 
vation there. The mineral wealth is immense, but we 
may well doubt whether it is equal to that of the United 
States, — at present the output is not a fifteenth of the 
American. When all is said and done, Quebec was founded 
before New York, and if the resources of Canada were greater 
than those of her southern neighbor, the world would have 
discovered the fact before now. 

There is also nothing in the beginning of an emigration to 
the northward that need alarm, or even astonish, Americans, 
especially while it is still only a twentieth of what they 
themselves are receiving from outside. It is true that this 



256 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

emigration is made up of excellent elements, — perhaps the 
best that Canada is getting, — but the movement in itself 
is natural, and is the continuation of one that has run 
through the history of the United States. With every 
decade the frontier line of colonization was pushed farther 
and farther to the westward, until, toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, there were no new tracts to open up, 
except Oklahoma, and no part of Canada has grown in the 
last ten years as Oklahoma has. But as the frontier which 
has played such a part in the history of the American 
West disappeared, men discovered that in Canada there 
were yet unopened regions, and the old movement set 
in again, this time to the northward. The original settlers 
who have pressed on after finishing their pioneer work 
in their first homes, have not, however, left a waste be- 
hind them : their place has been filled by newcomers, who 
have increased with the development of the country. The 
farmer who has sold his land in Iowa to seek virgin soil 
in Alberta may be the son of a man who parted with his 
acres in Ohio to go to Iowa, and the grandson of one who 
left New York or Penns}dvania for Ohio. And far from 
being left vacant, New York and Pennsylvania have each 
to-day a larger population than that of the whole Domin- 
ion. Americans, then, have no cause to be alarmed at the 
prosperity of their neighbors any more than they have to 
depreciate it. Unluckily they must put up with the fact 
that one of its effects has been to heighten national con- 
sciousness and a sense of rivalry with them. 

It is in the nature of things that there should be much 
more hostility to the United States among Canadians 
than there is to Canada among Americans. This is to be 
expected between two peoples of unequal strength, when 
the weaker has a succession of grievances against the 
stronger, and is suspicious of its designs for the future. 
For instance, we might conceive of the Belgians hating 



THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 257 

the French when the French were innocent of hostile 
feeling, or perhaps of any feeling at all, toward the Bel- 
gians. Canada is as large as the United States, but the differ- 
ence between them in population and developed resources is 
greater than that between France and Belgium. We need 
not be surprised, therefore, if Canadian newspapers abound 
in hits at America, while the American ones bother them- 
selves little about Canadian affairs. But in order to get a 
complete understanding of the attitude of the Canadians, 
we must examine separately the several elements that 
make up the population. 

Of all the inhabitants of the Dominion, the Irish Catholics 
are probably the most friendly to the United States. They 
have inherited little loyalty to England and her King, 
and they know that millions of their fellow-countrymen 
have found a happy home south of the border. They 
have nothing to lose by annexation, nor have they cause 
for sentimental repugnance to it ; they may therefore be 
counted as an influence tending to draw the two countries 
closer to one another. 

The French Canadians are in a different position. Al- 
though they are still affected by inherited national and 
religious antipathy to the Americans, the old reasons for 
hostility have in great measure disappeared. Time has 
softened the memories of the colonial feuds, and the 
United States now counts among its inhabitants some 
fifteen million thriving and contented people of their 
faith. Hundreds of thousands of the French Canadians 
themselves have found a home and a living in the New 
England States. To-day the prejudice of the French 
Canadians is hardly stronger against Americans than it 
is against their fellow-Canadians of English stock. Never- 
theless we find among the leaders of the French an invin- 
cible repugnance to the idea of annexation, a repugnance 
based no longer on prejudice but on a simple calculation. 



258 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

They believe that annexation would be fatal to their future. 
It is true that their old dream that the French element 
in the Dominion might in time outnumber the English, 
is now impossible of fulfilment ; still, the French bid fair 
to be an important fraction of the population as long 
as Canada remains independent. But if she should be 
annexed to the American republic, they would at once be 
reduced to a position of hopeless insignificance, so hopeless 
that one may doubt whether, in the long run, they could 
preserve their nationality. The clergy, too, are fearful of 
the more liberal spirit of the Catholic church in the United 
States. They have already noticed that their flocks in New 
England are less docile than at home, where the payment 
of tithes is enforced by law. Considerations like these 
explain the well-known saying that the last shot in defence 
of British sovereignty on the American continent will be 
fired by a Frenchman. 

The English and the Scotch of the central Province of 
Ontario are the full embodiment of the typical Canadian 
and old anti-American sentiment. In the Maritime Prov- 
inces this feeling is less strong, and the new West, with its 
mixed population, is subject to other influences; but in 
Ontario there is still the inherited antagonism of the Loyal- 
ists who fled from the revolted colonies. Memories of their 
wrongs and sufferings, as well as later ones of the glorious 
repulse of the invaders in the War of 1812, have been per- 
petuated in legend and in popular literature. Traditions 
of the sort are not easily forgotten. 

The patriotism of Canadians has besides been kept warm 
by their knowledge that any fresh war between the United 
States and England — and we know how often one has been 
threatened — must begin with an invasion of their ter- 
ritory, which they would have the utmost difficulty in 
repelling. In truth, the calm way in which the Americans 
have taken for granted — wrongly or rightly — that they 



THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 259 

could occupy Canada without much trouble whenever they 
tried, has caused natural resentment across the border. It 
must be admitted, too, that the general tone of careless 
condescension which has marked both the public and the 
private utterances of Americans when speaking of their 
kinsmen in the Dominion is a sufficient cause for anger in 
itself; such phrases as "manifest destiny" and "paramount 
position in the western hemisphere" are highly irritating. 
This has long been endured, but the national pride of the 
Canadians, always well developed, has at last something 
substantial to feed upon. The present growth and pros- 
perity of their country and its brilliant outlook for the 
future are a consolation for the slights they have had to 
put up with. They are cured of all desire for annexation 
or feeling of dependence, and they were never less in a 
mood to make concessions. 

By a certain poetic justice, now that the Canadians are 
no longer seeking for American favor, people in the United 
States are beginning to regret their own previous indifference 
towards Canada. Throughout the nineteenth century they 
held the comfortable belief that somehow or other, as a 
result of a war with England or, more probably, of "peace- 
ful attraction," the northern half of the continent would 
come to them by "manifest destiny." Although this opin- 
ion has been expressed with the frankness characteristic of 
American utterances, nothing has been done to aid destiny : 
the treaty of 1854 was not renewed, only a futile protest 
was made against the formation of the Dominion, and the 
increasing American tariff duties have never taken Cana- 
dian wishes into account. Of late, however, men have 
perceived that the United States, in its dealings with its 
northern sister, has not made the most of its favorable 
position. Canada has suffered from American tariff restric- 
tions, but so far from having been brought to her knees 
by them, she has artificially built up her native industries 



260 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

under the shelter of a high tariff of her own, first under the 
government of the Conservative party, and now under that 
of the Liberals, who used to be the sworn partisans of 
free trade. To-day, on both sides of the border there are 
powerful influences opposed to closer trade relations. 

In these days of popular government and protected in- 
terests, the making of commercial treaties is getting more 
and more difficult. No one interest shows any readiness to 
let itself be sacrificed for the general good, and each can 
exact the support of others by threatening to desert them 
in turn. Again, the selfish opposition of a minority to every 
measure that threatens to be to their disadvantage is 
usually much more determined and persistent than the 
action of a majority inspired only by zeal for the general 
welfare. Both Canada and the United States now have 
high duties on each other's goods, and neither seems to 
be in a temper to yield anything. It is true that some per- 
sons in the States are becoming convinced that closer con- 
nection with the Dominion is most desirable. This is 
particularly the case in New England, where the manu- 
facturers are eager for the free importation of leather, wool, 
and Nova Scotia coal. But it does not look at the present 
moment as if the efforts of New England were likely to 
lead to much — especially as they meet with little encour- 
agement from any quarter. And yet Boston is the natural 
port of eastern Canada. 

Since the Canadians do not receive for their exports to 
the United States one-half the money they expend on their 
imports from there, they are convinced that they are in a 
position to strike the harder of the two in the event of an 
actual tariff conflict. On the other hand, the Americans 
have always in reserve, in case of financial war, the sus- 
pension of the bonding privilege. As the St. Lawrence is 
frozen in winter, and Halifax and St. John are foggy and, 
if the passage through Maine were closed, would be far 



THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 261 

away, this is a weapon of considerable potency, but one 
to be used only at last resort. 1 

To Americans the relations between Canada and other 
British possessions are not without importance. It was at 
Canadian instigation that, in 1890, the Blaine-Bond Con- 
vention of the United States and Newfoundland was dis- 
approved by the imperial government. Newfoundland 
may, sooner or later, enter the Dominion ; but the Americans 
have no reason to be eager for a consummation which, 
among other things, will hardly tend to make the fisheries 
dispute easier. Another possible contingency that would 
affect them is the union which has been suggested between 
the Dominion and the British West Indies. Now that 
England has abandoned her old rivalry for the predomi- 
nant position in the Caribbean Sea, and has withdrawn 
from there most of her soldiers and ships, the Ameri- 
cans would not welcome newcomers upon the scene. 
We should hear before long of Canadian interests in the 
Panama Canal. Indeed, the annexation of the British West 
Indian Islands would give Canada somewhat the same ad- 
vantage of position as regards the United States, though in 
a lesser degree, that the Americans obtained over her by 
the purchase of Alaska. It would also provide her with a 
tropical territory of her own, whose prosperity she might, 
and probably would, stimulate by a bonus on its sugar and 
other exports. In rejoinder the United States could, if 
it wished, hit back very hard ; an import on fruit from 
Jamaica would pretty nearly ruin the island. Finally, it 
is worthy of note that, though the Dominion is the largest 
of the American countries, it is still only a foreign colony, 
not a free republic, and it has therefore not been invited 
to send representatives to the Pan-American congresses. 

1 The suspension might be applied in part ; as, for instance, against 
goods from another country benefiting by preferential duties denied 
the United States. 



262 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

At present, the political situation of Canada offers her 
many advantages; for she enjoys almost complete self- 
government, and is at the same time protected by the 
power of the British Empire. This arrangement cannot, 
however, last indefinitely. In a generation or two, when 
the Dominion comes to contain a population approaching 
and then surpassing in numbers that of the mother coun- 
try, it will scarcely remain contented with the status of 
a mere possession, whose official head is appointed from 
abroad, whose acts are liable to the veto of the home gov- 
ernment, and whose diplomatic relations with foreign powers 
are directed from London. It is in the last particular that 
changes may first be expected. Where and how they will 
end cannot as yet be foretold, but there are three possible, 
and not unlikely, solutions to the problem of the future of the 
country ; namely, imperial federation, complete indepen- 
dence, and annexation to the United States. Which of these 
shall prevail is a question of supreme interest to Americans. 

The arguments in favor of an imperial federation — of a 
Greater Britain, of which Canada shall be a vital part — are 
both sentimental and practical. The devotion to England 
of her children in the western hemisphere has been mani- 
fested on more than one occasion, and notably at the time 
of the South African War. Even admitting that the con- 
tingent which Canada sent into the field was hardly large 
enough to warrant the stir made about it, we need not 
doubt that if the mother country were engaged in a more 
desperate struggle, one putting a greater strain on her 
resources, — for instance, the protection of India against 
invasion, — the colonies would give far more aid than was 
necessary against a handful of Boers. Recently Canada has 
afforded another proof of her pro-British sentiment — and 
that under a French premier — in the preferential tariff, 
amounting on some goods to thirty-three and one-third per 
cent, granted to England and to some of the other British 



THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 263 

colonies. There is no doubt that the idea of being an equal 
member in the community of the largest and most popu- 
lous empire in the world is one to appeal to the imagina- 
tion, a magnificent dream capable of rousing the utmost 
enthusiasm in those who glory in the greatness of the 
English name. It is also one which has for the Canadian 
farmer attractions of a more prosaic kind. Such an em- 
pire would pretty certainly be bound together by prefer- 
ential duties, if not actual free trade between the members 
and a protective tariff against outsiders, and this would 
give Canadian wheat a decided advantage on the London 
market over rival grain from Russia or Argentina. There 
is no valid reason for regarding this dream as chimerical 
simply because the principles which it embodies received 
a check at the last English election. In one form or 
another the federation of Greater Britain is quite possible, 
and, though the issue will not be settled in a day, it bids 
fair to become within a generation one of the most mo- 
mentous in politics. 

From the point of view of the United States there would 
be no cause to welcome this federation. If it should be 
based on internal reciprocity with protection against other 
nations, American exports, both raw materials and manu- 
factured goods, would suffer. So vast are the markets 

j included in the domain of Greater Britain, so imposing is its 
situation almost everywhere, that if this greatest of empires 
were to follow a policy of exclusion toward others, it might 
provoke a league to break its power. In such a league, too, 

j the United States might conceivably have a place ; for, from 
the closeness of its relations with British America, it might be 
forced either to become a part of this Greater Britain or, as a 
matter of self-preservation, to oppose it. This may be fanci- 
ful speculation about the distant future, but it is a fact of 
the present that the drawing together of Great Britain and 
Canada is in no sense to the benefit of the United States. 



264 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

So far, however, Canadian public opinion is inclined to 
look forward not to absorption, but to ultimate indepen- 
dence, with friendship, and perhaps an alliance, with Greater 
Britain. Canadians to-day are so full of life and confidence, 
so proud of their resources, and so entranced with their 
dreams of their own future that nothing could seem more 
glorious to them than the destiny of Canada herself. The 
prospect of her being merged in a larger empire does not 
appeal to them. Above all, it possesses no attraction for 
the French Canadians, who would be an even more insig- 
nificant minority in Greater Britain than in the American 
Union. Besides, though traditional fealty to the old coun- 
try and to the crown is strong (except among the Irish) in 
Ontario and the Maritime Provinces, in the far West it is 
an exotic plant, too delicate to nourish in such soil. In 
these new regions, with their mixed population imbued 
with the materialism of frontier life, the whole tone is 
latter-day American rather than English. 1 The people 
are too matter-of-fact, too much taken up with their 
every-day affairs, to indulge in such luxuries as loyalty 
to a distant throne; to them it seems very unreal senti- 
mentality. 

From an independent Canada the United States would 
have little to fear. Strong and respected as such a state 
might be, it could hardly be dangerous. Canadians who 
believe that their interests have repeatedly been sacrificed 
by the mother country are wont to declare that they could 
manage their foreign affairs better themselves. Once in- 
dependent, they would have full liberty in this respect. 
But the Americans would certainly not complain if, in 
future discussions with their northern neighbors, they no 
longer had to think of such contingencies as the blockading 
of New York and San Francisco by English fleets. 

1 The English immigrants in Canada are far from being generally 
popular. 






THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 265 

There remains the third possibility for the Dominion: 
direct annexation to the United States, or union of some 
kind with it, either with or without a previous period of 
complete independence. This possibility, which for over a 
century most people in the United States and not a few in 
Canada expected soon to be realized, never seemed farther 
off than at the present day. Annexation is for the moment 
a dead issue. The United States is not eager for it, and 
Canadians are almost unanimously opposed to it. They no 
longer care even for reciprocity, which they once longed 
for. In each country the community as a whole is well 
satisfied with the present, and confident of the future, and 
it feels no need of a combination which must demand some 
concessions, not to say sacrifices. In each country, too, 
there is a protective tariff, whose beneficiaries will not of 
themselves give up a jot of their individual advantage in 
order to help along some general political idea. Why, then, 
should the Dominion and the republic ever unite, when 
each is so well off alone? 
The answer is, to-day is not eternity or even to-morrow. 

| Men, parties, protective tariffs, national ambitions, change, 
and change suddenly : the forces of nature remain. Noth- 
ing can alter the fact that the natural connection of every 
part of Canada is with the lands to the south of it rather 
than with those to the east or the west. Railways and 
tariffs may turn the channels of trade in other directions, 
but with what difficulty is shown by the much more rapid 

i increase of American than of English importations into the 
Dominion in the last few years, in spite of a tariff hostile 
to the United States and favorable to Great Britain. And 
even if political reasons can prevent men from dealing 
freely with their most obvious customers, such hindrances 
must be but for a time. 1 In the end, other interests will 

1 " The action of the great forces is often suspended by that of second- 
ary forces; but in the end the great forces prevail." — Goldwin Smith. 



266 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

win the day. Remembering, too, the essential similarity 
between the populations on the two sides of a purely 
artificial boundary, we can not conceive of their always 
remaining separated. Every new railway, every new 
wagon road, that crosses this line of four thousand miles, 
makes it a restriction harder to observe. If aerial naviga- 
tion should so improve in the next few years that people 
could go with ease in any direction they wished, the diffi- 
culty of maintaining a customs line, and particularly one so 
long as that between the United States and Canada, would 
become almost insuperable. Even without this improved 
means of locomotion, as American and Canadian towns 
grow up within a stone's throw of one another the task 
of keeping them separate will be ever more complicated. 
We need not take overseriously the bickerings of the mo- 
ment. Political and commercial unions are not always 
preceded by an era of good feeling; on the contrary, two 
nations, like two rival trading companies, may quarrel 
with and hurt one another until it becomes evident to both 
.-that the only wise course is to sink their differences. If 
we restrict our observations to present political conditions, 
we may see no reason why either the United States or Can- 
ada should ever wish to be merged in one larger whole; 
but if we take into account the great permanent forces of 
geography and nationality, we may well feel disposed to 
repeat the words of the marriage service, — "Those whom 
God hath joined together, let no man put asunder." 



CHAPTER XV 

THE ISTHMIAN CANAL 

THE relations of the United States with England in 
the western hemisphere have not been confined 
to questions concerning Canada. Even without the Do- 
minion, Great Britain occupies a position in the New 
World which Americans have always to take into account. 
In the fortified and almost impregnable coral islands 
of Bermuda, she possesses an ideal base of operations 
from which a hostile fleet could threaten the whole coast 
from Maine to Florida. Farther south, the Bahama group 
commands the entrance to the Florida channel, Jamaica 
watches over Nicaragua and Panama, British possessions in 
Guiana and the Lesser Antilles guard the eastern entrances 
to the Caribbean Sea. The chain of posts is a formidable 
one. The strongest of them, the Bermudas, stand by 
themselves, and have given rise to no dispute. Although 
the United States may not relish their being in British 
hands, there is nothing to be done in the matter. It has 
therefore turned its attention all the more to the waters in 
and about the Caribbean Sea, where, during most of the nine- 
teenth century, it found itself in fierce rivalry with England, 
— a rivalry which has only just come to an end. 

The great American Mediterranean is composed, like the 
European one, of two distinct halves, the Gulf of Mexico 
and the Caribbean Sea, which are connected with each 
other by only a narrow passage, somewhat similar to that 

267 



268 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

between Sicily and Tunis. The Gulf of Mexico has but 
two outlets: to the east the Florida channel, leading 
into the Atlantic ; to the southeast the straits of Yucatan, 
which open into the Caribbean Sea. Between them, and 
dominating them both, is the western end of the splendid 
island of Cuba. The Caribbean Sea is landlocked on the 
west and the south; at the north is the broken barrier 
formed by Cuba, Haiti, and Porto Rico, with Jamaica 
as an advanced post ; at the east is the chain of the Lesser 
Antilles, a line of small islands pierced by divers passages, 
and belonging to various powers. Along the coasts of the 
American Mediterranean are many points of strategic and 
commercial advantage, but two surpass all others: New 
Orleans, on the north shore of the Gulf of Mexico, at the 
mouth of the Mississippi, which drains the huge inland 
plain of the United States ; and secondly, on the southern 
edge of the Caribbean Sea, the canal which will connect 
two oceans. From the earliest days of their independence 
the Americans coveted New Orleans; they acquired it in 
1803. A century later, after several generations of dispute 
with Great Britain, they obtained definite control of the 
site of the future canal. 

The West Indian Islands were the first part of the New 
World discovered by Columbus, and the first territories to 
be settled by the Spaniards. In time they were invaded 
by other nations, and during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries they were the scene not only of the exploits of 
the buccaneers, but of many a fight by land and sea be- 
tween the regular forces of rival powers. The English were 
the first intruders to establish themselves in this Spanish 
domain by their conquest, in 1655, of Jamaica, to-day their 
oldest colony. The French, the Dutch, and even the Danes 
and the Swedes soon followed, all striving to get what they 
could of this favored part of the world ; for in early days 
an extraordinary value was attached to the possession of 



THE ISTHMIAN CANAL 269 

these islands, most of which have now sunk into insignifi- 
cance. With the fortunes of war several of them changed 
hands more than once. 

In 1783, after the conclusion of the peace of Paris, Spain, 
who had won back Florida and kept Louisiana, held all 
the shores of the Gulf of Mexico as well as the continental 
ones of the Caribbean Sea, besides Cuba, Porto Rico, San 
Domingo, and Trinidad. Her grasp was weak, but she had 
an overwhelming superiority of position. Compared with 
her territories in this quarter of the globe, those of the other 
European nations were mere outposts, although Haiti and 
Jamaica were proverbially wealthy and flourishing. The 
new American power, the United States, did not as yet 
possess a foot of land on the Gulf, but as the owner of the 
eastern head waters of the Mississippi it was already 
interested in Gulf affairs. 

Here, as elsewhere, the next sixty years witnessed great 
changes. Spain, during the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century, lost all her continental possessions in the New 
World, which went to form a number of weak independent 
republics or passed into American hands. France, during 
the wars of the French Revolution and the Empire, let 
slip her fine colony of Haiti, which became an indepen- 
dent negro republic, as did later San Domingo. England 
gained several more West Indian Islands, planted herself on 
the South American continent, at the expense of Holland 
in Guiana, and began to get a footing in Central America. 
The United States obtained its first foothold on the Gulf 
by the purchase of Louisiana, to which it soon added 
West Florida, then East Florida, and finally Texas, so 
that it came to own the whole northern coast. The 
rapid development of these lands, and, still more, the 
strength of the nation as a whole, assured to the North 
American republic an importance on the Gulf much su- 
perior to that of the feeble Spanish-American states, or, 



270 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

in spite of the matchless situation of Cuba, of Spain herself. 
Its only real rival was Great Britain, who, though holding 
a comparatively small area of territory, nevertheless was 
firmly intrenched in certain choice positions, from which, 
as ruler of the waves, she could sweep these seas with 
her fleets. On the other hand, the economic decay of her 
West Indian possessions in the nineteenth century lessened 
their value in her eyes. 

A curious fact about the rivalry between the two 
English-speaking powers in West Indian waters was that 
it was concerned not so much with any actual opposing in- 
terests as with an object that did not yet exist, — namely, 
the canal which should connect the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans and become one of the chief highways of the world. 
The idea of such a canal is as old as the days of Philip II, 
and ever since his time people have taken for granted 
that sooner or later it would be dug. Indeed, many have 
kept expecting that it would be begun, not to say finished, 
before long, for the tremendous difficulties of the under- 
taking have only very lately been grasped. To the old 
mistress of the seas, and to young America, the question of 
the control of the future thoroughfare seemed equally vital. 
No one knew for certain where it would be made; but 
whether it was to go through Nicaragua, or Panama, or 
was to take, some other route, the interest remained the 
same, and both countries were keenly alive to it. 

In their contentions on this subject we find two sharply 
defined periods, separated from one another by the calm 
that followed the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850. We need 
not cite the details of the various manoeuvres and nego- 
tiations that were entered into, but we must note the 
different standpoint of the United States in the first and 
in the last half of the nineteenth century. During the first 
period, while England was trying to strengthen her posi- 
tion in such a way that the canal, which men commonly 



THE ISTHMIAN CANAL 271 

supposed would be dug through Nicaragua, should be as 
much as possible within her reach, the United States 
watched every movement of hers with the utmost suspi- 
cion, protested violently in the name of the Monroe Doc- 
trine against her action, and upheld the theory that this 
international waterway should not be under the control of 
any one country. Its whole attitude was the defensive 
one of the weaker power. 

The interest of America in any passage connecting the 
two oceans was obvious from the start, and the whole 
course of her development tended to make it ever greater. 
Her trade with the Pacific, which had begun immediately 
after the establishment of her independence, soon became 
flourishing. In 1803, as a result of the expedition of 
Lewis and Clark, she first laid claim to land on its shores. 
That she kept vigilant watch in this part of the world 
was shown by her sharp protest in 1823 against Russian 
advance. In 1846 the Oregon treaty defined her Pac'fic 
territory in its northern limits, and the acquisition of 
California extended it to the south. Since these possessions 
of the republic could be reached only by long week of 
travelling overland, amidst many hardships, the necessity 
of a quicker, easier route was evident, and it kept the 
desire for a canal constantly before the American mind. 
The discovery of gold in California, with the ensuing rush 
of people there from all parts of the world, brought the 
question of transport more to the front than ever, and 
lines of vessels were started from the principal United 
States ports to the two sides of the isthmus. 

There was thus reason enough why the United States 
should view with alarm each step of Great Britain's which 
seemed likely to strengthen her already dangerous hold 
on the line of a future interoceanic route. The story of the 
moves and the counter-moves of the two powers is long 
and intricate, and was brought to a close, men hoped, by 



272 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which provided that neither 
should have control over the waterway, or build fortifica- 
tions along it, but that it was to remain open to all. Much 
as the Americans repented later of having signed the com- 
pact, at the time they got the best of the bargain ; for they 
attained their main object, which was a defensive one. In 
return for their recognition of English possession of British 
Honduras, which they had vainly protested against, they 
obtained a sufficient guarantee that England would not 
build and dominate the future canal. It is true that the 
United States bound itself in like manner, but at this 
time it was scarcely in a position where it could hope for 
supremacy. 

In spite of some misunderstanding as to the exact mean- 
ing of the treaty, and discussion about the so-called Mos- 
quito Coast of Nicaragua, — where England had certain 
claims which she did not surrender until 1860, — the Clay- 
ton-Bulwer agreement was successful in producing at least 
a lull in the dispute. For other reasons, too, the agitation 
in favor of the immediate construction of a canal subsided 
for a while. The building of the Panama railway lessened 
the immediate need of one, and the completion of the Union 
Pacific, in 1869, made California more accessible. More- 
over, the United States was soon engrossed by the Civil 
War and its after effects, and England, upon the opening 
in 1869 of the Suez Canal, which gave her a short route to 
the East, became less eager for a western passage. Thus 
the matter slumbered, although various plans were evolved, 
in one of which the Emperor Napoleon III was interested. 
Meanwhile public opinion was beginning to turn away from 
the Nicaragua route in favor of the Panama. 

With the organization of the French Panama Company 
by M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, flushed by his achievement in 
Egypt, the question became once more a live one. But 
American sentiment had changed: a feeling had grown 



THE ISTHMIAN CANAL 273 

that the future canal should be controlled by the United 
States. President Grant had held this belief, and dur- 
ing his administration various government surveys of the 
isthmus had been undertaken, and negotiations for a con- 
cession had been entered into with the United States of 
Colombia. The de Lesseps Panama plan was therefore 
looked at askance. President Hayes, in his message of 
March 8, 1889, declared that "The policy of this country is 
a canal under American control. The United States cannot 
consent to the surrender of their control to any European 
power. ... If existing treaties between the United States 
and other nations, or if the right of sovereignty or property 
of other nations, stand in the way of this policy, — a con- 
tingency which is not apprehended, — suitable steps should 
be taken by just and liberal negotiations to promote and 
establish the American policy, on this subject, consistently 
with the rights of the nations to be affected by it. . . . An 
interoceanic canal across the American Isthmus will essen- 
tially change the geographical relations between the Atlan- 
tic and Pacific coasts of the United States and between 
the United States and the rest of the world. It will be 
the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our 
Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coast-line of the 
United States." 

M. de Lesseps met the situation with much tact. Con- 
stantly insisting on the private nature of his company, he 
formed a special American committee to interest the 
American public and obtain support in favor of his plan. 
Still, what really prevented opposition in the United States 
from assuming an active form was the widespread doubt 
whether his enterprise would succeed. Had it done so, there 
would have been trouble. 

President Hayes's declaration had formulated the new 
policy of his country, but his assurance that any interference 
arising from the rights of other nations was "a contingency 



- 274 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

which is not apprehended" was, to say the least, optimistic; 
for by'' the Clayton-Bulwer treaty the United States had 
expressly given up all right to " American control" of any 
proposed interoceanic canal. In 1881, Secretary Blaine 
took up the matter, and began "liberal negotiations" to 
get over this obstacle. Unfortunately, his ingenious argu- 
ments were refuted without much difficulty by Lord Gran- 
ville, and those of Secretary Frelinghuysen, who succeeded 
Mr. Blaine and continued the discussion, fared no better. 
The wording of the treaty was clear enough ; there was no 
date set on which it should expire ; and the English govern- 
ment evinced no desire to abandon or to change it. When 
the negotiations came to an end, the Americans felt that 
they had not only been worsted in debate, but had been 
left in a most unsatisfactory position, from which they saw 
no way of escape except by denunciation of the treaty. 
Although this course was urged by irresponsible individuals 
in and out of Congress, soberer men felt that it would be a 
breaking of the national word, and an act of the most serious 
character. 

Another lull of some years followed. The increasing 
difficulty and final failure of the French Panama Company 
rather dampened the enthusiasm of would-be canal builders, 
and also helped to bring people over to the Nicaragua 
route, which, in contrast to the Panama, was recommended 
to patriotic sentiment as an American enterprise. 

During the Spanish War the spectacular cruise of the 
Oregon from the distant waters of the Pacific to join the 
blockading squadron before Santiago, while it thrilled 
the nation with pride, at the same time brought vividly 
before it the disadvantage under which the American navy 
labored owing to the immense detour that had to be made 
to transport its forces from one ocean to the other. By the 
terms of the treaty of peace Spain forfeited her last foot of 
land in the New World, which she had discovered. In her 



THE ISTHMIAN CANAL 275 

stead, the United States greatly strengthened its position in 
both the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, and in 
reference to any future canal. It was now in a situation, as 
well as in a mood, to take up the canal question with an 
energy it had never before shown. If it had still been on 
as unfriendly terms with England as it was, with little 
interruption, from the Declaration of Independence to 
the Spanish War, there would have been danger of 
friction almost at once ; but English sympathy with the 
United States during the war had produced a revolution 
in American feeling. Never had such cordiality reigned 
between the two nations. This was all very well for the 
moment ; the question was, would it last ? Fortunately the 
British government grasped the situation. For good and 
sufficient reasons it had determined to win American 
friendship, and it had succeeded; but it saw that that 
friendship would not endure if England placed herself 
squarely on the ground of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 
and, by refusing all modifications, thwarted a plan on which 
the Americans had set their hearts. Permanent good-will 
between the two countries could only be obtained by put- 
ting an end to the rivalry between them in West Indian 
waters, — a rivalry all the more difficult for England to 
maintain since her power in this part of the world had stood 
still, if it had not declined, during the greater part of the 
nineteenth century, whereas that of the United States had 
progressed immeasurably. English statesmen had made up 
their minds that the time had come for England to adopt 
a different policy, and that the benefits she would gain by 
it would more than compensate her for sacrifices she 
might be called upon to make. The events of the next few 
years in Africa and the Far East were to prove that they 
were right. 

Having once decided on its course of action, the London 
government did not allow itself to be influenced by the 



276 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

laments of a few people at home, or by the sneers of foreigners 
at British weakness. Not only did it consent to negotiations 
for a revision of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, but when a new 
agreement, the first Hay-Lansdowne treaty, proved un- 
satisfactory to the American Senate, it consented to a second 
one, which satisfied all American demands ; for it provided 
that the United States might not only construct the canal, 
but control and fortify it. Following this, British garrisons 
were reduced in the West Indies, and British ships with- 
drawn. In a word, England virtually recognized American 
supremacy in this long-disputed region. 

With this, the greatest, obstacle removed from their 
path, the Americans could now go ahead with their canal 
projects. The first thing to do was to decide upon the 
best route. While the majority of the people, for senti- 
mental reasons, still believed in Nicaragua, expert engi- 
neers had quietly come to the conclusion that the Panama 
course would be the better one. The government at 
Washington accepted their opinion, and, using the Nica- 
ragua project to bring the French Company to terms, 
made an offer, not characterized by generosity, to buy it 
out. Thus pressed, the old Panama Company accepted 
the hard bargain, and a treaty was negotiated with a repre- 
sentative of the Republic of Colombia to determine the 
status of the future canal. The rejection of this document 
by the Colombian Senate led to the Panama Revolution 
and the establishment of a new republic, which hastened 
to agree to a fresh compact, the Hay-Bunau Varilla treaty. 
In return for the payment of ten million dollars — pre- 
viously promised to Columbia — and a later annual subsidy, 
the United States acquired practical sovereignty over the 
two ends of the route, and a strip of five miles breadth 
on each side of it. 

The morality of American action in this affair has been 
often questioned. There is no doubt that, though the gov- 



THE ISTHMIAN CANAL 277 

eminent at Washington was not an actual party to the plans 
concerted in New York and elsewhere which resulted in 
the overthrow of Colombian sovereignty, it may have had 
more than a suspicion of their existence, and it did nothing 
to interfere with their success. To forbid the landing of 
Colombian troops was to stretch the meaning of the old 
American right to maintain order along the line of the 
railway to an extent hardly justifiable in dealing with a 
friendly nation, and the haste with which the administration 
at Washington recognized the independence of the new 
republic and concluded a treaty with it appeared to many 
people indecent. The truth was the Americans did not 
feel that they were dealing with a friendly nation. They 
looked upon the rejection of the Hay-Herran treaty by 
the Colombian Senate as what they would call a "hold- 
up" — a scheme to interfere, for the sake of personal 
profit, with a work which was to benefit all humanity. It 
must be remembered that the relations between the Colom- 
bian President and Senate were such as to preclude the 
belief that the government of Bogota had been acting 
in an honorable way in the negotiation of the treaty and 
I its subsequent refusal. It happened, too, that the political 
circumstances at Panama were such that the United 
States was able to get all it wanted, almost without moving 
a finger. It had little more remorse about brushing away 
Colombian opposition in this manner than a railway com- 
pany would feel in disposing of the claims of an Indian 
squatter which happened to interfere with its line. 

For some time after the signing of the Hay-Bunau 
Varilla treaty and the taking over of the Panama Canal 
by the Americans, matters did not proceed so well as it 
had been hoped they would. American optimism and self- 
confidence had underestimated the difficulties to be dealt 
with, — difficulties which seem to increase rather than to 
diminish as time goes on. But, whatever they are, the'y are 



278 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

at the worst only of a temporary nature, and at present it 
seems that they are being met with success. No one can 
doubt that sooner or later the Panama Canal will be dug : 
the wealth of the United States is in itself a sufficient 
guarantee that, though the cost may be enormous, the un- 
dertaking will be pushed to a successful conclusion. The 
difference of a year or two in the date of its completion, or 
of a score or two of million dollars, more or less, in the out- 
lay, is insignificant compared with the importance of the 
result. We can see now that no private company could 
have met the necessary expenses ; for a company must pay 
returns to its investors, whereas a government may rest 
satisfied with indirect profits. One smiles as one recalls the 
confident underestimation of all the earlier plans. 

When the Panama Canal is at last completed, the ad- 
vantages to the United States must be great. Even if 
it disappoints the expectations of those who think it will 
equal its rival at Suez in the traffic which it carries, it 
cannot but stimulate American trade. New York, as well 
as the Gulf ports, will be brought within a short distance 
of the western coast of South America, and will also be able 
to communicate with Australia and the Far East to more 
advantage than at present. How much this will amount 
to it is hard to say, — greater distance does not prevent 
Bremen from competing successfully with Marseilles in the 
same regions, — yet it must count for something. The 
gain to the American navy is still more evident; for the 
canal, by giving it a safe line of inner communication, will 
enable it to concentrate at short notice its whole strength 
in either ocean. 

The supremacy of the Americans in the Gulf of Mexico and 
the Caribbean Sea is to-day firmly established. Great 
Britain is no longer in a position to renew her former 
rivalry in this part of the world, even if she would; the 
other European powers count for but little here; and 



THE ISTHMIAN CANAL 279 

though the appearance of Canada might be annoying, it 
need not be taken tragically. And there are indications 
that the United States will not rest content with its present 
situation, satisfactory as it is, but that, guided by natural 
forces and inherited traditions rather than by any set pur- 
poses, it will be led still further to fortify its position 
The fate of the Danish West Indies is, we may believe, not 
yet finally settled. San Domingo is likely to come undei 
American supervision, and perhaps Haiti. The connection 
of Cuba with her protector seems to be destined to grow 
closer, rather than looser, as the years go by. 

When thinking of the future of these West Indian 
Islands, we must always remember the immense tempta- 
tion which the prospect of free access for their tropical 
productions to the protected American market holds out 
to them. The prosperity of Porto Rico is in itself an object- 
lesson ; and the economic advantage of free trade with the 
United States is enough to explain the strong sentiment of 
the property holders in Cuba in favor of annexation. Again, 
in the case of Jamaica, the recent welfare of the island 
is due to its fruit-trade, which the United States could 
destroy by adverse tariff legislation. So great indeed is 
the attraction which the American market, the wealthiest 
in the world, exercises on the West Indian Islands that 
there is scarcely one of them, of whatever nationality, which 
would not welcome annexation if it were accompanied by 
complete freedom of trade. As long as this state of affairs 
continues, — and we can see no reason why it should soon 
come to an end, — American preponderance in these regions 
: rests on a firm basis. 

But political expansion in the West Indies, following 
upon economic, raises a host of difficult questions. To 
begin with, it will be hard, without violating American 
traditions, to treat any parts of the New World as subject 
colonies, especially if they have already enjoyed self-govern- 



280 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

inent. How, then, are we to reconcile the annexation of new 
territories inhabited chiefly by negroes with the present po- 
sition of the same people in the Southern States ? Are the 
blacks in the islands more worthy of the ballot than those 
who have grown up under Anglo-Saxon institutions? If 
not, why should they enjoy greater privileges? The dilem- 
ma is evident. And there are other considerations which 
cannot be left out of account. It must not be forgotten 
that Cuba, Porto Rico, San Domingo, and Panama belong 
to what we call Spanish America, and the United States 
cannot separate its dealings with them from the broad 
question of its relations with all the Latin republics of the 
western hemisphere. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 

AMONG all the foreign questions with which the govern- 
ment at Washington has to deal, none are of more far- 
reaching consequence than those that concern the relations 
of the United States with the different republics of Latin 
America. And none require more tact and patience in 
small matters or more clear-sightedness in large ones. 
The situation is in some respects new; for though the 
affairs of South America have always had a certain impor- 
tance for the northern power, and have called forth the 
most characteristic expression of its policy, the connection 
between the two continents has not been close until recent 
years. We can sum up the chief historical facts in a few 
words. 

As was natural, the inhabitants of the United States 
sympathized with the Latin Americans when they rose against 
the long-continued misgovernment of the mother country. 
The movement was a counterpart to their own successful 
revolution, and could not fail to enlist the approval of a 
! people who had fought for and won their freedom from 
European rule. Accordingly, they furnished volunteers to 
the insurgent armies, and they were the first to recognize 
officially the independence of the revolted Spanish colonies. 
The enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine was, it is true, 
made primarily in the interests of the United States, but it 
was at the same time an act of extreme friendliness to the 

281 



282 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

weak republics of the South. All this was logical, even if 
the two struggles for freedom were unlike in many ways 
and the parallel which has been drawn between George Wash- 
ington and Bolivar serves to bring out differences rather 
than resemblances. American sympathy, however, did not 
go far enough to produce a desire for joint action : witness 
the tardy and hesitating despatch of delegates from Wash- 
ington to the first attempt at a Pan-American Congress, the 
abortive conference of Panama in 1826. After this, for 
more than half a century relations, in most cases, were 
unimportant, amicable but distant. In general, the Anglo- 
Saxon republic, while protecting its weaker sisters in virtue 
of the Monroe Doctrine, has been content to leave them 
to their own devices, and most of its citizens have known 
little and cared less about what was going on in the terri- 
tories south of the isthmus. 

With Mexico, its immediate southern neighbor, the deal- 
ings of the United States have not been of a kind to reassure 
the other American republics, or make them desire its ap- 
proach. It is to be expected that Mexicans will never 
entirely forgive or forget the treatment they received, and 
that their fate will be held up as a warning to others. But 
there is no real reason for them to dread a repetition of the 
events of two generations ago. The Gadsden Purchase, 
following a territorial dispute, was not perhaps an entirely 
voluntary cession on the part of Mexico, but since that time 
the relations of the two republics have been untroubled and 
as cordial as could be hoped for. By compelling the with- 
drawal of the French troops who supported the Emperor 
Maximilian, the United States, while enforcing a principle 
whose maintenance it believed to be necessary to its own 
security, also did the Mexicans a service in freeing them 
from foreign domination. For that service it made no 
attempt to exact compensation. With the disappearance of 
slavery north of the Rio Grande, and with the increase of 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 283 

population and the achievement of order south of the river, 
the former causes of American aggression have disappeared. 
For forty years, Mexico, under the strong rule of President 
Diaz, has enjoyed a political tranquillity unknown in her 
previous history ; she is in a peaceful, prosperous condition, 
and on excellent terms with her northern sister. 

Central America has in the past attracted the attention 
of the United States chiefly by its proximity to the site 
of the future interoceanic canal. 1 Thus, the Americans 
supported the claims of Nicaragua against Great Britain 
for the possession of the Mosquito Coast, and long refused 
to recognize the English occupation of Belize/ They also 
did much negotiating with Nicaragua on their own account ; 
but this chapter of canal history has come to a close. 

The story of the political relations between the United 
States and the different republics of South America since 
the establishment of their independence is brief enough. 
In regard to Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay, there 
is nothing to be noted here. The Argentine Republic 
asserts that it has actually lost territory to a European power 
by American intervention, and has vainly demanded an 
indemnity therefor. In 1831, owing to the seizure of three 
American sailing vessels for violating fishing regulations in 
the Falkland Islands, the ship of war Lexington, sent by 
President Jackson, removed the Argentine colony settled 
there. Two years later the islands were occupied by Great 
Britain, which had claims upon them, and the Argentine 
Republic has ever since maintained that her loss of this 
possession was the direct consequence of American action. 

With Paraguay the United States had a more serious diffi- 
culty. In 1850 it was obliged to send an armed expedition 
to exact satisfaction for hostile treatment of a ship sailing 

1 Walker, the American filibuster, whose exploits as a would-be dictator 
were brought to an end by his execution in 1860, never obtained official 
countenance, though he had many partisans in the South. 



284 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

under' its flag in the Paraguay River, but this small show 
of force was enough to bring about a peaceful settlement 
of the affair. 

In the case of Brazil, we need only mention that in 1893, 
during a civil war, the American fleet present in the harbor 
of Rio Janeiro almost came into conflict with the Brazilian 
vessels which were blockading the port. As the Brazilian 
navy was then in the hands of the party who were in the 
end unsuccessful, harmony between the United States and 
Brazil was not disturbed. 

With Chile, the chief South American power on the 
Pacific, and one of the most enterprising on the continent, 
there have been a number of unfortunate incidents, due 
not to any necessary divergence of interests between 
Americans and Chileans, but to a succession of accidental 
circumstances. In 1881, the attempt of Secretary Blaine to 
moderate the demands of Chile after her triumphs over 
Bolivia and Peru angered the victorious belligerent. Ten 
years later it so happened that, during the civil war between 
President Balmaceda and the Chilean Congress, the Ameri- 
can minister in Santiago was friendly to Balmaceda, whereas 
the sympathy of most Europeans was on the side of the 
Congress. The affair of the Itata, in which the United 
States government was prepared to use force, if need be, to 
get back a fugitive vessel loaded with supplies for the troops 
of the Congress, increased the anger of that party, whose sub- 
sequent triumph gave the occurrence a semi-international 
character. While feeling in Chile was still sore on this sub- 
ject, a riot occurred in Valparaiso, in which sailors of the 
American cruiser Baltimore were attacked by a Chilean 
mob. An unsatisfactory correspondence ensued, till a 
circular note of the Chilean foreign minister, couched in 
undiplomatic language, led to an ultimatum from Wash- 
ington. Chile submitted, but the incident has rankled. 

When the United States supported Venezuela against 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 285 

Great Britain in 1895, the Latin Americans were jubilant 
over this defence of the Monroe Doctrine. Shortly after- 
wards, however, when war broke out between the United 
States and Spain, their emotions were conflicting. They 
sympathized with Cuba in her revolt, which was but the 
last of the series by which they had freed themselves 
from Spanish rule ; but on the whole, the bonds of com- 
mon language and civilization, and, still more, fear of the 
expansion of the all-too-powerful Anglo-Saxon republic, 
outweighed their enthusiasm for Cuba and for Pan-Ameri- 
can ideals. Their apprehension seemed to be justified by 
the annexation of Porto Rico, and again by the events 
that took place in Panama in 1904. It was not that they 
cared for Colombia rather than for her revolted province, 
but they were alarmed by the spectacle of the United 
States summarily getting rid of the opposition of a sister 
republic, abetting the dismemberment of her territory, and 
securing for itself practical sovereignty over the canal zone. 
Finally, the arrangement made with San Domingo, how- 
ever good the reasons were that might be urged in its 
defence, suggested a disguised protectorate, or one more 
step toward extending Anglo-Saxon sovereignty over Latin- 
American territory. 

In order to still the fears thus excited, the United States 
has repeated its assurances of friendly intentions, pointing 
out that, in Panama, all it has desired is the requisite con- 
trol of a canal which it is ready to build at its own expense 
for the benefit of the whole world ; and that in San Domingo 
it is endeavoring to maintain the independence of a bank- 
rupt state, threatened with foreign interference. But it 
| has had a more convincing argument than these : it has 
been able to dwell on the fact that the Americans, in spite 
,[j of all temptation to the contrary, kept their promise to 
evacuate Cuba, when the rest of the world believed they 
would never surrender so valuable a possession. Their 



286 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

faithfulness to this promise, though somewhat marred by 
the Piatt Amendment, did indeed produce an excellent 
effect in Latin America as well as in Europe. For some 
years the island was quiet and prosperous, presenting a 
spectacle they could well point to with pride as a refuta- 
tion of the charge that they coveted further territory in 
the New World. 

Under these circumstances, the recent troubles in Cuba 
have a significance that goes far beyond the immediate 
limits of the island. Much turns on the success of the ex- 
periment being tried there. We must remember that to-day 
people in the United States are hesitating over the question 
whether those of the so-called Latin-American countries in 
which there is a large proportion of colored blood are 
capable of satisfactory self-government. As long as this 
question remained an outside one, men did not need to 
make up their minds decidedly, one way or the other ; 
but with Porto Rico eager for statehood, and with the 
Philippines clamoring for independence or, at any rate, 
extensive autonomy, the matter has become pressing. 
President Roosevelt has recommended further privileges 
for Porto Rico, the first Philippine assembly has already 
met, and before long the American people must come to 
some decision about the future of these territories. Since 
the conditions in them are, in most respects, so nearly the 
same that what is true of one is likely to be so of the 
others, the conduct of the Cubans, who have been given 
a fair start, cannot help affecting public sentiment in the 
United States about the whole question of the ability of the 
Latin-American population of mixed blood to rule them- 
selves without disturbance. 

No fair-minded observer can doubt the honesty of Presi- 
dent Roosevelt's administration in its dealings with Cuban 
affairs. American troops were landed on the island only 
after the government collapsed, when it was obvious that 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 287 

something must be done to prevent anarchy ; and they will 
be withdrawn if there is a reasonable hope that the Cubans 
can keep the peace among themselves. The outlook, how- 
ever, is very discouraging; for though we may take for 
granted that the majority of the natives prefer indepen- 
dence, and may even be ready to fight for it, the property 
holders of all nationalities appear to desire a union with the 
United States, which would, they hope, bring them not only 
protection, but free access to the American markets, with 
resulting financial profit. The mass of the inhabitants — 
more of whom are of negro blood than are acknowledged 
as such in the statistics — are densely ignorant, they have 
the tradition of insurrection, and they live in a country in 
which sleeping out-of-doors is no hardship, and which, with 
its alternation of field and forest, mountain and plain, is 
ideally suited to guerilla warfare. To the insurgents who 
took part in the movement that caused the resignation of 
President Palma, the whole affair was one long picnic : for 
a month they lived at the expense of others ; they had no 
fighting to do ; and in the end they were allowed to keep for 
their own use the horses which they had appropriated, for 
it would have been worse than useless to try to get them 
back. And even if the masses are of themselves dis- 
posed to keep quiet, it is not inconceivable that some 
of the property holders may think it worth their while 
to stir them to mischief, in order to force American inter- 
vention. 

Feel about Cuba as we may, it is certain that the Ameri- 
can government will and must interfere in the event of a 
menace to the foreign property in the island. Not only are 
there probably more than one hundred and fifty million 
dollars' worth of American investments there, but there are 
English, German, French, and Spanish holdings of value, 
which cannot be left exposed to the whim of a few half-clad 
negroes who in a few hours can work vast damage. Already, 



288 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

before the troops were sent to Cuba this last time, several 
foreign governments had inquired at Washington what steps 
the United States was prepared to take. Now, no nation 
will go to the trouble and expense of continually occupying 
and then evacuating an unruly region. As history runs, 
we may wonder that the Americans ever evacuated Cuba 
at all. If they do it a second time, they will deserve still 
more credit. But if the Cubans rise in insurrection before 
the Americans leave, and have to be repressed, perhaps at 
the cost of a long and arduous campaign, or if they soon 
force the American army to return once more, the occu- 
pation may be a long one, and the days of Cuban inde- 
pendence numbered. 

The effect of the Cuban situation on public opinion in the 
United States is already evident. Those who have always 
declared that the abandonment of the island was a mistake, 
and that half-breed Latin Americans are incapable of gov- 
erning themselves, now repeat triumphantly, "I told you 
so." Others who have approved with some reservations 
the policy of Pan-Americanism, cannot help being con- 
firmed in their doubts. 

On the other hand, the Latin-American republics are dis- 
posed to accept the policy of the United States in Cuba 
as the touchstone of its sincerity. Annexation, however 
veiled, and however justified, could not fail to excite their 
fears. They would believe it to be dictated at bottom by 
greed and by lust of dominion, and would regard it as full 
of menace to themselves. They, too, are liable to internal 
troubles which might endanger the property of foreigners, 
and which could furnish reasons enough for intervention. 
In spite of the special circumstances which may demand 
that the Cubans should be treated as children who, for the 
moment at least, are incapable of taking care of themselves, 
the fact remains that whatever policy is adopted toward 
them will react, not only on Porto Rico and the Philippines, 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 289 

but on the whole of Latin America in its relation to the 
United States. 

By virtue of the Monroe Doctrine, even the weakest and 
the most disorderly of the American republics have hitherto 
been shielded against foreign aggression without having 
to render any service in return, whereas their protector, 
in the maintenance of the doctrine, has been called upon 
to meet without flinching the complications with European 
states which this policy has entailed. Of late, however, 
questions of a new order have arisen, which threaten to 
involve it in difficulties with its proteges rather than 
with the European powers. Secretary Olney declared 
in 1895 that the United States was "paramount" — 
whatever that may mean — on the American continent, 
and that it would defend its weaker sisters. This is all 
very well, but suppose — as has happened in the past — 
foreign nations have legitimate grievances to be righted. 
Then, of course, the United States does not pretend to inter- 
fere, unless the righting of these grievances leads to results 
that violate the Monroe Doctrine. But every dispute has 
two sides to it, with something to be said for each, and 
who is to determine which way the balance inclines? The 
United States has no desire to assume the position of ar- 
biter in matters of this kind, even if the other great powers 
were willing, as they are not, to recognize its right to pass 
judgment on every controversy between a European and an 
American country. And if it should act as arbiter, how 
would its decisions be carried out? Would the European 
plaintiff, if in the right, be allowed to take any method he 
pleased to enforce the verdict, or would the United States 
serve also as sheriff, and carry out its own decrees against 
refractory American republics? Neither prospect is at all 
alluring. 

President Roosevelt deserves praise for the admir- 
able way in which he has recognized and faced the dim- 



290 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

culties of the situation. In his message of February 7, 
1905, to the Senate, he declared: "It has for some time 
been obvious that those who profit by the Monroe Doctrine 
must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights 
which it confers, and that the same statement applies to 
those who uphold the doctrine. ... An aggrieved nation 
can, without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine, take 
what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes with 
American states, provided that action does not take the 
shape of interference with their form of government or of 
the despoilment of their territory under any disguise. But 
short of this, when the question is one of a money claim, the 
only way which remains, finally, to collect it is a blockade 
or bombardment or seizure of the custom-houses, and this 
means . . . what is in effect a possession, even though 
only a temporary possession of territory. The United 
States then becomes a party in interest, because under the 
Monroe Doctrine it cannot see any European power seize 
and permanently occupy the territory of one of these 
republics, and yet such seizure of territory, disguised or 
undisguised, may eventually offer the only way in which 
the power in question can collect any debts; unless there 
is interference on the part of the United States." Return- 
ing to the subject in his message of December 5, of the 
same year, he wrote : — 

"We must make it evident that we do not intend the 
Monroe Doctrine to be used by any nation on this continent 
as a shield to protect it from the consequences of its own 
misdeeds against foreign nations. If a republic to the south 
of us commits a tort against a foreign nation, such as an 
outrage against a citizen of that nation, then the Monroe 
Doctrine does not force us to interfere to prevent punish- 
ment of the tort, save to see that the punishment does not 
assume the form of territorial occupation in any shape. 
The case is more difficult when it refers to a contractual 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 291 

obligation. Our own government has always refused to 
enforce such contractual obligations on behalf of its citizens 
by an appeal to arms. 

"It is much to be wished that all foreign nations would 
take the same view. But they do not ; and in consequence 
we are liable at any time to be brought face to face with 
disagreeable alternatives. On the one hand, this country 
would certainly decline to go to war to prevent a foreign 
government from collecting a just debt ; on the other hand, 
it is very inadvisable to permit any foreign power to take 
possession, even temporarily, of the custom-houses of an 
American republic in order to enforce the payment of its 
obligations ; for such temporary occupation might turn into 
a permanent occupation. The only escape from these 
alternatives may at any time be that we must ourselves 
undertake to bring about some arrangement by which so 
much as possible of a just obligation shall be paid. It is 
far better that this country should put through such an 
arrangement, rather than allow any foreign country to 
undertake it." 

It will be noticed that the President emphasizes the dis- 
tinction between torts and contractual obligations, and rec- 
ognizes the right of the European powers to take action in 
the former cases. Indeed, unless the United States were to 
declare a protectorate over Latin America, this is the only 
tenable ground; for we cannot expect that any great self- 
respecting nation will submit to another's meddling in its 
disputes unless that other is willing squarely to accept all 
the responsibilities involved. But, in practice, the Presi- 
dent's distinction does not help much. Contractual dis- 
putes may easily be complicated by torts, 1 and it will be 
hard to make the American people appreciate the differ- 
ence between the two. They are inclined to view with 

1 For instance, the treatment by President Castro of the French Charge 
a'Affaires in Venezuela. 



292 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

increasing impatience and suspicion all military action 
of European powers in the New World, and yet they are 
unwilling to substitute themselves for the injured party. 
This is easy to understand. Apart from their natural disin- 
clination to put themselves out for matters which do not 
interest them, they know well that, if they undertake to en- 
force justice against a Latin- American delinquent, they will 
immediately be regarded as tyrants who, under cover of the 
Monroe Doctrine, are trying to become dominant over the 
whole western hemisphere. The role of forcible mediator 
is a most uncomfortable one. The Americans have shown 
a creditable willingness to defer to arbitration the contro- 
versies in which they themselves have been engaged, and 
they have good reason to desire that the practice should 
be adopted in all the disputes in which Latin America is 
concerned. Nothing could do more to relieve them of their 
present embarrassments. 

In the particular case with which President Roosevelt 
was dealing in his message, that of San Domingo, he recom- 
mended a remedy which consisted in playing the part of 
both judge and benevolent policeman. The American gov- 
ernment had brought about an agreement between San 
Domingo and her creditors as to the proportion of the 
Dominican customs-duties that should be devoted to settling 
their claims; and, in order to insure that the payments 
should really be made, American officials were appointed 
to take charge of the Dominican custom-house. The 
arrangement seems equitable enough in itself, and avoids 
immediate trouble. But who can blame the outside world, 
and especially the Latin Americans, for regarding it as a 
sort of disguised protectorate over San Domingo? No 
wonder that the Senate hesitated to approve the measure, 
which had to be twice modified before it was confirmed. 
No wonder, too, that it produced some disturbances in San 
Domingo itself, and although it is in active operation, has 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 293 

not yet been ratified there. If the next of the many Do- 
minican insurrections should start in the orthodox way with 
a seizure of the custom-house (the only place where there 
are available funds), the United States might be forced to 
act at once. It is easier to see the beginning than the end 
of such interventions. 

In its policy toward San Domingo the administration at 
Washington was doubtless influenced by the recollection of 
the blockade of Venezuelan ports in 1902. The incident 
had produced so great irritation in the United States 
that the international situation was, for a moment, pre- 
carious; and the outcome left American public opinion 
profoundly dissatisfied. The guarantee of thirty per cent 
of the Venezuelan customs to the creditor powers gives 
them a hold on the country which may be menacing; 
it also may easily lead to trouble with the native govern- 
ment. To make matters worse, the decision of the Hague 
Tribunal, granting priority to the claims of those nations 
which had taken steps to enforce them, was a distinct invi- 
tation to creditor powers to press their demands without 
delay, for fear of being forestalled by the action of others. 
It was to preclude another crisis of the sort that the San 
Domingo arrangement was entered into ; but the question 
arises, What next ? * 

The whole subject of the relations between debtor and 
creditor states is big with possibilities of trouble for the 
future. The modern development of capital among civil- 
ized nations, and its investment in all parts of the globe, 
have greatly complicated the situation; the more so, as 
international law has not yet expressed itself clearly on 
some of the points at issue. So far, strength alone has 

1 In the still unfinished dispute between France and Venezuela, it has 
looked as if France were remaining quiet on the assurance that the United 
States, which has grievances of its own against Venezuela, will not forget 
the French ones when the day of reckoning comes. 



294 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

decided such cases. Take, for instance, the question of re- 
pudiation. When a community has been strong enough, 
like the Ottoman Empire, or in a safe enough position, like 
some of the American states, to repudiate its debts, the 
creditors have had to suffer without redress ; when it has 
been weak, like Egypt, it has been exposed to the danger 
of seeing itself deprived of independence for the benefit of 
those who hold its bonds. If the Russian Empire were to 
go into bankruptcy to-day, France could do nothing to save 
herself from enormous loss ; but if Persia were to repudiate 
the debt she has contracted with English and Russian banks, 
she would be taken in hand at once. 

The matter of private investment in foreign lands is more 
difficult still. Civilized states have protected the interests 
of their citizens abroad by treaties insuring to them, as far 
as possible, the rights enjoyed by the native population. 
When they have had cause of complaint on this score, they 
have had to remain content with protests if opposed by 
equals, but if dealing with weaker or barbarous communi- 
ties, they have often resorted to force. Never have people 
been emigrating so freely as to-day ; never has capital been 
invested in foreign lands to the same extent ; hence op- 
portunities for conflicts are being multiplied. At present, 
owing to the disappearance, within a generation, of many 
Asiatic and African states where Europe has had to inter- 
fere in the past, danger from those quarters is less to be 
feared. It is in some of the Latin-American countries 
that we meet the conditions best suited to produce inter- 
national difficulties of a financial kind, frequently compli- 
cated by ill-treatment of resident foreigners. When we 
find an ignorant mixed population, a government con- 
sisting of a few greedy politicians grouped about a dic- 
tator soon to be overthrown by some rival and his band, 
and this in regions whose splendid natural resources in- 
evitably tempt foreign capital, which is now scanning the 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 295 

whole world for chances of profitable investment, we have 
almost ideal conditions for trouble. What makes matters 
worse is that the parties to such a dispute are often not 
those who made the original transaction. An irresponsible 
Eastern prince or Latin-American president may profit by 
his brief lease of power to conclude a loan with foreign 
bankers on terms which constitute a crushing burden for 
the future of the unfortunate people over whom he is mo- 
mentarily ruling. He disappears, and they are left to pay 
the bill. On the other side, a group of shady capitalists, 
advancing money under these circumstances, will hasten to 
unload their bonds on the unsuspecting public of investors, 
to whom the transaction is represented as a reasonable and 
normal one. The debtor country objects to suffering in- 
definitely for the caprices of some conscienceless Khedive, 
as in Egypt, or dictator, as in parts of Latin America; 
but the state where the bond-holders reside feels obliged 
to do its utmost to protect the interests of its citizens, 
who have believed that their legitimate investment was 
guaranteed by the honor of an established government. 
It is notorious, too, that the decisions of the courts of some 
Latin-American states, owing to corruption or to subservi- 
ence to the Executive, cannot be accepted as final by the 
rest of the world. To cap the climax, in some of these 
same countries legislation has been made, forbidding for- 
eigners to appeal to their home governments for protection. 
All this helps to make the outlook rather discouraging from 
the point of view of the United States, which is trying to 
keep the peace without shielding the wrong-doer. 

The last few years have witnessed the birth of the so-called 
Drago Doctrine, according to which all states should be 
forbidden by international law from collecting debts from 
one another by force. As was to be expected, this prin- 
ciple has met with much scorn in Europe, but has been 
hailed as a new gospel by many Latin-American countries. 



296 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

There may well be two opinions as to its inherent justice. 
If, after many centuries of contention, the world has not yet 
made up its mind as to the exact limits of the rights of 
debtors and creditors among individuals, we need not 
expect any prompt agreement when in the place of individ- 
uals we have states, or collections of individuals, often less 
responsible than are private citizens. The Latin-American 
republics look at the question from their point of view, that 
of comparatively weak communities owing money. It is 
not surprising that at the recent conference of Rio Janeiro, 
many of the delegates desired to see the new creed adopted 
by the powers represented, and above all by the United 
States. 

The position of the latter is delicate. It is evident 
that it would be relieved of much responsibility if the 
European powers were prevented by international law 
from trying to compel American republics to pay their 
debts. Incidents like the latest Venezuela one would then 
be impossible, and the burden of the Monroe Doctrine would 
be appreciably lightened. But, as we know, the United 
States is becoming more and more a creditor itself, and 
its interests are not in favor of protecting irresponsible 
debtors. In the course of time, if Pan-American dreams 
are realized, it may have more money than any other coun- 
try invested in the domains of the sister republics, and in 
that case it will be more solicitous than any other that such 
investments receive fair treatment. At Rio Janeiro its rep- 
resentatives carefully avoided expressing an opinion on the 
Drago Doctrine, which was referred to The Hague. There 
its commissioners succeeded in putting through a resolu- 
tion — one of the few tangible achievements of the Con- 
ference — that no nation should attempt to collect debts by 
force till arbitration had been tried and had failed. 

As far as it goes the principle is sound, and its adop- 
tion at this juncture was a brilliant stroke of diplomacy. 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 297 

The debtor Latin-American states, while not obtaining all 
they wanted, did acquire a certain protection for cases in 
which they should act in good faith, and the creditor Euro- 
pean powers did not abdicate the right to enforce the pay- 
ment of claims justly due them, but only consented to try 
peaceable means first. The United States was able to ap- 
pear as the friend of both, and of abstract justice, without 
having to commit itself in one way or the other on the 
theories of Senor Drago. 

If, at the time of the promulgation of the Monroe Doc- 
trine, it appeared to Americans that the New World differed 
from the Old chiefly in being the home of free governments 
in contrast to the lands ruled by the principle of authority, 
to-day, at the opening of the twentieth century, one of the 
main distinctions between Latin America and western 
Europe is that between debtor and creditor nations, but 
the interests of the Anglo-Saxon republic are no longer 
entirely on the side of the former. 

Secretary Root's declaration in Rio Janeiro that the 
United States "does not and will not collect private debts," 
though received with enthusiasm as meaning adherence to 
the Drago idea, does not dispose of the question. We may 
be sure that the United States will do its best to protect the 
property of its citizens wherever circumstances so demand. 
The causes which have forced it to intervention in Cuba 
would lead to similar action in Haiti or Nicaragua, if 
American interests there were of equal magnitude ; and it 
would never tolerate either wanton destruction or confis- 
cation, even if confiscation were sanctioned by the verdict 
of some Latin-American court. Already, American invest- 
ments in Mexico are so great that we cannot conceive that 
the government at Washington would remain inactive in 
case they were menaced; and what is true of Mexico 
to-day may be equally so of Venezuela to-morrow. As 
matters stand, if the United States should formally accept 



298 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

the Drago Doctrine, it could not be with the understand- 
ing that it was thereby precluded from defending the 
large present and prospective interests of its citizens in the 
regions in which it is so eager to promote them to-day. 
And, on the other hand, we must not forget that, from the 
Latin-American point of view, the intervention of the 
United States would be regarded as perhaps more dangerous 
to the independence of the southern republics than that of 
any European power, and that forcible measures against one 
would almost certainly alarm them all. Even such salutary 
discipline as compelling the turbulent little communities of 
Central America to keep the peace with one another must 
be enforced with all possible tact, and the United States 
government has been wisely inspired in seeking the coop- 
eration of Mexico in its recent efforts in this direction. 

The idea that all the republics of the New World should 
draw closer together was first taken up with energy by 
Secretary Blaine. In many ways it is a development of 
the Monroe Doctrine, — one to which Bolivar had already 
tried to give premature expression. We may say that 
Pan-Americanism, as the conception is usually called, is 
based on two considerations. The first is the sentimental 
one, which is dwelt upon chiefly on state occasions. It 
proclaims the natural community of ideals and aspirations 
of the American republics. This community, be it remem- 
bered, applies only to the self-governing nations of English 
or Latin tongue : it was applicable to Brazil when it had just 
ceased to be a monarchy, and to Cuba when it became in- 
dependent of Spain, but it does not apply to Canada even 
now, although the Dominion, if we take into account its 
Arctic domains, is the largest of all American states. 

The second consideration is of a more practical nature, of 
a kind to appeal not merely to enthusiasts, but to hard- 
headed business men. In spite of natural sympathies, of the 
workings of the Monroe Doctrine, and other forces of the 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 299 

sort, the trade between the Anglo-Saxon republic and the 
Latin ones of the western hemisphere has been, and is, 
unreasonably small. European critics declare that South 
America, a new country, has preferred intercourse with 
those lands from which she has had most to gain, the 
lands of historical traditions and aged civilization, rather 
than with a new and comparatively crude nation in much 
the same state as herself. The American explanation is, 
of course, different. It is, in substance, that the manufac- 
turers and merchants of the United States have been so 
busy elsewhere that they have neglected the regions to the 
south of them. Without denying that there is some truth 
in each of these theories, we may accept as more satisfactory 
the explanation that, until lately, the United States has been 
an exporter almost entirely of raw materials, many of which 
South America either possesses herself, or has not felt the 
lack of. American wheat is not needed in Argentina, nor 
can it be expected to compete in the long run with the 
wheat of Argentina in the markets of Brazil. And South 
American industry has not been sufficient in the past 
to make much demand on the United States for cotton. 
But to-day conditions are changed ; for the manufacturing 
industries of the United States have developed, and are 
developing, at such a rate that the Americans are not afraid 
to meet their European rivals in almost any branch of trade. 
It was to be expected that they should turn their gaze to 
the southern half of their own hemisphere, where, as yet, 
they are only beginning to get a good commercial foot- 
hold, but where the future appears to offer them golden 
opportunities. Why should the American merchant leave 
this splendid field to be exploited by the Englishman or the 
German ? Is it not the plain duty of his government to aid 
and encourage his enterprise in every possible way ? As for 
the easy sneer that Pan-Americanism combines business 
and sentimentality, we may answer that the same is true 



300 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

of most national friendships, as well as of many private 
ones. An obvious initial step to bring about amity between 
people, especially in these modern days, is to bind them 
by commercial ties which shall be to the advantage of 
both. 

The first Pan-American Congress was held at Washington 
in the winter of 1889-1890. It lasted many weeks, some 
of which were devoted to a special trip for the purpose of 
showing the United States to the Latin delegates. Numer- 
ous speeches were made, and expressions of good-will were 
freely exchanged. In so far as the object of the Conference 
was to promote harmonious relations, it may be called suc- 
cessful; but its concrete achievements were not imposing. 
All thought of a customs-union was soon abandoned, and 
most of the various resolutions and recommendations that 
were passed did not lead to action on the part of the gov- 
ernments represented. The most definite creation of the 
Congress was the Bureau of American Republics, an institu- 
tion which has had a career of modest usefulness. At its 
headquarters in Washington it has gathered a library of 
some fourteen thousand volumes ; it has published, besides 
its regular bulletins, a series of monographs on the conditions 
and the resources of the different Latin-American countries, 
and also a commercial directory. So far, its work has been 
chiefly that of a bureau of information. 

In accordance with the spirit of the Congress as well as 
with Secretary Blaine's own policy, the Secretary and his 
successors negotiated a number of reciprocity treaties with 
different Latin-American states ; but the moment chosen 
was an unfortunate one. The McKinley Tariff Bill, by 
which the American government committed itself to a 
principle of extreme protection, was just going into effect, 
and the highly protected industries had no thought of allow- 
ing their profits to suffer for the sake of promoting friend- 
ship and closer relations with Latin America. So strong 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 301 

was their influence that these treaties, like certain later 
ones with European countries, fell to the ground without 
even being submitted to the Senate for ratification. The 
manufacturer in the United States means to conquer the 
Latin-American market, if possible, but he does not intend 
to sacrifice any of his own advantages, if he can help himself. 
This attitude is comprehensible, but it limits the ideal of 
Pan-Americanism. After the high hopes that had been 
cherished, and the exaggerated language in which enthu- 
siasts had indulged, such a result was meagre. Foreign 
writers proclaimed the whole movement a fiasco, and 
they have joyfully held that opinion ever since, although 
each new congress has awakened fresh trepidation. Some 
Americans, on the other hand, have attempted to conceal 
the smallness of the results by fine language about the 
moral effect produced by the conferences and the affection 
which the republics of the New World have come to enter- 
tain for one another. Stripped of rhetoric, this view has 
some truth in it : the Pan-American congresses have tended 
to produce good feeling between the United States and its 
sister republics. Even the actual creations have been of 
value, if for nothing else, as stepping-stones toward future 
progress. But progress has been slow. The second Con- 
gress, that of Mexico, in 1901-1902, accomplished very little. 
When the third meeting was called in Rio Janeiro in 1906, 
men had profited by experience. In a session which lasted 
but six weeks this Congress achieved more than its pre- 
decessors. Avoiding general discussions, it did its real work 
in committees, and, laying aside all ambitious dreams, it 
confined itself to a modest programme of practical objects 
which were attainable. 

The Bureau of American Republics was made an 
executive organization, entitled to correspond with the 
different American governments ; to call their attention to 
the necessity of ratifying treaties or recommendations, — 



302 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

in general, to take action in Pan-American matters. The 
Bureau will also prepare the programmes for future Con- 
gresses, its scope as purveyor of information is to be 
enlarged, and it is to make investigations of common 
American interests. It is to have a building of its own, 
which, thanks to a private gift, is to be a considerable 
one, and which will probably become a club for Latin 
Americans in the city of Washington. Each of the gov- 
ernments represented has been called upon to appoint for 
its country a permanent Pan-American commission, and 
certain bureaus dealing with special subjects are to be 
established in some of the South American cities. Even 
this total is not startling, but it represents distinct prog- 
ress. In connection with the Congress, Secretary Root's 
journey to South America made an excellent impression, 
and one can only regret that the unfortunate outbreak 
in Cuba which threatened to undo much of what he had 
accomplished, occurred even before he got home. To sum 
up, we can say that the Pan-American movement, which 
is being wisely kept within moderate limits, has so far 
achieved satisfactory if not brilliant results, and promises 
well for the future. 

Many foreigners have declared that Pan- Americanism 
is nothing but militant Monroeism and the beginning of 
an attempt to impose Yankee domination, political and 
commercial, on the whole western hemisphere. Kindliness 
is not to be looked for in the judgments of those who 
feel that their interests are menaced by unwelcome com- 
petition, and we may expect that most Europeans will 
regard this part of the policy of the United States as 
a cloak for covert designs. We also need not wonder 
that many people in the Latin-American republics enter- 
tain suspicions of the same kind. No fair-minded observer 
can, however, deny that the aims of Pan-Americanism 
have so far been legitimate, and the means of carrying 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 303 

them out unobjectionable. Like the Triple Alliance or the 
entente cordiale, Pan-Americanism can claim that it is not 
directed against any one, but is an association for mutual 
benefit, of which no one has a right to complain. It is 
the business of other nations to make the most, in their 
turn, of such ties as may be beneficial to themselves. 

This is true as far as it goes, but though in theory the 
commerce of Latin America may develop to such an extent 
that all the peoples trading there may sell more goods than 
they do at present, in practice some of them are likely to 
suffer by competition. It would therefore be idle to pretend 
that American rivalry in these regions is not a menace to 
the commerce of several European countries. This may be 
deplored by the philanthropist, but in the present stage of 
industrial competition it seems unavoidable. If my shop 
sells better or cheaper goods than any other, my rivals are 
likely to be disagreeably affected, but not through my fault. 
All we can ask is that competition shall be fair. Among 
nations, reciprocity treaties with mutual concessions are re- 
garded as within the rights of all. If the European powers 
were to join together in a customs-union, the United States 
would have no ground for protest, even if it suffered by the 
combination; but it would be perfectly justified in trying 
to detach any member from that union, just as Germany 
is at liberty to make a better commercial treaty than the 
United States, if she can. In many cases the odds are not 
all on one side ; for instance, it is not probable that Ameri- 
can friendship will lead Mexico and Argentina to forget that 
Spain was their mother country, any more than there is an 
immediate prospect that the literary and aesthetic standards 
of New York will supplant those of Paris at Rio Janeiro or 
Buenos Ayres. 

The gravest difficulties in the way of Pan-American- 
ism are those which are inherent in the social and politi- 
cal conditions of the New World itself. To begin with, 



304 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

although such topics are avoided in public discussion, it is 
useless to blink the fact that the average citizens of the 
United States and of the Latin-American republics are 
not overcongenial to one another. There are, of course, 
numerous exceptions to this rule, but not enough to affect 
the general truth that the people of the United States 
have a rough contempt for the Latin Americans, espe- 
cially when they are of mixed blood, and the latter sus- 
pect and dislike their Anglo-Saxon brothers. To the Latin 
Americans, the Yankee frequently appears brutal, egotis- 
tical, arrogant, and lacking in appreciation of the aesthetic 
side of civilization. To the citizen of the United States, 
his Southern neighbors, when he stops to think of them at 
all, often seem vain, childish, and, above all, incompetent 
to maintain decent self-government. Time and better 
acquaintance will, let us hope, do much to eradicate these 
mutual prejudices; but we must recognize, as one of the 
obstacles to good feeling to-day, the fact that the two races 
do not find it easy to understand and appreciate each other. 
In Paris, for instance, where there is a large colony of both, 
they seldom flock together : both have far more to do with 
the French than with one another. We must remember, 
however, that comparatively few people of the Anglo-Saxon 
republic and the Latin-American ones come into actual 
contact, hence their lack of natural affinities may not prove 
a serious obstacle to good relations. Then, too, nations 
can esteem those of very different character from themselves : 
the great masses on both sides do not know each other suffi- 
ciently to appreciate how much they differ. 

It is the political suspicion which many Latin Americans 
entertain of their Northern neighbors, and which Europeans 
will always be ready to keep alive, that is perhaps the greatest 
bar to closer connections. Without paying attention to irre- 
sponsible writers who have declared that it is the destiny 
of the United States to rule the whole western hemisphere, 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 305 

and without questioning the sincerity of the American people 
any more than that of the government at Washington in seek- 
ing the friendship of the Latin- American countries, we must, 
nevertheless, admit that thi6 suspicion is not without foun- 
dation. History shows that the close association of weak 
states and strong ones may be dangerous, sooner or later, 
to the independence of the former. At the present moment, 
the United States, as regards strength, is in somewhat the 
same position as was Prussia toward the other members of 
the German Zollverein, that is to say, it has a larger popula- 
tion, greater actual wealth, more available resources, — in 
a word, is stronger in almost every respect, not only than any 
one of the Latin American republics, but than all of them put 
together. Such a disproportion is formidable to the weaker 
states, and though with the growth of Argentina and 
Brazil it will diminish before long, the day when any likely 
combination of the Latin republics will be the equal of 
the Anglo-Saxon one is still far ahead. We must admit, 
too, that the history of the growth of the United States is 
not entirely reassuring to the Latin Americans; in par- 
ticular the story of the Mexican War will always frighten 
them. With such fears in their minds, they are prone to 
; scrutinize closely each act of their powerful neighbor, to 
i take offence at any semblance of a slight to their dignity, 
I and to view with angry alarm every step which can in 
1 any way be interpreted as menacing to their independence. 
! Incidents which in the United States have hardly attracted 
: a moment's attention, careless words of public men to 
! which people at home have never thought of attaching 
' weight, — these, repeated abroad and magnified, are capable 
of producing among a sensitive people a resentment danger- 
ous to all friendly relations. To make matters worse, public 
j men in the United States, as well as private citizens, are by 
! disposition notoriously reckless of possible consequences of 
[ their words and deeds, and often quite indifferent to the 



306 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

opinion of any persons but those to whom their remarks are 
immediately addressed. 

American statesmen who have been trying to bring about 
better relations between the countries of the New World 
appreciate all this, and are aware that the first task for 
the government at Washington must be to convince the 
Latin Americans that they have nothing to fear. This was 
one object of the circular voyage of Secretary Root already 
mentioned. In his speech at Rio Janeiro he declared, with 
equal tact and emphasis: "We deem the independence and 
equal rights of the smallest and weakest members of the 
family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of 
the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that 
respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression 
of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights or 
privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every 
American Republic." This idea Americans will have to 
repeat without ceasing if they wish to dispel the suspicions 
which their superior strength cannot help exciting. They 
will also have to act in such a manner that their conduct 
shall not give cause to doubt the sincerity of their words. 

For their part, enlightened Latin Americans find much 
to admire and imitate in the history, institutions, and char- 
acter of their Northern neighbors ; they admit that they owe 
a debt of gratitude to the United States for protection in the 
past, and they realize that the intention of its government 
is excellent. On the other hand, they are beginning to feel 
pretty well able to defend themselves against European 
attacks, which they do not now dread as much as they do 
North American preponderance. They are very touchy on 
the subject of their own dignity, and they wish to see their 
nations treated on an equal footing with all others. Per- 
haps the most important result of the recent Congress at 
The Hague was the new prominence it has given to the Latin- 
American countries. They appeared there not at all as 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 307 

quiet followers in the train of the United States: on the 
contrary, they assumed an independent attitude, — one 
that on certain occasions brought them into open collision 
with the United States in a way ill-suited to further the 
cause of Pan-Americanism. We may consider them as 
having for the first time thoroughly established their equal- 
ity and obtained a recognized status in world politics. They 
are ceasing to feel the need of a protector, much less of a 
guardian. 

Against Pan-Americanism some persons in the southern 
republics have set up the standard of Pan-Iberianism, in 
furtherance of which a congress was held, in 1904, in Madrid. 
In the course of eloquent speeches, former feuds were con- 
signed to oblivion, bonds of blood and language were exalted, 
and the dangers of Anglo-Saxon predominance were more 
than hinted at. Yet nothing more practical than a flow of 
soul was sought for, and so far, the first effusion has had 
no successor. Pan-Iberianism is a comprehensible ideal, 
and we can understand why many a man in Mexico or 
Chile should prefer it to Pan-Americanism: many people 
in the United States care more about friendship with Great 
Britain than with the sister republics. But however elevated 
a sentiment in itself, Pan-Iberianism scarcely belongs to the 
domain of practical politics. Close alliance with Spain and 
Portugal would do little to fortify the Latin-American 
countries against the United States. Though nothing can 
be more proper than that they should do all they can to 
strengthen the intellectual and moral ties which bind them 
to their old mother countries, their salvation must come from 
themselves. 

When we come to examine in detail the present dealings 
of the separate Latin-American republics with the Anglo- 
Saxon one, and the outlook for the future, we perceive that 
underneath a certain general resemblance in the relations 
there are great differences, and that these are likely to in- 



308 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

crease rather than to diminish. Without entering into the 
considerations affecting each particular case, we may divide 
these republics into three or four groups as regards their 
connection with the United States. 

The most important of these groups is composed of four 
states — Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. Together 
they include two-thirds of the South American continent, 
and almost the whole of its non-tropical portion. They 
have great undeveloped resources, nearly three-quarters of 
the total population, and nineteen-twentieths of the white 
blood ; and with the exception of Chile, they are receiving 
a large immigration, that ought to continue. They are 
modern organized communities, which, if not yet free from 
the danger of revolutions such as have troubled them in 
the past, at least seem to be settling down to orderly gov- 
ernment and good progress, and, individually or in com- 
bination, they should be able to take care of themselves, 
and to play their fair part in the world. To all intents 
and purposes, they are about as far from the United 
States as from Europe, so far, in fact, that some persons 
maintain that it is absurd to include them in the scope 
of the Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless, the doctrine is 
certainly an advantage to them, for it insures them against 
perils to which, owing to the presence of many foreigners 
within their borders, they might otherwise be exposed. 
The Americans, on their side, hope for better relations. 
The United States which to-day receives more than half 
of the exports of Brazil furnishes in return only about 
eleven per cent of its imports, — less than Germany, and 
far less than Great Britain. Even in the case of Chile, 
which after the completion of the Panama Canal will be 
much nearer than it now is to the eastern coast, there 
is, in spite of past difficulties, no ground for permanent 
estrangement ; the disputes of a few years ago were due 
to chance events, not to permanent opposition of inter- 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 309 

est. As for Brazil and Argentina, unless they compromise 
their future through some fault of their own, they should 
enjoy before long a much more prominent international posi- 
tion than they have to-day. And none of these four south- 
ern republics need entertain the slightest fear of their North 
American sister. 

Since Paraguay and Bolivia have no sea-coast, it is not 
likely that the United States will ever have very much to 
do with them. 

The northern republics of South America, those of Cen- 
tral America, and the two insular ones of Haiti and San 
Domingo may, for convenience, be grouped together; they 
differ in size and population, but they have many char- 
acteristics in common : all are situated in the tropics 
and have but few white inhabitants compared with the 
colored ; all have been the homes of revolution ; most are 
burdened with debt, and in danger of financial disputes 
with foreign creditors. Although they have in their splen- 
did natural resources a promise of better days, they are 
not making rapid progress at present, and they attract but 
little immigration. Here are the lands that threaten to 
make trouble for the United States, which has come into 
more immediate contact with them since it has established 
itself in the waters of the Caribbean Sea, and will come 
into closer contact still when the Panama Canal is completed. 
In none of them are the governments stable enough as yet 
to give permanent assurance of law and order, and several 
are likely at almost any moment to break the peace, or to 
become involved in dispute with European nations whose 
citizens have made investments in their territories. The 
United States may at any time be called upon, as it has 
already been in San Domingo, to perform police duty the 
ultimate consequences of which will be hard to limit. A 
first task will be to keep the peace between them. This 
applies particularly to Central America, whose miniature 



310 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

states are ready to fly at each other's throats with or with- 
out provocation. The time will soon be past when small 
nations in any part of the world will be allowed to settle 
their quarrels by force : this will become a privilege of those 
countries which are strong enough to fight, not only their 
immediate enemy, but whoever tries to stop them. Just as 
Europe would not tolerate to-day hostilities between, let us 
say, Holland and Portugal, so very soon America will com- 
pel the smaller Latin- American states to live at peace, 
whether they like it or not. It is here, if anywhere, that 
the "big stick" of the United States should be used when 
the occasion demands. 

The republic of Mexico must be considered by itself. 
Along a boundary of many hundred miles it is in direct 
proximity to a far stronger power, and such a position can- 
not be quite free from danger, — a danger which the mem- 
ories of the Mexican War will never allow to be quite 
forgotten. It is a land in which the native Indian ele- 
ment is more numerous than the white, and which as yet 
attracts but few foreigners. Its resources are extraordinary, 
as American capitalists have of late been discovering. 
Although the American colony in the country numbers less 
than fifty thousand (not one-third of one per cent of the 
population), more than half the imports of Mexico are 
from the United States, nearly three-quarters of its ex- 
ports go there, and the investment of American capital in 
Mexican enterprises of many sorts is already very exten- 
sive, and likely to increase. It cannot be denied that this 
peaceful taking possession constitutes a peril to the inde- 
pendence of the Mexican republic. Not that the American 
capitalists are working in favor of annexation, — on the 
contrary, they are well satisfied with conditions as they are ; 
but if Mexico were to fall back again into her old slough 
of revolutions, and especially if these were complicated by 
anti-foreign policy, we may feel sure that, in view of the 



THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 311 

immense interests involved, intervention from the North 
would come sooner or later. It would be the story of Cuba 
again on a larger scale. The best, indeed the only, way 
for Mexico to avoid this peril, is to maintain orderly govern- 
ment. For more than a generation now she has been 
peaceful, in striking contrast to her condition at earlier 
periods in the history of the country. Whether this 
stability is permanent or not, it is still too soon to say ; it 
is so much the work of one man. Not until some time after 
President Diaz has disappeared from the scene, can we 
judge whether the order which he has established will be 
lasting. As long as it holds, Mexico need have little fear, 
for the United States is not meditating unprovoked aggres- 
sion against her. 

Stable government is the first condition which all the Latin- 
American republics must accept, if they wish to keep clear 
of difficulties. The more responsible they become, the more 
they will win the respect of the world, and the more secure 
they will be against interference from outside. They have, 
too, another means of self-defence which no one could deny 
them, and which might go far to insure their safety : they 
can combine into larger units. Although these new countries 
could treat with the United States more as equals than their 
individual components are able to do now, American public 
opinion, far from opposing such unions, would regard them 
as thoroughly sensible ; for nothing could be further from 
its conceptions than the idea of playing one Latin-American 
power against another, or of fearing any combination of 
them. The North American republic is too conscious of 
its own strength to stoop to thoughts of this kind. If, for 
instance, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay should unite 
with Argentina; if the old United States of Colombia 
should be reconstructed to include, as once before, Vene- 
zuela and Ecuador, with the possible addition of Peru ; 
if the Central American republics should at last succeed in 



312 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

forming a stable federation, and perhaps joining with Mexico ; 
Latin America would then consist of a few large states, each 
of sufficient importance to claim a dignified place in the 
modern world, and to be safe against aggression on the 
part of any outside power. It is one of the clearest proofs 
of the political backwardness of the Latin-American peo- 
ple, as well as an unfortunate inheritance of Spanish 
temperament, that where there are so many essential sim- 
ilarities between them, they persist in political divisions 
which are but historical accidents. In spite of the obstacles 
in the way of such combinations as the above, — the diffi- 
culties of communication, diversity of interest, inherited 
feuds and jealousies, — we may hope that some day the 
natural forces which make for union will prevail. The 
formation of these larger Latin republics would be ap- 
plauded by the world, and by no country more cordially 
than by the United States. Their birth would relieve it 
of cares from which it would gladly be free. 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC 

IN the days when the Americans first assumed their place 
among nations, neither they nor others foresaw how 
soon they would turn their attention towards the distant 
Pacific Ocean, and play a leading part on its shores. Not 
only had they no territory there, but they did not even 
send their first exploring party across the continent until 
nearly a generation later. The thirteen original states were 
all situated on the North Atlantic. Boston was farther 
in actual time from China or Japan than were London and 
Paris, or St. Petersburg ; and yet, scarcely had the treaty 
of peace with Great Britain been signed, when American 
vessels made their way to the South Seas. Since then, 
in a century and a quarter, the United States has ac- 
quired a coast line of some thousand miles on the eastern 
side of the Great Ocean, it has established itself firmly in 
the middle and in the west, and has proclaimed to the 
world its dream of the dominion of the whole. In all 
history such momentous changes have rarely taken place in 
so short a time. 

If we examine the reason why American ships penetrated 
so early into these remote waters, we find that their hardi- 
hood is easier to explain than it would seem at first glance. 
The people of New England had been active in com- 
mercial and maritime affairs in the old days of British 
rule. As colonists, they had carried on a thriving trade, 
much of which was closed to them when they became 
foreigners, cut off by the English shipping laws from their 
former privileges. They were too energetic not to look 

313 



314 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

elsewhere for compensation. Like Scandinavia, if in less 
measure, their rocky, wooded country, with its severe 
climate and many excellent harbors, afforded little tempta- 
tion to agriculture, but pushed its inhabitants to ship- 
building and a maritime life. In 1784, within a year after 
the conclusion of peace with Great Britain, the first 
American vessel reached Canton. 1 So successful were its 
operations that, two years later, the number of ships from the 
United States had risen to five, and three years after that to 
fifteen, a number exceeded by those from Great Britain only. 
The situation was indeed very favorable to the Ameri- 
cans in their commerce with the Far East, and though 
they encountered many risks and hardships, they reaped 
enormous profits, for they had marked advantages over 
their rivals. The English were hampered by the fact 
that their China trade was in the hands of the East India 
Company, which did not deal in furs, the most profit- 
able articles that could be sold in China. The French and 
others soon suffered by the European wars which broke out 
in 1792 and lasted until 1815. The Russians, who had almost 
a monopoly of the fur trade in the Northern Pacific, were 
fettered by the Chinese regulations which excluded them 
from Canton, and confined their commerce to Kiakhta on the 
borders of Mongolia. In consequence, the furs they had 
obtained were obliged to make a long, expensive journey 
overland before they even crossed the Chinese frontier. 
The Americans were free from such restrictions. After 
killing their fur-bearing animals in the South Seas or on 
the northwest coast of America, or, oftener still, buying the 
skins from the natives, they sold them at Canton, and re- 
turned home with a cargo of tea, silks, and other valuable 
Chinese goods. In 1801 we find them importing into Can- 
ton four hundred and twenty-seven thousand sealskins 

1 During the last part of its voyage, it was escorted and aided by two 
French men-of-war, which it had met on its way. 



THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC 315 

alone, besides skins of otter and other animals. It is true 
their own country did not as yet produce much that the Chi- 
nese wanted, nor was it rich in gold and silver; but some 
vessels carried goods which they were able to dispose of in 
Persia or the Indies, where they loaded up with others that 
found a market in China. 

In their wanderings through the length and breadth of 
the Pacific Ocean, American skippers felt the need of a 
convenient stopping-place where they could repair damages 
to their craft, dry the skins they had on board, and pass 
the worst of the winter months. As a haven of this kind, no 
place was so well situated as the Hawaiian Islands, which 
had been discovered by Captain Cook in 1778. So obvious 
were their attractions, with their equable climate, gentle 
natives, and plentiful resources, that Cook's successor, 
Vancouver, found Americans already located there in 1792. 
The newcomers soon discovered a fresh source of profit for 
their commerce. Sandalwood was abundant in the islands, 
and as it was much in demand among the Chinese, the 
Americans exported it in large quantities. From the first, 
they were the largest and most influential foreign element 
in Hawaii, which they looked upon as, in a way, their own 
domain. Thus, by one means or another, their trade in 
the Pacific grew, till, within a few years of the time when 
they made their appearance there, it formed an im- 
portant part of the national commerce, and their influence 
had become dominant in the only convenient stopping- 
place in mid-ocean. 

Overland their progress was slower, for they did not 
cross the continent until 1803, and Astoria, their first trad- 
ing station on the Pacific, was swept away by the War of 
1812. When peace was restored, they returned, and in 
time their numbers increased. It was not, however, until 
the compromise treaty of 1846 that they secured undis- 
puted possession of the whole territory south of the forty- 



316 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

ninth parallel. California they took from Mexico just before 
the discovery of gold, which brought into it such a rush of 
population that it soon became a full-fledged state. Never- 
theless, until the completion of the first transcontinental 
railway, California was in many respects more like a distinct 
self-governing colony than an integral part of the republic. 
To-day the Pacific coast is bound to the rest of the Union 
by five lines of rail, the land behind it is no longer vacant, 
and though the Pacific States retain certain characteristics 
of their own, they are not a detached portion of the country, 
but the western front. As their resources develop and their 
population increases, the United States will be assured an 
ever firmer position on the Great Ocean. Without Alaska, 
the actual Pacific coast-line of the republic is shorter than 
that of Chile, but it is backed by a much larger territory, 
and it faces directly towards China and Japan, instead of 
towards the South Sea Islands. The acquisition of Alaska 
has nipped in the bud Canadian rivalry in this part of 
the world, and when the Panama Canal shall have brought 
the Atlantic and Gulf coasts into easy communication by 
water with the Pacific, through a passage which the United 
States can close at will, its situation will be unassailable. 
Even the unfortunate break in continuity caused by British 
Columbia does not seriously weaken its strength. 

Toward the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, when the fur-bearing animals had become less abun- 
dant and the sandalwood of Hawaii was almost exhausted, 
American vessels in the Pacific began to devote them- 
selves chiefly to whaling, an occupation which they had 
followed in the days when the colonies belonged to Great 
Britain. Hawaii, however, remained as important a centre 
as ever for resting and refitting. In 1822, twenty-four 
whaling vessels were in the harbor of Honolulu at one time ; 
in 1845, according to the local records, 497 whalers, manned 
by 14,905 sailors, visited the islands, and, of the total, some 



THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC 317 

three-fourths flew the flag of the United States. But earlier 
in the nineteenth century, another class of Americans, the 
Protestant missionaries, had found their way there. Before 
long they succeeded in converting the King and the princi- 
pal chiefs, and the larger part of the population, over 
whom henceforth they exercised much influence. French 
Catholic priests, it is true, came afterwards, and also 
made many converts; but, as later arrivals, they never 
were so successful as the Protestants in bringing the 
natives into their fold. As usual, the missionary element 
and the foreign commercial one bore little love to each 
other. 

So thoroughly had the United States become interested 
in Hawaiian affairs that in 1842, five years before the 
acquisition of California, and before the Oregon dispute with 
Great Britain was settled, — that is to say, before the 
Americans held a foot of uncontested territory on the 
Pacific coast, — the President declared in a message to 
Congress that the republic would oppose the seizure of the 
islands by any foreign power, and in 1851 this assurance 
was repeated by Daniel Webster as Secretary of State. In 
1874, and again in 1889, when there were local disturbances, 
American marines were landed to guard the legation. After 
the acquisition of California, a direct trade had sprung up 
between San Francisco and the Far East, in consequence of 
which the unique position of Hawaii as a stopping-place 
and as a strategic point became more evident than ever. 
The Americans, without as yet wishing to possess it, were 
determined that it should never become a hostile outpost 
in the hands of someone else to menace their Pacific coast, 
in the way that Bermuda does their Atlantic. 

On the high seas, and in Chinese waters, the United States 
continued to be well represented until after the middle of 
the nineteenth century. In its diplomatic intercourse with 
China, it followed in the wake of England and France, but 



318 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

in the opening up of Japan it took the lead. Soon after 
this, however, it met with reverses. During the Civil War, 
owing to the depredations of Confederate cruisers, and to 
the fear of them, American vessels almost disappeared from 
the Pacific. At another moment the misfortune might have 
been short-lived ; but it occurred just at the period when 
sailing vessels were giving way to steam, and wooden 
ships to iron ones. In the construction of wooden sailing 
vessels, the New England builders feared no competitors; 
but the American iron and steel industry at that date was 
not sufficiently developed to compete with the European, 
and the registration laws of the United States forbade the 
purchase of foreign ships. At just about this time, too, 
the whaling industry declined, owing to the decrease in the 
number of whales, and the substitution of mineral oil for 
whale oil for lighting purposes. From these and other 
causes, the American flag, once so common all over the 
Pacific, became rarer, and in many regions almost un- 
known, for the navy long shared in the decay of the mer- 
chant marine. Politically, too, for some thirty years the 
influence of the United States in the Far East remained 
stationary, or declined. But the country itself grew and 
prospered; its different parts became more closely knit to- 
gether, and the purchase of Alaska doubled the American 
coast-line in the Pacific, and, through the Aleutian Islands, 
first brought it near to Japan. Meanwhile, relations with 
Hawaii became more intimate as the years went on. In 
1876 the islands were granted a reciprocity treaty which 
bound them close to the continent by economic ties; for 
with free access to the American market, the exportation 
of sugar to San Francisco increased enormously. In 1884 
the United States obtained a lease of Pearl Harbor for a 
naval station. 

It has been generally supposed that, in the event of a 
war with England, the American navy would make the 



THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC 319 

destruction of British commerce its chief object. But if it 
possessed no base of operations beyond San Francisco, it 
could hardly inflict much damage on British trade in the 
East. To overcome this difficulty, American seamen were 
desirous of securing more advanced posts, which they be- 
lieved would be invaluable to the country for successful 
warfare, either offensive or defensive. Hawaii was un- 
rivalled as a first stopping-place; and, still farther away, 
though the American public scarcely realized the fact, the 
United States had acquired claims in Samoa. 

The primary cause of the annexation of Hawaii in 1898 
was the change that had taken place in its population, which 
rendered the old system of government impossible to main- 
tain in the long run. As is well known, the Hawaiians, like 
their kindred, the Tahitians, and the Maoris in New Zealand, 
belong to a race which, though unusually attractive, has 
so far not shown the ability to adapt itself to civilization. 
The relations between the whites and the islanders had 
been good. Indeed, from the first coming of the foreigners, 
the natives had followed their advice, and under the 
guidance of the missionaries had made creditable progress. 
They remained children in character, yet, if they could 
have held their own in numbers, they might have kept in 
power for some time longer. But they have been dimin- 
ishing at a fearful rate. In 1830 they numbered about one 
hundred and thirty thousand, already considerably less 
than when the islands were discovered ; by 1850, they had 
sunk to eighty-four thousand, and by 1890 to thirty-nine 
thousand; to-day, with less than thirty thousand, they 
do not make more than fifteen per cent of the total popula- 
tion of their own country. On the other hand, ever since 
the treaty with the United States had procured a free 
entrance for Hawaiian sugar, the whites, who had ended 
by acquiring most of the land, had been importing laborers 
by the thousands to work on the plantations. The natives 



320 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

were too indolent for this toilsome labor ; Polynesians from 
other islands also proved unsuitable ; Portuguese from the 
Azores soon left the fields and took to occupations like 
market-gardening, in which they have since thriven. The 
Chinese did well, as usual, but promptly began to flock into 
the towns and to go into shopkeeping in such numbers 
that the supply on the plantations could be kept up only 
by further importations that would threaten the rest of 
the inhabitants with being submerged. Partly under the 
influence of anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States, 
the immigration from China was restricted, and Japanese 
were next tried, again with success in the beginning, but 
with somewhat the same disadvantage as in the case of the 
Chinese, aggravated by the fact that they had the support 
of a watchful government at home which was determined 
to secure to them their rights. 

In this state of unstable equilibrium, the kindly, indolent 
natives, reduced to ever greater insignificance between 
white capitalists and Asiatic laborers, could not maintain 
for long even a show of political domination. The very 
fact that the Hawaiian sovereigns had, as a rule, followed 
wise foreign advice and governed well made it certain that, 
when a less intelligent ruler should act differently, a rising 
of some sort could not fail to take place. The actual 
circumstances that led to the revolution of 1893, the 
attempt of the Queen to change the constitution and her 
overthrow, are unimportant. The much-debated question, 
whether the landing of the American marines who were in 
the harbor did or did not render aid to the movement, is 
also idle to-day. Admitting that the prompt appearance 
of the American force gave such moral backing to the 
insurgents that the party of the Queen was terrified into 
submission, we may still feel sure that the marines would 
in any case have been obliged to land within a few hours. 
Whatever we may think of the way in which the revolu- 



THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC 321 

tion was brought about, we can see that something of the 
sort was inevitable. 

The well-meant attempt of President Cleveland to restore 
the sovereignty of the Queen proved abortive. The 
republic which was then constituted, during its short exist- 
ence, ruled wisely and well. From the natives, after one 
feeble attempt at revolt, it had little to fear; but the 
growing strength of the Japanese, coupled with a readiness 
on the part of the government at Tokio to uphold their 
demands, made the whites on the islands feel that they 
must have American protection. The outbreak of the 
Spanish War brought the question once more to an issue. 
In the prosecution of hostilities the Hawaiian Islands were 
almost indispensable as a halting-place on the long journey 
from San Francisco to the Philippines. Had they remained 
neutral, the task of supplying Dewey's squadron would 
have been much more burdensome; but as it was, they 
made no pretence of neutrality. They were definitely 
annexed to the Union on July 7, 1898. 

In the case of Samoa, the United States was drawn into 
unexpected complications, partly through the zeal of its 
own officials there, and partly through anger at the over- 
bearing conduct of the Germans, who, it is fair to remem- 
ber, had the largest interests in the islands. The result 
was a situation that no one for a time knew just how to 
get out of. In 1872, Admiral Meade had concluded a treaty 
with the native chiefs which granted to the United States 
as a coaling-station the excellent harbor of Pago Pago in the 
island of Tutuila. Although the Senate never took action 
on the document, it included this stipulation in a commer- 
cial treaty which it ratified half a dozen years later, while 
at the same time it refused the request of the natives for 
a protectorate. 

Small as the Samoan group was, its politics were seldom 
quiet. The intrigues and disputes of ambitious local 



322 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

chiefs, stimulated by ultra-patriotic and overzealous for- 
eigners, led to repeated disturbances, culminating in 1887 
and 1888 in conflicts that brought about intervention. 
Irritated by the high-handed action of the Germans, the 
United States despatched three war vessels to the scene ; 
but they, like their German rivals, were destroyed in the 
harbor of Apia by a typhoon. This disaster cooled down 
all parties, and after a conference in Berlin, a provisional 
arrangement was made for a mixed system of government, 
which for ten years worked badly, as such systems do. 
Then followed fresh trouble, in which the English and the 
Americans were the ones to use force against the natives, 
while the Germans protested. Each of the three powers 
sent a commissioner to investigate matters, a new agree- 
ment was made, and finally, by the treaty of December, 
1899, the English, in return for compensation elsewhere, 
withdrew altogether from the islands, which were divided 
between the other two claimants. Although Germany got 
the larger part, the United States was satisfied with its 
share, Tutuila, which contained the best harbor in the 
archipelago. 

Already, before this agreement was arrived at, the treaty 
of peace with Spain had given the Americans another Pa- 
cific station by the cession of Guam in the Ladrones. Here, 
again, the territory acquired was too small to have any value 
except as a good stopping-place. 

In the Philippines, the situation was very different. 
There the question of a naval base was so distinct from that 
of the retention and government of the islands that some 
Anti-imperialists, who were violently opposed to keeping the 
whole group, with its seven million inhabitants, were willing 
to retain a particular spot for naval purposes. This was 
thought of in Washington, and though in the end every- 
thing was kept, the importance of a strategic position in 
the western Pacific is nevertheless a subject that can be 



THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC 323 

considered apart from the problems involved in the treat- 
ment of the native population. 

That this interest alone would justify the United States 
in retaining possession of the Philippines is an opinion some- 
times advanced. However extreme we may regard such a 
tenet, we cannot deny that the acquisition of the islands, 
for better or for worse, has radically changed the situation 
of the Americans in the Far East. They are no longer a 
mere trading nation, come to-day and gone to-morrow, but 
like other great powers, they are a land-holding one with 
populations to govern, local interests to see to, and terri- 
tories to defend. They are now not only the near neigh- 
bors of the French, the English, the Germans, and the 
Dutch, and as such interested in whatever affects these; 
they are also in close proximity to the two Asiatic empires 
of China and Japan, in both of which they are deeply 
concerned. 

Although we may not go so far as those who declare that 
Manila is the natural distributing point of the trade of the 
whole western Pacific, it is evident that, with the possession 
of the Philippines, the Americans have come into imme- 
diate contact with the Chinese and Japanese in their own 
part of the world. There are drawbacks to propinquity, 
but as long as China is weak, the Americans are far better 
placed to bring pressure on the Middle Kingdom, as well as 
to hold their own against other powers in affairs relating 
to it, than if they did not occupy a strong position in the 
immediate vicinity. If, for instance, they had not had a 
powerful army near by in 1900, they would never have been 
able to send the troops they did in time to take part in the 
Peking expedition, nor would they have had the authority 
which was theirs in the councils of the assembled nations, 
and which they have enjoyed in the Far East ever since. 

On the other hand, we must admit that, by making these 
distant acquisitions, the United States has forfeited part of 



324 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

its former invulnerability. But, though its real strength 
might be little affected by losing them to some victorious 
enemy, the wound to its pride would be so intolerable 
that it will defend them at any cost. To heed warnings 
as to the dangers they bring with them would seem like 
listening to the counsels of cowardice. It is too confident 
in itself to fear other powers, and it is willing to accept 
the responsibilities of its new greatness. 

Whatever pertains to the Pacific Ocean appeals strongly 
to Americans at the present day. There is something in 
the very immensity of the field which makes it seem appro- 
priate for the display of their superabundant energy. They 
believe that they have an unequalled advantage, and are 
entitled to the foremost place. As early as the middle of 
the nineteenth century, Mr. (later Secretary) Seward de- 
clared : " The Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the 
vast region beyond, will become the chief theatre of events 
in the world's great Hereafter." According to Mr. Seward, 
and to many others who have since shared his opinion, the 
United States is to play the leading role in this theatre of 
the Hereafter. 

This idea has always been firmly held in the states of the 
Pacific coast, and the more they have grown, the more it 
has appeared justified. In 1903, President Roosevelt pro- 
claimed, at San Francisco, in a speech of lofty imperialism, 
that to the United States must belong the dominion of 
the Pacific. Such terms are vague, and we may suspect 
that if the Russo-Japanese War had then taken place, the 
President might have been more guarded in his phrase. 
Nevertheless the conviction which it embodies is an article 
of faith to many, and it has found much in recent events 
to confirm it. Everywhere the minds of men have turned 
towards the Pacific as never before ; all five of the world 
powers hold territory on its shores, and are vitally inter- 
ested in its concerns. Within a few years it has witnessed 



THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC 325 

a succession of startling events, which have followed each 
other with bewildering rapidity — two wars and several 
minor conflicts, the appearance of Germany as a power in 
the East, the sudden menacing growth of Russia and her 
sanguinary discomfiture, the threatened dissolution and 
the present awakening of China, and the transformation 
of Japan. We can understand why President Roosevelt 
should have called the period of the world's history which 
is just beginning, " the Pacific Era," though not in the 
sense of the peaceful one. 

Among these startling events, the stretching out of the 
United States to the farther shores of the Great Ocean is 
second to almost none in its wide importance. No one can 
wonder that it has fired the American imagination, especially 
in the Pacific States ; it has also interested the whole people 
as never before in the broader questions of world politics. 
Many who would be glad to get rid of the Philippines 
are none the less unwilling to see the new prestige of their 
country diminished by one tittle. This feeling has given 
stimulus to the desire to build up a mighty navy. In the 
Atlantic, the American fleet remains chiefly in its own 
waters, where, now that most of the English vessels are 
withdrawn, it does not come into direct competition with 
that of any other country. But in the Pacific it is kept 
on the farther side of the ocean, at the great gathering 
place of the fleets of all nations. American pride demands 
that the United States shall be well represented there, and 
the sending of a formidable squadron of battle ships to 
show the might of the republic in Pacific waters as it has 
never been shown before, is an impressive demonstration 
which thrills popular patriotism. The Americans are 
already disposed to regard themselves as more than the 
equal of any other people in this part of the world, and 
they are convinced that when the Panama Canal has been 
dug, and New York and New Orleans have been brought 



326 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

into quicker water communication with the Far East 
than London and Hamburg, and when their fleet can 
pass at will from one ocean to the other, then their 
supremacy will be beyond question. 

But the Pacific is not for any one nation to take exclu- 
sively to itself; and American boasts about domination, 
besides being irritating to others, are premature. Every 
one of the world powers has territories in this domain, and 
interests which it will defend to the best of its ability. Not 
only has imperial Britain widespread possessions in this 
ocean world, but it has a merchant marine many times 
larger than that of the United States, and a far stronger 
navy ; and it has also great and growing children, Canada 
and Australia, who will have to be taken into account by 
their American kindred. And there are others to be 
considered. Both China and Japan, if in different ways, 
have entered into the drama of world politics, which they 
have already profoundly affected, and on which their further 
influence is incalculable. With both of them the present 
relations of the United States exceed in intricacy and in 
difficulty, when not in actual importance, those with any 
state in Europe. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 

I^HE historian of the relations between the United States 
and China is confronted at the outset of his task 
with a curious fact. He has to recognize that the tale of 
the dealings of the American government with the Chinese 
Empire and with its inhabitants in their own homes is one 
story, and that of the treatment of Chinese immigrants 
to the land of liberty, by both government and people, is 
quite another. What is stranger still is that until very re- 
cently the two phenomena had almost as little influence on 
each other as if they concerned separate groups of nations. 
In the first case the Americans can point with pride to 
their record; in the second they can feel no pride what- 
ever; at best, they can fall back only on the plea of self- 
defence and of disagreeable necessity. 

The American traders who made their way to Canton in 
the last years of the eighteenth century and the first of the 
nineteenth, suffered from the same disabilities as other 
foreigners bartering at that port, but, on the whole, they 
seem to have been successful, as such success went, in get- 
ting on with the local authorities. In one respect their 
government took moral ground from the first ; not only did 
it prohibit its citizens by law from sharing in the opium 
traffic, but it declared that those guilty of so doing should 
thereby forfeit their claim to the protection of their 
country, and be left to the tender mercies of the Chinese 
courts. Even if we admit that there are two sides to the 
opium question, and that the English have not deserved 

327 



328 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

all the blame which has been cast upon them in this con- 
nection, the stand of the Americans is to their credit, in 
spite of the sneers it has provoked from some foreign 
writers, who regard it as a bid for Chinese favor. 1 Like 
other powers, the United States profited by the successes 
of the English and the French in wringing from the rulers 
in Peking concessions in behalf of foreign trade. Its policy, 
if a little inglorious, was prudent and successful; but the 
decline of the national commerce in the East in the period 
following 1860 left to American diplomats and consuls in 
China, as their chief occupation, the protection, not of 
traders, but of missionaries. 

The first American missionaries reached Canton in Feb- 
ruary, 1830, and were soon followed by others who estab- 
lished themselves at many distant points. Their activity 
has been great, but its results have been the cause of pro- 
longed dispute. This is not, however, the place to enter 
into the complicated and thorny question of the value of 
Christian missions in heathen lands, and especially in the 
Far East. In judging the evidence on the subject, we must 
remember that the witnesses are rarely unprejudiced, and 
that owing to the permanent antagonism between the busi- 
ness community and the missionaries, the oral testimony 
of the former has little more claim to impartiality than the 
official reports of the latter. They can be used indeed, to 
a certain extent, to counterbalance one another. To the 
diplomat and to the consul, unless they happen to have 
personal sympathy with efforts to spread Christianity, the 
missionaries appear chiefly as the makers of endless trouble. 
Without passing a summary judgment on so many-sided 
a controversy, we can understand the point of view of 
those who declare that the coming of strangers to convert 
a people of ancient civilization from long-inherited beliefs 
with which they are satisfied, is an impertinence in itself; 

1 Of late the prohibition of opium has been extended to morphine. 



THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 329 

that the missionaries frequently lack tact, and by their 
meddlesomeness get into unnecessary difficulties, and that 
what good they have accomplished has been incommen- 
surate with the money spent in doing it. All this may be 
more or less true, but unprejudiced observers bear witness 
that, notwithstanding the jibes of the foreign settlements 
about the missionaries' comfortable mode of life, the latter 
often set a fine example of unselfishness; that they have 
alleviated much suffering, and in many cases they have 
done great good to individuals if not to nations as a whole. 
They have also more than once been helpful to their own 
government, and they have promoted civilization by adding 
to our knowledge of the lands where they have worked, often 
at the price of untold hardships and perils, and sometimes 
at the cost of their lives. Finally, it should be noted, that 
at the present day the Protestant missionary of the older 
type, whose single idea was that of preaching the Gospel 
to the recalcitrant heathen in season and out of season, is 
dying out. In his place we find the practical, efficient 
representative of Christianity, who gives more time to look- 
ing after the material wants of his flock, and in particu- 
lar to the cure of their diseases, than he does to direct 
propaganda. 

Whatever might be the personal opinions of the official 
representatives of the United States in the Far East, they 
were obliged to protect their missionary fellow-citizens in 
the rights which treaties had accorded to them. Beyond 
this duty, the American ministers in Peking had, for many 
years, little to do. In one respect they pursued a course 
different from that observed by their government in every 
other part of the world. Few principles have been more 
characteristic of American policy than the avoidance of 
" entangling alliances," and the maintenance of the perfect 
independence of the United States in all its dealings with 
other powers. The only marked exceptions to this rule 



330 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

have been made in the East where, by the necessities of 
the situation, the American representatives have been 
forced to associate themselves with their European col- 
leagues in the making of joint demands upon the imperial 
government. Thi s association has even gone to the extent 
of taking common military action, as in 1900, when the 
allied troops marched on Peking to rescue the besieged 
legations. 

For a whole generation after the Civil War there is little 
to tell about the conduct of the United States in Asiatic 
affairs. In 1894, when the war between China and Japan 
broke out, the sympathy of the Americans at home, though 
not of those on the spot, was generally on the side of Japan. 
The American government did not put itself forward at the 
time, but it received a unique tribute to its fairness by 
being charged by each of the warring empires with the 
protection of its subjects who were resident in the domain 
of the other, — always a difficult and delicate task and here 
doubly complicated. It was through the American min- 
ister at Peking that the first overtures for peace were made 
by the Chinese, and a former American Secretary of State, 
Mr. John W. Foster, was one of the commissioners ap- 
pointed by China to negotiate the treaty. Nevertheless, 
the role of the United States in this part of the world re- 
mained a platonic one, exercising slight influence on the 
course of events, till the results of the Spanish War brought 
American warships and armies into the scene. 

Up to the outbreak of the Chinese-Japanese conflict, the 
interest of the American people in the politics of the Far 
East had been languid. Now it became keener, and it was 
quickly stimulated by the acquisition of the Philippines, 
and by the independent revival of American trade. The 
United States had never ceased to make large purchases 
from China, and in 1880 its imports from that country 
amounted to almost twenty-two million dollars, but its, 



THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 331 

exports thither were barely over one million. In 1890, 
the imports came to about sixteen million and a quarter, 
the exports to just under three million; in 1900, when 
the imports had risen to almost twenty-seven million, the 
exports had grown to over five times what they were ten 
years before, and were now fifteen and a quarter million ; 
in 1902, the exports at last exceeded the imports. This 
rapid increase in the sale of American goods, an increase 
which bade fair to continue, made it incumbent on the 
nation to follow with more attention what was going on 
in the Far East, and above all to determine what course to 
adopt in reference to the break-up of the Chinese Empire 
which then seemed imminent. 

The situation was not easy. Something had to be done, 
and done promptly, lest a trade which, in the popular 
imagination, offered unlimited possibilities for the future 
should be lost just as it was coming into existence. Several 
of the European powers seemed bent on the partition of 
China, and even Great Britain and Japan, who were op- 
posed to it, had taken care to mark off a sphere of interest 
for themselves in order that, if the worst should befall, 
they might not come out empty-handed. Unable to pre- 
vent and unwilling to take part in a division of this sort, 
the United States fell back on the principle of the " open 
door." The move was successful; for not only did it serve 
to steady the somewhat wavering attitude of Great Britain, 
but it elicited at least the nominal approbation of the states 
to which Secretary Hay's circular was addressed. How- 
ever little some of them might sympathize with the doctrine 
it enunciated, none dared oppose it openly; for to do so 
would have been to proclaim to the world an intention of 
taking over Chinese territory for purely selfish purposes. 
Secretary Hay was too shrewd to put unlimited trust in 
the assurances he received, but the United States had now 
ground to stand on, a principle formally accepted by other 



332 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

countries, and one which it could maintain with all the 
weight of its influence. The declaration had the addi- 
tional merit that, though prompted by interested motives, it 
did not set forth a selfish theory, but one of fair play for all ; 
and it was likewise advantageous to the Chinese themselves. 

The American policy towards China was, indeed, one of 
consistent friendliness. Even during the Boxer troubles 
and the siege of the legations, the United States announced 
that it had no war with the Empire as such. The Ameri- 
can troops in the Peking expedition may have looted as 
much as the others, but they treated the native population 
with more humanity than some of them did. When order 
was restored, the government at Washington, disclaiming 
all thoughts of revenge, exacted an indemnity that was 
moderate compared with what was demanded by most of 
the other powers ; and to-day, after revising the estimates, 
it proposes to release China from all payments in excess of 
the loss actually suffered by the United States and its 
citizens at that time, or from more than half of the total 
amount. 1 After the suppression of the Boxer revolt, when 
China was bolstered up, with her territory intact, American 
influence at Peking was exerted in favor of treating her as 
leniently and trusting her as much as possible. 

There still remained for the Americans the difficulty of 
protecting their trade in Manchuria, where the Russians, 
in spite of promises to the contrary, were making themselves 
more and more at home. Here again American interests 
coincided with Chinese. Profiting by the fact that the 
province was still theoretically a part of the Chinese Empire, 
just before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War the 
United States persuaded the Peking government, in the 
interest of both parties, and in the face of Russian dis- 
pleasure, to open two more Manchurian ports to American 

1 In 1885 the United States returned to China a sum of $453,400 for 
overpayment of earlier damages. 



THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 333 

trade. When hostilities began, Secretary Hay, in a new 
circular, insisted on the importance of limiting their area, 
— a condition which was accepted by the two belligerents 
to the great advantage of China. Without ascribing to the 
United States a superhumanly altruistic motive, we may 
say to sum up that for many years it showed more real 
kindliness to the Chinese Empire and gave it more disinter- 
ested aid and protection than did any other power. 1 If the 
relations between the two had been confined to the western 
side of the Pacific, we could record them with almost un- 
mixed praise. But, during the years when the Americans 
were showing themselves the honest friends of the Chinaman 
in his own home, their attitude toward him in theirs was 
something very different. 

As soon as American trade with China began, a few mer- 
chants went out and settled, at first in Canton, later in 
other ports, forming small colonies such as have existed in 
other Oriental countries. That the Chinese might, in their 
turn, come in any considerable number across the water 
did not seem a contingency worth troubling about. To be 
sure, they had shown in their history a persistency in 
emigrating to the Malay Peninsula, Java, the Philippines, 
and elsewhere, but these had been merely migrations in 
Asia itself and were little known in Europe and America, 
where the Chinese were supposed to be a people much 
attached to their homes. If their relatives died abroad, 
did they not send them back to be buried in the sacred 
soil of their native land? 

All this being so, when, in 1868, the American minister 
at Peking, Anson Burlingame, signed the treaty known by 
his name, it was regarded as a diplomatic triumph for his 
country. The contracting parties " cordially recognized . . . 

1 And yet with characteristic carelessness the United States has some- 
times sent as consuls to China men who have been the laughing-stock, if 
not worse, of the Far East and a disgrace to the country they represented. 



334 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his 
home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the 
free immigration and emigration of their citizens and sub- 
jects respectively from one country to the other, for pur- 
poses of curiosit} r , of trade, or as permanent residents." 

Here was a fine repetition of the principles for which the 
United States had always contended, principles whose 
validity many European nations still refused to acknowl- 
edge, but which were now solemnly accepted by the most 
conservative of Oriental empires, thereby throwing open 
its doors to American enterprise. That the Chinese, for 
their part, would ever make great use of the opportunities 
offered to them, was not foreseen, and if it had been, it 
would not at the moment have aroused alarm. The first 
who crossed over to the Pacific coast were invaluable in 
the development of California; they helped in the digging 
of the mines, and in the building of the railways, and they 
made excellent servants. They were therefore heartily wel- 
comed. Very soon, however, as they grew more numerous, 
the tone about them underwent a change. 

We have seen what reasons have impelled many persons 
in the United States who bear no dislike to the Chinese to 
favor their exclusion from the country. It is not merely 
the clamor of the Pacific coast, or the influence of the labor- 
unions, which has led to this conclusion so much as a con- 
viction that the Mongolians constitute an element which 
cannot be Americanized, cannot be amalgamated with the 
rest, and which, though useful in itself, will, by competition, 
lower the standard of living of the American workingman, 
and end b}' driving him from the field. The belief is not 
peculiar to the United States, it is equally strong in Canada 
and Australia, and would be in other places under the same 
conditions. And it is not necessarily a reflection on the 
character of the Chinese ; on the contrary, we might re- 
gard it as a tribute to their sterling qualities. 



THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 335 

It was some time before the seriousness of the problem 
presented was realized in the Eastern States, where the 
Chinese have never come in sufficient numbers to awaken 
much opposition, and where their virtues have been appre- 
preciated. A good many people in the East condemn 
exclusion, but they are lukewarm in the matter, whereas 
the Pacific coast is terribly in earnest. 

The story of anti-Chinese legislation in the United States 
can be told in a few words. In 1878, only ten years after 
the signing of the Burlingame Treaty, Congress passed a 
first exclusion bill, which was vetoed by President Hayes 
as being contrary to that treaty. Two years afterward, 
however, the administration succeeded in concluding with 
Peking a new agreement, according to which the United 
States was given power to "limit or suspend" Chinese im- 
migration, though not to prohibit it. On the strength of 
this, in 1882 Congress passed a bill forbidding Chinese 
immigration for twenty years. This bill was vetoed, but a 
similar one, fixing the period at ten years, received the Presi- 
dent's signature. In 1888, another treaty was negotiated, 
but before it had been ratified by the Chinese government, 
Congress and the President, spurred by the near prospect of 
an election, passed a new exclusion bill, in violation of exist- 
ing treaty rights. To quiet qualms of conscience, the 
authorities in Washington concluded one more treaty, by 
which the two countries agreed that Chinese immigration 
to the United States should be forbidden for the next ten 
years. Since 1904 this agreement has lapsed, but the ex- 
clusion law remains in force — illegally, the Chinese claim. 
Not content with protecting itself against cheap labor at 
home, the United States has extended its policy to its trop- 
ical possessions, where the conditions are very different. 
Even before annexation, Hawaii had checked the inflow of 
Chinese, useful as they were on the plantations. Now the 
door has been shut against them in the Philippines, partly 



336 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

out of deference to the American labor-unions — though any 
one must know that the American can never work in the 
fields in the tropics — and partly because those in charge 
of the welfare of the islands have felt that the Filipino is 
no match for the Chinaman. In consequence we have the 
curious anomaly that though Chinese immigration on a 
large scale would probably be an excellent thing for the 
Philippines, it might be death to the Filipinos, and it is 
the people rather than the territory that those who are 
shaping American policy have at heart. On the other 
hand, this policy adds materially to the grievances of which 
the Chinese have cause to complain. Can we wonder at 
their indignation when the United States, while seeking 
unrestricted access to their territories, shuts them out of 
its possessions not only in its own hemisphere, but in 
theirs ? 

Whatever arguments may be urged in favor of prevent- 
ing further immigration of Chinese to the United States, 
they do not affect the disgrace to the country of the treat- 
ment which has been meted out to some of those already 
settled in it. The story of the outrages which Chinese have 
had to suffer at the hands of mobs or of individual ruffians 
must make any American blush for shame. 1 

For another wrong in connection with Chinese exclusion, 
there can also be no defence, though there is an unsatisfac- 
tory explanation. The Chinese are born smugglers of their 

1 "More Chinese subjects have been murdered by mobs in the United 
States during the last twenty-five years than all the Americans who have 
been murdered in China in similar riots. ... In every instance when 
Americans have suffered from mobs, the authorities have made repara- 
tion for the losses, and rarely has the punishment of death failed to be 
inflicted upon the guilty offenders. On the other hand, I am sorry to 
say that I cannot recall a single instance where the penalty of death has 
been visited on any member of the mob in the United States guilty of 
the death of Chinese, and in only two instances out of many has indem- 
nity been paid for the losses sustained by the Chinese." — Speech of a 
former Chinese Minister quoted from China and America To-day (p. 165) 
by A. H. Smith. 



THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 337 

persons as well as of their goods, and many have succeeded 
in making their way into the United States in spite of the 
vigilance of the government officials. On their side, the 
latter have received all arrivals from China with impartial 
brutality. Chinese gentlemen of education and refinement, 
provided with papers beyond suspicion, have been herded 
in with coolies and subjected to many indignities before 
being allowed to pass the customs. These barbarous pro- 
ceedings for long went on unchecked. It was only when 
people in China began to retaliate that the Americans awoke 
to the necessity of mending their manners. 

For many years, the Chinese government, and Chinese 
public opinion, such as it was, seemed extraordinarily in- 
digent to all these things. To an Asiatic empire of some 
hundreds of millions of inhabitants, the fate of a few thou- 
sand Kwantung coolies was, it appeared, not a matter of 
much concern. Besides, it was taken for granted in the 
outside world that the Chinese had no patriotism or 
national sentiment. Retaliation on their part was not 
seriously considered, and Americans cherished the comfort- 
able belief that it was possible to have at the same time 
two policies in regard to them — a selfish one for home 
consumption and a generous one for foreign export. 

The boycott of 1905 rudely shattered this illusion. We 
may argue as much as we will that the movement, the 
inner history of which we do not yet know, and perhaps 
never shall, was due to all sorts of influences. It may 
have had some foreign instigation, though there has never 
been any real proof to that effect. It may have been 
primarily a trial of strength of certain organizations which 
determined to show their power at the expense, as it hap- 
pened, of the Americans, but might just as readily have 
chosen some other victim. Again, the boycott may have 
had something of the nature of mere chance explosion, or 
have been the work of a few agitators who knew how to 



338 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

mould others to their use. Be all this as it may, the anti- 
American boycott has proved that, throughout China, there 
now exists a national resentment against the way in which 
the Chinese have been treated in the United States. It 
also gave proof of a skill in organization hitherto unsus- 
pected, and it has revealed to Americans the disagreeable 
truth that, though China may be weak as a military power, 
her people are still in a position where they can hit back, 
and hit back effectually, if their rights and feelings are 
trampled upon. 

The difficulty which faces American statesmen is a grave 
one. Such grievances as the ill-treatment of upper-class 
Chinese can be, and probably will be, easily remedied ; and 
there is reason to hope that Chinese laborers may be bet- 
ter protected in the future from mob violence. But the 
root of the trouble goes deeper. On the one hand, there 
is, at present, no chance whatever that the United States 
will open its doors to unrestricted Chinese immigration. 
The Pacific coast is immovable on this point, and it is sup- 
ported, not only by the laboring classes everywhere, but 
also by many other persons who wish America to remain "a 
white man's country." Every powerful independent nation 
will exercise as an indispensable part of its sovereignty 
the right of determining what strangers shall or shall not 
be allowed to enter and to reside within its borders ; only 
to the weak can the privilege of shutting their doors be 
denied. The Americans cannot be forced to let in the 
Chinese if they are determined to keep them out, but this de- 
termination may cost them dear. It is perfectly conceivable 
that by such means as the boycott, if not by an official 
prohibition, Americans may be deprived of the market in 
the Far East to which they have looked forward with 
confidence. And this is no small loss in itself. If the Ameri- 
cans, in spite of the obvious advantage of their position, in 
spite of the excellence and cheapness of their manufactured 



THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 339 

goods, in spite, too, of the friendliness they have shown to 
China in foreign affairs, are to be denied the privilege to 
which their situation seems to entitle them, they will be 
paying a heavy price for their self-defence. And yet, even 
this price they will pay if need be, rather than let their 
country be overrun by Asiatics. It remains for their 
statesmen to prevent matters from reaching this extremity, 
and to persuade the Chinese that no hostility is intended 
against them ; that exclusion does not imply a condemna- 
tion of their character, but it is only a recognition of the 
inability of white and yellow men to meet in large masses, 
on terms that are satisfactory to both. 

There is, however, fair reason to hope that the task of 
maintaining good relations may not prove impossible. 
China, like every other state, has no motive for desiring 
that her children should swarm into lands where they are 
not wanted. Provided she receives fair and courteous treat- 
ment, which has not always been accorded her in the past, 
she may well think it best to submit with a good grace to 
restrictions which are no real injury to her. To act other- 
wise, to attempt to force open all doors to her emigrants, 
would soon bring her into disastrous conflict, not only with 
the United States, but with the British Empire, Russia, 
Japan, and probably others. And this she can by no means 
afford to do ; for in spite of recent reforms, her military 
power is not yet great, nor is it likely to be, at least for 
offensive purposes, this many a day. Among the empires 
of the world she is one of those which most require internal 
reforms, and have most cause for keeping clear of complica- 
tions with foreign powers. More than that, she is in no 
small need of friends. 

Though friends can be had for a consideration, unfor- 
tunately, even friendship, especially when bought, may be 
dangerous to a weak, distracted country. Russia and Japan 
are both, perhaps, in a position to give China more valuable 



340 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

aid for the moment than is the United States, but aid from 
them would not be without obvious perils. The United 
States has a remarkably clean record in the Far East : it 
alone of all the powers active there has never taken, 
or tried to take, one foot of Chinese soil. While naturally 
intent on its own interests, it has shown more actual kind- 
ness to the empire than has any other nation, and it can 
hardly be suspected of designs against her. The Chinese 
know this, and they are plainly eager for at least the moral 
support of the Americans in their dealings with some of 
their neighbors. In spite of all assurances, China has not 
yet got back the control of Manchuria, — of either the Jap- 
anese or the Russian portion, — and the two late enemies may 
not improbably agree to keep her sovereignty there a nomi- 
nal one. This she will not submit to tamely, if she can help 
herself ; and still less does she intend to allow the Japanese 
to take her in hand and direct her footsteps as they have 
dreamed of doing. The reformers among the Chinese are 
ready to learn from Japan and to imitate her, but not 
at all to be dominated by her, and against her too great 
influence they are turning for support to the United States. 
As a result of these various considerations, the prospect 
for American relations, though clouded, is not disheartening. 
The power of the United States commands respect, and its 
good-will is of value. The Americans can show them- 
selves friendly to the Chinese Empire and desirous of its 
maintenance, without having to admit its swarms of needy 
laborers into their territories. And even in regard to this 
vexed question, their attitude now appears less offensive; 
for recent events have proved that they are not intent on 
affixing a stigma on one particular people, but are, rather, 
struggling with a general problem of self-defence, a problem 
which has brought them into difficulties with their old 
friend, Japan. 



CHAPTER XIX 

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 

IF the position of the United States on the Pacific Ocean 
offers it greater advantages, and imposes upon it graver 
responsibilities, in its dealings with China than fall to the 
lot of any European power except Russia, this is even more 
true in regard to its relations with Japan. Since the open- 
ing of the Empire of the Mikado to outside influences, which 
was brought about by the direct action of the United States, 
the connection between the two countries has been closer 
than that between Japan and any other western state. 
It is true that America faces, and long will face, to the east 
rather than to the west ; for in spite of all eloquent proph- 
ecies to the contrary, there is as yet little solid ground of 
fact to support the opinion that a change will soon take 
place in this respect. Nevertheless, she already has on the 
shores of the Pacific a situation superior to that of her 
European rivals, she has just transferred, if only tempo- 
rarily, the bulk of her navy to its waters, and what goes on 
there becomes of more vital interest to her every year. And 
to Japan the Pacific is all in all. 

It was the famous expedition of Commodore Perry in 
1854 which brought Japan into general intercourse with 
the rest of the world. Previous attempts to obtain this 
result had been made without success by Americans as 
well as by Europeans. Perry's expedition was a strong 
one, and he himself was more determined than any of his 
predecessors. Since he was prepared to repel attack, and 
firmly maintained his ground instead of complying with 

341 



342 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

the requests of the Japanese that he take himself away, we 
may say that he triumphed by the use of physical force, 
however gently applied. We know now, what Perry did 
not, that conditions in the island empire were ripe for a 
revolution which must have occurred soon in any event, 
and that the old system of rigorous exclusion of the foreigner 
was doomed; but the glory of Commodore Perry loses 
nothing by this, any more than does that of any discoverer 
or inventor by his appearing when the age is ready for 
him. It was part of Perry's merit that he carried out his 
mission with singular tact, and succeeded in accomplishing 
his purpose without resort to actual violence, — an exploit 
for which there is every cause to be grateful. To-day, far 
from remembering with humiliation the duress once put 
upon them, the Japanese, in view of what they have since 
achieved, look back on the coming of the Americans as 
the beginning of their new birth, as one of the eventful, 
glorious dates in their history. Their feeling about it has 
been shown by the erection in 1901 of a monument to 
Perry, to which the emperor himself besides many other 
prominent men subscribed. 

The United States was, moreover, fortunate in the choice 
of its first regular diplomatic representative at Tokio. 
Mr. Townsend Harris was not only skilful and firm in his 
treatment of official matters, but was also sincerely inter- 
ested in the welfare of the strange people with whom he 
was called upon to deal. While obtaining from them con- 
cessions, which he believed would be for their own bene- 
fit as well as that of his compatriots, he took no unfair 
advantage of their ignorance of international usages or of 
their bewildered condition. His friendliness has since been 
gratefully recognized by the Japanese, and has helped to 
render them well disposed towards the country which he 
represented. Their first mission abroad was despatched 
to the United States. 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 343 

In the troubled years that witnessed in Japan the over- 
throw of the old regime, the Americans, like others, suffered 
from the prevailing insecurity and the hatred of foreigners 
rampant in the empire. An American secretary of legation 
was murdered, and on another occasion the legation itself 
was burned to the ground, yet, in spite of all, relations con- 
tinued good, and the Americans did not land troops for the 
protection of their ministers, as did the English and the 
French. The United States did, however, take a part with 
Great Britain, France, and Holland, in the bombardment 
of Shimonoseki, in 1863, and though the part was almost 
nominal, 1 none the less, the United States received a quarter 
of the indemnity exacted. But the money thus obtained 
weighed on the national conscience until, in 1883, by a 
vote of Congress, it was given back. This fair dealing, with 
its implied admission of a previous wrong, was not lost on 
the Japanese, who are quick to appreciate a chivalrous act. 
They were grateful, too, to the United States for being the 
first power to show itself favorable to treaty revision, a thing 
that for years they ardently desired in order to remove the 
badge of inferiority which the earlier arrangements, necessary 
at the time, had imposed upon them. In 1878, the Wash- 
ington government expressed its readiness to surrender its 
right of exterritoriality and commercial privileges as soon 
as the other powers should be willing to do the same ; in 
1886 and 1887 it negotiated with Tokio a treaty on the sub- 
ject, and when, in 1894, the British government at last 
acceded to the wishes of the Japanese, the American took 
the matter up again and brought it to a conclusion. 

The far-seeing statesmen, who with marvellous success have 
re-made Japan, early realized the necessity of copying for- 
eign models, and of profiting by the superior knowledge of 
western teachers. Among these the Americans were conspic- 

1 Owing to the Civil War at home, the Americans were represented at 
the bombardment by a hired Dutch vessel. 



344 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

uous. They were employed as counsellors in foreign affairs 
down to the most recent days ; they aided in creating the 
new system of public education, modelled on their own; 
they organized the agricultural bureau, and assisted in the 
founding of scientific institutions. By request, officials were 
detached from the Treasury in Washington to establish a 
modern financial system for the empire, and in many other 
ways American teaching and example have exercised an 
influence in its political and social transformation. Other 
nations, indeed — Germany, England, France — have had 
their good share in this work ; but none of them, according 
to the testimony of the Japanese themselves, have done as 
much as the United States. 

Turning now to the commercial transactions between the 
two lands, we notice that for long they were very unequal. 
From the first, the United States was one of Japan's best 
clients. By 1871, it bought from her $5,298,153 worth of 
imports (almost twelve times as much as it sold in return). 
By 1893, the year before the war between Japan and China, 
this total had more than quintupled, being $27,454,220, and 
in 1906 it had almost doubled again, and amounted to 
$52,551,520. American exports to Japan have until recently 
been insignificant : as late as 1893 they were only $3,195,494, 
but since that year they have grown by leaps and bounds. 
In 1905, in consequence of the demands of the war with 
Russia, they were twice as large as in 1904 ; in 1906 they 
held a good part of their gain, and amounted to $38,464,952. 
There is reason to expect that, in spite of protective tariffs 
in both countries, trade between them will continue to 
prosper, for each can furnish to the other things of which it 
stands in need. Already the United States sells to Japan 
more than it does to all but its largest customers, and in 
return it is a far better mart for Japanese exports than ia 
any state in Europe. 

Since Japan has been thrown open to outside curiosity, 






THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 345 

she has exercised an extraordinary fascination on untold 
thousands in the western world. Visitors have returned de- 
lighted with her scenery, the monuments of her civilization, 
the picturesque structure of her society, and the intelligence, 
amiability, and exquisite courtesy of her people. Others, 
who have never been able to see the islands, have been 
carried away by the charm of Japanese art, whether in its 
great creations or in the dainty trifles that soon became popu- 
lar abroad ; their imagination has been thrilled with tales 
of the chivalrous ideals of old Japan and the beauty and 
refinement of the life there. And of foreign nations none has 
been more deeply interested than the Americans. They 
were the first to study Japanese art, as is testified by the 
collection of the Boston Art Museum, which is finer than 
any other in existence outside of the empire itself. They, 
the most western of modern peoples, have been peculiarly 
attracted by the subtle charm of the Far East. They have 
filled their houses with the products of its handiwork, and 
they have flocked over in thousands to visit it. A trip to 
Japan has seemed less of an undertaking to an American 
than to a European, and, in fact, for a citizen of San Francisco 
a visit to Tokio takes scarcely more time, and less trouble 
and expense, than one to London or Paris. No wonder that 
Americans have crossed the Pacific in swarms, most as mere 
tourists, but some for serious study, and others to aid in 
bringing modern knowledge to the Japanese, many of whom 
on their part have come as students to the United States. 

It was not to be expected that these pleasant relations 
should be exempt from occasional discord. In the Far 
East, the American trading community, like the various 
European ones, has entertained a poor opinion of the com- 
mercial honesty of the Japanese, and has had little affection 
for the nation as a whole. During the war between China 
and Japan, American as well as European merchants in 
both countries, who as near observers would supposedly 



346 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

be well informed, not only sympathized with the former 
power, but were convinced that she would win. When the 
event turned out otherwise, though the public in the United 
States warmly applauded the success of its friends, the 
trader in the East shook his head and declared that the 
Japanese would now be more insufferably conceited and 
difficult to deal with than ever. 

Few echoes of this dissatisfaction reached home ; but even 
there enthusiasm did not go to the length of willingness to 
sacrifice interests. If Japan suffered from a surplus of 
population, let her, said the Americans, direct it some- 
where else — to Korea, to Manchuria, only not in too 
great numbers to Hawaii, which, years before, the United 
States had declared would not be abandoned to any foreign 
power. The influx of Japanese into the little republic, 
and the tone which the government at Tokio took in pro- 
tecting their rights, was indeed the chief reason why many 
people felt annexation to be urgent. When it took place, 
Japan handed in a formal protest at Washington, — a rather 
surprising act, for though it was but a mild expression of the 
disappointment felt at this harsh awakening from ambitious 
dreams of a Japanese Hawaii, still the ministers of the 
Mikado are ordinarily too cool and sensible to indulge in 
futile recriminations. They appear to have thought better 
of this one before long, for the protest was presently with- 
drawn. 

When the United States took over the Philippines, 
whatever dissatisfaction Japan may have felt, she kept it 
to herself. She was not in a position to stop the transfer 
if she had wished to, and she desired American support 
in matters which concerned her more nearly. 

In the various questions that agitated the Far East during 
the troubled years intervening between the last two wars, 
American and Japanese interests were usually in harmony, 
and the policy pursued by the two governments was much 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 347 

the same. They supported equally the principle of the " open 
door," even if the Japanese had not applied it in Formosa v 
and they were opposed to the partition of China, though 
Japan, like England, took care to provide herself by treaty 
with a particular sphere of influence (the province of Fukien) 
in case of accident. During the relief expedition to Peking, 
the American and the Japanese soldiers were on the best of 
terms, and both fraternized with the English, while the 
troops from continental Europe tended to form another 
group. The United States was throughout in sympathy with 
Japanese efforts to prevent the Russians from establishing 
themselves permanently in Manchuria, — a step which it 
regarded as contrary to its interests. 

It is not to be wondered at, despite the surprise and 
anger of many Europeans, that during the recent war the 
American public overwhelmingly favored Japan, and gave 
practical proof of its good-will by its readiness to subscribe 
to her last loan. We must remember how much the tradi- 
tional friendship between the United States and Russia had 
cooled down by that time. Then there was a natural sym- 
pathy for the smaller country, even if it did have the 
greater available resources at hand ; and soon the splendid 
courage and patriotism shown by the Japanese in the course 
of the struggle, the perfection of their organization, and the 
skill of their conduct of affairs, elicited unstinted applause. 
Besides this, their triumphs flattered a certain self-satisfac- 
tion in the Americans; for nations, like individuals, are 
wont to be proud of their pupils, and sometimes have a 
closer attachment to those on whom they have conferred 
favors than to those from whom they have received them. 
One argument which appealed to many persons in Europe, 
even among those who had little fondness for the Russians, — 
that of the solidarity of the white peoples against the yellow, 
— made little impression in the United States. Strong as 
race feeling is there, it has small influence in foreign affairs. 



348 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

The American has for some time been afraid of the Asiatic 
as a competitor at home, and he is beginning to dread him 
as a rival abroad ; but the "yellow peril," in a political sense, 
has no terrors for him. He believes that on his own conti- 
nent he is able to defend himself against any armed foe; 
and prophecies of the future danger to the white races when 
countless millions of Chinese, disciplined and led by Japan- 
ese instructors, shall renew the exploits of Genghis Khan, 
have left him quite unmoved. He was much more affected 
by the comparisons drawn between the reactionary severity, 
then at its height, of the Russian autocracy and the liberal 
transformation which had made of Japan a modern civilized 
power. In fact, he was ready to declare that the Japanese 
were the more advanced and the more truly western nation 
of the two. 

For this friendliness, the Japanese were honestly grateful. 
We need not always take the professions of their public 
men, orators, and newspapers at their face value, any more 
than we do those of other countries, but we should beware 
of distrusting Asiatics just because they are Asiatics. 
Even if their profusion of polite assurances may be mere 
figures of speech oftener than we are used to in the western 
world, this does not prove them to be incapable of sin- 
cerity. For instance, the extraordinary ovations to the 
party headed by Secretary Taft which passed through Japan 
while hostilities were still in progress, though doubtless 
stimulated and directed by political calculation, displayed, 
as any one present would testify, much genuine warmth of 
feeling. It is true that there was a sharp reaction when the 
terms of peace turned out less favorable than Japanese 
public opinion in its elation had expected, and the anger 
aroused by this disappointment was in part directed against 
the nation which had helped to end the war. But it is now 
recognized by unprejudiced observers that at the time the 
military outlook in Manchuria was far from ju'omising for 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 349 

Japan. The Russian army had never been stronger or in 
better condition ; the cost of the siege of Port Arthur did 
not tend to make the prospect of the more difficult one of 
Vladivostok alluring ; the financial strain on the Empire of 
the Mikado was very severe ; so that, when all was said and 
done, the Japanese obtained as satisfactory terms as they 
were entitled to hope for. They have, therefore, no legiti- 
mate cause to resent the action of America in bringing about 
the peace of Portsmouth, especially as she put no obsta- 
cle in the way of their domination in Korea, though she 
was under treaty obligation to aid in maintaining Korean 
independence whenever her good services should be asked 
for. Taking advantage of the forced technical consent of 
the unfortunate Korean emperor to the terms imposed upon 
him, the government at Washington paid no attention to 
his private appeals, but left him and his empire to their 
hard, though not unmerited, fate. 

To sum up, we may say that the record of the relations 
between the United States and Japan, from the days of 
Commodore Perry down to a few months ago, has been one 
of genuine and rather extraordinary mutual friendliness. 
Why, then, has a new feeling grown up of late, and why is 
the present outlook less serene? 

In replying to these questions we may as well recognize, 
to begin with, that the two countries can never again be on 
quite the same terms that they were ten years ago. Their 
feelings towards one another may be of the most cordial 
kind, but both have changed too much for the old rela- 
tion, which was almost that of benevolent teacher and eager 
pupil, to be possible in the future. The Americans are no 
longer the mildly interested spectators in the Far East 
that they once were, and Japan has outgrown the need of 
their tutelage. In the past they have applauded her suc- 
cesses, sometimes without stopping to consider whether 
these would in the end be to their advantage, and now they 



350 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

can claim no grievance if her altered position gives her new 
interests and inspires her with new ambitions which are not 
invariably in accord with their own desires. America, who 
has grown to be the rival of so many older states, cannot 
complain when she in her turn is confronted by the rivalry 
of a younger one. The world is still large enough for many 
nations to compete without quarrelling, but when the aspira- 
tions of one conflict with those of another, it serves no good 
purpose to blink the truth. It is saner to accept the situ- 
ation frankly, and to try to see what can reasonably be ex- 
pected on both sides, for without such an understanding, a 
fair adjustment cannot be arrived at. 

For the sake of convenience, we may divide the questions 
which threaten to produce friction between Japan and the 
United States into two groups: the first to include those 
which relate to the coming of the Japanese into the New 
World, and the second those pertaining to the rivalry be- 
tween the two powers in Asia and in the waters of the Pacific. 
The line of demarcation between these sets of questions is 
not distinct, — it is hard to say to which of them Hawaiian 
matters belong, — but in the main they are separate, though 
they react on one another and combine to make a much 
involved problem. 

On taking up the first group of questions, we note at the 
start that for some time the Japanese have been less popu- 
lar on the Pacific coast than in other parts of the United 
States. Merchants of California have had unpleasant expe- 
riences in trading with them, and the laboring classes have 
looked on Japanese immigrants with the same hostility that 
they have felt towards the Chinese. Different as these two 
Asiatic peoples are, the effect of their presence from the 
point of view of the white laboring man is the same, — it ex- 
poses him to a competition against which, as long as he 
maintains his present standard of living, he is unable to hold 
his own. In California, the Japanese have found a climate 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 351 

which suits them perfectly, occupations which are conge- 
nial, — indeed, owing to their intelligent carefulness they are 
particularly well adapted to the important industry of fruit- 
growing, — and they can get wages far above what they can 
hope for at home. It is true, the cost of living is greater 
in America, but it leaves a large margin of profit for peo- 
ple of their simple, economical habits. To many of them a 
preliminary sojourn in Hawaii has served as an introduc- 
tion to American ways and conditions. 

If the movement of immigration were a small one, it need 
not excite alarm, but though still young, it has rapidly 
taken on large dimensions. The annual surplus of births 
over deaths in Japan, already an overcrowded country, is 
some seven hundred thousand, and a yearly immigration of 
half this number into the United States — a thing by no 
means inconceivable — would soon flood the Pacific coast 
with an Asiatic population that would certainly displace 
white workmen and shopkeepers, and perhaps whole com- 
munities. Already there are Japanese capitalists there who 
own industrial enterprises of importance, which employ 
many of their compatriots and attract others from Japan. 
No wonder that the labor-unions are up in arms against the 
danger, and that they find popular support, to the surprise 
of many good people in the eastern states who cling to their 
old pro-Japanese sentiments. The exclusion of Japanese 
children from the California schools was but the chance 
occasion of the raising of the whole broad issue. 

Some persons maintain that the ideals which have made 
America great in the past are above mere differences of race 
and color, and rest on fundamental truths applicable to all 
mankind. They declare that the treatment and influences 
which make good Americans out of Italians, Hungarians, 
and Russian Jews will be equally efficacious with the Japan- 
ese ; that no one can doubt their mental capacity, or deny 
their eagerness to learn, not only the language of their new 



352 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

home, but everything it has to teach them, and to copy its 
ways ; that nothing, indeed, but the unjust law which forbids 
the naturalization of Asiatics prevents the Japanese immi- 
grants from becoming good citizens within a few years after 
their arrival in the United States. It may be answered that 
all this is unquestionably true of individuals, and were the 
Japanese coming over in small numbers only, it would be 
invidious and wrong to impose restrictions on them, even 
if we might regret the addition to the American population 
of another ethnic element, which, whatever may be its own 
virtues, would not, in the opinion of many, blend well with 
the rest. But the question at issue is different ; it is that of 
checking such an influx of the yellow race as will swamp the 
whites on the Pacific coast. We may doubt, too, whether 
the Japanese, though desirous of obtaining citizenship, are 
as willing as most other immigrants to divest themselves of 
their former nationality; whether for them naturalization 
would not be merely a means of gaining influence and 
power, and whether they would not use the advantages the 
vote confers to build up on American soil a great community 
of the Shin Nihon (the New Japan), which their enthusiasts 
have dreamed of, and some of their writers have discussed 
with a frankness that, if known, would make men stare in 
the United States. It is not easy to believe that a people 
who hold such views think of their emigrants as lost to 
their old home for the benefit of a new one : on the contrary, 
they appear to regard them as pioneers in a movement of 
national colonization. But national colonization of the 
sort is an obvious menace to the integrity of the country 
to which it is directed. While we need not take unauthor- 
ized patriotic fancies too seriously, it would be unwise to 
ignore them altogether. 

The late violent outburst against the Japanese on the 
Pacific coast was primarily due to their rapid increase of 
numbers in the last two years. The incident placed the 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 353 

government at Washington in a very uncomfortable situa- 
tion. Owing to the nature of the American Constitution, 
federal control over any state in such matters is feeble 
enough at best, as was clearly shown at the time of the New 
Orleans massacre in 1891. Now, while unable to bring 
much pressure upon California, the administration has 
had to soothe the legitimate wrath of a proud, sensitive 
nation, aglow with triumph. The assumption that their 
compatriots were to be treated as an inferior race whose 
children must be parked for infectious moral disease in sep- 
arate schools, seemed an intolerable insult. The Japanese, 
except when they are trying to win popularity with the 
Chinese, resent being classed with them or being termed 
Mongolians at all, and they will never submit to the same 
unceremonious treatment. They ask for no privileges, but 
only for the equality granted to twenty other peoples and 
assured to them by solemn treaty. No wonder that they 
were fierce with anger at the news that reached them from San 
Francisco, and that the unscrupulous howling of the Ameri- 
can yellow press provoked equally wild outbursts in reply. 
Happily for all parties, the cool, clear-sighted statesmen 
who are at the head of affairs in Tokio have remained un- 
moved by popular clamor. They realize the difficulties 
under which the American government labors, and they 
have shown themselves willing to help it out to the best 
of their ability, provided only the dignity of their country 
be respected. To have insisted uncompromisingly on their 
treaty rights without doing anything to make the situation 
easier for the Americans, would have been to move directly 
towards war ; for we may accept it as beyond doubt that, if 
Japanese immigration to the United States were to keep on 
growing at its recent rate, some means would be found to 
stop it, treaty or no treaty, peacefully or by force, at any 
risk and at any cost. This may well have been appreciated 
at Tokio. 

2a 



354 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

Another consideration which, we may feel sure, has been 
weighed there by men who have not been led astray by 
dreams of the Shin Nihon, is whether it is for Japan's real 
interest, not to speak of her dignity, that her children should 
leave her in this manner. Few countries view with pleasure 
the permanent departure of their citizens for foreign climes. 
It is true that colonies, even under alien rule, help to stimu- 
late the national trade ; and many Japanese emigrants to 
America send or take back the money they have made there, 
to the enrichment of their native land. But will they not 
all in the end be lost to their old home, as so many Euro- 
peans have been ? Would it not be better for the Empire, 
in any case, that they should colonize Formosa, Korea, 
Manchuria, where they would remain under the control of 
their own authorities, and could use their strength and skill 
for the benefit of the Empire? 

The United States on its part may take comfort in the 
fact that the Pacific coast of Canada, as the troubles at 
Vancouver have shown, shares its dislike to Asiatic compe- 
tition. This is but natural in view of the similarity of 
conditions. There is also sufficient evidence that the same 
feeling obtains in Australia; all of which is exceedingly 
awkward for Great Britain, the sworn ally of Japan. Since 
it is hardly conceivable that the mother country should at- 
tempt to coerce her great self-governing colonies, it appears 
that, like the United States, she is in the rather humili- 
ating position of having to rely chiefly on the prudence 
and moderation of another country to get her out of a bad 
predicament. Probably she will not be disappointed; for 
the Japanese, whatever may be their feeling towards the 
Americans, are not going just now to rush into a quarrel 
with the English. But concessions made to Canada cannot 
well be refused to the United States. The anti- Japanese 
movement is the same in both places, and its spread 
into the dominions of Japan's close friend proves that its 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 355 

character is not specifically American. After all, Japan her- 
self has just been ruthlessly expelling Chinese and Korean 
laborers from her territory. 

We must lament that the very desire to exclude people 
from a territory serves as an advertisement of its attrac- 
tions, and leads to determined efforts to smuggle them- 
selves in, a thing hard to check in the United States 
because of its thousands of miles of open frontier toward 
Canada and Mexico. The measures taken to suppress this 
smuggling cannot help leading to incidents not conducive 
to international good feeling. 

It is fortunate that the whole situation appears to be well 
understood by the governments concerned, who have pre- 
served cordial relations. The Japanese one has earned a 
claim to gratitude by its spirit of concession, as shown in a 
willingness to restrict the number of its emigrants to the 
United States, as also to Canada. On their side, most Amer- 
icans still entertain a lively admiration for Japan ; they 
are fair-minded enough to appreciate her side of the ques- 
tion, and they have sufficient respect for her military 
strength to appreciate that, even if they would, they could 
not settle matters off-hand without regard to her wishes. 
Under these circumstances, as long as they gain their main 
point, the checking of immigration, they are not likely to 
indulge in wanton provocation of a great and friendly 
power. For the moment, at least, the danger of serious 
complications seems past. 

Nevertheless, it would be idle to pretend that the outcome 
is wholly satisfactory. An unpleasant feature of the con- 
troversy for Americans has been that, however much they 
may be in the right on the larger issues, the fact remains 
that, owing to formal treaty stipulations, and to their own 
inability to suppress mob violence with due promptness, 
they have been in an awkward quandary from which they 
owe their release chiefly to the wisdom, not to say the 



350 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

magnanimity, of Japan. And the arrangement which will 
give the United States the protection it demands, will rest, 
not on the efficiency of its own laws, but on the fulfilment 
of obligations voluntarily assumed by a foreign state. This 
may be making the best of a bad job, but it is not ideal. 
Whatever course wisdom may dictate to the Mikado and 
his counsellors, a great nation like the American cannot 
depend indefinitely on the generosity, real or presumed, 
of a neighbor. The Japanese people as a whole will not 
regard even their partial exclusion from the United States 
with anything but bitterness ; and if they should ever wish 
for war with their former friends, they will have no trouble 
in finding a plausible pretext. As long as the Americans 
make a distinction between nations in the opening of their 
doors to strangers, so long will those who are discriminated 
against feel that they have a grievance hard to forgive. 
This consideration may strengthen the growing opposition 
in the United States to the present enormous immigra- 
tion from all quarters. Such a measure as the imposition 
of a property qualification, which many advocate on its 
own merits, would have the additional advantage that 
it would at the same time put an end to the invasion of 
Asiatic laborers, and remove the most serious complaint of 
China and Japan. It may be that the solution of the whole 
problem lies in this direction. 

The present rapid increase of population in certain parts 
of the world threatens to raise troublesome questions. 
On the one hand, the peoples herded together in poor, small 
areas will strive to break down all barriers erected by 
the selfishness of those who possess thinly settled tracts 
with rich natural resources. On the other, those who by 
the kindness of nature or by their own efforts are well 
provided for, will not lightly consent to be swamped by a 
horde of famished strangers; they will not see why they 
should sacrifice their own comfort and standard of life just 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 357 

because their needy neighbors choose to have big families. 
Communism among states will not soon prevail, especially 
as it is unattractive to the very men who favor it among 
individuals; for the laboring classes are those who suffer 
most from unrestricted immigration, and are, in conse- 
quence, most hostile to it. 

Now the Japanese, perceiving that their islands have 
already about as large a population as they can well contain, 
and that the tide is still swelling, are anxious to find a 
good outlet for their overflow. For the moment Korea may 
do ; but Korea is not very spacious, and it has people of its 
own, who may be expected to multiply under improved con- 
ditions. If, in addition it were to receive for a generation 
the surplus of births from across the strait, it would become 
as crowded as is Japan to-day. Manchuria is larger, but 
Manchuria already has some twenty million Chinese inhabit- 
ants, with many more coming. There is room enough there 
for Japanese enterprise, but the Chinese trader is not easy 
to surpass, and the Chinese day laborer, under fair compe- 
tition, has yet to find his equal. Looking further, we see 
vacant land in the tropics ; but the Japanese have so far not 
shown themselves well adapted to field work in a hot climate ; 
in Formosa, for instance, they have been none too successful. 
It would seem that, like the whites, they can live as offi- 
cials, merchants, and employers of labor everywhere, but 
only within the temperate zone can they emigrate in such 
numbers as to relieve the congestion at home. Among the 
comparatively empty temperate regions, Siberia, Canada, and 
Australia will assuredly be closed to any great immigration 
on their part, for the reasons that have been operative in 
the United States, and that would be equally so in any 
country of Europe. There remains only Latin America. 

Most of the Latin-American republics are the happy pos- 
sessors of splendid natural resources still waiting to be 
developed. In order to develop them, and it is desired to 



358 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

do so at once, there is need of both capital and labor. The 
former can be furnished by Europe or the United States, and 
will be forthcoming, provided it can enjoy security. The 
latter is also to be had ; but so far only a few of the Latin- 
American countries have attracted any considerable Euro- 
pean immigration. The others may have their turn in 
time, but they are unwilling to wait while their rivals pass 
them in the race, and if they cannot get European laborers, 
they are ready to take Asiatic. They made their first ex- 
periments in importing Chinese in the days of the infamous 
coolie traffic ; but not many of these Chinese have remained, 
and few have come since. Here, then, is an opening for 
the children of Japan, — broad, fertile, thinly settled lands, 
fine climates, natural wealth of divers kinds, and in some 
cases indolent, unprogressive populations, who with their 
mixture of white, black, and Indian blood can hardly enter- 
tain the race haughtiness of the Anglo-Saxon. Neither gov- 
ernments nor peoples seem to have any fear of the Japanese ; 
nay, in some quarters a desire has already been expressed 
for growth of their influence in the New World to prevent 
the too great preponderance of the United States. 

The existence of these favorable conditions is already 
known in Japan, where a movement towards Latin Amer- 
ica has actually started, and bids fair to proceed rapidly. 
For some years there has been a Mexican colonization society 
in the empire, whose activity did not altogether cease even 
during the late war with Russia. But in Mexico the condi- 
tions are peculiar, for if immigrants should flock there only 
to make their way across the border into the United States, 
as they have already begun to do, the latter may, in self- 
defence, be obliged to ask of Mexico and Tokio that the 
same restrictive measures be applied to Mexican immigra- 
tion as to its own. At last accounts, something of the kind 
had been conceded, but, judged by international law, it is a 
curious demand to make, and it might be hard to persist in 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 359 

if it were refused. And now the Japanese are appearing 
in South America. They have begun coming to Peru and 
Chile, where they have been welcomed, and recently their 
government signed a treaty with Brazil providing for the 
establishment there of agricultural immigrants, to whom 
lands are to be allotted. Direct communication between 
the Empire of the Mikado and the chief ports of the Southern 
republics is to be assured by a Japanese line of steamships. 
In view of all these facts it seems highly probable that im- 
migration will soon set in on a large scale, to the immediate 
advantage of all concerned. 

At present this does not matter in any way to the United 
States, and we may hope that it never will ; yet we cannot 
be too confident. If the plan of having European capital 
cooperate with Asiatic labor in the development of the 
South American countries for the particular benefit of the 
natives is attractive, it is not without its dangers. We have 
considered elsewhere some of the difficulties connected with 
the investment of capital from Europe ; those springing 
from the influx of laborers from Asia are certainly not less. 

Even in the sparsely settled territories of Latin America, 
the presence of a considerable number of Japanese may 
provoke agitation. This will be more likely to happen if 
the newcomers are successful and get control of affairs to 
an extent that will alarm the rest of the population, — a not 
impossible contingency, for the Japanese have shown their 
ability to meet more severe competition than that of the 
ordinary Latin American. And they need not be expected 
to disarm hostility by excessive modesty or by prompt as- 
similation with those about them. In the United States, 
where the Japanese have freely acknowledged that they have 
had much to learn, one of the charges commonly brought 
against them is that of intolerable conceit. How will it be in 
lands where they will feel themselves superior at all points to 
their neighbors? If it is difficult to think of the Japanese 



360 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

as being converted into "good Americans," it requires a 
wider stretch of the imagination to conceive of them as 
turning promptly into typical Peruvians or Brazilians ; and 
they have proved that they will not submit tamely to ill- 
treatment, such as, for instance, the Chinese formerly en- 
dured in Brazil. We may rest assured that the government 
at Tokio will not leave its citizens unprotected in any part 
of the world ; nor will it sit by with folded hands while one 
door after another is slammed in their face, — an insult 
which no high-spirited nation could bear with equanimity. 
It is one thing to show moderation in dealing with the 
United States, and readiness in helping its government out 
of a quandary ; it is another to put up with an affront 
from, let us say, Ecuador. Can we imagine that in every 
case Japan would submit to an exclusion act directed against 
her people? 

Questions like the above may some day have to be taken 
into earnest consideration by the United States; for it is 
certain that, if the Japanese should threaten to use force 
against any Latin-American republic, that republic, even 
if it harbored no friendly feeling towards its Anglo-Saxon 
sister, would speedily appeal to her for protection in the 
name of the Monroe Doctrine. The Americans might then 
find themselves in a bad dilemma. They would not wish 
to protect a delinquent against deserved punishment, and 
could remain tranquil if the punishment were not pushed 
too far, but the case might not be so simple. If, for instance, 
the Japanese were to increase to such an extent in Peru 
that the native population, in fear of losing control of their 
own country, were to forbid further admission of Asiatics, 
and were to turn to the United States for support against 
coercion from Japan, what then ? Could the Americans be 
expected to accept all the fearful responsibilities of war 
solely that the people of Peru, not one-seventh of whom 
are of the white race, might shut out at their good pleas- 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 361 

ure the immigrants who could best develop the country? 
It would be still more absurd if the United States, while 
excluding the Japanese from its own borders, should insist 
that a sister republic admit them. And yet, to stand 
aside and abandon that republic to its fate would be hazard- 
ous, besides being quite out of keeping with the present 
practice of the Monroe Doctrine. We must remember, too, 
that while the Japanese may respect the Monroe Doctrine 
as the corner-stone of the foreign policy of a powerful nation, 
there is no reason why they should like it any more than 
many Europeans do. As applied to them, it cannot be 
defended on the same moral ground as when enforced 
against Europe ; for then, in theory at least, it rests on 
the idea of reciprocity. The United States holds no land 
in the Old World, takes no part in its political affairs, and 
in return will not tolerate that any European power should 
intervene in the affairs of the New, or extend its domination 
there. But this theory breaks down when applied to 
Japan, for the United States not only takes part freely in 
the affairs of the Far East, — witness its championship of 
the "open door," — it also has acquired extensive terri- 
tories, territories much nearer to Japan than is most of 
South America to the United States. To any insistence on 
the Monroe Doctrine the Japanese can therefore reply, 
"Why not Asia for the Asiatics? " 

No people, of course, ever lets itself be prevented by a logi- 
cal dilemma from defending what it believes to be its rights 
and its legitimate interests; and the Americans will not 
change their long-established policy, even if the Japanese 
are able to prove in argument that it is one-sided. But 
they will do well to appreciate the Japanese point of view. 
Fortunately, the perils of a large immigration into Latin 
America are not immediate, and the movement itself may 
not come to anything, — prophecy in such matters is most 
uncertain. If the present problem of the Japanese influx 



362 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

into the United States can be satisfactorily settled, Ameri- 
cans will not borrow trouble about the future in their own 
part of the world. They must, however, pay attention 
to their relations with Japan in the Far East, for in that 
region, too, though there is no crisis, there are causes of 
discord which will require watching to prevent them from 
becoming serious. 

To begin with, it is, alas, true that the Japanese, in ad- 
dition to their resentment about the immigration question, 
have other grievances, the existence of which is barely known 
in the United States, but which are not forgotten by the 
jingo party in Japan. These same jingoes also entertain 
ambitions not reconcilable with American interests. To be 
sure, there is as yet no valid reason for taking these am- 
bitions tragically, or for supposing that they are shared by 
public men ; every country has its irrepressible chauvinists, 
who often attract more attention abroad than at home. 
Their aspirations cannot, however, be entirely overlooked 
in a study of international politics, for the jingoes are 
sometimes merely an advance guard, — men who give 
indiscreet expression to hopes that others cherish in secret 
and may some day, if circumstances are favorable, try to 
carry out. 

The first Japanese grievance of this kind relates to Hawaii. 
Although the useless protest made at the time of annexa- 
tion was soon officially withdrawn, the disappointment to 
which the protest gave expression has not disappeared, nor 
can we expect it to as long as the Japanese in the islands 
outnumber all the other elements put together and are 
several times as numerous as the Americans. Geographi- 
cally, Hawaii is almost as much a natural outpost of Japan 
as it is of the United States, and would be invaluable to her 
for either defensive or offensive purposes. Since it will 
hardly be pretended that the Japanese there are inferior 
to the natives, they cannot in justice remain indefinitely 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 363 

deprived of the vote; but, if they get it, they may profit 
by their numbers to agitate in favor of union with their 
former country. We need not wonder, then, that there are 
patriotic subjects of the Mikado who still hope to see his 
authority extended over this, the first conquest of Japanese 
colonization. 

In the Philippines the situation is different. Few Japanese 
are to be found there, and, though their number is increas- 
ing, it will never be formidable, as the tropical climate is no 
more suited to them than to white men. In the past, Japan 
has had some slight connection with the islands, and in the 
sixteenth century even meditated a military expedition 
against them. In recent years she has been accused of 
eyeing them covetously, of encouraging native revolt against 
Spain, and, now that the United States has taken the place 
of Spain, of biding her time until she is ready to snatch 
at this splendid spoil. 

As far as we know, there is little foundation for this 
supposition. Admitting that Japanese imperialists of the 
usual type are animated by a desire to get the Philippines, 
there is no reason to think that their feeling is shared by 
responsible statesmen in Tokio. Nor is there evidence that 
the latter ever had designs on the islands when they were 
under Spanish rule, although this spectre was made use 
of by malcontent Filipinos, and troubled men's minds in 
Madrid. 1 A few Filipino insurgents at the time of the last 
rising against Spain sought refuge in Japan, where the 
movement in which they were engaged awakened a certain 
amount of sympathy, and suggested tempting possibilities, 
but never received real help. Japan was just then taken 
up with plans in another direction, and at the moment of 

1 In 1895 when Russia, Germany, and France forbade a Japanese ac- 
quisition of the Liaotung Peninsula, Spain wished to have the same pro- 
hibition extended to Formosa, in order to avoid having Japan the nearest 
neighbor to the Philippines. 



364 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

the transfer of the Philippines to the United States she 
gave no sign of resentment. The desire of the Japanese 
for the islands, such as it is, and their objection to the 
presence of the Americans there, date rather from the last 
war, which so mightily stimulated their national self-con- 
fidence and ambition. Their successes were indeed enough 
to turn weak heads, but the men who direct their destinies 
cannot be accused of weakness. 

Many of those who accuse Japan of longing for the 
Philippines forget that since she is rich in children and 
poor in capital, what she really needs is vacant lands in the 
temperate zone, and not unprosperous territory in the 
tropics peopled by seven million Christian inhabitants who 
prefer to govern themselves. Still, we must admit that 
the ardent expansionist will not be stopped so easily. He 
believes that his country, like others, should have tropical 
colonies, and he points out that the Philippines should 
obviously be the first, not only because they are close 
at hand, but because they have been forcibly acquired by 
their present owners at so recent a date that possession is 
not consecrated by time. To crown all, they are inhabited 
by a discontented population, possibly of distant kin to the 
Japanese, who, he is convinced, will be welcomed as libera- 
tors. If he is an enthusiast for Pan-Asiatic ideals, his zeal 
will be the more inflamed against the Americans, the most 
western of western nations. 

Without attaching too much importance to fancies of this 
sort, we must recognize that they exist and may need watch- 
ing. We must remember too that, though the Japanese 
said nothing when the Philippines were taken over by the 
Americans, no people, be it ever so innocent of covetousness, 
enjoys seeing the territories in its vicinity, those which are 
the most obvious field for possible future expansion, pass 
from the hands of a weak nation into the grasp of a strong 
one. Ten years ago the United States had no designs on 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 365 

the Spanish West Indies, but it had long announced that it 
would never allow them to be transferred from Spain to 
another European power. If Japan at that date had been 
in a position to enforce her views, she would have been 
justified in maintaining a similar doctrine about the Spanish 
East Indies, albeit against the United States. To-day, 
when she is strong enough to take such a stand, it is too 
late, but the thought will rankle. 

Another thing which Americans must be prepared to 
accept is that their policy, however justified, of debarring 
the Japanese from the western world, will surely impel 
them towards the eastern. In recent years the Japanese 
have been almost morbidly desirous of not being regarded 
as Asiatics in the ordinary western sense of the term. 
It has been their heart's dearest wish to be accepted as one 
of the great civilized peoples, the equal of any other. And 
now the United States, with Great Britain shamefacedly 
concurring for her colonies, says to them, "We welcome 
Europeans of every nationality to our shores, we throw open 
our gates to Jews and Armenians, but you are not wanted, 
you are Asiatics." If the Japanese are forced to acquiesce 
in this decision, we may expect to see them bending their 
energies the more strenuously to the work of securing and 
extending their position in Asia, where they have been told 
that they belong. There is limitless room for their ambi- 
tions, and, after all, why are not Pan-Asiatic dreams as 
legitimate as Pan-American? 

In the general politics of the Far East, complete harmony, 
as we have seen, prevailed for a time between the interests of 
the United States and those of Japan. We may doubt, how- 
ever, whether the situation is still the same. Both powers 
were opposed to a partition of China ; but this danger is no 
longer menacing, — indeed, it is less so than Japanese pre- 
dominance, which would hardly be to the advantage of the 
United States. Both were hostile to a Russian absorption 



366 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

of Manchuria; but if Russia should now keep any part 
of Manchuria, it would only be in collusion with Japan, 
who herself threatens to absorb the southern and more 
thickly settled portion, the chief field for American trade. 
Already accusations have been made that the Japanese are 
aiding the sale of their own goods by underhand methods, 
and we may expect to hear of more such charges in the 
future. If, as seems likely, the United States and Japan 
are to be two of the most active commercial rivals in this 
part of the world, perhaps the most active, we need not 
be surprised if wherever one is in political control it is 
tempted to put obstacles in the way of the other, which, 
in return, will be ready on the slightest provocation to com- 
plain of unfair play. What adds to the displeasure of 
Americans is that the Japanese imitate, not to say counter- 
feit, their productions with inferior ones of their own, a way 
of underbidding, and at the same time discrediting a rival 
that has more than once been followed by nations as well 
as by individuals. If now the Japanese make use of 
their position in Korea and southern Manchuria to violate 
the principle of the "open door," — a principle so much 
easier to support with enthusiasm when you yourself do 
not control the door, — American resentment is sure to 
be keen. 

On the side of the Japanese, it will not be conducive to 
good feeling if people get the impression that the United 
States is not only a troublesome competitor in the Chinese 
markets, but is also the power which does most to hinder 
the fulfilment of their political ambitions. Already they 
have one grudge on this score, which, however unwarranted, 
none the less exists. Though the wiser heads among them 
may recognize that at the peace of Portsmouth Japan 
obtained as many advantages as she had any right to expect 
in view of the military situation and of her own financial 
condition, to the Japanese public, the terms of the treaty 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 367 

came as a bitter disappointment ; and there is danger of the 
survival of a belief that just as Russia, Germany, and France 
combined to rob Japan by force of the fruits of her earlier 
victories, so the United States, actuated by the same 
jealousy, but in the guise of a friend, managed to deprive 
her of the full reward of her triumphs over Russia. False 
as is this interpretation of what took place, it is the sort 
of legend which, owing to its appeal to national passion, is 
everywhere too readily accepted. The whole story points 
out some of the perils of even the friendliest mediation. 

Towards China, the position of the Japanese is, in their 
own eyes,- that of magnanimous liberators who have saved 
her from servitude to the Europeans, of wise teachers who 
have imparted to her the lessons necessary for her regenera- 
tion, of kindly guides who will direct her footsteps along 
the paths that lead to future greatness. The Chinese look 
at the matter differently : it was Japan, they say, that first 
exposed their weakness to the world, that robbed them of 
Formosa, and deprived them of their ancient suzerainty 
over Korea, which state she has now seized for herself; 
her action in repelling the Russians was due to selfish 
motives, and in any case it will be time enough to talk 
of gratitude when Manchuria has been restored without 
restriction to its sole legitimate possessor. Accordingly, 
their attitude, far from being docile, is rather one of distrust 
not unmixed with fear. Taught by experience, they are 
suspicious of disinterested professions, but they feel the need 
of foreign aid, and there is but one country to which they 
can well turn. Great Britain, France, Russia, have all re- 
cently signed treaties with Japan ; Germany, though doubt- 
less sympathetic, is not in a position to run the risk of 
openly opposing her for their sake ; there remains, then, the 
United States, whose interest still is, as it has been, to main- 
tain the integrity of the Chinese Empire, including Man- 
churia, and to uphold the policy of the "open door." 



368 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

This is all very well, and it may be sound policy as well 
as generosity for the United States to assume a benevolent 
attitude, but whatever it gains in thanks from China it 
will assuredly lose in good-will from Japan. The mere 
suggestion that the Chinese look upon it as their natural 
protector against the ambitions of the Japanese is enough 
to irritate the latter, whether they cherish designs or not, 
— a fact of which the Chinese are perhaps quite well aware. 
There remains one last set of reasons for which many 
people in Japan as well as in the United States, and perhaps 
still more outside, believe that the two must some day come 
to blows. The inevitable contest between them is to be 
either a "conflict between eastern and western civiliza- 
tion" or for the less ideal, but scarcely more tangible, "do- 
minion of the Pacific." Now it is safe to say that the vast 
majority of the persons who use these high-sounding terms 
have very little idea of what they mean. The differences 
between eastern and western civilization, though often pro- 
found, are not easy to define with accuracy, and the 
phraseology is misleading. There is more difference between 
the Turk and the Japanese, for instance, than between the 
latter and the European. But, whatever the differences 
may be, it is not clear how Japanese and Americans, by 
destroying each other's persons and possessions with the 
aid of the latest improved implements of warfare, are going 
to promote civilization of any kind. If the Americans 
triumph, they will scarcely impose on their adversaries, 
by the articles of peace, the use of the Roman alphabet 
or baptism into the Methodist Church, and even a com- 
plete Japanese victory would do little to further the study 
of the Chinese classics or to spread the tenets of Shintoism 
in the New World. If there is to be a conflict of civilizations 
between the East and the West, a point about which one 
may remain sceptical, it will not be settled in this simple, 
forcible manner. 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 369 

Again, the grandiloquent expressions " dominion of the 
seas," "mastery of the Pacific," and the like, are mere 
claptrap. What does this " mastery" signify, and how is 
either America or Japan to obtain it by victory over the 
other? Does it mean building up the larger navy? But 
Britannia continues to rule the waves by having more ships 
of war than any other power, and she can send them all to 
the Pacific, if she so pleases. As long as she retains this 
superiority, American or Japanese "mastery" can last only 
so long as the English kindly keep out of the way. Or, 
suppose that one country possesses the stronger fleet and 
the other holds most of the trade: which will then enjoy 
"dominion"? Theoretically, perhaps, the one with the 
more vessels of war, as being able to plunder its neighbor; 
but piracy is out of date, and while peace is preserved, there 
is no doubt which will have the more valuable asset. And 
why should a war between the United States and Japan 
settle any question of commercial supremacy between them ? 
Great loss might be incurred, and certain industries be 
crippled, but the day is past when the victors could pro- 
hibit the vanquished from manufacturing what they wished 
to, and disposing of their produce as best they could in 
neutral markets. If the American fleets were to sweep the 
Pacific, this would not prevent Japanese cotton goods from 
underselling American ones in the shops of Shanghai, or, 
when peace returned, Japanese ships from charging lower 
freight rates than those of their American competitors. 
Per contra, the loss of the Philippines and Hawaii, grievous 
as it might be, would probably not seriously affect the 
sale of Standard oil in the Far East. The United States 
and Japan may, indeed, be rivals in the waters of the 
Pacific to-day, and rivalry of this sort is accompanied by 
some friction, but the supposition is monstrous that they 
must therefore enter into a desperate struggle with each 
other in order that one of them may obtain an undis- 

2b 



370 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

puted primacy, which depends on other things than force 
of arms. 

Unfortunately, the use of even meaningless phrases may 
be dangerous in itself. Vague and intangible as " domin- 
ion " and "mastery" are, they appeal to men's imagination; 
and before now people have fought for abstractions. We 
may think that a war for the "dominion of the Pacific" 
would be absurd, and wicked, but if a large number of per- 
sons in the United States and in Japan are convinced that 
this "dominion" properly belongs to their own country and 
not to the other, and that there must some day be a war 
between the two to settle the point, — an opinion in which 
many outsiders noisily concur, — a situation and a state of 
mind are created which are perilous to the peace : nations 
have not quite lost the temper of the game-cock ready to 
do battle for the privilege of having the roost to himself 
and crowing undisturbed. And the widespread impression 
that the United States and Japan are inevitable rivals for 
the " mastery " of the Eastern seas renders friendship be- 
tween them more difficult, and familiarizes both with the 
idea of a possible conflict. Even when the adjective 
"peaceful" is attached to the word "domination," and 
it is explained that only commercial supremacy is meant, 
the reiteration of the claim by leading men in both 
countries is not likely to improve international relations. 1 

1 The first number (October, 1907) of the new review of The Pacific Era, 
contains articles by President Roosevelt and Baron Kaneko. Here are 
two extracts : — 

"The extension in the area of our domain has been immense; the 
extension in the area of our influence even greater. America's geograph- 
ical position on the Pacific is such as to insure peaceful domination of 
its waters in the future if we only grasp with sufficient resolution the ad- 
vantages of that position." — President Roosevelt, revised version of 
speech in San Francisco, in 1903. 

"What then should be the attitude of our imperial country in the face 
of all this American activity ? It cannot possibly be otherwise than this : 
That we must do our utmost in disputing this command of the Pacific 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 371 

To sum up, when we come to consider the factors, large 
and small, which have contributed in the last three years 
to the estrangement of Japanese and Americans, we 
need not marvel at the change in their feeling towards 
one another. How far it has gone, whether the angry 
vaporings of a part of the press or the cordial utterances of 
public men represent more exactly the popular temper 
in the two countries, it is not easy to say, though we may 
remember the general truth that an angry man talks louder 
than a contented one. There are people in both who 
expect war; there is distrust on the American side, a 
suspicion that Japan having triumphed, first over China, 
then over Russia, has now picked out the United States 
as her third antagonist, and that when she thinks the 
moment come, she will strike as suddenly and as fiercely 
as she did in her last conflict. In return, there are Japanese 
who look on the United States as the chief obstacle to the 
future greatness of their country. But in both lands there 
are also men, men high in authority, mindful of the old 
friendship between the two, convinced that there is no 
valid reason why it should not continue, and certain that 
a war between them would be not only a folly but a crime. 

If Japan were to plan an attack, she would have to act 
soon. She cannot build as many ships as the United 
States, and when the Panama Canal is dug, — a task 
which some might compare, in its military significance, to 
the construction of the Trans-Siberian land route for 
Russia a few years ago, — the Americans will no longer 
suffer from their worst disadvantage, the dispersion of 
their naval strength, and it is not likely now that they 
will be caught napping as the Russians were. 

It is also not very evident where Japan could find the 
resources for a prolonged contest, especially as there is 

with the United States, and also do our best in the control of the Far 
Eastern markets." — Baron Kaneko Kentaro. 



372 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

little chance that she could obtain financial or other aid 
from outside. Alliance or no alliance, Great Britain will 
never take up arms against the United States in Japan's 
sole behalf. No treaty obligations could stand the strain, 
for such a course of action would not be tolerated by the 
English public, and would be enough to drive some of the 
colonies into rebellion. 

The glib prophets of future conflicts usually overlook the 
many forces that are working to prevent them. Nations 
are capable of losing their heads and of beginning to fight 
before they know what they are doing, but the conse- 
quences of modern war are enormous, and the uncertain- 
ties so fearful that few public men will deliberately plan 
one. It may not take two to make a quarrel, but one 
at least has to be willing for it. Now there is no reason 
why the United States should wish for a war with Japan : 
it has no desire for her territory, no grudge to vent, and no 
grave danger to fear from her in the future. The trade 
rivalry between the two is not dissimilar to other commer- 
cial rivalry all over the world. We may confidently affirm 
that it is beyond the bounds of probability that the Ameri- 
cans should go out of their way to seek a conflict with the 
Japanese. For Japan the temptation may be greater. 
The chance of getting the Philippines and Hawaii, of 
adding another to the list of Japanese victories, of giving 
to the empire of the Mikado a still prouder position among 
the nations of the world and vindicating the claims of the 
Japanese race to equality with others, — all these may 
well appeal to the instincts of an ambitious, warlike people 
flushed with success. But if Japan has more to gain by 
a war than the United States, the risks she runs are more 
formidable. The American navy is the stronger of the 
two ; but even supposing it to be defeated, and the Ameri- 
cans to be deprived of their insular possessions in the East, 
the mass of their territory would remain invulnerable, and 



THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 373 

they have given in the past sufficient evidence of their pride 
and determination to make it probable that they would 
persist in the struggle till it terminated in their favor, as 
it should do ultimately, owing to their superior resources. 1 
When it did, they would exact heavy retribution for what- 
ever humiliation they had undergone. In war with the 
United States to-day, victory would bring to Japan glory 
and power, but scarcely much permanent gain ; defeat 
would mean crushing disaster, the end of her high hopes, 
and the loss of the splendid position she has won for 
herself by her two brilliantly successful appeals to the 
decision of the sword. 

It was only with extreme reluctance that several of the 
Japanese statesmen consented to the war with Russia, 
although they believed that the vital interests of their 
country were imperilled ; and it is hard to imagine their 
plunging light-heartedly into a perilous conflict with a 
country from which otherwise they have little to fear. Of 
course, if their safety were threatened or their honor were 
affected, the Japanese would fight, and fight to the bitter end, 
or if the Americans were to neglect reasonable precautions 
for defence, this might subject the virtue of their neighbors 
to too severe temptation. There is no especial reason to 
expect either of these contingencies, but when all is said 
and done, the best guarantee for continued peace between 
the two nations is the earnest desire of the wisest men in 
both that they should remain friends. 

The moral for Americans of the various international 
complications in which they find themselves involved 
is, after all, the old one that greatness brings responsibili- 
ties. These they will have to face, for it is now too late 
for them to return to the simple life of their earlier history. 

1 Russia, who was in a much more disadvantageous position, might 
have fought on indefinitely if she had not been weakened by internal 
discontent. 



374 THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER 

They will do well, therefore, to take to heart the words 
of the President : — 

"We have no choice, we people of the United States, as 
to whether or not we shall play a great part in the world. 
That has been determined for us by fate, by the march of 
events. We have to play that part. All that we can 
decide is whether we shall play it well or ill." 



V"*~-~— 



INDEX 



Adams, J. Q., and Monroe Doctrine, 96, 
99 n. 

Aerial navigation and Canadian-Ameri- 
can relations, 266. 

Aguinaldo, Emilio, and American offi- 
cials, 152-155. 

Alabama claims, 232. 

Alaska, government, 30 ; purchase, 38, 
216 ; status, 138 ; boundary tribunal, 
241 ; effect of acquisition on Canada, 
251. 

Alexander I of Russia, and United States, 
214. 

Alexis, Grand Duke, visit to United 
States, 215. 

Algeciras Conference, United States and, 
119; "open door," 183. 

American Revolution, cause, 29 ; French 
aid and attitude, 184-186 ; German 
interest, 197 ; attitude of Catherine II, 
213; of French Canadians, 247, 248; 
Canada and peace negotiations, 248; 
loyalists in Canada, 249. 

Americans, character, and immigration, 
40, 43 ; English as language, 44-46, 
58; future, 60; French opinion of, 
193-195; and Russians, 216; Eng- 
lish opinion of, 235, 242. See also 
Nationality, Political ideas. 

Annexations. See Territory. 

Anti-imperialists, origin, 134; and Ha- 
waii, 134; and Porto Rico, 135, 143; 
arguments against annexation of 
Philippines, 135 ; and Philippine In- 
surrection, 156 ; and government of 
Philippines, 159; and protectorate, 
167 ; and naval base in Philippines, 
322. 

Anti-Semitism in United States, 52. 
See also Jews. 

Arbitration, San Juan Island, 102 ; 
Venezuela-Guiana boundary, 104 ; and 
Monroe Doctrine, 111; Behring Sea , 
232; Geneva, 232; Alaskan tribunal, 
241. 
Argentine Republic, not a world power, 
7; future, 17; and Falkland Islands, 
283; future American relation, 308. 
See also Latin America. 



Armed neutrality, 213. 

Armenian massacres, 226. 

Army, American, negroes as soldiery, 73; 
attitude towards regular, 89 ; in Phil- 
ippine Insurrection, 157. 

Assimilation. See Immigration. 

Australia, anti-Japanese agitation, 354. 

Austria- Hungary, as European power, 2 ; 
not a world power, 7 ; and United 
States, 224. 

Bahama Islands, strategic position, 267. 

Balkans, Russian intervention (1877), 
128. 

Baltimore incident with Chile, 284. 

Beaconsfield, Earl of, and expansion, 5. 

Behring Sea controversy, 232. 

Belgium and Congo, 5. 

Bermuda, strategic position, 267. 

Bismarck, Fiirst von, and expansion, 5; 
on Monroe Doctrine, 107. 

Blaine, J. G., and New Orleans Mafia 
lynching, 235; and isthmian canal, 
274 ; and Pan-Americanism, 298, 300. 

Bohemians as immigrants, 54. 

Bolivar, Simon, and Washington, 282. 

Boundaries, character of United States, 
/ 20 ; disputes with England, 230 ; 
Alaskan, 241 ; Canada and disputes 
over, 250. 

Boxer troubles, attitude of United States, 
332. 

Brazil, not a world power, 7; future, 
17 ; German colonists, 49 ; and Ger- 
man expansion, 208-211 ; past Ameri- 
can relations, 284; future American 
relations, 308 ; Japanese immigration, 
359. <See also Latin America. 

Bureau of American Republics, utility, 
300; enlarged scope, 301. 

Burlingame, Anson, Chinese treaty, 333. 

California, annexation and development, 
35, 316, 334. See also Chinese, Jap- 
anese. 

Canada, and treaty of 1783, 27, 248 ; Eng- 
land and American relations, 244 ; 
physical divisions, 245; geographical 
relations with United States, 246, 



375 



376 



INDEX 



266 ; union, 246 ; patriotism and hos- 
tility to Americanism, 247, 256, 258 ; 
habitants and American Revolution, 
247, 248 ; loyalist immigrants, 249 ; re- 
membrance of War of 1812, 249 ; and 
boundary disputes, 250 ; growth of 
English-speaking population, 250 ; 
role of Catholic Irish in, 250 ; reciproc- 
ity with United States, 251 ; and ac- 
quisition of Alaska, 251 ; American 
protest against union, 252 ; slow 
growth, 252 ; emigration to United 
States, 252; wheat culture and de- 
velopment of western, 253 ; other 
resources, 254 ; immigration from 
United States, 254, 255 ; enthusiasm 
over future, justification of it, 254 ; 
attitude of Irish Catholics towards 
United States, 257; of French Cana- 
dians, 257 ; of inhabitants of Ontario, 
258 ; American former condescension 
and present attitude, 259 ; tariff re- 
lations, 260, 262 ; and Newfoundland 
261 ; and union with West Indies, 261 
and Pan-American Congresses, 261 
present government, 262 ; future pos- 
sibilities, imperial federation, 262- 
264; independence, 264; union with 
United States, 265; anti-Japanese 
agitation, 354. 
Canadians as immigrants, 252. See 
also French Canadians. 

Canning, George, and Monroe Doctrine, 
96, 98, 99, 101. 

Caribbean Sea, strategic points, 268 ; 
English-American rivalry in, 270 ; 
end of rivalry, 275 ; American su- 
premacy and future, 278. See also 
Isthmian canal, West Indies. 

Carolines, cession to Germany, 199. 

Catherine II, and American Revolution, 
213. 

Catholicism, in United States, 50; of 
French Canadians, 53, 258; of Fili- 
pinos, 165. 

Central America, past American rela- 
tions, 283 ; future American relations, 
300. <See also Isthmian canal, Latin 
America. 

Chile, past American relations, 284 ; 
future American relations, 308. See 
also Latin America. 

China, as former world power, 1 ; not a 
present one, 7; threatened partition 
and "open door" policy, 180, 331 ; 
rivals for trade of, 204 ; development 
of American trade, 313-315, 326 ; in- 
fluence of Philippines on American 



relations, 323 ; duality of American 
relations, 327 ; opium trade, 327 ; 
missionaries in, 328 ; United States 
and concerted demands on, 329 ; and 
Japanese War, 330, 345; develop- 
ment of American exports to, 330 ; 
United States and Boxer troubles, 
332 ; and Manchurian trade, 332 ; and 
Russo-Japanese War, 333 ; disinter- 
estedness of American policy, 333 ; 
Burlingame treaty, freedom of resi- 
dence, 333, 334 ; American exclusion 
and treatment of Chinese, 334-337 ; 
retaliation by boycott, 337-339 ; prob- 
able submission to exclusion, 339 ; 
need of American friendship, 339, 367 ; 
and Japan, 340, 367 ; American in- 
difference to political "yellow peril," 
348 ; future Japanese- American re- 
lations as to, 365-368. See also 
Chinese, Far East. 

Chinese, basis of exclusion, 74-78, 334, 
340; and Philippines, 160, 162, 171, 
335 ; in Hawaii, 320, 335 ; treaty right 
of immigration, 334 ; attitude of 
Eastern States, 335 ; exclusion legis- 
lation and treaty, 335 ; treatment in 
United States, 336 ; harsh adminis- 
tration of exclusion law, 337 ; Chinese 
retaliation by boycott, 337 ; perma- 
nence of exclusion, the possible cost, 
338 ; solution of exclusion problem, 
339, 340, 356. 

Citizenship. See Nationality, Naturali- 
zation. 

Civil War, and physiography, 22; issue 
closed, 37, 173; attitude of Russia, 
214 ; of England, 232. 

Clark, G. R., conquest of Northwest, 
27. 

Clay, Henry, on Monroe Doctrine, 
115. 

Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and Monroe 
Doctrine, 102 ; provisions and effect, 
272 ; attempts to abrogate, 274 ; 
abrogation, 275. 

Cleveland, Grover, and Hawaii, 39, 139 ; 
and foreign affairs, 80; Venezuela 
boundary incident, 103. 

Climate of United States, 19. 

Colonies, defined, 137. See also next 
title, and Dependencies. 

Colonies, English, in America, and Alle- 
ghanies, 22 ; conditions of settlement, 
23, 24 ; character of sections, 24 ; 
French and Indian War, 25, 26. 

Commerce. See Trade. 

Congress of Vienna, control at, 3. 



INDEX 



377 



Consuls, character of American, 85, 
333 n. 

Cotton, international importance, 18. 

Cuba, strategic position, 124, 268 ; first 
American attitude towards, 124; and 
slavery interests, 125 ; desire to annex, 
126; Ostend Manifesto, 126; first 
insurrection, 126 ; investment of 
American capital, 127 ; second insur- 
rection and intervention, 127 ; con- 
ditions compared with Balkans in 
1877, 128 ; sovereignty over dis- 
claimed, 129; fate, 279; effect of 
evacuation on Latin-American senti- 
ment, 285 ; reoccupation and future 
relations, 286-289. 

Custom-house, and forcible collection of 
foreign debts, 290, 292. 

Danish West Indies, attempted annexa- 
tion, 39, 139, 140; fate, 112, 279. 

Debts, forcible collection of public, and 
Monroe Doctrine, 116; Roosevelt on, 
290, 291 ; and torts, 291 ; San Do- 
mingo case, 292 ; Venezuela case, 293 ; 
problem of national bankruptcy, 293 ; 
of private investments, 294 ; Drago 
Doctrine, 295-298; Hague Confer- 
ence on, 296. 

Democratic party and annexation of 
Philippines, 136. 

Dependencies of United States, as out- 
posts, 17, 20 ; and policy of Northwest 
Ordinance, 28, 30, 36; defined, 137; 
and territories, 138 ; former American 
repugnance to alien, 139 ; effect of 
Spanish War, 140 ; character, 140 ; 
status, 140. See also World powers, 
and dependencies by name. 

Devonshire, Duke of, on Monroe Doc- 
trine, 106. 

Dewey, George, in Philippines, 149 ; and 
Diedrichs, 199. 

Diaz, Porfirio, as President, 283, 310. 

Diedrichs, Otto, in Manila Bay, 199. 

Drago Doctrine, attitude of United 
States, 177, 296-298; purpose, 295; 
Hague Conference on, 296. 

Economic conditions, in Porto Rico, 144 ; 
in Philippines, 170; period of depres- 
sion in United States, 173 ; prosperity 
and its effect on international policy, 
176 ; influence of investments abroad, 
176, 296. See also Debts, Immigra- 
tion, Labor, Trade. 

Education, in Philippines, 162, 169; 
anti-British, in United States, 233. 



Election of 1900 and Philippines, 157. 
Emigration to Canada, 254, 255. See 

also Immigration. 
England. <See Great Britain. 
English as immigrants, 61. 
Equality, American attitude, 91-93. 
Europe, great powers (1500-1875), 2-4; 

interests, and world-power empires, 

13-15, 99, 109. 
Expansion, recent impetus, 4. See also 

Territory, World powers. 
Exterritoriality in Japan, 343. 

Falkland Islands incident, 283. 

Far East, Russian development, 6, 221 ; 
as field for American trade, 180 ; 
policy of "open door," 181-183, 221, 
331, 347, 366; French attitude, 191; 
German attitude, 200; American- 
British relations, 242 ; temporary 
decline of American political influence, 
318. See also China, Japan, Philip- 
pines. 

Ferry, Jules, and expansion, 5. 

Filipinos. See Philippines. 

Finances, influence of investments 
abroad on foreign policy, 176, 296. 
See also Debts, Economic condi- 
tions. 

Fisheries, disputes with England, 231. 

Florida, annexation, 32; contest with 
Spain over, 123. 

Foreign policy of United States, con- 
ditions (1897), 70; Venezuela boun- 
dary incident, 80 ; indifference, 85 ; 
diplomatic and consular service, 85, 
333 n. ; recklessness of speech, 86 ; 
impatience of irksome obligations, 86, 
93 ; national honor, 87 ; inconsist- 
ency, 87 ; development of policy, 88 ; 
peacefulness, 88-90 ; army and navy, 
89 ; influence of investments abroad, 
176, 296; and transformation in ex- 
port trade, 177-179; influence of 
English press on American ideas, 192, 
193, 200, 219. See also Isolation, 
Monroe Doctrine, and nations by 
name. 

Foster, J. W., and Chinese-Japanese 
War, 330. 

France, as European power, 2, 3; sacri- 
fice of former colonies, 4, 25 ; expan- 
sion, 5 ; population and area of em- 
pire, 11; sale of Louisiana, 31, 184, 
187 ; world power and race questions, 
63; and American Revolution, 93, 
184; and peace negotiations (1782), 
185 ; United States and French Revo- 



378 



INDEX 



lution, 186, 187; Napoleon III and 
Mexico, 187 ; United States and Ger- 
man War, 18S, 197 ; and American- 
Spanish War, 188; and Boers, 188; 
present American relations, 188, 201 ; 
elimination of possible disputes, 189 ; 
Panama Canal, 189, 272-274, 276; 
and West Indies, 190; and Tahiti, 
190 ; and affairs in Far East, 191 ; 
American trade competition, 191 ; 
American knowledge of, 192, 193 ; 
social relations with Americans, 193 ; 
influence on American thought, 194 ; 
on politics, 195 ; Venezuelan dispute, 
293 n. See also New France. 

Franco-German War, American atti- 
tude, 188, 197. 

Franklin, Benjamin, and acquisition of 
Canada, 247. 

Frederick the Great, and American 
Revolution, 197; incident of gift of 
statue of, 201. 

Frelinghuysen, F. T., on Monroe Doc- 
trine and arbitration, 111 n. ; and 
Liberia, 139 ; and isthmian canal, 
274. 

French and Indian War, 25, 26. 

French as immigrants, 52. 

French Canadians, as immigrants, 52, 
253 ; and American Revolution, 247 ; 
present attitude towards United States, 
257. 

Fur-trade with China, 314. 

Gadsden Purchase, 35. 

Genet, E. C, as minister to United 
States, 186. 

Geography, influence on nations, 18. 

Germans, as colonists in Russia, 48 ; in 
Brazil, 49, 208-211; as immigrants 
in United States, number, 55, 56 ; 
Pennsylvania Dutch, 56; decline of 
immigration, 56; assimilation, 57, 
196. 

Germany, as European power, 3 ; policy 
of expansion, 5, 16, 206, 208; popu- 
lation and area of empire, 12 ; race 
questions of empire, 62 ; and Monroe 
Doctrine, 106 n. ; and Philippines, 151, 
199 ; recentness of American relations, 
196 ; historical ties with United States, 
197; and Samoa, 198, 321, 322; and 
American-Spanish War, 198; acqui- 
sitions from Spain, 199 ; influence of 
these incidents on American attitude, 
199; influence of British press, 200; 
and Far Eastern affairs, 200 ; ad- 
vances to United States, 201, 211; 



Venezuela incident, 202; American 
trade rivalry, 203, 206 ; present Amer- 
ican relations, 203, 211; and South 
American politics, 205-211 ; Pan- 
Germanists, 208; and Brazil, 208- 
211. 

Government, policy of Northwest Ordi- 
nance, 28, 30, 36 ; people as sovereign, 
40 ; status of dependencies, 140. See 
also Foreign policy, Political ideals, 
and dependencies by name. 

Grant, U. S., and Monroe Doctrine, 112, 
114; and isthmian canal, 273. 

Granville, Earl of, and Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty, 274. 

Great Britain, as European power, 2; 
growth of colonies, 4; policy of ex- 
pansion, 5 ; and European interests, 
13, 99 ; population and area of empire, 
9 ; race questions of empire, 62 ; 
Venezuela boundary incident, 80, 103- 
105; and Holy Alliance, 96, 98; 
Japanese alliance, 99; increase of 
empire in America since Monroe Doc- 
trine, 101 ; present attitude toward 
Monroe Doctrine, 106; and imperial 
Zollverein, 179, 242 ; and "open door," 
181 ; as source of American knowledge 
of continental Europe, 192, 193, 200, 
219 ; and France, 193 ; and Germany, 
200; intervention in Venezuela, 202, 
241 ; reasons for importance in Ameri- 
can foreign relations, 228, 233 ; ill- 
feelings after Revolution, 229, 230; 
boundary disputes, 230, 241; fish- 
eries disputes, 231 ; disputes over 
Central America, 232 ; and Civil War, 
232 ; American anti-British educa- 
tion, 233; hostility of American 
Irish and Germans, 234; American 
resentment of criticism by, 235; 
former attitude towards Americans, 
235 ; harmonizing influences, 235 ; 
mutual mollification of hostility, 236 ; 
attitude during American-Spanish 
War, causes and effects, 237-239 ; iso- 
lation, 238 ; America and South Afri- 
can War, 239, 240 ; present and future 
American relations, 241-244; and 
Far Eastern affairs, 242 ; social ties, 
242 ; potency of kinship, 243 ; and 
American relations with Canada, 244 ; 
imperial federation, 262-264; stra- 
tegic position in Caribbean, 267 ; 
American rivalry in West Indies, 270, 
271 ; Clayton-Bulwer treaty and its 
abrogation, 272, 274, 275; and isth- 
mian canal, 273 ; end of rivalry, 275 ; 



INDEX 



379 



and Samoa, 323 ; and colonial anti- 
Japanese agitation, 354. See also 
American Revolution, Canada, Colo- 
nies. 
Guam, annexation and value, 140, 141, 
322. 

Hague Conference, United States and, 
105, 117; on Drago Doctrine, 296; 
Latin America in Second, 306. 

Hague Tribunal, on Venezuelan inter- 
vention, 293. 

Haiti, fate, 279. 

Harris, Townsend, as minister to Japan, 
342. 

Hawaii, attempted annexation, 39 ; 
value and social structure, 141 ; ter- 
ritorial government, 141 ; beginning 
of American interest, 315 ; and Ameri- 
can whalers, 316 ; missionaries in, 317 ; 
American assertion of paramount in- 
terest in, 317 ; reciprocity with, 318 ; 
strategic value, 318; character and 
decrease of natives, 319 ; labor con- 
ditions, 319 ; native government, 320 ; 
revolution and annexation, 320, 321 ; 
Chinese exclusion, 335 ; Japanese 
protest against annexation, 346 ; atti- 
tude of Japan, 362. 

Hay, John, basis of his policy, 95 ; pro- 
tests on treatment of Jews, 119 ; abro- 
gation of Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 276 ; 
isthmian canal treaty, 276; "open 
door" policy, 331 ; circular on Russo- 
Japanese War, 333. 

Hayes, R. B., and isthmian canal, 273 ; 
and Chinese exclusion, 335. 

Henry of Prussia, Prince, visit to United 
States, 201. 

Hindus, immigration problem, 75-78. 

Holy Alliance and America, 98, 99. 

Holy Roman Empire as European 
power, 2. 

Hungarians as immigrants, 54. 

Immigration, and American character, 
40, 43 ; opposition, 43 ; and English 
language, 44-46 ; proportion of foreign 
population, 44; sectional predomi- 
nance by immigrants of one nation not 
possible, 45 ; politics as assimilating 
power, 46 ; influence of voluntary 
character of, on assimilation, 46-49; 
Catholic immigrants, 50 ; English- 
speaking immigrants, 50, 51 ; speed of 
assimilation, 51 ; Russian Jews, 51 ; 
French, 52 ; French Canadians, 52, 
253; Scandinavians, 53; from south- 



ern and eastern Europe, 54 ; danger 
from these, 54 ; Germans, 55-58, 196 ; 
unlimited, 58, 75 ; restrictive move- 
ments, 58-60 ; Asiatic, 74-78 ; Cana- 
dians, 252; emigration to Canada, 
254, 255; general effect of anti- 
Japanese agitation, 356 ; property 
qualification, 356. See also Chinese, 
Japanese. 

Imperial federation, United States and 
possible Greater Britain, 263. 

Imperialists, origin of name, 134. 

Indians, treatment, 67, 68 ; probable ex- 
tinction, 68; and foreign relations, 
69. 

Insular Decisions, 141. 

International law and Monroe Doctrine, 
107. 

Irish, as immigrants, 50, 51 ; influence 
on American anti-British sentiment, 
234 ; role in Canada, 250, 257. 

Isolation, as American foreign policy, 
93, 94, 131; Jefferson's policy, 95; 
and Monroe Doctrine, 117; growing 
disregard, 119 ; effect of Spanish War, 
131-133 ; conditions favoring aban- 
donment, 172-176 ; disregarded in 
Chinese relations, 329. See also For- 
eign policy. 

Isthmian canal, zone acquired, 140 ; 
strategic position, 268 ; British Amer- 
ican rivalry, 270; early American de- 
fensive attitude, 270; American in- 
terest, 271 ; Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 
272; lull in agitation, 272; French 
company, 272 ; demand for American 
control, 273; attempts to abrogate 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 274 ; failure of 
French company, 274 ; effect of Span- 
ish War, 274 ; abrogation of Clayton- 
Bulwer treaty, 275 ; route selected, 276 ; 
French company bought out, 276 ; 
abortive Colombian treaty, 276 ; 
Panama Revolution and treaty, 276 ; 
progress, 277; advantages, 278, 371. 

Italians as immigrants, 54, 226. 

Italy, as European power, 3, 4 ; ex- 
pansion, 5 ; not a world power, 7 ; 
and United States, 224-226. 

Itata affair, 284. 

Jackson, Andrew, and Falkland Islands, 

283. 
Jamaica, and trade with United States, 

261, 279; strategic position, 267. 
Japan, policy of expansion, 6, 16; not 

a world power, 7 ; and Korea, 62, 349, 

357; and white superiority, 64, 353; 



380 



INDEX 



British alliance, 99, 242 ; and Monroe 
Doctrine, 1 19, 365 ; and Philippines, 
166, 346, 363-365 ; and Chinese trade, 
204 ; United States and Russian War, 
222, 223, 347, 348 ; United States and 
Chinese War, 330, 345; and China, 
340, 367 ; connection with United 
States, 341; and the Pacific, 341; 
Perry's expedition, 341 ; Harris as 
minister to, 342 ; United States and 
internal disturbances, 343 ; and 
Shimonoseki indemnity, 343 ; and 
exterritoriality, 343 ; American teach- 
ing and example, 343 ; American 
trade, 344 ; American interest in con- 
ditions and art, 344 ; protest against 
annexation of Hawaii, 346; and 
United States in Far Eastern ques- 
tions, 346; and "open door," 347, 
366; American indifference to politi- 
cal "yellow peril," 347; effect of 
peace of Portsmouth on American re- 
lations, 343, 366 ; necessary basic 
change in American relations, 349 ; 
present questions with United States, 
350 ; and American and Canadian 
anti-Japanese agitation, 353-355 ; and 
emigration to America, 354 ; effect of 
anti-Japanese agitation on American 
relations, 355 ; possible American 
complications due to Latin American 
emigration, 359-362 ; attitude towards 
Hawaii,' 362 ; and Pan-Asianism, 365 ; 
future American relations as to Far 
East, 365-368; abstract questions, 
"conflict of civilizations," 368; war 
for "dominion of the Pacific," 369, 
370 ; extent of estrangement with 
United States, 371 ; speed necessary 
if Japan plans to attack, 371 ; factors 
working against war, 372, 373. See 
also Far East, Japanese. 
Japanese, basis of agitation for exclusion, 
74-78, 350, 351, 359; emigration to 
Latin America, 210, 357-362; as 
laborers in Hawaii, 320 ; and annexa- 
tion of Hawaii, 321, 346; commercial 
honesty, 345 ; unpopularity on Pacific 
coast, 350 ; probable attitude as 
citizens, 351 ; American and Japanese 
governments and ant i -Japanese agi- 
tation, 352, 353 ; home opposition to 
American emigration, 354 ; opposition 
to, in British colonies, 354 ; smuggling 
of, 355 ; effect of agitation on Ameri- 
can relations with Japan, 355 ; neces- 
sity of emigration, 357 ; emigration to 
Korea, 357; to Manchuria, 357; and 



tropics, 357 ; and citizenship in 
Hawaii, 362. See also Japan. 

Jefferson, Thomas, and Louisiana Pur- 
chase, 31, 88; and French alliance 
(1793), 94; policy of isolation, 95; 
and Cuba, 124 ; and French Revolu- 
tion, 186 ; and Genet, 186 ; and Alex- 
ander I, 214. 

Jews, as immigrants, 51, 218; anti- 
Semitism in United States, 52; 
persecution in Russia, 217. 

Kennan, George, articles on Siberia, 217. 
Kentaro, Baron Kaneko, on command 

of the Pacific, 371 n. 
Kishinev massacre, 220. 
Korea, and peace of Portsmouth, 349; 

Japanese immigration, 357. 
Kossuth, Louis, visit to United States, 

224. 
Koszta affair, 224. 

Labor, unionism and immigration, 59 ; 
and negro problem, 72; and Asiatic 
immigration, 75, 77, 351 ; question in 
Philippines, 160, 162, 171 ; in Hawaii, 
319. 

Ladrones, cession to Germany, 199. 

Lafayette, Marquis de, as American 
hero, 185. 

Language, and nation, 42, 44 ; future, 
in United States, 44-46, 58; and 
assimilation in Porto Rico, 147 
question in Philippines, 169. 

Latin America, fear of Monroe Doctrine 
107; preservation under it, 109-111 
168, 2S9 ; Monroe Doctrine and re- 
sponsibility for conduct, 115-117 
Pan-Americanism and congresses, 180 
298-302; and "open door," 183 
German-American trade rivalry, 204 
206 ; and German expansion, 205— 
211 ; test of American diplomacy, 281 
United States and revolt, 281 ; later 
American historical ties, 281-284 
and Venezuela boundary incident 
284 ; and American-Spanish War 
285 ; and Panama Revolution, 285 
and evacuation of Cuba, 285 ; Cuba as 
test of capacity for self-government 
286 ; and reoccupation of Cuba, 288 
United States and foreign grievances 
in, 289-292; Roosevelt on this, 289- 
291 ; torts and contractual obliga- 
tions, 291 ; San Domingo interven- 
tion, 292 ; political suspicion oj 
United States, 292, 298, 304-306; 
Venezuela case, 293; problem of pri- 



INDEX 



381 



vate foreign investments, 294 ; Drago 
Doctrine, 295 ; United States and 
doctrine, 296-298 ; reciprocity treaties, 
300; Europe and Pan- Americanism, 
302, 303 ; social relations with Ameri- 
cans, 303 ; and international equality, 
306 ; at Second Hague Conference, 
306 ; Pan-Iberianism, 307 ; groups as 
regards future relations with United 
States, 307-311 ; necessity of stable 
governments, 311; union, 311; Jap- 
anese immigration, 357-359 ; of pos- 
sible resulting American-Japanese 
complications, 359-362. See also 
Monroe Doctrine, West Indies, and 
nations by name. 

Lesseps, Ferdinand de, and Panama 
Canal, 272, 273. 

Liberia, and United States, 139. 

Liberty, American attitude, 91-93. 

Louisiana, purchase, 30 ; importance of 
purchase, 31, 184, 187; Creoles, 52. 

Loyalists, in Canada, 249; attitude of 
descendants, 258. 

McKinley, William, interests, 79 ; char- 
acter, 80; and annexation of Philip- 
pines, 148-152, 158 ; and government 
for them, 159. 

Madagascar, American trade, 179. 

Mahan, A. T., on Monroe Doctrine, 111, 
118. 

Manchuria, Russia in, 221 ; American 
trade, 332 ; limiting of Russo-Japanese 
hostile area, 333 ; restoration of 
Chinese control, 340, 366, 367; Jap- 
anese immigration, 357. 

Massachusetts, Catholicism in, 50 n. 

Meade, R. W., Samoan treaty, 321. 

Mexico, and Texas, 34 ; American War, 
35 ; empire and Monroe Doctrine, 
100, 115, 188 ; past American relations, 
282; stability and future American 
relations, 310 ; Japanese immigration, 
357. See also Latin America. 

Mexico City, Pan-American Congress, 
301. 

Mexico, Gulf of, strategic points, 268; 
development of American dominance, 
269, 278. 

Middle colonies, character, 24. 

Minnesota, Scandinavians in, 54. 

Miscegenation, 65-67. 

Missionaries, conditions in Turkey, 226 ; 
in Hawaii, 317 ; in China, 328. 

Monroe, James, statement of Monroe 
Doctrine, 96; as minister to France, 
186. 



Monroe Doctrine, basis, 95 ; immediate 
cause, 95; original statement, 96; 
reception at home, 97, 102 ; and 
hegemony in America, 98, 110, 120; 
appearauce of daring, 98 ; present rela- 
tive value of passages in statement, 
99, 100, 108; and European coloni- 
zation and interventions, 101, 111; 
concessions, 101 ; development, 102, 
108, 111 ; Venezuela boundary inci- 
dent, Olney Doctrine, 103, 105, 115; 
as national creed, 105 ; present atti- 
tude of European powers, 106; not an 
impertinence, 107 ; not international 
law, 107 ; not doctrine of expansion, 
107 ; and protection of Latin America, 
109-111, 168, 289; and arbitration, 
111; and transfer of territory, 112; 
and cessation of European colonies, 
114; dependence on force, 114; obli- 
gations, 114; and responsibility for 
Latin- American conduct, 115-117, 
290; and non-intervention in Euro- 
pean politics, 117, 227; and Asia, 
117, 118; and Asian intervention in 
America, 1 19, 359-362 ; and growing 
interest in European affairs, 119, 120; 
Spain and, 123 ; and German inter- 
ests in South America, 205, 210; and 
revolt of Spanish America, 281. See 
also Foreign policy, Political ideals. 

Montesquieu, influence on American 
thought, 194. 

Morocco and "open door," 183. 

Morris, Gouverneur, as minister to 
France, 186. 

Napoleon I, sale of Louisiana, 187. 

Napoleon III, and United States, 187; 
Mexican expedition, 188. 

Nationality, American, and immigra- 
tion, 40, 43; force of spirit, 41, 243; 
language as chief element, 42, 44; 
danger of diverse nationalities in 
United States considered, 44-46 ; 
and religion, 49; growing policy of 
forcing, on immigrants, 58 ; type of 
future American, 60; and Asiatic 
immigration, 75, 334, 351, 352. 

Naturalization, requirements, 59 ; and 
return to native land, 59 n. ; probable 
effect on Japanese, 352. 

Navy, decline of American, 89; in the 
Pacific, 325. 

Negroes, and sovereignty of the people, 
41 ; problem, 69 ; increase, 69 ; 
segregation, 70, 72; question of amal- 
gamation, 70; white domination in 



382 



INDEX 



South, 70; social conditions, 71 
labor questions, 72, 74; progress, 72 
problem and foreign relations, 73 
no religious problem, 73 ; as soldiers, 
73; problem and West Indian an- 
nexations, 280. 

Netherlands, as European power, 3; 
colonies, 4, 23. 

Neutrality, American, and Napoleonic 
Wars, 187. 

New England, colonial character, 24 ; 
and French Canadians, 53. 

Newfoundland and Canada, 252, 261. 

New France, control of interior, 22 ; over- 
throw, 25, 26. 

New Mexico, annexation and develop- 
ment, 35. 

New Netherland, 23. 

New Orleans, Mafia lynching, 225. 

Nicaragua, canal scheme, 274, 276. 

Northwest Ordinance as basis of policy, 
28, 30, 36. 

Olney, Richard, interpretation of Mon- 
roe Doctrine, 103, 114, 115, 284. 

"Open door," and Philippines, 171, 182; 
American advocacy, 181-183 ; ex- 
tension, 183 ; Russia and, 221 ; in 
China, 331 ; Japan and, 347, 366. 

Opium, United States and Chinese 
trade, 327. 

Oregon, voyage, 274. 

Oregon Country, dispute and settle- 
ment, 33. 

Ostend Manifesto, 126. 

Ottoman Empire as European power, 
3, 4; and United States, 226, 227. 

Pacific coast. See Chinese, Japanese, 
Pacific Ocean. 

Pacific Ocean, Russian interests, 6; 
growth of American interest on east- 
ern coast, 271, 315; development of 
American trade, 313-315; American 
whalers, 316; decline of American 
marine, 318; Importance in world 
politics, question of American su- 
premacy, 324-326, 341 ; Japan and 
United States, 341, 369, 370. See 
also Far East, Isthmian canal, and 
islands and bordering nations by 
name. 

Pan-Americanism, origin of policy, 180 ; 
and "open door," 183; Canada and, 
261 ; sentimental basis, 298 ; practical 
basis, 298; first Congress, 300; 
Bureau, 300, 301 ; later Congresses, 
301 ; European attitude towards, 302, 



303 ; and social conditions, 303 ; 
and political conditions, 304-306. 

Pan-Asianism, 365. 

Pan-Iberianism, 307. 

Panama. See Isthmian canal. 

Paraguay, expedition against, 283. St* 
also Latin America. 

Pennsylvania Dutch, 56. 

People, sovereign power, 40. 

Perry, M. O, Japan expedition, 341. 

Philippines, natives and negroes, 73 ; 
arguments on annexation, 135-139 ; 
status, 141 ; annexation unpremedi- 
tated, 148 ; reasons for Manila cam- 
paign, 149, 150; control by insur- 
gents, 150; alternatives as to, in 
peace negotiations, 150, 155 n. ; 
Aguinaldo and American officials, 152- 
155; insurrection, 155-158; reaction 
against retaining, 156, 157 ; Anti- 
imperialists and insurrection, 156 ; 
cruelties, 157 ; and election of 1900, 
157; Taft policy of government, 158, 
162-164 ; opposing policy of Anti- 
imperialists, 151 ; of commercialists, 
159-161 ; and Chinese immigration, 
160, 162, 171, 335 ; attitude of upper 
class of natives, 161, 164-166; edu- 
cation, 162; native participation in 
government, 163 ; elective assembly, 
163; Christianity, 165; natives and 
Japan, 166; no transfer without con- 
sent, 167 ; question of protectorate, 
167 ; question of neutralization, 168 ; 
results of American rule, 169-171 ; lan- 
guage question, 169; tariff, 171, 182; 
German attitude, 199 ; insurrection 
and American attitude in Boer War, 
240; as naval base, 322; influence 
on American situation in Far East, 
323 ; attitude of Japan, 346, 363-365. 
See also Dependencies, Far East. 

Physiography of United States, 19-21 ; 
and process of settlement, 22. 

Poles as immigrants, 54. 

Political ideas, American, self-satisfac- 
tion and consciousness of success, 
81-83; idealism, 83; optimism as 
to deficiencies, 83 ; improvidence, 84 ; 
boastfulness and European conde- 
scension, 84 ; official simplicity, 90 ; 
equality and liberty, 91-93. See 
also Americans, Foreign policy. 

Politics, and assimilation of immigrants, 
46. 

Polk, J. K., and Monroe Doctrine, 102 n., 
108 n. 

Population, of five world powers, 9-12 ; of 



INDEX 



383 



United States, growth and territorial 
expansion, 29, 35, 36 ; ratio of foreign, 
44 ; of Porto Rico, 142. 

Porto Rico, Anti-imperialists and, 135 ; 
status, 141 ; character of population, 
142 ; welcomes annexation, 143 ; 
government, 143, 144 ; and tariff, 144 ; 
economic conditions, 145 ; and state- 
hood, 146 ; and assimilation, 147. See 
also Dependencies. 

Portugal, colonies, 4; and expansion, 5. 

Portuguese in Hawaii, 320. 

Protectorate for Philippines, 167. 

Prussia, as European power, 3. See 
also Germany. 

Race questions, of world powers, 61-63 ; 
of United States, 63, 67 ; and belief 
in superiority of whites, 64; misce- 
genation, 65-67; Indians, 67-69; 
negroes, 69-74 ; Filipinos and Ameri- 
cans, 161, 164-167;. and Pan-Ameri- 
canism, 303. See also Chinese, Immi- 
gration, Japanese. 

Reciprocity, Canadian, 251 ; attempted 
Latin American, 300, 303 ; Hawaiian, 
318. 

Religion, conditions in English colonies 
in America, 23 ; and nationality, 49 ; 
Catholicism in United States, 50; 
Catholicism of French Canadians, 53, 
258 ; not involved in negro problem, 
73 ; and policy in Philippines, 165 ; 
foreign missionaries, 226, 317, 328. 

Republican party and annexation of 
Philippines, 136, 157. 

Rio Janeiro, Pan-American Congress, 301 . 

Rome as world power, 1. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, and Monroe Doc- 
trine, 105, 107 ; on problem of Latin 
America, 116, 289-291; and status 
of Porto Rico, 146 ; and government 
for Philippines, 159, 162; and Kish- 
inev massacre, 220 n. ; and Russo- 
Japanese War, 223 ; and protection of 
foreigners, 226 ; and Cuba, 286 ; on 
American domination in the Pacific, 
324, 370 n. ; on inevitability of Ameri- 
can world power, 374. 

Root, Elihu, and Drago Doctrine, 297 ; 
in South America, 302, 306. 

Roeebery, Earl of, on expansion, 5. 

Roumania, protest against treatment of 
Jews in, 119. 

Rousseau, J. J., influence on American 
thought, 194. 

Russia, as European power, 3 ; expan- 
sion, 6 ; *«H tli" Pacific, 6 ; popula- 



tion and area of empire, 10 ; and 
European interests, 13 ; sale of Alaska, 
38, 216 ; German colonists, 48 ; and 
Asiatic immigration in Siberia, 77; 
and origin of Monroe Doctrine, 95, 99 ; 
and Balkans and United States and 
Cuba, 128; compared with United 
States, 213, 216 ; and American Revo- 
lution, 213 ; later relations, 214 ; and 
Civil War, 214 ; exchange of amenities, 
215 ; change in American sentiment, 
effect of autocracy, 217, 219 ; of treat- 
ment of Jews, 217-219 ; of Kishinev 
massacre, 220; of Manchurian affairs, 
221, 332, 340; America and Japanese 
War, 222, 347-349, 366; reaction 
towards better feeling, 223 ; future 
relations, 223. 

Russian Jews, as immigrants, 51, 219; 
persecution, 217. 

Russians as immigrants, 219. 

St. Barthelemi Island, transfer to France, 
113. 

St. Thomas Island, attempted annexa- 
tions, 39, 139, 140; and Monroe Doc- 
trine, 112. 

Salisbury, Marquis of, and Venezuelan 
boundary controversy, 103, 108. 

Samoa, controversy, 198, 321, 322. 

San Domingo, attempted annexation, 
39, 139 ; temporary Spanish rees- 
tablishment, 112; fate, 279; Latin 
America and intervention in, 285 ; 
problem of intervention, 292. 

Sandalwood, Hawaiian trade, 315. 

Scandinavians as immigrants, 53. 

Sectionalism, adverse influence of physi- 
ography of United States, 21. 

Seward, W. H., and French in Mexico, 
100 n. ; on the Pacific, 324. 

Shimonoseki incident and indemnity, 
343. 

Slavery, in southern colonies, 25; and 
expansion, 33 ; and secession, 37 ; and 
Cuba, 125. 

Slovaks as immigrants, 54. 

Smith, Goldwin, on physical map of 
Canada, 245, 265 n. 

South, colonial character, 24. See also 
Negroes, Slavery. 

South African War, American attitude, 
188, 239, 240; Canadian contingent, 
262. 

Sovereignty in the people, 40. 

Spain, as European power, 2-4; and 
Florida, 32, 123 ; past relations with 
United States, 122 ; and Monroe Doc- 



384 



INDEX 



trine, 123 ; cessions to Germany, 199 ; 
present American relations, 224 ; de- 
cay as American power, 269 ; Pan- 
Iberianism, 307. See also Spanish War. 

Spanish War, effect on international 
status of United States, 121, 130-133, 
172 ; military insignificance, 121 ; 
remote and immediate causes, 123- 
128 ; and Cuban freedom, 129 ; effect 
on military position of United States, 
130 ; and acquisition of colonies, 
140; Philippine campaign, 148-150; 
Philippines and peace negotiations, 
150; attitude of France, 188; of 
Germany, 198; of Great Britain, 
237-239 ; effect on isthmian canal, 
274 ; attitude of Latin America, 285 ; 
and annexation of Hawaii, 321. 

Steuben, Baron von, in American Revo- 
lution, 197. 

Suez Canal, cud British interest in Pan- 
ama, 272. 

Sweden as European power, 3. 

Switzerland, religion and nationality, 50. 

Taft, William, and government of 
Philippines, 158, 162; and Philip- 
pine tariff, 171, 182; reception in 
Japan, 348. 

Tahiti, United States and, 190. 

Talleyrand, C. M. de, at Congress of 
Vienna, 3. 

Tariff, and dependencies, 141 ; Porto 
Rican, 144; Philippine, and "open 
door," 171, 182; loses force as issue, 
174; and development of export 
trade, 178, 179; present British atti- 
tude, 242 ; Canadian reciprocity, 251 ; 
Canadian and American, 259, 260; 
Canadian preferential, 262 ; reciproc- 
ity with Latin America, 300; Ha- 
waiian reciprocity, 318. 

Territories, policy of government, 28, 
30, 36; and colonies, 137-139. See 
also Dependencies. 

Territory, scramble of powers for, 4-6 ; 
area of five world powers, 9-12 ; es- 
sential element to world power, 16 ; 
character and influence of continental 
United States, 17-22; American, 
under treaty of 1783, 27; expansion 
and growth of population, 29, 35 ; 
Louisiana Purchase, 30-32, 184, 187; 
Florida, 32, 123; Oregon, 33; slav- 
ery and expansion, 34 ; Texas, 34 ; 
California and New Mexico, 35 ; Gads- 
den Purchase, 35 ; character of an- 
nexations since 1866, 36 ; expan- 



sion and Union, 36, 37 ; Alaska, 38, 
216 ; attempted non-continental an- 
nexations, 38 ; period of non-imperial- 
istic attitude, 39, 80 ; annexations 
after Spanish War, 130, 321; 
question of annexation of Canada, 
265 ; economic and social aspects of 
possible West Indian annexations, 
279; Hawaii, 321. 

Texas, annexation, 34. 

Tocqueville, Alexis de, as student of 
American conditions, 195. 

Trade, attitude of commercial interests 
in Philippines, 161, 170; and develop- 
ment of world powers, 178; American 
international policy and develop- 
ment of export of manufactures, 177- 
180; rivalry for Far Eastern, 180, 
366; Pan-American, 180, 299, 308, 
310; United States and Asian "open 
door," 180-183, 331; "open door" 
elsewhere, 183 ; French-American 
competition, 191 ; German-American 
rivalry, 203-207 ; Russia and Ameri- 
can, in Manchuria, 221, 332; diffi- 
culties of commercial treaties, 260 ; 
and isthmian canal, 278 ; aspect of 
possible West Indian annexations, 
279 ; American-Chinese, 313-315, 326, 
330; effect of Civil War on American 
marine, 318 ; opium, 327 ; Chinese 
boycott of American, 337-339 ; Ameri- 
can-Japanese, 344 ; futility of an 
American-Japanese war over, 369. 
See also Tariff. 

Treaties, difficulty of commercial, 260. 

Turkey. See Ottoman Empire. 

Tutuila, annexation, 140 ; value, 141, 322. 

Union, influence of physiography on 
American, 21 ; attempted secession, 
22, 37 ; influence of expansion, 36. 

Venezuela, Guiana boundary incident, 
80, 103, 104, 115, 285;" European 
intervention, 202, 241, 293; dispute 
with France, 293 n. Sec also Latin 
America. 

Vergennes, Comte de, and peace nego- 
tiations (1782), 185. 

Virginius affair, 127. 

Von Plehve, Baron, administration, 219. 

Walker, William, filibuster, 283 n. 
War of 1812, Canadian remembrance of, 

249, 258. 
Washington, George, foreign policy, 93, 

94, 187. 



INDEX 



385 



Webster, Daniel, and Hawaii, 317. 

West Indies, Monroe Doctrine and trans- 
fer of territory in, 112, 113; United 
States and French, 190 ; union of 
British, with Canada, 261 ; British 
strategic position, 267 ; European 
rivalry for, 268; British-American 
rivalry, 270, 271, 275; American 
supremacy and future, 278 ; trade 
and social aspects of union with 
United States, 279. See also Latin 
America, and islands by name. 

Whaling, American, in Pacific, 316; de- 
cline, 318. 



Wheat culture in Canada, 253. 

Wildman, Edwin, and Aguinaldo, 153. 

William II of Germany, advances to 
United States, 201, 211. 

World powers, meaning of phrase, 1, 7; 
scramble for land, 4—6 ; and continen- 
tal interests, 13-15, 99, 109; com- 
parison of recognized, 8-13 ; territory 
as essential element, 16 ; and subject 
races, 61-63 ; effect of Spanish War 
on United States, 121, 132; expan- 
sion and trade, 178 ; inevitability and 
responsibility of United States as 
world power, 374. 



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